Tag: Lerner

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Exam Questions Johns Hopkins Theory

Johns Hopkins. Exam for Welfare Economics. Lerner, 1958

 

Abba Lerner changed his academic locations (including leaves of absence to accept visiting positions) with a frequency rivaled by few. The academic year 1957-58 found him visiting the department of political economy at Johns Hopkins University. The artifact for this post is the final examination for Lerner’s course on welfare economics.

Lerner’s notes for seminars on social welfare functions held at the IMF and at the Cowles Commission in  1952.

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THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
Welfare Economics
18-640

Final Examination May 20th 2-5 p.m., 1958.
Abba P. Lerner

Answer four questions, in separate blue books, in ink.

  1. Discuss the meaning, the validity and the significance of the proposition that it is impossible to derive a social welfare function from individual preference functions.
  2. How far can one carry the analogy between a political voting procedure and the economic price mechanism, and between the rationale of voting between alternative policies and that of allocating dollars between alternative purchases?
  3. Discuss the rational elements in relation to other elements in the social objectives of optimum distribution of income, optimum population, and optimum rate of saving.
  4. What is sound, what is unsound, and what is useful in the doctrine of consumers’ surplus?
  5. Why is it socially desirable to have the prices of products equal to the value of the marginal factors used in their production? How is this objective affected by equity elements such as the need for subsidies?
  6. Under what conditions would a partial freeing of trade be harmful to society in the largest sense? In your answer explain the treatment of this problem in terms of “second best” and the use of the concept of “divergence”.
  7. Compare the arguments for the imposition of trade restrictions for the sake of affecting the international terms of trade with those undertaken for the sake of affecting the domestic distribution of income. Give special attention to the interdependence of efficiency and equity considerations.

Source: Johns Hopkins University. The Eisenhower Library. Ferdinand Hamburger, Jr. Archives. Department of Political Economy [Records], Series 6/7, Box 3, Folder “Department of Political Economy, Graduate Exams 1933-1965”.

Image Source: Photograph of Abba Lerner printed in an announcement for his speech “Israel—The Next Ten Years” (February 25) at the 1958 Forum presented by Beth Emet the Free Synagogue (Evanston, Illinois). Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. The Papers of Abba P. Lerner, Box 6, Folder 8 “ ‘B’ miscellany”. A copy of the announcement was posted by Ellen Blum Barish in Tablet (January 14, 2014).

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Exam Questions Suggested Reading Syllabus Theory

Queens College. Reading assignments and exams for macroeconomics. Lerner 1973-1975

Economics has its share of Wunderkinder, “Primo Donnos”, and heterodoxic poseurs. It is also a fact that economists are overwhelmingly herd animals. From time to time we find a genuine maverick among us, Abba Ptachya Lerner could be designated the poster-child of maverick economists. 

In this post Economics in the Rear-view Mirror has assembled material over three consecutive years from his seminar in advanced macroeconomic theory offered at Queens College of the City University of New York from the 1970s. Class schedules, assigned readings, midterm and final exams are transcribed here from the Spring terms of 1973 through 1975.

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Course Description (1974)

Economics 710, 80:
Seminar in Advanced Macroeconomic Theory
Abba Lerner

An integration of the theories of employment, inflation, interest, capital, investment, and growth, and new lessons for the uses of monetary policy, fiscal policy, and price policy. The Keynesian revolution (interpretations and misinterpretations—general theory or special case?), pre-Keynesian, Keynesian, and post-Keynesian economics. International complications and the myth of international money.

Basic Reading
Ackley Macroeconomics
Keynes The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
Leijonhufvud On Keynesian Economics and the Economics of Keynes
Lerner “Money” (Encycl. Britt., 1946 ed.)
Everybody’s Business
Flation
Other Suggested Readings
Lekachman Keynes’ General Theory – Reports of Three Decades
Harrod Life of Keynes
Lerner The Economics of Employment

There will be one midterm test and a final Examination.

Source: Queens College of the City University of New York. Economics, Spring 1974 (Economicsdepartment brochure), p. 20. Copy in Papers of Abba P. Lerner, Box 17, Folder 6 “Queens College of the City University of New York: General”, U. S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division.

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1973

QUEENS COLLEGE
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

Economics 710, 80: Advanced Macroeconomic Theory
Inflation, Employment and Growth
Seminar, Spring 1973

Prof. Abba Lerner
Th. 6:30-8:20 P.M.
SS 314

Reading
Branson Macroeconomics Theory and Policy
Harper & Row		 (B)
Lerner Flation
Quadrangle Books		 (F)
Lerner Everybody’s Business
Harper Torchbooks (paperback)		 (EB)
Lerner Money
(Encycl. Britt 1946 edition)		 (M)
Leijonhufvud On Keynesian Ecs & the Ecs of Keynes
Oxford U P		 (L)
Keynes The General Theory of Interest and Money (sic)
Harcourt Brace		 (K)
Tentative Outline
Week Date
1 Feb. 8 Introduction B:1-3 / M / EB:X.
2 15 The Classical Case B:4-6 / F:1-5 / K.
3 22 Static Equilibrium B:7-9 / F:6-7 / K.
4 Mar 1 Consumption and Investment B:10,11 / K.
5 8 Money B:12,13 / M / K.
6 15 Monetary & Fiscal Policy B:14 / K.
7 22 The Foreign Sector B:15 / F:16,17 / K.
8 29 International Money F:18-20 / K.
9 Apr 5 Inflation B:16 / EB:XI / F:8-15 / K.
10 12 Unemployment Disequilibrium L: I and II / K.
11 19 Macromodels L: III / K.
12 26 Liquidity Preferences L:IV / K.
13 May 3 Keynes and Post Keynes L:V and VI / I(sic).
14 10 Growth Models B:17-19.
15 17 Optimum Growth Models B:20-23.
Other Suggested Readings
Lerner Economics of Employment
Ackley Macroeconomics
Lekachman Keynes’ General Theory – Reports of Three Decades
Lekachman The Age of Keynes
Harrod Life of Keynes

Source: U. S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. Papers of Abba P. Lerner, Box 17, Folder 4 “Queens College of the City University of New York: Course outlines. 1971-77, n.d.”.

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QUEENS COLLEGE
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

Economics 710 and 80
Prof. A. Lerner
Midterm Examination
March 22, 1973

Answer two questions from each Part

PART ONE

  1. M = 300, V = 4, C(Y) = 5/6, I = 300 – 10i
    (I = Investment), (1 = rate of interest)
    What would be the equilibrium values of Y, i, I, and S?
    What would happen to those if

    1. there was an increase in liquidity preference?
    2. M was increased to 450?
    3. C(Y) increased to 7/8?
  1. What is the multiplier? Now is it similar to and how different from the velocity of circulation of money? the accelerator? the balanced budget multiplier?
    How would it be affected by

    1. a change in liquidity preference?
    2. a change in time preference
    3. a change in the elasticity of supply of money?
    4. a change in the propensity to consume?
    5. a fixed M and v?
  1. Describe carefully the mechanism by which an increase in M would increase S. How would this be affected if a lower i decreased the amount people wanted to save?

PART TWO

  1. Discuss these statements:
    “The main contribution of Keynes was to point out that full employment is not reached automatically because

    1. cannot become negative.
    2. workers have no way of reducing their real
    3. workers insist on a real wage greater than their marginal product.
    4. There is a liquidity trap.
  2. Describe carefully the meaning of the marginal efficiency of capital and the marginal efficiency of investment, and how they are related.
    1. in a growing economy
    2. in a declining economy
    3. in a stationary economy
    4. in a steady state of growth economy.
  3. “The rise and fall of the Phillips curve.”
    or
    “ The natural level of unemployment.”

Source: U. S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. Papers of Abba P. Lerner, Box 17, Folder 5 “Queens College of the City University of New York: Examinations”.

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QUEENS COLLEGE
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

Economics 710 and 80
Mr. Lerner
Final Examination
Spring 1973

Answer Question 1 and three others.

  1. Branson Page 24 “the saving investment identity…as a natural derivative from the GNP identity”
    Branson Page 26 “The basic GNP identity:—

C + I + G + (X -M) = GNP = C + S + T + Rf,”

[where]

C=616; I=135; G=219; (X-M)=4; GNP = 974;
S = 149; T=208; Rf=1

    1. Show how the S, I identity can be derived from the GNP identity, spelling out any definitional differences in S or I.
    2. Give (and explain) another definition of S or I, as used by economists that makes I necessarily equal to S only in equilibrium.
  1. Compare the “classical” with the “keynesian” explanations of the automatic establishment of full employment on the assumption of wage and price flexibility.
  1. Explain how an increase in thrift (the desire to save) could (or could not) have the effect of (a) increasing investment, (b) decreasing investment, (c) increasing total income, (d) decreasing total income.
  1. Permanent Income, Life-cycle Consumption Hypothesis, Time Preference, Ratchet Effect, Wealth Effect, Pigou Effect — How are these six items related to the consumption function and to each other?
  1. Explain Branson’s distinction between the “real wage model” and the “money wage model”, and the purpose of the distinction.
  1. What do you consider the most distinctive feature of Leijonhufvud’s approach?
  1. Discuss.
    1. “With perfect wage and price flexibility there can be no problem of involuntary unemployment.”
    2. “A little wage and price flexibility (such as might be achieved in practice) could be worse than none.”
    3. “Too much wage and price flexibility could also cause trouble and not provide stable full employment.”
  1. Why is a rise in the price of foreign currency considered more of a crisis than a rise in the price of coffee or Mutual Fund Shares or real estate?

Source: U. S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. Papers of Abba P. Lerner, Box 17, Folder 5 “Queens College of the City University of New York: Examinations”.

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1974

QUEENS COLLEGE
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

Economics 710, 80
Inflation, Employment and Growth
Seminar in Advanced Macroeconomic Theory
[1974]

Abba Lerner
Tues. 6:20-8:00 P.M.
Temp. 3, Room 2

An Integration of the theories of Employment, Inflation, Interest, Capital, Investment and Growth, and its lessons for the uses of Monetary Policy, Fiscal Policy and Price Policy. The Keynesian Revolution (Interpretations and Misinterpretations – General Theory or Special Case?) Pre-Keynesian, Keynesian and Post Keynesian Economics. International Complications and the Myth of International Money.

Basic Reading
Ackley Macroeconomics A
Breit & Ransom The Academic Scribblers B
Keynes The General Theory of Employment, etc. K
Leijonhufvud On Keynesian Economics, etc. L
Lerner Money (Encycl. Britt 1946 edition) M
Lerner Everybody’s Business EB
Lerner Flation F
Other Suggested Readings
Lekachman Keynes’ General Theory – Reports of Three Decades
Harrod Life of Keynes
Lerner The Economics of Employment

There will be one midterm test and a final Examination.

Week Date
1 Feb. 5 Outline — Classical to Keynes M, A 1-4, EB 10, F 1-5
2 12 Lincoln’s Birthday — no classes
3 19 Outline — Post Keynes A 5-8, EB 11, F 6-10
4 26 Say’s Law, Saving and Investment EB 13-14, F11-15
5 Mar 5 Monetary Policy A 9
6 12 Fiscal Policy, Consumption Function A10-12
7 19 The Complete Keynes Model A13-15
8 26 Inflation and Investment A16-17
9 Apr 2 Capital and Growth A18-19
10 9 No Class (Recess)
11 16 International Money F16-20
12 23 Keynesian Revolution? Dynamics L Parts I, II
13 30 Macromodels L Part III
14 May 7 Liquidity and Wealth L Part IV
15 14 Expectations, Illusions and Policies L Parts V, VI
16 21 Review M, A 20, EB, F

Source: U. S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. Papers of Abba P. Lerner, Box 17, Folder 4 “Queens College of the City University of New York: Course outlines. 1971-77, n.d.”.

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QUEENS COLLEGE
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

Econ. 80—710
MIDTERM
Mr. Lerner
April 16, 1974

Answer question 1 and 3 other — 4 altogether.

  1. Suppose there is a decrease in the propensity to consume. Show how would this affect Employment, Prices and Investment
    1. if the amount of money is held constant
    2. if the rate of interest is held constant
      with wages and prices (1) perfectly flexible; (2) sticky downward
  1. Explain the relationship between the marginal efficiency of capital and the marginal efficiency of investment.
    How are these affected by an increase in
    1. the rate of interest?
    2. the optimism of investors?
    3. the wealth of the economy?
    4. the rate of time preference?
  1. I-S, L-M. Explain the nature of these curves, their use, and the stability condition they demonstrate.
  1. Show how the multiplier would be affected by an increase in
    1. the propensity to consume
    2. the marginal propensity to consume
    3. the marginal propensity to save
    4. the quantity of money
    5. the velocity of circulation
    6. liquidity preference
    7. government spending
    8. tax collection
    9. (7) and (8) together
  1. Why must saving (S) always be equal to investment (I)? What could be meant by the statement that an excess of S over I is deflationary?
  1. What are the features which distinguish the Keynesian from the pre-Keynesian and from the Post-Keynesian theories of the equilibrium level of employment? 

Source: U. S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. Papers of Abba P. Lerner, Box 17, Folder 5 “Queens College of the City University of New York: Examinations”.

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QUEENS COLLEGE
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

Economics 80, 710
Inflation, Employment and Growth
Seminar in Advanced Macroeconomic Theory
Dr. A. Lerner

Final Examination
Spring 1974

Answer Question 1 and any three other questions — Four altogether

  1. Suppose there is an increase in thriftiness. Show the direct and the indirect effects on the Multiplier, Income, Employment, Prices and Investment
    1. with wages and prices perfectly flexible,
    2. with wages and prices sticky downward,
      in each case

      1. with the quantity of money held constant
      2. with the rate of interest held constant
  2. State and discuss the primary criticisms that Leijonhufvud makes of a) Keynes and b) the “Keynesians”.
  1. Compare the advantages and disadvantages of indexing
    1. when there is a steady rate of inflation and
    2. when there is a danger of inflation getting out of control.
  1. A well informed and intelligent observer remarks that “We are now suffering from an excess of saving over investment, which is deflationary”. He cannot really mean what he is saying because in the first place we are suffering from inflation rather than deflation and in the second place it is not possible for saving to be greater (or less) than investment. What could he be meaning to say?
  1. Marginal productivity of capital; Marginal productivity of investment; Marginal efficiency of capital; Marginal efficiency of investment.
    Under what conditions are any of these equal to the rate of interest? Explain carefully.
  1. How come America allowed the dollar to depreciate on the international money market? How is this different from national bankruptcy? Will this not result in the disorganization of international trade “beggar thy neighbor” competitive devaluations of freely floating currencies. How could it have been prevented and why was it not prevented?
  1. “The present very high interest rates show the determination of the government to stop the inflation. If this policy is persisted in it is bound to achieve this purpose since, as we all know, the fundamental cause of inflation is the increase in the quantity of money which the authorities have provided in the recent past in order to keep down interest rates”. Discuss the logic and the practicality of such a policy.
  1. How is the size of the multiplier likely to be affected by an increase in:
    1. the rate of interest?
    2. time preference?
    3. liquidity preference?
    4. government spending?
    5. the quantity of money?
    6. the population?
    7. the government budget?
    8. the use of charge accounts for consumer credit?

Source: U. S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. Papers of Abba P. Lerner, Box 17, Folder 5 “Queens College of the City University of New York: Examinations”.

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1975

QUEENS COLLEGE
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

Economics 710, 80
Inflation, Employment and Growth
Seminar in Advanced Macroeconomic Theory
Abba Lerner
Spring 1975
Temp. 3, Room 2

An Integration of the theories of Employment, Inflation, Interest, Capital, Investment and Growth, and its lessons for the uses of Monetary Policy, Fiscal Policy and Price Policy. The Keynesian Revolution (Interpretations and Misinterpretations – General Theory or Special Case?) Pre-Keynesian, Keynesian and Post Keynesian Economics. International Complications and the Myth of International Money.

Basic Reading
Ackley Macroeconomics A
Keynes The General Theory of Employment, etc. K
Lerner Money (Encycl. Britt 1946 edition) M
Lerner Everybody’s Business EB
Lerner Flation F
Other Suggested Readings
Lekachman Keynes’ General Theory – Reports of Three Decades
Lerner The Economics of Employment

There will be one midterm test and a final Examination.

Week Date
1 Feb. 6 Outline — Classical to Keynes M, A 1-4, EB 10, F 1-5
2 13 Outline — Post Keynes A 5-8, EB 11, F 6-10
3 20 Say’s Law, Saving and Investment EB 13-14
4 27 Monetary Policy A 9
5 Mar 6 Fiscal Policy, Consumption Function A10-12
6 13 The Complete Keynes Model A13-15
7 20 No Class (Recess)
8 27 Midterm test
9 Apr 3 Inflationary Depression, the Wage Unit A16
10 10 Capital and Growth A17-18
11 17 International Money F16-20
12 24 Keynesian Revolution? Dynamics Lerner JEL Mar 1974
13 May 1 Liquidity and Wealth A 19
14 8 Expectations, Illusions and Policies A 20, F 11-15
15 15 Review

Source: U. S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. Papers of Abba P. Lerner, Box 17, Folder 4 “Queens College of the City University of New York: Course outlines. 1971-77, n.d.”.

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Economics 710-80
Midterm Exam

Abba P. Lerner
March 20, 1975

Answer Question 1 and any two other questions (three altogether)

  1. If the propensity to consume (average and marginal) increases from 50% to 60% what would be the effect on the level of income?
    In your answer consider the six (6) possible combinations of the following conditions:
    The mpI (marginal propensity to invest, i.e. the increase in investment due to an increase in income as a percentage of the increase in income) is (a) 40% (b) 30%
    The elasticity of supply of money plus the elasticity of demand for money is (i) infinite (ii) unitary (iii) zero
  1. Discuss your views and those of Keynes, Ackley, and Lerner on “Involuntary unemployment is basically due to the inability of workers to reduce their real wage”.
  1. Which (if any) of [the following] statements are true? Why do you think so? Indicate any connections between them.
    1. “The more steeply any average (A) is rising (falling) the more will the corresponding marginal (M) be above (below) it, i.e. the greater will be M minus A”.
    2. “The short run mpC (marginal propensity to consume) is less than the short run apC (average propensity to consume)”.
    3. “The long run mpC is equal to the long run apC”.
    4. “For a temporary increase in income mpC minus apC is less than for a permanent increase in income”.
  1. What is Say’s Law? Discuss its logical base, its empirical validity and its practical usefulness.
  1. Income can be defined more widely or more narrowly. Distinguish between the different definitions and indicate how the different definitions could better serve different purposes.

Source: U. S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. Papers of Abba P. Lerner, Box 17, Folder 5 “Queens College of the City University of New York: Examinations”.

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QUEENS COLLEGE
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

Economics 710/80
Dr. A. Lerner
FINAL EXAMINATION
May 22, 1975 (Thursday)

Temp 3 Room 2

Answer Questions 1 and any two others — 3 altogether

  1. Suppose consumption increases from 70% of GNP to 80% and the marginal propensity to consume increases from 50% to 75%. What could be the effect on the GNP if the elasticity of demand for money plus the elasticity of supply of money (with respect to changes in the rate of interest) is (a) infinite (b) zero (c) one, and the marginal propensity to invest (with respect to GNP) is (and remains) (i) 20% (ii) 25% (This makes six combinations).
  1. Is an increase in the national debt beneficial, harmful or neutral for the welfare of (a) the present generation (b) future generations? State and examine the arguments for the different views.
  1. “Involuntary unemployment is due to the inability of workers to reduce their real wage”. “Involuntary unemployment is due to an unsatisfied demand for a larger stock of money”. Discuss.
  1. “To succeed in winning the battle against stagflation we must (a) tighten our belts (b) use the tax rebate to buy more automobiles and (c) make more money available for mortgages for housing”. Discuss.
  1. “Say’s Law is invalid but useful while the Pigou Effect is valid but useless.” Does this make any sense?
  1. Does the rate of interest determine the marginal efficiency of capital? Or Vice versa? Or what?

Source: U. S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. Papers of Abba P. Lerner, Box 17, Folder 5 “Queens College of the City University of New York: Examinations”.

Image Source: National Academy of Sciences. 1994. Biographical Memoirs: Volume 64, p.208.  Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.

 

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Berkeley Suggested Reading

Berkeley. Harsanyi Seminar Reading List, ca. 1976-1977

 

While in all likelihood there is a copy of the seminar reading list from John C. Harsanyi’s seminar “Rule Utilitarianism and Decision theory” in the Bancroft Library at Berkeley where John C. Harsanyi’s papers are to be found, I don’t know when or if I will be in Berkeley anytime soon. Furthermore I figure it is doubtful that many people interested in rule utilitarianism would happen to search Abba Lerner’s papers at the Library of Congress where I found the copy transcribed below. So duty called and the seminar reading list will now be entered here into the digital record.

For what it’s worth, I was mildly amused to see an apology for including books, books I say!, on Harsanyi’s reading list.

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Nobel Laureate John C. Harsanyi, UC Berkeley economist and game theory pioneer, dies at 80
11 August 2000

Berkeley – John C. Harsanyi, winner of the 1994 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences and a longtime professor at the University of California, Berkeley’s Haas School of Business and its Department of Economics, died of a heart attack at his home in Berkeley on Wednesday, Aug. 9.

He was 80 and had been suffering from Alzheimer’s Disease.

Harsanyi was awarded the Nobel Prize for his work in game theory, a mathematical theory of human behavior in competitive situations that has become a dominant tool for analyzing real-life conflicts in business, management and international relations.

He shared the award from the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences with fellow game theorists Reinhard Selten of Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitaet in Bonn, Germany, and John Nash of Princeton University.

When Harsanyi, an immigrant from communist Hungary, won the Nobel Prize, he expressed hope that game theory would help public and private institutions make better decisions. In the long run, he said, he hoped this would lead to a higher standard of living and to more peaceful and more cooperative political systems.

“Professor Harsanyi’s life-long work probed the idea of rationality in human affairs, and he was a scholar who cared deeply about the human condition. We will miss him at Berkeley, where his years of devoted teaching and his ground-breaking research inspired us all,” said Chancellor Robert M. Berdahl.

Harsanyi began teaching at UC Berkeley in 1964 as a visiting professor in the business school. He became a full professor in 1965 and remained on the faculty of the Haas School of Business until his retirement in 1990. Harsanyi accepted a joint appointment on the economics faculty in 1966.

“John Harsanyi dedicated his life to employ the science of economics and game theory for the betterment of the human race,” said Haas School Dean Laura Tyson. “He was a brilliant thinker, a gracious man, and a gentle soul, ever concerned with the well-being of others. We will all miss him dearly.”

“The passing of John Harsanyi is a great loss to the economics profession and to his many friends and colleagues on this campus,” said John Quigley, UC Berkeley professor of economics and former chair of the department. “Harsanyi’s work was instrumental in making economic theory ‘fit’ the imperfect world in which we live. His development of game theory showed how differences in the information available to economic actors affected market outcomes and economic welfare. His seminal works form the basis for all modern analyses of industrial organization, and they have real practical implications in business and government policy.

“John was a gentle and shy man, but a bold and powerful intellectual presence. We will miss his grace and charm.”

Game theory uses mathematics to try to predict the outcome of games, such as chess or poker, and is increasingly being applied to political and economic conflict situations, including labor negotiations, price wars, international political conflicts, and even federal auctions, such as bandwidth auctions.

Harsanyi’s principal contributions to the field addressed the prediction of outcomes in games or situations in which the players lack complete information about each other or the rules of the game.

In 1964, Harsanyi was asked to be one of 10 game theorists to advise the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on its negotiations with the Soviet Union. The team found that it could not advise the U.S. negotiators effectively because neither side knew much about the other – it was a game of incomplete information.

Harsanyi subsequently developed a systematic procedure to convert any incomplete-information game into an equivalent complete-information game containing random moves, thereby significantly expanding the applicability of game theory to political and economic conflicts. In the late 1960s, Harsanyi described this theory in a three-part article, “Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players,” which is now the basis for all work on games with incomplete information.

Harsanyi was born on May 29, 1920, in Budapest, Hungary, as the son of a Catholic pharmacist of Jewish descent and was educated at the University of Budapest. His main interests were in mathematics and philosophy, but because of the uncertain political situation and the impending Nazi danger, Harsanyi opted to obtain a degree in pharmacology so he could work in his father’s pharmacy.

In 1944, the Germans occupied Hungary, and Harsanyi, being of Jewish descent, was drafted into a forced-labor unit near Budapest. Shortly thereafter, the Nazis started deporting these laborers to mines and concentration camps. Harsanyi narrowly escaped deportation and found refuge with three friends at a Jesuit monastery in Budapest.

After the war, Harsanyi earned a PhD in philosophy at the University in Budapest where he later taught as an assistant professor of sociology and also met his future wife, Anne. In 1948, a Stalinist regime seized power in Hungary and became increasingly intolerant of Harsanyi’s liberal views. Eventually, he had to resign from the university and return to work in his father’s pharmacy.

Pressure on Harsanyi persisted and, in 1950, the family decided it was too dangerous for him to remain in Hungary. Harsanyi and his soon-to-be wife, Anne, escaped across the border to Austria, and emigrated to Australia, as the waiting list of the Hungarian immigration-quota to the United States was full. The couple were married on January 2, 1951, three days after arriving in Sydney.

In Sydney, Harsanyi worked in factories during the day while earning an MA in economics at the University of Sydney at night. In 1954, he was appointed lecturer in economics at the University of Queensland in Brisbane.

Harsanyi soon realized he was too isolated in Australia to be effective in his field. In 1956, he enrolled in the PhD program in economics at Stanford University, writing his dissertation on game theory under the guidance of the future Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow.

Before arriving at UC Berkeley in 1964, he taught economics at the Australian National University in Canberra from 1958 to 1961 and at Wayne State University in Detroit from 1961 to 1963. At Berkeley, he continued his path-breaking work in game theory and also made important contributions to the fields of ethics, social choice and welfare economics. Harsanyi was awarded seven honorary doctorates by universities around the world. Harsanyi is survived by his wife, Anne, of Berkeley, and son, Tom, of Somerville, Mass.

When Harsanyi was interviewed in Budapest after being awarded the Nobel Prize, he said his family and his work were the most important things in his life. He took frequent trips all over the world with his family.

A memorial service for the campus community will be held at 4 p.m. on Thursday, Aug. 31, in the Great Hall of UC Berkeley’s Faculty Club.

Donations in John Harsanyi’s memory may be sent to the Alzheimer’s Association of the Greater Bay Area, 2065 West El Camino Real, Mountain View, CA 94042.

Source: University of California. Press Release 11 Aug 2000.

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Selected Publications on Rule Utilitarianism
by John C. Harsanyi

John C. Harsanyi. “Rule Utilitarianism and Decision Theory,” Erkenntnis, 11 (1977), 25-53.

____________. “Rule Utilitarianism and Decision Theory,” Decision Theory and Social Ethics, 1978, Volume 17, pp. 3-31.

____________. “Bayesian Decision Theory, Rule Utilitarianism, and Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem,” Theory and Decision, 11 (1979), 289-317.

____________. “Rule Utilitarianism, Equality, and Justice,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 2 (1985), 115-127.

___________________________

[Lerner’s Attached Label “HARSANYI WORKSHOP”]

Rule Utilitarianism and Decision Theory.
John C. Harsanyi

Background References.

In economics, it is customary to publish important results at first in journal articles, even if these later are expanded into books. In contrast, in philosophy, important ideas are often presented immediately in books (often in much greater detail than most economists care to read). This is why so many books had to be included with the references listed below.

Items marked by —> will have xerox copies distributed to members of the Seminar. It would be helpful if people could read as many of these as possible. But my own presentation will be largely self-contained and independent of these references.

1. Morality as the Viewpoint of an Impartial Observer.

Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1759.

—> John C. Harsanyi, “Ethics in Terms of Hypothetical Imperatives”, Mind, 67 (1958), pp. 305-316.

2. Classical Utilitarianism.

Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1789.

John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, 1863.

Henry Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 1874.

3. Ideal Utilitarianism.

George E. Moore, Principia Ethica, 1903.

4. Rule Utilitarianism.

—> R. F. Harrod*, “Utilitarianism Revised”, Mind, 45 (1936), pp. 137-156. Harrod has been the first proponent of rule utilitarianism as an alternative to act utilitarianism.

Richard B. Brandt, “Towards a Credible Form of Utilitarianism”, in Morality and the Language of Conduct (H.D. Castañeda, editor), 1963.

David Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism, 1965. Brandt and Lyons tried to show that rule utilitarianism is logically equivalent to act utilitarianism and, therefore, has no real advantage over the latter.

5. Defense of Act Utilitarianism against Rule Utilitarianism.

J. J. C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics. First Edition, 1961. Second Edition (with a critical essay by B. Williams), 1973.

6. A Utilitarian Theory based on Bayesian Decision Theory.

W. S. Vickrey, “Measuring Marginal Utility by Reactions to Risk”, Econometrica, 13 (1945), pp. 319-333.

—> John C. Harsanyi, “Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility”, Journal of Political Economy, 63 (1955), pp. 305-316. (Omit Section II.)

7. An Ordinalist Approach to Social Welfare.

Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individualistic Values. First Edition, 1951. Second Edition, 1963.

Kenneth J. Arrow, “Extended Sympathy and the Possibility of Social Choice”, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper No. 484 (June 1976).

8. Egalitarian Critiques of Utilitarianism (Rawls, Diamond, Sen) and Utilitarian Rebuttals.

—> John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness”, Philosophical Review, 67 (1958), pp. 164-194.

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971.

—> John C. Harsanyi, “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’ Theory.” American Political Science Review, 69 (1975), pp. 594-606.

—> Peter Diamond, “Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment”, Journal of Political Economy, 75 (1967), pp. 765-766.

—> A. K. Sen, “Welfare Economics, Utilitarianism, and Equity”, Chapter 1 of A. K. Sen, On Economic Inequality, 1973.

—> John C. Harsanyi, “Nonlinear Social Welfare Functions: Do Welfare Economists Have a Special Exemption from Bayesian rationality?” Theory and Decision, 6 (1975), pp. 311-332.

*The well-known economist.

 

Source: United States Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. The Papers of Abba P. Lerner, Box 12, Folder “5. ‘H’ miscellany 1976-1977”.

Image Source: John C. Harsanyi – Facts. NobelPrize.org. Nobel Media AB 2021. Fri. 5 Feb 2021. <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1994/harsanyi/facts/>

Categories
Economists

CUNY, Queens College. Reviewing Minsky on Keynesian Economics, Abba Lerner, 1977

 

This post is in the spirit of “restoring the director’s cut” for a commercial film, except for a book review. Abba Lerner was given only two pages to review Hyman Minsky’s 1975 book John Maynard Keynes in the popular economics magazine Challenge. Lerner identified Minsky’s value-added to the Keynesian tradition of macroeconomics with the model of “how optimisim leads to a fragility of the financial economic structure through the accumulation of enormous ratios of debt to equity financing [and how] the ‘double risk’ of borrowers and lenders amplifies movement in both directions.” Lerner’s basic criticism of the “intractable instability” thesis of Minsky is that Lerner believes “an intelligent Keynesian monetary and fiscal policy would […] be able to prevent the normal myriad disturbances throughout the economy from developing into general expansions or contractions large enough to start up Minsky’s intractable oscillations.” [I’ve taken the liberty to drop Lerner’s double negative in the interest of simplicity of expression].

It turns out that Lerner had a further laundry list of objections and quibbles that I transcribe below.

Review of John Maynard Keynes by Hyman P. Minsky. New York: Columbia University Press, 1975.  Challenge, May-June 1976, pp. 69-70.

At the time of publication of the review, Abba Lerner was Distinguished Professor of Economics at Queens College, City University of New York.

_____________________

Lerner’s Critical Laundry List

The following is a list of items which I had to omit from my review of Minsky’s “John Maynard Keynes” to keep it within the limits demanded by Challenge.

  1. The misunderstanding of user cost as if it were equivalent to the expected future return on capital or in some uses to the mark up over variable cost.
  2. The misunderstanding of Keynes’ repudiation of Viner’s argument in 1937 Journal of Political Economy where Keynes was not repudiating the logic of the neo-classical “synthesis” but rather was objecting to Viner’s confusion about “voiding” in particular Viner’s claiming that voiding could not be very important because there were no great changes in the quantity of money in existence. Keynes point was that it showed itself not in changes in the quantity of money, but in changes in the price of money for the rate of interest.
  3. Minsky’s toying with the Cambridge post-Keynesian tautologies. Minsky used these under the title of “Budget Constraints.”
  4. To object to his calling the marginal efficiency schedule a caricature. What is a caricature? is to suppose as Minsky does that this goes suppose not to move [sic].
  5. To point out that there is also uncertainty about the current demand and that there is essential part in explaining the setting of a price with a markup up in a society where the price is in about [sic, above?] the marginal cost which is why there exists the profession of salesmanship.
  6. A possible confusion between marginal user cost and average user cost
  7. A discussion of the relevance or irrelevance of the “joylessness” of American affluence.
  8. A discussion of what is meant by debt deflation sometimes it seems to be the argument that this is necessary for the health of the economy, and other times it seems to be merely pointing out that we have a depression in which some firms go broke. In this way some of the debts disappear. There is possible also a suggestion that the damage done by the accumulating debts could be washed away by inflation.
  9. The carrying over of the Cambridge post-Keynesian tautologies in the form of budget restraints to what becomes a repetition of the ancient tautologies of MV=PT especially where he uses delta M as being the cause of a change in income where delta M Keynes describes as being due either to a change in the quantity of money or to a change in the velocity of circulation. This becomes especially tautological in which it changes in [illegible] may changes in M or V.[sic]
  10. In reference to Keynes’ occasional stress on instability of the boom carrying in itself the seeds of its own destruction taken by Minsky as being a universal truth where as I understand it only as describing what happens in the absence of a policy for regulating the level of economic activity.
  11. In connection with the tautologies the use of the [a blank here] in places where they are not necessary at all when what he is proving is the same as the Robinson definition in which an excess of investment [over?] saving is not the cause or even the result of a change in income but merely another way of saying that there is or has been or will be a change in income. The result is [the difference?] between income [of the current?] period of the income of the next period and there is no meaning left to the distinguishing of the one [from the other?].
  12. Some comment on his declaration that “the fundamental unemployment is the unemployment of capital assets”
  13. The emphasis on the construction unions has been the moving element in causing stagflation. i.e. inflation in times of depression. This confuses the causes of inflation with the ideal of monopoly. A monopoly can raise a price or a wage relative to other prices and wages. It could conceivably be the beginning of an upward movement of prices when other prices and wages tried to keep up with an increase originally started by a monopoly but this is important only in the beginning. The further increases in the monopoly (construction workers) is now in the course of the progress of exactly the same kind as of the competitive wages which tried to keep up with the construction wages.

This is the end of my list of items omitted in my reviews of Minsky’s “John Maynard Keynes”.:

Abba P. Lerner
February 26, 1967 [sic, should be 1977].

Source: U. S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. The Papers of Abba P. Lerner. Box 15, Folder 4 “Minsky, Hyman P. 1972-76”.

Image Sources:  Hyman P. Minsky page at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. Abba Ptachya Lerner chapter, web edition, in Biographical Memoirs, vol. 64, p. 208, The National Academies Press, 1994.

Categories
Chicago Economists Exam Questions

Chicago. Preliminary Examinations in Economic Theory. Friedman, chair. 1952

 

Today’s post includes not only the questions for the economic theory preliminary examinations (Part I and Part II) from the summer quarter of 1952 at the University of Chicago, but also some interesting background material. From Milton Friedman’s papers at the Hoover Institution archives I have transcribed copies of the entire schedule of preliminary examinations for summer 1952 along with the correspondence between Friedman, Frank Knight and the departmental secretary. We can compare Friedman’s suggested questions with the questions that were actually used for the exam along with Friedman’s rankings of the anonymous examinations. Two sentences in Frank Knight’s letter to Friedman (after the grades had been compared among the graders and the veil of ignorance regarding the identities of the examinees was lifted) is definitely worth considering in light of current discussions about systemic elements of racism in the discipline of economics.

“I feel that these Negroes are in the same position as the Chinese students only more so in that they compete in a completely different market, and they are never really compared with our “full fledged” Ph.D. graduates. (Besides, between you and me, I have attended 4 or 5 Ph.D. exams this summer and thought very few of them ought to pass but they all did).”

I have gone on to track down the top eight examinees as ranked by Milton Friedman. Fun facts: Gary Becker won the bronze medal and Abba Lerner’s son, Lionel Lerner, placed fourth.

The summer 1951 theory preliminary exams were posted earlier.

_________________________

Schedule for the Preliminary Examinations
Summer 1952

July 15, 1952

To: Committee members of Preliminary examinations
From: J. Barker, Departmental Secretary
Re: Schedule and committees for Preliminary Examinations, Summer Quarter, 1952.

Date Examination Committee Registration
Tues., July 29 Economic Theory I M. Friedman, Chr.,
F. H. Knight
G. Tolley		 26
Thurs., July 31 Economic Theory II (as above) 4
Tues., July 29 Government Finance P. Thomson, Chr.
H. Lewis		 1
Thurs., July 31 Industrial Relations F. Harbison, Chr.
A. Rees
M. Reid		 1
Tues., Aug. 5 Money, Banking & Monetary Policy L. Mints, Chr.
E. Hamilton
J. Marschak		 21
Tues., Aug. 5 Statistics T. Koopmans, Chr.
W. Wallis		 4
Thurs., Aug. 7 Agricultural Economics D. Johnson, Chr.
T. Schultz
P. Thomson		 8
Thurs., Aug. 7 International Econoics L. Metzler, Chr.
C. Hildreth
H. Lewis		 9

_________________________

Friedman to Knight and Tolley
Carbon copy

Orford, N.H.
July [19 or 20], 1952

F. H. Knight
G. Tolley

Dear Knight and Tolley:

I have just received word from Miss Barker that I am chairman of the Theory prelim committee for this summer, that you are the other members, and that the exams are to be in her hands by July 22.

I wish you could join me here for a session to get out the exams—and I am sure you do too if what we have been hearing about the weather in Chicago bears any resemblance to the truth.

Since you cannot, I enclose some suggested questions for both Part I and Part II. I wonder if the two of you could get together and combine these or such of them as you think worthy of retention with your own questions. Time does not permit of rechecking with me and I assure you I shall be more than satisfied with whatever decisions the two of you make.

As to the papers, have them sent to me at any stage that suits your own plans best, since mine are very flexible. I shall try to read them promptly and return them promptly. If I send you in my grades, perhaps the two of you can combine them with your own. I realize this puts more of the work on you, but I know not what else to do. I do hope we can get the grades in reasonably promptly, and certainly before the end of the quarter, which also means before I return.

Many thanks, and apologies. Best regards too.

Yours,

_________________________

Friedman’s proposed theory exam questions
Summer 1952

M. Friedman

Suggested Questions for Theory Prelim, Summer, 1952

Part I

  1. Define the following terms precisely and indicate briefly the use made of each in economics:
    1. Demand
    2. Supply
    3. Equilibrium
    4. Indifference Curve
    5. Marginal
    6. Rate of Substitution
    7. Marginal value product
    8. Marginal efficiency of capital
    9. Production function
    10. Time preference
    11. Profit
    12. Rent
    13. Run
    14. Net advantages
    15. Variable Costs
  2. (a) “I wouldn’t take it if you paid me”. Draw the consumption indifference curves implied by this statement. (You may find it helpful to suppose first that there is some finite minimum price per unit at which the speaker would take “it”; then approach the limit implied by the quotation.)
    (b) “I’ve reached the point of diminishing returns, so I better quit”. Analyze, indicating under what conditions and for what definition of diminishing returns this is a valid inference from the conditions for a maximum.
  3. (a) Complaints are often heard about the “high” incomes of bootleggers in dry states, or gamblers where gambling is illegal, or smugglers, etc. Are high incomes in such cases evidence of the success or the failure of the laws? Explain your answer.
    (b) A man buys a ticket in a lottery and wins. View this as a business transaction. How much, if any, of his prize is properly regarded as “profit”? Does your answer use the concept of “profit” implicit in the common statement “entrepreneurs seek to maximize profit”? Justify your answer and indicate the difference, if any, between the two concepts.
  4. (a) Outline the theory of joint supply
    (b) What factors determine the elasticity of the derived supply curve of one of a pair of jointly supplied items? Show the direction of influences and prove your statements graphically or otherwise.

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

M. Friedman

Suggested questions for theory prelim, Summer, 1952

Part II

  1. During every hyper-inflation there are always recurrent complaints of a “shortage of money.” How do you explain this phenomenon?
  2. The following quotation is from an article on the illicit gold traffic:
    “Traffic on the Asian gold-smuggling trails has doubled since Korea…Meanwhile savings which could be productively invested by banks lie idle; paper money is snubbed for gold, depreciates with every rise in the gold price, and becomes a weaker and weaker factor in national economies.” (H.R. Reinhardt, The Reporter, July 22, 1952, p.21).
    Analyze this quotation. Precisely what effect would the willingness of people to hold bank deposits instead of gold have on productivity or productive investment, and through what channels? What of sense and what of nonsense is there in the statements after the semi-colon?
  3. There has been much talk of the so-called “wage-price spiral.” What is generally meant by this term? Give a theoretical analysis of the so-called spiral, indicating under what circumstances you think it could or could not arise.

_________________________

Actual Economic Theory Preliminary Examination Questions
Summer, 1952

Summer, 1952

ECONOMIC THEORY I

Time: 4 hours

Answer all questions.

  1. Define the following terms precisely and indicate briefly the use made of each in economics:
    1. Demand
    2. Supply
    3. Indifference Curve
    4. Rate of Substitution
    5. Marginal value product
    6. Marginal efficiency of capital
    7. Production function
    8. Time preference
  2. (a) Outline the theory of joint supply
    (b) What factors determine the elasticity of the derived supply curve of one of a pair of jointly supplied items? Show the direction of influences and prove your statements graphically or otherwise.
  3. Assume that Crusoe is interested in economizing the use of his resources and that during the period in question there is no change in his knowledge of production techniques. How does capital and interest theory aid in explaining the following observations?

(a) After several years, Crusoe begins to obtain berries by planting and cultivation rather than simply by picking them as he had done previously.
(b) After an additional number of years, he reverts to picking wild berries.

  1. What theories do you offer to explain the following phenomena?

(a) During a prolonged rise in the general level of prices, the price of soft drinks remained at five cents with no change whatsoever in the physical characteristics of the product.
(b) During a prolonged rise in the general level of prices the price of candy bars remained at five cents, at the same time, however, as the size of the bars decreased.

  1. Using diagrams, briefly discuss the long-run cost curve for a competitive industry. Indicate, with diagrams, the response to be expected from (a) an expansion of demand, (b) a decrease of demand, within periods too short for a significant change in the fixed investment.
  2. Briefly state the main changes in the body of accepted price theory at the turn from “classical” to “Austrian” (the subjective-value school), i.e., at the “revolution” of the 1870’s. Similarly describe the transition from Austrian to “New-classical” (Marshallian) doctrine.

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

Summer, 1952

ECONOMIC THEORY II

Time: 2 ½ hours

Answer all questions.

  1. During every hyper-inflation there are recurrent complaints of a “shortage of money.” How do you explain this phenomenon? Compare the situation during acute depression.
  2. A part of the nation’s productive capacity is destroyed, say by a war. Ignoring any possible expectational and distributive effects, how will this affect: (a) the division of the national income between consumption and investment? and (b) the income-velocity of money. How, if at all, does your answer depend on whether wealth is a variable which influences behavior?
  3. There has been much talk of the so-called “wage-price spiral.” What is generally meant by this term? Give a theoretical analysis of the so-called spiral, indicating under what circumstances you think it would or would not arise.

_________________________

Theory Prelim, Summer, 1952, Part I. Grades by M. Friedman

General notes:

  1. I have classified the papers into five groups.

P—clear pass for the Ph.D. (7 papers)
P(?) Questionable pass for Ph.D. (5 papers)
A.M. Pass for a.M./questionable fail for Ph.D. (5 papers)
F(?) Questionable fail for A.M., clear fail for Ph.D. (4 papers)
F Clear fail for both (4 papers)

Should emphasize that as always this is somewhat arbitrary. In particular, difference between two fail classes is particularly small in this batch.

  1. In addition to the above class mark, Igive the ranking by my numerical grades. 1 is the best paper, 2, the next best, etc., to aid in seeing whether any differences among members of the committee reflect differences in absolute or relative grading.
# of candidate. Class grade Rank Remarks
1 AM 16
2 F 24
3 P 6
4 P(?) 8
5 P 5
6 F(?) 21
7 AM 14
8 P(?) 11
9 AM 15
10 P 4
11 P(?) 12
12 F 25
13 P 2 This and 15 distinctly the two best papers
14 F(?) 18
15 P 1 See under 13
16 AM 13
17 AM 17
18 F 23
19 F 22
20 P 7
21 P 3
23 F(?) 19
25 P(?) 10
26 F(?) 20
27 P(?) 9

 

PART II OF THEORY PRELIM

Not one of the three papers submitted on this part seems to me satisfactory. #1 is the best of the three, though not by much, and might deserve a questionable pass. Both of the others seem to me clear failures.

_________________________

 

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
Chicago 37, Illinois
Department of Economics

September 8, 1952

Mr. Milton Friedman
Orford
New Hampshire

Dear Milton:

Tolley and I have just gone over our three reports and find them fairly well in agreement. The most serious exception is #7—John J. Klein, whose paper you marked passable for the A.M. only, while both Tolley and I gave him a clear pass. Your rank was 14, as you probably have the record to show. What do you suggest? It will be no great hardship to us to re-read the paper, and we shall do so with the next day or so. Do you want to see it again? Or what can we report?

Another questionable case is Adolph Scott (Colored). Here I am the odd man, as I marked him passable, while you ranked him 23 out of 25, and Tolley ranked him 24. I yield as far as passing him for the Ph.D. is concerned but wondered what you would think about passing him for the A.M. He seems to have squeezed through in International Trade at the A.M. level. This would allow him to get the Master’s degree. I feel that these Negroes are in the same position as the Chinese students only more so in that they compete in a completely different market, and they are never really compared with our “full fledged” Ph.D. graduates. (Besides, between you and me, I have attended 4 or 5 Ph.D. exams this summer and thought very few of them ought to pass but they all did).

On Part II there is also some discrepancy. I had Mints read these papers, and he and I agree that #2, Mrs. Mullady, was passable. But you and Tolley both wrote failure and as she failed “flat” on Part I and has also failed a second time in another field, it looks as though that disposes of her case. This leaves S. Smidt who has your vote, a questionable pass, Tolley’s a clear pass, and Mints and I though a very very [sic] dubious pass. But Smidt passes Part I with colors flying. I am perfectly willing and in fact disposed to yield on him and pass him as I don’t feel competent to grade these Part II papers anyway.

Cordially,

(Dictated but not read)
Frank H. Knight

Source: Hoover Institution Archives. Milton Friedman Papers. Box 76. Folder 2 “University of Chicago ‘Economic Theory’”.

_________________________

Identities of eight examinees given passing grades
by Milton Friedman by rank

First place

Seymour Smidt. University of Chicago Ph.D. (1954). Dissertation: “Efficient Management for Government Wheat Stocks”.

Second place

Conrad Jan (Coen) Oort. University of Chicago A.M. (1954). Doctor of Economics, University of Leiden (1958).

Professor economics, U. Utrecht, The Netherlands, 1960-1971; professor economics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1956-1957; treasurer-general, Treasury, The Hague, The Netherlands, 1971-1977; managing director, Algemene Bank Nederland Bank (now Algemene Bank Nederland-AMRO), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1977-1989; non-executive director various companies, The Netherlands, since 1989; professor economics, Maastricht, The Netherlands, since 1986. Chairman KLM, Amstelveen, Netherlands, 1992, Robeco Group, Rotterdam, Netherlands, 1989. Vice chairman Aegon Insurance, The Hague, 1990.
Source: Prabook webpage for Conrad Jan Oort.

Third place

Gary S. Becker. University of Chicago Ph.D. (1953). Dissertation: “The Economics of Racial Discrimination”.
The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1992.

Fourth place

Lionel John Lerner. [son of Abba P. Lerner and Alice Sendak]. University of Chicago A.B. (1950) and A.M. (1952). Johns Hopkins University Ph.D. (1955). Dissertation: “Theories of Imperialist Exploitation.”
Source: Johns Hopkins University, Sheridan Libraries, Special Collections. Commencement Program 1955, p. 19.

Fifth place

Edward J. Kilberg. Hofstra University B.A. (1949). Duke University A.M. (1952). University of Chicago A.M. (1957).
Apparently Kilberg was never awarded a Ph.D. in economics by the University of Chicago for his dissertation “Commercial bank holdings of cash and liquid items”. Most likely reason is that he died in the crash of a Northeast airliner at Nantucket Airport on August 15, 1958. Kilberg left a research job at the Mutual Life Insurance Company in 1957 to go to the NBER where he worked as assistant to Arthur F. Burns for the book Prosperity Without Inflation (1958).

Sixth place

Hugh Roy Elliott. In the list of economics Ph.D. dissertations kept by the department of economics at the University of Chicago we find “Hugh R. Elliott. Dissertation: Savings Deposits as Money (Summer 1964)” which seems rather late in the game. But then we see: AER Sept. 1957, p. 838 “Hugy [sic] R. Elliott, B.A. Harvard 1950; M.A. Chicago 1952.” Thesis in preparation at Chicago “Savings deposits as money”.

Seventh place

Irwin Ira Baskind. I have found the following item “Baskind, Irwin. Postwar Monetary Policy in Belgium (Ph.D., Chicago)” from U.S. State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. External Research. A List of Studies Currently in Progress, Western Europe, ER list no. 5.14 (April 1960), p. 9. Note: Baskind’s name does not appear in the list of economics Ph.D.’s kept by the Chicago department of economics.

Eighth Place

Paul Gabriel Keat. Baruch School of the City University of New York B.B.A. (1949). Washington University A.M. (1950). University of Chicago A.M. (1952, 1956). University of Chicago Ph.D. (1959). Dissertation: “Changes in Occupational Wage Structure 1900-1956”.

Keat, Paul G. PhD 88, passed away on April 2, 2014.Born in Prague, Czechoslovakia May 2, 1925. A WWII vet who served in Ardennes, Normandy and Rhineland. Decorated with the European African Middle Eastern Services Medal, Good Conduct Medal and WWII Victory Medal. Discharged 1946. Graduated 1959 from the University of Chicago with an M.A. and PhD in economics. Student of his cherished professor, Dr. Milton Friedman. Earned B.B.A. in accounting from Baruch School of the City University of New York and M.A. from Washington University. Paul’s work with IBM was extensive in both the United States and in the European headquarters based in Paris. He taught both finance and economics at the graduate level in numerous universities including Syracuse University, Washington University, the City University of New York, Iona College and the Lubin Graduate School of Business at Pace University. In 2013 he co-authored and published the seventh edition of his textbook “Managerial Economics”.
Source: Arizona Republic, Phoenix. April 13, p. F9.

Images: The economic theory prelim examiners, Friedman, Knight, and Tolley. From the University of Chicago Photographic Archive.

Categories
Cowles Economists Seminar Speakers

Cowles and IMF seminars on social welfare functions. Abba Lerner, 1952

 

In this post we have material related to a seminar on social welfare functions that Abba Lerner gave on at least two occasions in the fall of 1952–once at the I.M.F. and once at the Cowles Commission. The three items transcribed below come from a single folder in the “Abba P. Lerner Papers” at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. The first two items are typed notes Lerner kept for himself followed by a page of handwritten notes that presumably were his presentation notes (his class lecture notes are seldom, if ever, more than a page per lesson and often no more than a list of key words). Where I have been forced to guess a word, I use boldface. Simple typos and spelling mistakes have been corrected without fanfare, Lerner was a pretty lousy typist.

Transcribed notes for Abba Lerner’s five lectures about labor (1949) can be found in an earlier post.

__________________________

SOME ASPECTS OF WELFARE ECONOMICS
IMF 9-19-52
[Lerner’s own typed notes, followed by handwritten notes]

Western Humanism—Efficient use of resources for satisfying human wants.

adding utilities, measuring utility, complementarity, weighting

For analysis avoid by indifference curves, more generally, by ordering

For Welfare Economics avoid by social welfare function also an ordering.

Democracy means deriving social decision from individual preferences.

Bergson and Samuelson seem to suggest possibility of getting social ordering from individual ordering

Arrow on the derivation. The Paradox.

More generally. Five conditions. Free choice, positive, irrelevance non-dictatorial, non-imposed.

Serious for Democracy how much consensus is needed? (Single peaked pref[erences]s.)

Much Math. Reviewers gingerly defer and repeat the paradox.

Too loose. Too severe. at the same time.

Voting is weighting. cf. “unweighted index numbers” voting excluded.

If voting should be consistent. 1+1 =1. (single peaked prefs avoid the triangle)

The third postulate. Men, not preferences, born free and equal.

Majority rule not = democracy. (tho not minority rule)

must be checked for significance of the preference to the individual.

PR [preference revelation?] as concentrating of voting.

Scale of ordering.-1-100 (voting by differences between votes)

Republican Editorial after Democratic Conference.

Must weigh individuals. Must allow individuals to weigh their preferences.

voting and pricing

[Bottom half of paper has the following handwritten notes:]

Social Welfare Function vs. process for social division.

One Commodity World

 A B C Total
x 3 1 2

6

y

 2 3 1 6
z 1 2 3

6

the middle one cannot be the worst

“indifference” [not the same as] “cannot say”

consensus about rules, not content
values vs. prefs?

__________________________

Social Welfare Functions
Discussion at Cowles Commission 10-9-52
[Lerner’s own typed summary of comments he received]

The essence of Democracy is not giving everybody equal influence or voting power but the recognition of uncertainty so that policies can be corrected. Not the determination of policy but the election of official to whom authority can be delegated. Houthakker.

How can the greater needs of some be protected? One cannot rely on those majorities who care little about anything being prevented from oppressing minorities by devoting only a little of their voting power to the oppression—what if there are not many decisions but only one which matters very little to the majority but is very important to the minority? Koopmans

The conditions for a successful democracy do include some restrictions on the preference of the members of society. If conflicts are so strong that they mean more than the preservation of the unity of the society or the keeping of the rules then the democracy cannot persist. Koopmans

Arrow’s third postulate is unnecessarily strong. His purpose would be served by having a social welfare function derived from some set of “complete” private orderings which would then continue to be used even when some of the alternatives have disappeared.  Chairman

Economics is where division between the satisfaction of the desired of different individuals is possible. Each can then get (buy) what he wants without this affecting others. Where there is an indivisibility or a non-separability of the effects on different individuals we have political rather than economic problems. Discussion after the meeting with Colin Clark.

Where there is indivisibility we have to have government and must sacrifice freedom. Colin Clark

 

Source:  Library of Congress. Manuscript Division. Papers of Abba P. Lerner, Box 21, Folder 5 “Welfare Economics, Undated”.

__________________________

The following handwritten sheet was not stapled to the previous two which were stapled together, but it does have what appear to be matching staple holes, as if the notes had been taken and used for another lecture at some other time.

Welfare Economics—Social Welfare Functions
[Lerner’s handwritten notes
(boldface indicates uncertain transcription)]

Present concerns—Sustaining Forces—Psych[ological] Warfare

deeper to Basic Ec[onomic] Analysis, Basic Political Philosophy.

                        Keynes, Adam Smith              Wilson, Jefferson, Socrates

Democratic Society. Voting. Arrow Paradox. Social ordering from individual orderings.

Is democracy possible? (Single peaked pref[erence]s, single commodity)

Political Ec[onom]y—Welfare Economics—preferred in to “Economics”.

conforming

Summation & Measurement of U[tility]. Social Welfare Function. Social States

Behaviorism + ordering OK.

If no comparison unanimity reasoning. voting means comparing – weighting.

Analyze paradox — inconsistent w[eigh]ting 1 + 1 = 1. (all preferences born equal)

(unweighted)

1 + 1 = 2 give rank ordering (not reasonable—adjust pref[erence]s equal)

\left( \text{another case  }xyz\text{  or  }zxy\,\,\to \,\,\bar{x}\bar{z}\,,\,\bar{z}\bar{y}\text{  but  }xy \right)

diff[erent] low votes is the influencing power not [number] of votes (cf P.R. [preference revelation?] etc) or majority rule

add cardinal utilities (which must also be comparable) to get social ordering

How much for each individual? How democratic

S.W. Function really impor[tant]. But do we need one?

All we need is a democratic decision

Equal influence — given a democratic result

Principle of relevance—different use of voting power. Not a S.W. Function

Inconsistency ceases to be irrational—diff[erent] circumstances

 (games, influence, voting, force, smudged-word)

Over-ambition—cf compensation issue “can’t tell” or “indifference”

output and distribution.

Democracy depends on multiplicity of items.

Consensus + Possibility of Democracy.

 

Source:  Library of Congress. Manuscript Division. Papers of Abba P. Lerner, Box 21, Folder 5 “Welfare Economics, Undated”.

__________________________

From the Cowles’ record of Commission Seminars

Oct. 9 [1952] Abba P. Lerner, Roosevelt College, “Social Welfare Functions”

Source: Yale University. Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics. Webpage: Commission Seminars, 1943-1955.

Image Source: Publicity photo of Abba Lerner as Guest Speaker February 25, 1958 in the Beth Emet 1958 Forum. Library of Congress. Papers of Abba P. Lerner, Box 6, Folder 8.

 

Categories
Economists

Roosevelt College. Five lectures about Labor. Abba Lerner, 1949

 

 

Abba P. Lerner was quite a pack rat when it came to his lecture notes (but also his correspondence!). This post offers a glimpse into the archival record of  lecture outlines and keywords preserved as found in these notes. Sometimes we have a polished outline, sometimes there is what appears to be a brief lecture synopsis, and in this case we also have both handwritten drafts of notes as well as his typed notes (on note cards…who would have thought?) for the lectures.

All the material transcribed below comes from a single folder in Abba P. Lerner’s papers:

Source: Library of Congress. Papers of Abba P. Lerner, Box 23. Folder “Lectures and speeches: Other”.

I have added a source note to each item with a brief description of its physical form (typed, handwritten, paper v. notecards).

Abbreviations encountered in Lerner’s notes:

ap–average product (of labor)
DF–Democratic Functionalism
FE–Full Employment
FF–Functional Finance
mp–marginal product (of labor)
NG–no good
TU–Trade Union

________________________

An
Economist…
Looks
at Labor

Series of Five Lectures
by Abba P. Lerner

Tuesday Evenings, 7:30-9:30, March 1 to 29, 1949

March 1—Philosophy—Capitalism, Socialism, Laborism

March 8—Ideology—Labor and Democracy

March 15—Theory—Bourgeoisie, Marxist and Laborist Economics

March 22—Policy—Labor and Prosperity

March 29—Prophesy—Labor Under Full Employment

THE SPEAKER

Mr. Lerner is an economist of international reputation. One of the leading exponents of the Keynesian school, he contributed to the development of the concept of functional finance which underlies the Employment Act of 1946 and the British White Paper on Full Employment of 1944. He started his academic career as a lecturer at the London School of Economics, and has lectured at the Universities of California and Virginia, at Columbia University, and at the New School for Social Research in New York. His book, “The Economics of Control,” published in 1944 by Macmillan, is an outstanding exposition of the theory of planning for economic welfare. Mr. Lerner is Professor of Economics at Roosevelt College.

 

ADMISSION

Tickets for the whole series (five lectures): $4.00
Single lecture tickets, if available, may be purchased at the door at $1.00

 

CREDITS

One hour of college credit will be given for the series of five lectures if a written examination is taken at a sixth session on April 5.

Students who wish to secure credit will be charged at the regular rate of $10.00 for one semester hour. They should register in advance at the main floor information desk.

 

PREREQUISITES FOR CREDIT

Students may enroll for credit if they have complete six semester hours of introductory courses in the social sciences or introductory courses in economics, sociology, or political science. Consent of the lecturer may replace these prerequisites

Series tickets may be secured from the Business Office in Room 818.

Sponsored by
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
Roosevelt College—Chicago

430 SOUTH MICHIGAN AVENUE, CHICAGO 5—Wabash 2-3580

 

Source:  Official printed event poster.

________________________

The Role of Labor
in Present-Day Society

Ever since Karl Marx, social reformers and progressives have looked upon labor organizations as the carriers of economic and social progress.

Since the inception of trade unionism, organized labor has come a long way. From revolutionary institutions outside the framework of private property and free enterprise, they have become part and parcel of our social and economic system. Labor leaders, once impotent outlaws, are now the holders of great political and economic power. The discussion of unionism used to center around the problems of the underdog; but today we are concerned with the responsibilities that should go with the increasing power of labor.

The following questions are frequently raised: “Which are the goals that organized labor tries to attain by the use of its power?” “Can the exercise of this power be harmful to society and should it be restricted?” How is “Economic Democracy” related to political and social democracy? Are the ideals of a free society compatible with the goal of “class liberation”?

Professor Lerner will endeavor in this series of lectures to analyze these and similar problems. He will pay particular attention to the problems of monopoly, both of capital and of labor, and to the role of labor in a society which has succeeded in achieving and maintaining full employment.

 

Source:  From the printed announcement flyer.

________________________

Typed draft description

There is much loose talk nowadays about the rise of labor to power and the responsibility that should go with this power. This can be interpreted positively as directing attention to ways in which labor would exercise this power toward the end of implementing the ideals that are associated with the labor movement, But it can also be interpreted negatively as suggesting that labor should be so careful to avoid using its power in ways that would harm society that it would simply not exercise its power at all. No judgment can properly be made on the meaning of Labor’s responsibility without first clarifying the nature of both the ideals and the dangers; and this cannot be done without first distinguishing between the ideals and the interests of the working people on the one hand and of the organizations that we often call “labor” on the other. It is also necessary to explore the relationships between the liberal ideals of a free society and labor’s ideals of class liberation, between democracy and “economic democracy”, and between the economic theories that are often identified with the interests or prejudiced of capitalists, and those that are more closely associated with labor and its economic and political organizations.

Professor Lerner will endeavor in this course of lectures to analyse these problems and will pay particular attention to the problem of monopoly, both of capital and of labor, to the problems connected with achieving and maintaining full employment and to the special problems that would arise in connection with labor in a society which had succeeded in achieving and maintaining full employment.

 

Source:  Carbon copy of typed single page.

________________________

Outline of the Five Lectures

Abba P. Lerner

An Economist Looks at Labor Five Lectures March 1, 8, 15, 22, 29, 1949 at 7:30 P.M.

(For those taking the course for credit an examination period following the lectures.

Prerequisite Soc. Sc. 102 or Ec. Pol Sci and Soc 101)

  1. Philosophy—Capitalism, Socialism and Laborism.
    What does labor want? What can Labor get? The nature of social cooperation. The means and the ends. Labor and labor organizations.
  2. Ideology—Labor and Democracy.
    The interest of Labor and the general interest. Property and privilege. [handwritten note:“T.U.’s (trade unions’) & workers’ dignity”] Welfare economics. Laborism and Liberalism. Economic Democracy. Democratic Functionalism. Output, effort and income. Labor organizations and liberty. Progress and the progressive Democracy. Dictatorship and Efficiency. Imports and wages.
  3. Theory—Bourgeoise, Marxist, and Laborist Economics.
    The share of labor. Marginalism. Bargaining power. The labor theory of value. The International Labor Office. Labor legislation. Capitalism Cooperation and Competition. Monopoly in business and in labor. The dictatorship of the proletariat. Payment and productivity. [handwritten note:“wages & efficiency”] Minimum wages. [handwritten note:“Wider meaning of exploitation”]
  4. Policy—Labor’s stake in and responsibility for prosperity.
    The determinants of employment. Labor’s freedom from some dogmas. Inflation and Deflation. Wage rates and cost of living. Full employment policy. Anti-labor objections to Full employment policy. Functional Finance.
  5. Prophesy—Labor under Full Employment.
    Inflationary pressure. Excessive bargaining power. Function of the Trade Unions. Residue of fear of unemployment. Dangers to Capitalism. Dangers to Freedom. Dangers to Progress. A substitute for collective bargaining. Effects on Liberty, Equality and Fraternity.

 

Source:  Typed single page outline.

________________________

Typed draft of notes for Lecture 1 (Version A)

Lecture I Capitalism, Socialism, Laborism. Philosophy

I am feeling my way[.] Sentimental associations and loyalties[.] Humanism basic. Identification with Labor organisations. We must check. In case the organization claiming to enhance the dignity of the working man may not be lowering it instead.

means not ends—

Labor organisations as part of the organization of our whole society.

Capitalism. From the point of view of the private capitalist and th[at] from the point of view of the collectivist (anti-capitalist) socialist.

Two extreme dogmas.

Socialism from the extreme points of view. Labor org[anisation]s as means to communism.

Enlightened capitalism-enlightened capitalists who still seek profit—and enlightened socialism—meet in Democratic Functionalism.

Parallel in the price mechanism. DF [“Democratic Functionalism”]

none of these views is that of Laborism. Getting more.
as narrow as any private capitalism. Re prices until very lately and that not very clear. More on this in lecture 3. degree of monopoly and rate of markup.

combinations of narrow interests remains narrow log rolling pork barrels.

interests of the TU [trade union] bureaucrat, loyalty works the same way. (like national sovereignty)

[handwritten note:“Labor as agent for extending Democracy – Univ(ersal) Suff(rage), Univ(ersal) Education”]

Source:  Typed single page of notes.

________________________

Typed draft of notes for Lecture 1 (Version B)

Lecture 1 March 1st 1949 Philosophy. Capitalism, Socialism, Laborism.

Not Work, or even working men, but the organisations of working men. In relation to the interests of working men as a majority of all men in which I am interested.

This what is meant by “not believing in the class struggle”. Humanism is the basic philosophy that I start with and that I find all decent people do to when you get down to rock bottom. Sometimes it is difficult to get down to rock bottom.

Dogmas get in the way. The class enemy as an excuse for inhumanity, just like the National or Racial enemy. Labor organisations as means. Always check whether it really does work for the interests of working men, to raise their dignity rather than to lower it. And incidentally, we find that a wider interest in all men helps rather than hinders the well-being of working men.

Capitalist view. 1.2. The two extreme views go together. Profit, Exploitation 3: A social organization enlightened capitalism, (not enlightened capitalists—capitalists must seek profit)

Socialism: Robbery, millennium through abolition of profit. class collaboration the greatest sin.

Democratic Functionalism. Serving society, Property, private and social, as means for serving society. serving people better. providing wealth, freedom, opportunity, maximum freedom which includes wealth.

Laborism, something else. Getting more. As narrow as any business man, applies not to labor but to the particular group. like “business” Works on relative shares.

Degree of monopoly or rate of markup determine rel[ative] share of labor as a whole, not the wage bargain.

The price mechanism parallel. Cap[italism]. Soc[ialism]. DF [Democratic Functionalism].

The interests of the labor organization, its officials etc. (bureaucracy) rationalisations; higher wages lead to greater productivity assumes higher real wages, assumes greater productivity.

 

Source:  Typed page of notes.

________________________

Typed notes for Lecture 1 (one note card)

Fancy Outline

I Philosophy. Cap[italism], Soc[ialism], Laborism.

Not work. Orgn of workers,
for working men, all men. Not
Class Struggle. Humanism
Decency.vs. Dogmas & Inhumanity.
Harmony of Workers and Men.

What Lab org can get for Workers.

Extreme Cap view

Profit as right, public be damned.
Lab org as enemy.
narrow
ignorant

Extreme Soc view

Propty as theft
Millenium by abolition of Prpty
Class war. Collaboration sin.

Reasonable views meet. Serve Socty.

D.F. max freedom. Equality, free
sectors, inequality if functional.
Freedom and Welfare the same.

U.S Soc?

Laborism 1. Group, narrow just like Bus.

2. Org. means & ends.

Dogma –worse—

If widened
Social cooperation: Max Freedom.

force can increase freedom. Place for State. Law—avoid arbitrariness.

Money wages to illustrate all.
(stands for all bargaining)

 

Source:  Typed note card.

________________________

Typed notes for Lecture 2 (one note card)

Lecture II March 8th 1949

Ideology—Labor and Democracy

Repeat

Humanism vs. Class view.
narrowness of interest
narrowness of ignorance. Social [point of] view.
organization as means.
DF functional inequality only.
vs. revolutionary demands.
Capitalism, Socialism, Laborism

 

Capitalism & Democracy—

Identification of Labor with Democracy

suffrage, education
Economic Democracy? meaningless?
Dignity of the worker in collective
bargaining. If not lost in the
bargaining organisation. Rackets.

The real job is real wages. scale of living.

derived from this are hours and conditions
paradox of lower pay for meaner work.
marginalism. Dtermination of real wge.

Raising money wges does not help. Illusion
from the particular. Capitalist form in
objecting, in blaming for unemployment.

Laborist form in demanding and blaming for
unemployment. Communists more consistent.

ILO            Ideal layout for rev. demands.

preventing hyperdeflation. sparking infl.

I.e. useful in depression.

Offsetting monopsony. Making a market

But the real protection is the dignity of
full employment.

Full employment brings us to the political
field.

 

Source:  Typed note card.

________________________

Typed notes for Lecture 3 (one note card)

III Theory—Bourgeoise, Marxist, Laborist

Last week:

Particularist Illusions, Cap & Lab.
TU cant raise gen real wage
Can prevent hyperdeflation.
reove [sic , “remove”?] monopsony

Real Wage determination

mp. Monopoly a factor. Exaggerated.

Bargaining, indeterminacy
irrelevant for general.

As long as private enterprise
significant. (rationality)
(Bourgeoise Theory OK)

Exploitation theory
Sentimentality (of Laborism) exploited by Marxism.
demagoguery of nationalization Profits.

Vulgar Marxism.

Marx and Pigou ap & mp
Justice and efficiency
Both (comp. a means)

Equality. Functional inequality
Non-functional inequality
is the test of expltn.

Source:  Typed note card

________________________

Typed synopsis of Lecture 3

Abba P. Lerner

Lecture III. An Economist Looks at Labor March 15th 1949

Trade Unions are comparable to Governments rather than to free associations. The pressure on workers to belong and pay for the benefits they get whether they belong or not is just like the pressure on citizens to pay taxes to the State or Municipality toward the cost of services from which they would benefit whether they paid their taxes or not.

The parallel extends to the way in which governments use their sovereignty for the benefit of their nationals as against the nationals under other governments. In the same way the benefits provided by trade unions are largely at the expense of the members of other unions, and there is the same kind of resistance to unification as there is to world government. We even have in this country two labor organizations although their rivalry is not anything like as dangerous as the counterpart in world power organization.

The opposition to the only explanation of the level of real wages, the explanation in terms of marginal analysis, springs from a sentimental attachment to the labor theory of value which is being exploited by the servants of present-day totalitarianism. Modern marxists in particular are doing just what Marx excoriated in what he called “Vulgar Political Economists” so that the proper name for them would be “Vulgar Marxists”. They extol the elimination of a particular kind of “exploitation” as the end of all “exploitation” closing their eyes to the fact that it may be replaced by New forms of exploitation that from any human point of view is much worse than what is abolished.

Source:  Typed page of notes.

________________________

PRESS RELEASE
for Lecture 3

FOR RELEASE TUESDAY, MARCH 22 [1949]

“Labor and Prosperity” will be discussed by Abba P. Lerner, noted economist, in a Roosevelt College public lecture March 22, 7;30 p.m., in Altgeld Hall at the college.

Dr. Lerner will make the parallel between the practices of unions which place pressure on workers to belong and pay for the benefits they get and the pressures exerted by governments on their citizens to pay taxes toward the cost of services from which they would benefit whether they paid taxes or not.

The lecture is part of an institute titled “An Economist Looks at Labor.”

Dr. Lerner, professor of economics at Roosevelt College, has been a member of the faculty of the London School of Economics and has lectured at leading American universities. He is the author of “The Economics of Control,” an outstanding exposition of the theory of planning for economic welfare.

Sent to: 4 Met. Papers, Journal of Commerce, Christian Science Monitor

cc: Dr. Sparling, Dean Hart, Dean Leys, Mr. Dibble, Mr. Lerner, E. Morrison, Information Desk, Torch, Community News Service, Al Morey—WBBM, Consolidated Clipping Serv., FILE

 

Source:  Lerner’s copy of Press Release.

________________________

Draft notes for Lecture 3 (typed with hand corrections)

Lecture III March 15th 1949

  1. Last week:

Illusion of the particular, capitalist and laborist.

TU’s unable to raise general real wage level.
prevent hyperdeflation. Responsible neither for employment or unemployment.

except monopsony—providing a given rate to the employer.

 

  1. Real wage determination—marginal productivity—degree of monopoly a factor.

difficulty of figuring marginal really irrelevant.

bargaining and indeterminacy misses the point, passed on anayway.

except for measures that reduce degree of monopoly.

 

  1. Exploitation. Marx a.p., Pigou m.p. Justice and Efficiency. Both by different methods.

Equality (basic to socialism) and functional inequality.

National dividend equal (according to need) and wage equal to vmp. is the ideal. –competition (a means)

Vulgar Political Economy and Vulgar Marxism. Sentimentality exploited by Marxists. Demagoguery.

Exploitation need not be by private property any more than by slavery or serfdom. The test is non-functional inequality.

 

  1. How then can wages (real) be raised (in general)
    1. productivity. (TU’s are often tempted to hinder this. Lester and Shister)
      Insights into Labor Issues
      Unionism and Marginal Productivity Theory. Belfer and Bloom
      TU Policy under Full Employment. Forsey

[handwritten addition: “Werth, Nation.”]

    1. Decrease monopoly, increase competition,
      Limits to this. Rents not eliminated.
    2. By redistributive taxation.
    3. By Full employment which helps all three of these.

 

  1. TU as sovereign bodieswith governmental functions

Political Power, narrow, like Nationalism.

Resistance to unification may be [two words illegible].

Monopoly on way to socialism.

Imperialism on way to World government.

Full employment prior to all of these.

 

Source:  Lerner’s single typed page and handwritten additions for Lecture III.

________________________

Typed notes for Lecture 4 (three note cards)

IV Policy—Lab & Prosperity

Last week—

No function for TU
Real wages by prod x monply
Exploitation—Justice, Efficiency
Vulgar Marxism

Test—Nonfunctional inequality.

Eff & Justice. (cf Welfare & Freedom)

TU do not help. Sentiments. exploited.

TUs explicable rather in political terms.

Sovereignty.

Dues like taxes—for benefit
Power of Govts—before benefits to workers (dem helps)
Narro—like Nations.
Resist Unification—cf World Government.
Nothing more obvious.
Loyalty.

Monopoly of partial combn.
–cf Imperialism on way to World Gvt.

Economic representation difficulty of fitting in
with Geographical constituencies. Syndicalism.

How then raise Real Wages?

  1. Productivity
    TU’s often hinder
  2. Increase competition
    [leaves rents (ap-mp)]
  3. Redistribute Income & Wealth

FE prior to all these.

FE prior to these

Cf England labor restriction
increases competition
mobility useful, possible

How FE?.

Low wage and high wage fallacies.
particularism.
FE automatic, impossible Doctrinaire
Labor freer from Sound Finance dogma.

Governmental responsibility.

both Bus and Lab suspicious.

Unemployment in nobody’s interest.

Functional Finance.

Next Week: Problems in FE

 

Source:  Three typed note cards

________________________

Loose typed notes for Lecture 4 [?]

The responsibility of labor for maintaining the value of money and thus of the price system and the free society.

Technique for maintaining a wage structure compatible with a constant cost of living. See older writings like The State Theory of Money (?)

one percent rise every four months with adjustments for deviations from the national average percentage of unemployment.

I shall have to develop the machinery for establishing wage rates, relative, without harming the interests of the working people. Avoid the word class though explain why before the analysis.

Why the free market will not do the trick—it depends on the use of mass unemployment as an instrument of adjustment.

Why control wages and not prices. See article on Inflation. In forthcoming RESt.

[handwritten note:“What are the prospect for CIO & AFL & Labor Party. Labor’s past contribution to dignity and democracy.”]

 

Source:  Typed single page of notes

________________________

Lecture notes for Lecture V

 

V Prophesy—Labor Under Full Employment

Last week—

TU’s [Trade unions] not economic but political, narrow, jealous
sovereignty,
loyalty
imperialism
protectionism (e.g. seniority)

raise real wages by

efficiency
competition
redistribution

Chief instrument full employment.

TU’s  [Trade unions] freer from prejudices which prevent full employment policies. (business prejudices)

Fe via FF [Full employment via Functional Finance]

 

With Full Employment

Depression and inflation. cumulative movements. TU  [Trade unions] prevent hyperdeflation.

inflationary pressure. Excessive bargaining power.

Preaching no use. price stability via unemployment,

price control no use, it also works only via unemployment.

Formula for wage determination (tentative) has to be fair.

One big union—Union responsibility, no obvious solution.

The formula 1%, 2% every 4 months.

no restrictions on entry, maximise mobility, full employment basic.

fair to those in, fair to those out. Fair to workers, fair to employers. Prevents exploitation, demands for more are demands for preferential treatment, demand to pay less is demand for maintaining substandards.

the functions of Trade Unions, negotiations, understanding, belonging

sliding scales no good.

 

Source:  Typed, single page.

________________________

 Typed notes for lecture 5 (two note cards)

V Prophesy Lab under FE

Last week: TU’s Political

Sovereignty
loyalty
imperialism
protectionism
World govt.

Efficiency, Comptn, Redistn
Via FE—Lab can help, freer from Prej.

FE via FF

With FE

Depn and Infln. Cumulatn.
Hyper defl, infl.

Excessive bargaining power
Preaching no use.

One Big Union, ?

Responsibility?

The Formula (with FE)
1%. 2%. Max mobility.
Fair to all.

Why control wages without controlling prices?
works via unemployment.

prevents all exploitation
functional inequality

Sliding scales NG [no good]

Other problems other means

redistribution
public utilities
compensation

Fairness, privilege, or under privilege

TU’s have other functions

feeling of belonging
human dignity
handling grievances
negotiation, clrifiction [sic]
Most important, work for FE.

Source:  Two typed note cards

________________________

Draft of handout[?] for Lecture V 

Abba P. Lerner 5th Lecture (also the last) March 29th 1949
An Economist Looks at Labor
V. — Prophesy[:] Labor Under Full Employment.

The objectives of Labor organizations, as far as labor as a whole is concerned, can be reached most effectively by a full employment policy. This would not only give workers security of livelihood, that would enhance their human dignity more than it could be enhanced even by the most successful of labor organizations and labor legislation, and would also increase the share of the national product enjoyed by labor by leading to an increase in the degree of competition or in other words to the diminution of the degree of exploitation of labor by monopoly. Full employment would also increase the efficiency of the economy as a whole and so actually enlarge the cake of which labor would also get a larger share.

But in full employment conditions, the bargaining power of workers’ organizations would be too strong.

From the point of view of each workers’ organization it seems essential that their strength be maintained. This is because any group of workers whose bargaining power is relatively weaker would be left behind in the struggle between wages and prices that ensues. But from the general or even from the workers’ point of view taking all the workers together, the bargaining power of the workers is too strong for their own good. The pressure on wages would result in continually rising wages and consequently in continually rising cost of production and of prices of products. The workers as a whole would not gain from this because they would lose in higher prices what they gain from higher wages, and would lose further from the disturbances and dislocations of the economy from the inflation. It would therefore be advisable for some other method to be adopted for the determining of wages which would maintain stability while still giving fair wages, as high as is permitted by the productivity of the country. Professor Lerner will suggest some lines on which such a method of determining wages could be developed that would not be an excuse for hiding or perpetuating any kind of exploitation, either of workers by employers, or of some group of workers in the interests of other groups.

 

Source:  Typed single page of notes

Image Source:  Publicity photo of Abba Lerner as Guest Speaker February 25, 1958 in the Beth Emet 1958 Forum. Library of Congress. Papers of Abba P. Lerner, Box 6, Folder 8.

Categories
Chicago Economists

Chicago. Economics Department on Possible Candidate for Permanent Employment, 1950

 

How big was the split within the department of economics in 1950 at the University of Chicago? Judging from the decision by chairman T. W. Schultz to essentially table the matter of approaching the central university administration with a candidate for a permanent position, there was a departmental deadlock.

The half-dozen economists discussed were: George Stigler, Abba Lerner, Kenneth Boulding, Leonid Hurwicz, Kenneth Arrow, and Lawrence Klein. Contemplate those names for a moment and then read aloud the following two sentences:

Several members of the Department stated that none of these men had all of the qualities sought: a good mind reaching out fruitfully in new directions in economics. It was agreed, however, that there were no likely candidates possessing these qualities in a high degree.   

We can only speculate which alpha economists happened to lock horns in those three meetings.

_________________________

From the MINUTES, Meeting of the Department,
May 24, 1950.

Present: T. W. Schultz, T. Koopmans, A. Rees, H. G. Lewis, D. G. Johnson, E. J. Hamilton, R. Burns, J. Marschak, F. H. Harbinson, F. H. Knight, M. Friedman, B. Hoselitz, L. Metzler

[…]

II. Appointments

Schultz informed the Department that Hildreth’s position has been renegotiated for a term of three years. The Department approved a motion authorizing for Hildreth the courtesy rank of Associate Professor for a three year term.

The Department then considered the appointment problem raised by the leaving of Blough (probably initially on a one year leave of absence) and Brownlee. Schultz suggested that the Department had two alternatives open to it: a temporary replacement (construed broadly) and a permanent appointment of a top ranking person.

The Department considered first possible candidates for permanent appointment. Attention centered on George Stigler, Abba Lerner, Kenneth Boulding, Leonid Hurwicz, Kenneth Arrow, and Lawrence Klein. For a temporary appointment Schultz suggested Gunnar Myrdal.

[Meeting began at 3:30 pm and ended 5:45 p.m.]

_________________________

From the MINUTES, Meeting of the Department,
May 30, 1950.

Present: T. W. Schultz, R. Burns, D. G. Johnson, E. J. Hamilton, F. H. Knight, L. Metzler, R. Blough, F. H. Harbinson, A. Rees, H. G. Lewis, T. Koopmans, J. Marschak, M. Friedman.

Appointments

The discussion of appointments continued from the previous meeting. Schultz expressed the conviction that the time was propitious for a new permanent appointment. On Metzler’s suggestion, the Department returned to discussion of the following candidates for a permanent appointment: Stigler, Hurwicz, Boulding, Klein, Lerner, Arrow.

Several members of the Department stated that none of these men had all of the qualities sought: a good mind reaching out fruitfully in new directions in economics. It was agreed, however, that there were no likely candidates possessing these qualities in a high degree.

The chairman then polled those present with respect to their first choice (or ties for first) for a permanent appointment. As a result of the poll the list of candidates was narrowed to Hurwicz, Stigler, and Lerner. The chairman then polled those present on their position toward permanent appointment of each of these men.

The poll showed that of those present

4 would favor and 5 oppose the permanent appointment of Hurwicz
4 would favor and 5 oppose the permanent appointment of Lerner
6 would favor and 6 oppose the permanent appointment of Stigler

A motion was passed instructing the chairman to poll the absent members of the Department in the same way on the appointment of Hurwicz, Lerner, and Stigler and to report back to the Department for further discussion.

[Meeting began at 3:30 pm and ended 6:15 p.m.]

_________________________

From the MINUTES, Meeting of the Department,
June 8, 1950.

Present: T. W. Schultz, H. G. Lewis, D. G. Johnson, J. Marschak, H. Kyrk, P. Thomson, M. Friedman, T. Koopmans, A. Rees, E. J. Hamilton, F. H. Knight, R. Blough.

Appointments

Schultz reported that he had polled Kyrk, Thomson, Mints, and Nef (but had not heard from Goode) on the matter of a permanent appointment for Stigler or Hurwicz or Lerner. The upshot of the poll was that the Department, the Chairman not voting, was evidently divided in its rating of Stigler for a permanent appointment; both permanent members and temporary members of the faculty showed an even division. The Chairman explained that he would abstain from voting on the belief that the Department was not now prepared to advance, with a strong meeting of minds, a strong case to the Central Administration for a permanent appointment. Schultz proposed that we investigate a slate of names for a one-year appointment.

A motion was passed authorizing the Chairman to put Gunnar Myrdal in the first position on the slate for a one-year appointment.

Successive motions passed by the Department added the following names to the slate:

Nicholas Kaldor   Simon Kuznets
Arthur F. Burns
H. M. Henderson
W. Vickrey
A. Hart
H. Stein

The Department then, following the system of ranking used in fellowship appointments, ranked these seven persons. The rank order follows:

1. Kaldor
2. Burns
3. Henderson
4. Kuznets
5½. Vickrey
5½. Hart
7. Stein

[Meeting began at 3:30 pm and ended 6:00 p.m.]

Source: University of Chicago Archives, Department of Economics Records, Box 41, Folder 12.

Image Source: Social Science Research Building.  University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf2-07466, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.

 

Categories
Harvard Seminar Speakers

Harvard. International Economic Relations Seminar. Haberler and Harris, 1940-45

 

The most famous economics seminar at Harvard University in the history of economics is undoubtedly the fiscal policy seminar run by John Williams and Alvin Hansen. A list of that seminar’s speakers and their topics was included in an earlier post. Below I provide the reported speaker’s and topics for the “younger” international economic relations seminar jointly organized by Gottfried Haberler and Seymour Harris during the War years.

___________________________________

EXPANSION OF THE SEMINAR PROGRAM

Several additions have been made in the seminar program of the School [of Public Administration] for the year 1940-1941. Professors Haberler and Harris are presenting a seminar on international economic relations. We planned our seminar program in 1937 on the assumption that it was wise to begin with domestic problems despite the fact that a number of the Faculty had special interests in the international field. In view of the events of the last few years, it seems highly important to develop these interests. The seminar given by Professors Haberler and Harris deals with the application of the principles of international trade to current problems…

Source: Harvard University. Report of the President of Harvard College and Reports of Departments for 1939-40, p. 306.

___________________________________

1940-41
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS SEMINAR
[partial list]

[Seven of the meetings of the Fiscal Policy Seminar were held jointly with other seminars – four with the International Economic Relations Seminar and three with the Agricultural, Forestry, and Land Policy Seminar.]

 

October 11. SVEND LAURSEN, Student, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University.

Subject: International Trade and the Multiplier. (Joint meeting with Fiscal Policy Seminar.)

February 21. HARRY D. WHITE, Director, Division of Monetary Research, United States Treasury Department.

Subject: Blocked Balances. (Joint meeting with Fiscal Policy Seminar.)

March 21. RICHARD V. GILBERT, National Defense Advisory Commission.

Subject: The American Defense Program. (Joint meeting with Fiscal Policy Seminar.)

May 2. GUSTAV STOLPER, Financial Adviser.

Subject: Financing the American Defense Program. (Joint meeting with Fiscal Policy Seminar.)

 

Source: Harvard University. Report of the President of Harvard College and Reports of Departments for 1940-41, p. 323 ff.

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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS SEMINAR:
1941-1942. Professor Haberler and Associate Professor Harris

In 1941-42 the seminar devoted its attention to war and post-war problems in the field of International Economic Relations. A few meetings were spent on the discussion of fundamental theoretical problems. During the first semester all meetings were taken up by papers of outside consultants and their discussion. In the second semester student reports were presented and discussed, and a few extra meetings were arranged for outside speakers. The consultants and their topics were as follows:

 

October 1. EUGENE STALEY, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Economic Warfare.

October 8.[**] CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, Federal Reserve Board. Canadian-American Economic Relations in the War and Post-War Period.

October 15.[**] A. F. W. PLUMPTRE, University of Toronto. International Economic Position of Canada in the Present Emergency.

October 22. HEINRICH HEUSER, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Exchange Control.

October 29. FRITZ MACHLUP, University of Buffalo. The Foreign Trade Multiplier.

November 5. HENRY CHALMERS, United States Department of Commerce. Trade Restrictions in Wartime.

November 12. ARTHUR R. UPGREN, United States Department of Commerce. International Economic Interest of the United States and the Post-War Situation.

November 19. OSKAR MORGENSTERN, Princeton University. International Aspects of the Business Cycle.

November 28.[*] NOEL F. HALL, British Embassy. Economic Warfare.

December 5.[*] ROBERT BRYCE, Department of Finance, Canada. International Economic Relations with Special Reference to the Post-War Situation.

January 26.[*] PER JACOBSSEN, Bank for International Settlements. The Problem of Post-War Reconstruction.

February 13.[*] JACOB VINER, University of Chicago. Monopolistic Trading and International Relations.

February 18. H. D. FONG, Director, Nankai Institute of Economics, Chungking, China. Industrialization of China.

February 25. MICHAEL HEILPERIN, Hamilton College. International Aspects of the Present and Future Economic Situation.

March 11. JACOB MARSCHAK, New School for Social Research. The Theory of International Disequilibria.

March 14.[*] RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR., Yale University and the United States Department of Commerce. Post-War Domestic and International Investment.

March 18. ANTONIN BASCH, Brown University. International Economic Problems of Central and Southeastern Europe.

March 20.[*] ALBERT G. HART, University of Iowa. The Present Fiscal Situation.

April 10. ABBA P. LERNER, University of Kansas City. Post-War Problems.

May 8. HORST MENDERSHAUSEN, Bennington College. International Trade and Trade Policy in the Post-War Period.

 

Six of these were joint meetings with the Fiscal Policy Seminar [*] and two were joint meetings with the Government Control of Industry Seminar[**].

Student reports were presented on the following subjects:

Argentine International Trade.
Exchange Control in Argentina.
Some Aspects of Sino-Japanese Trade.
International Effects of Price Ceilings.
Location Theory and the Reconstruction of World Trade.
Some Post-War Politico-Economic Problems of the Western Hemisphere.
Economic Problems and Possibilities of a Pan Europe, Pan America and Similar Schemes.
The Balance of Payments of China.

 

Source: Harvard University. Report of the President of Harvard College and Reports of Departments for 1941-42, pp. 344-346.

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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS SEMINAR
1942-43. Professor Haberler

A larger portion of the time of the seminar than usual was devoted to the discussion of fundamental principles of international trade and finance. This was due to the fact that the graduate course on international trade (Economics 143) was not offered, and the seminar had to take over to some extent the functions of the graduate course.

There were eleven meetings with outside consultants, of which eight were joint meetings with the Fiscal Policy seminar. The smaller number of students made it advisable to combine the two seminars more frequently than usual. The consultants and the topics discussed with them were as follows:

 

November 13. Professor FRITZ MACHLUP, University of Buffalo. (Joint meeting with Fiscal Policy seminar.)

Subject: National Income, Employment and International Relations; the Foreign Multiplier.

November 18. Dr. THEODORE KREPS, Economic Adviser, Board of Economic Warfare, Office of Imports.

Subject: Some Problems of Economic Warfare.

November 27. Hon. GRAHAM F. TOWERS, Governor, Bank of Canada. (Joint meeting with Fiscal Policy seminar.)

Subject: Canadian War Economic Measures.

December 4. LYNN R. EDMINSTER, Vice-Chairman, U. S. Tariff Commission. (Joint meeting with Fiscal Policy seminar.)

Subject: Post-War Reconstruction of International Trade.

December 11. Professor SEYMOUR E. HARRIS, Director, Office of Export-Import Price Control, Office of Price Administration. (Joint meeting with Fiscal Policy seminar.)

Subject: Trade Policy in Wartimes.

February 12. THOMAS MCKITTRICK, President, Bank for International Settlements. (Joint meeting with Fiscal Policy seminar.)

Subject: The Bank for International Settlements.

February 24. Dr. LEO PASVOLSKY, State Department. (Joint meeting with Fiscal Policy seminar.)

Subject: Post-War Problems in International Trade.

March 3. P. T. ELLSWORTH, War Trade Staff, Board of Economic Warfare.

Subject: The Administration of Export Control.

April 12. EMILE DESPRES, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C. (Joint meeting with Fiscal Policy seminar.)

Subject: The Transfer Problem and the Over-Saving Problem in the Pre-War and Post-War Worlds.

April 16. Dr. ALBERT HAHN. (Joint meeting with Fiscal Policy seminar.)

Subject: Planned or Adjusted Post-War Economy.

April 20. Dr. ALEXANDER LOVEDAY, League of Nations.

Subject: European Post-War Reconstruction.

 

Student reports were presented on the following subjects among others: practice and theory of an international bank; post-war industrialization of China; coordination of fiscal policy in different countries; international position of the Brazilian economy; international commodity agreements; international implications for fiscal policy; British exchange equalization account; and Argentine exchange control.

Twelve students were enrolled in the seminar of which four were Littauer fellows, seven graduate students from the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, and one from the College.

 

Source: Harvard University. Report of the President of Harvard College and Reports of Departments for 1942-43, pp. 246-247.

 

___________________________________

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS SEMINAR
1943-44. Associate Professor Harris

A new approach was tried in the International Economic Relations Seminar this year. We paid particular attention to the international economic problems of Latin America and especially to the problems raised by the great demand for Latin American products for war, the expansion of exports and of money, and the resulting inflation. Attention was also given to the transitional problems in the postwar period, particularly to the adjustments that will be required in exports, imports, capital movements, exchange rates, and the allocation of economic factors. In the course of the year leading government authorities on Latin American economic problems were invited to address meetings of the seminar, which were frequently joint meetings with the Fiscal Policy Seminar or the students of the graduate course in international organization.

The schedule of meetings for 1943-44 was as follows:

 

November 12. Professor HARRIS.

Subject: Inflation in Latin America.

December 9. Dr. CORWIN EDWARDS, Chairman, Policy Board of the Anti-Trust Division of the Department of Justice and Chief of Staff of the Presidential Cooke Commission to Brazil.

Subject: Brazilian Economy.

December 17. Dr. HARRY WHITE, Director of Monetary Research, Treasury Department.

Subject: Problems of International Monetary Stabilization.

January 6. Professor HARRIS.

Subject: International Economic Problems of the War and Postwar Period.

January 10. Professor HABERLER.

Subject: Reparations.

January 14. Dr. N. NESS, Member, Mexican-U. S. Economic Commission.

Subject: Mexico.

January 17. Dr. BEARDSLEY RUML, Chairman, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Subject: Economic Budget and Fiscal Budget.

January 21. Dr. P. T. ELLSWORTH, Economic Studies Division, Department of State.

Subject: Chile.

January 24. Dr. DON HUMPHREY, Special Advisor on Price Control to Haitian Government; Chief, Price Section, O.P.A.

Subject: Haiti.

January 31. Dr. ROBERT TRIFFIN, Member, U. S. Economic Commission to Paraguay.

Subject: Money, Banking, and Foreign Exchanges in Latin America.

February 4. Dr. MIRON BURGIN, Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.

Subject: Argentina.

February 9. Dr. FRANK WARING, Director, Research Division, Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.

Subject: Broad Aspects of Latin-American Economics.

February 10. Dr. BEN LEWIS, Head of Price Control Mission to Colombia, Special Assistant to the Price Administrator.

Subject: Colombia.

March 9. Dr. HENRY CHALMERS, Department of Commerce.

Subject: Inter-American Trade Practices.

March 31. Mr. HENRY WALLICH.

Subject: Fiscal Policy and International Equilibrium.

 

Source: Harvard University. Report of the President of Harvard College and Reports of Departments for 1943-44, pp. 271-2.

___________________________________

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS SEMINAR
Professor Haberler and Associate Professor Harris

The seminar meetings in the year 1944-1945 may be arranged under the following headings:

  1. Exchanges, Controls, and International Trade (8 meetings)
  2. Regional Problems (8 meetings).
  3. Regional and International Aspects of Domestic Problems (8 meetings).
  4. Lectures and Discussions on International Trade by Professors Haberler and Harris (8 meetings).

Four of the papers presented at these meetings were subsequently published in economic journals.

The schedule of meetings for 1944-1945 was as follows:

November 16. Dr. RANDALL HINSHAW, Federal Reserve Board.

Subject: American Prosperity and the British Balance-of-Payments Problem. (Published in the Review of Economic Statistics, February 1945.)

December 11. EDWARD M. BERNSTEIN, Assistant Director, Division of Monetary Research, Treasury Department.

Subject: The Scarcity of Dollars. (Published in The Journal of Political Economy, March 1945.)

December 15. Dr. FRANCIS MCINTYRE, Representative of the Foreign Economic Exchange on Requirements Board of the War Production Board.

Subject: International Distribution of Supplies in Wartime.

December 21. Dr. ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON, Federal Reserve Board.

Subject: Some Problems of the Economic Collaboration with Russia.

January 11. Dr. WOLFGANG STOLPER, Swarthmore College.

Subject: British Balance-of-Payments Problem After World War I.

January 22. Dr. WALTER GARDNER, Federal Reserve Board.

Subject: Some Aspects of the Bretton Woods Program.

January 26. Dr. WILLIAM FELLNER, University of California.

Subject: Types of Expansionary Policies and the Rate of Interest.

January 29. Professor WALTER F. BOGNER, Dr. CHARLES R. CHERINGTON, Professors CARL J. FRIEDRICH, SEYMOUR E. HARRIS, TALCOTT PARSONS, ALFRED D. SIMPSON, and Mr. GEORGE B. WALKER.

Subject: The Boston Urban Development Plan.

March 5. Dr. ROBERT TRIFFIN, Federal Reserve Board.

Subject: International Economic Problems of South America.

March 19. Dr. LOUIS RASMINSKY, Foreign Exchange Control Board, Ottawa, Canada.

Subject: British-American Trade Problems from the Canadian Point of View. (Published in the British Economic Journal, September I945.)

March 22. Dr. ROBERT A. GORDON, War Production Board.

Subject: International Raw Materials Control: War and Postwar.

March 26. Dr. HERBERT FURTH, Federal Reserve Board.

Subject: Monetary and Financial Problems in the Liberated Countries.

April 2. Dr. LLOYD METZLER, Federal Reserve Board.

Subject: Postwar Economic Policies of the United Kingdom. (An article based on this paper and written in collaboration with Dr. RANDALL HINSHAW was published in The Review of Economic Statistics, November 1945.)

April 16. Professor EDWARD S. MASON, State Department, Washington.

Subject: Commodity Agreements.

April 23. Dr. ABBA P. LERNER, New School for Social Research, N. Y.

Subject: Postwar Policies.

April 27. Professor JOHN VAN SICKLE, Vanderbilt University.

Subject: Wages and Employment: A Regional Approach.

May 14. Dr. E. M. H. LLOYD, United Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, British Treasury.

Subject: Inflation in Europe.

May 28. Professor LEON DUPRIEZ, University of Louvain, Belgium.

Subject: Problem of Full Employment in View of Recent European Experience.

May 29. Professor SEYMOUR E. HARRIS, Professor WASSILY W. LEONTIEF, Professor GOTTFRIED HABERLER, Professor ALVIN H. HANSEN.

Subject: The Shorter Work Week and Full Employment.

 

Source:   Harvard University. Report of the President of Harvard College and Reports of Departments for 1944-45, pp. 285-6.

 

Categories
Berkeley Lecture Notes

Berkeley (but maybe Roosevelt College). Notes for 9 lectures on income and employment. Lerner, 1947.

 

 

The following (typed unless noted) lecture series outline by Abba Lerner is quite typical for his lecture notes. When I checked the University of California catalogues for 1945/46 and 1946/47, I discovered that there were no courses numbered in the 300’s at that time. William Fellner did teach a graduate course Economics 235A and 235B “Advanced Money and Credit” that could conceivably have been the relevant course.

It is also quite possible that Lerner’s handwritten note on the first card “Univ. of California Spring 1947” was incorrect. Maybe some day, this loose end gets tied. According to Lerner’s c.v. he was Professor of Economics at the New School for Social Research (1946-47) and at Roosevelt University, Chicago (1947-59).  He also lists visiting professorships at Roosevelt College in the Spring and Summer of 1947. He does not list the University of California for that year.
CV Source: Library of Congress. Papers of Abba P. Lerner. Box 6, Folder 2 “Biographical, 1943-82, n.d.”.

________________________

Income and Employment

9 lectures

  1. I, C Y, S. ✓ defs. ✓ system.
  2. Say and Keynes FF ✓ [functional finance]
  3. Rigidities and Unemployment
  4. The Rate of interest ✓
  5. Neo classical theory of Emp.
  6. Business Cycles
  7. FF and National Debt. ✓
  8. Employment Policy
  9. Sentimental Internationalism.

handwritten: multiplier ✓

handwritten: [Univ. of California Spring 1947]

________________________

INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT 335A

1. F. April 11th, 1947

✓ I and C make Y
✓ S and I. defs.
Steering Wheel
Deficits or big budgets (for defl
Keynes’ Law.
✓ simplicity and complicators.

Ec Steering Wheel
FF and Fed Debt
Integrated FE policy

________________________

INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT 335A

2. F. April 18th, 1947

Repeat I, C, and Y ✓

Functional Finance Principles. ✓
[handwritten: o] six instruments
Deficits or big budgets.

Say’s law and Keynes’ Law. ✓

Refs. Ec Steering Wheel
FF and Fed Debt
Integrated FE Policy

________________________

INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT 335A

3. F. April 25th, 1947

S and I. Pd. count receipts and payments. ✓
increased M. “out of” not ✓
value appreciation (Brookings)

[following section labeled “O” =omit?]
FF and six instruments
            implicit combination
Budgets and Debt Principles fall
Fear of Debt. Internal and External.
grandchildren. Interest Burden.
Real Burden. Inequality.
Inflation and taxes. Incentives
both ways – silent socialism.
What Aternative? Private
Debt worse. efficiency,
price charge, monopolistic
falsification keeps the evil
an especially bad tax system
though private.
Limit and limit.

handwritten addition: multiplier ✓

________________________

INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT

4. F. May 2, 1947

S and I again. govt S and I too ✓

Robertson’s definition ✓ –don’t explain. ✓

Ex ante—no clear meaning. ✓

propensities—equ. conditions. ✓

handwritten addition unclear: low? i

Debt. in- external. grandchild
interest burden. Real burden
inequality inflation and taxes.

incentives and loss offset
silent socialism Alternative?
private debt worse. efficiency
price charge monopoly as bad
tax limit and limit.

________________________

INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT

5. F. May 9, 1947

? No I and S ?

Continue Debt
Real burden
Distribution, loss offset,
socialism, profit rebate,
taxes, bad taxes, why taxes
bad? surplus. departure from
optimum price. what alternative
tax now or later.
troubles those of FE not of Debt.
private debt. efficiency of
private vs. public investment.
monopoly as very bad tax.
(negative rent)

limit and limit (Hansen)

Next Theory of Interest.

________________________

INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT

6. F. May 16, 1947

Conclude Debt.
Private vs. Govt Debt.
greater efficiency
charging average cost
like bad tax worse.

limit and limit.

Theory of Interest.
Classical S & D for saving Handwritten: Define F.E.

 

Handwritten: 7. May 23

Loanable funds ✓
Liquidity preference ✓
Must bring in Income
Assets and Money, (credit & Capital)
o[=omit?] ? Sigma
two margins OK ✓

Next Neo Classical Theory
Business Cycles.

________________________

INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT

8. F. June 6, 1947

Questions on Theory of Interest. ✓
Neo-Classical Theory of Employment
eight stages. Like Int. Th. ✓
Stability conditions
marginal propensity to invest.
marginal efficiency of investment
marginal productivity of Cap.

Business Cycles
expansion and prosperity
prosperity depending on expansion.

Kalecki’s scheme.
(Process analysis)

________________________

INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT

9. Sat. June 7, 1947 (?)

Sentimental Internationalism

Free trade failure
beggar my neighbor
advantages of fixed exchanges
International Monetary Fund.
exchange adjustment vs. price adjustment.
hedging. longterm investment for foreign trade.
competitive devaluation—T.T. ✓

hoarding each others’ currencies
conditions for single currency.
symptom cannot be legislated.

 

Source: Library of Congress. Papers of Abba P. Lerner. Box 22, Folder “Lectures and speeches: Other, 1937-47”.

Image Source: Publicity photo of Abba Lerner from Beth Emet’s announcement of speakers in its 1958 Forum (that included besides Dr. Abba Lerner, the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. as well as the actor Theodore Bikel) in Library of Congress. Abba P. Lerner Papers. Box 6, Folder 8 “’B’ miscellany”.