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Exam Questions Johns Hopkins

Johns Hopkins. Exams for graduate course on business cycles. Domar, 1951-54

 

Below are three final exams for the Johns Hopkins University graduate course on business cycles taught by Evsey Domar. The examination for 1948-49 has been posted earlier, we see that a few of those questions were recycled below.

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Economics 617
BUSINESS CYCLES

Three hours —January 25, 1951—E.D. Domar

  1. How does the U.S. Department of Commerce treat the following items in the computation of gross national product, national income and consumers disposable income:
    1. Interest on the Federal debt paid to consumers.
    2. Dividends received by American consumers from abroad.
    3. Personal income taxes.
    4. Sales taxes.
    5. Social security payments made by the government to individuals.
    6. Undistributed profits of corporations. If you disagree with the Commerce Department methods, present and justify the methods you would recommend.
  2. Set up a simple model of the Keynesian system including its interest theory and explain its essential differences from the so-called classical system.
  1. 1. Construct a model according to the following conditions:

a) Consumption of a given period is a linear function of the income of the same period.
b) Investment of a given period is a linear function of the difference between incomes of two immediately preceding periods.
c) Income is the sum of consumption, investment and an export balance (constant), all of the same period.

  1. Derive the equation describing the movement of income over time.
  2. Analyze this equation for convergence, divergence and fluctuations and derive the critical values of the parameters.
  3. Make a graph of your results.Give a careful explanation of each step.
  1. Now that we are entering an inflationary period, increased production is suggested as an excellent anti-inflation measure. But larger production means larger incomes which intensify inflation. What then is the actual effect of increased production on inflation?
    Indicate clearly each step in your reasoning.

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ECONOMICS 618
BUSINESS CYCLES

E. D. Domar—Three Hours—May 21, 1952

Answer any four questions. They carry equal weights. Your reasoning is more important than your answers.

I.

“So far as capitalism is concerned we are undoubtedly justified in calling underconsumption a disease of old age.” (Paul Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development,” p. 189.)
Comment.

II.

“Technological progress is alleged to create new investment opportunities by making existing capital assets obsolete. But to the extent that such obsolescence was foreseen, the assets were depreciated over a shorter period and thus gave rise to larger gross savings. Therefore expectedtechnological progress fails to stimulate the economy.”

III.

Hansen emphasizes the positive effect of the growth of population on investment, national income and employment. Yet during the depression many countries suffering from unemployment tried to reduce immigration.
Can you explain this contradiction?

IV.

About 1945 or 1946 when a large loan to Britain was discussed in Washington, the New York Times tried to justify it on the grounds that the British were sure to spend all this money in the United States. On the other hand, the Russians (who also might have asked for a loan) could not be so trusted.
Comment on this and develop your answer into an essay.

V.

Write an essay on any subject related to the course but not covered in your term papers. Take something interesting if possible.

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THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
E. D. Domar              May 21, 1954

ECONOMICS 617-618
(Business Cycles)

Three Hours

Answer all questions. They carry equal weights.

I.

Present and analyze some (respectable) business cycle theory not discussed in your own term paper.

II.

The following statement appeared in the National City Bank Monthly Letter (Jan. 1944) regarding government spending as a means of raising the level of income and employment:

“Government spending tends to be like a drug, in that it takes larger and larger doses to get results, and all the time debt and taxes get higher and higher.”

Comment. What could be said regarding private investment directed to the same purpose?

III.

“In spite of his claim to the contrary, Keynes did not succeed in proving the possibility of underemployment equilibrium if wages and prices were assumed to be flexible. That a long period of unemployment could persist as a result of wage and price rigidity we had known long before Keynes.”

Comment on this statement and show what effects flexible prices and wages would have on elimination of unemployment (in a depression) and a bottleneck (during inflation). Indicate clearly every step in your analysis. What practical recommendations follow from your discussion?

IV.

The following comment was made by Mr. Ayzenshtadt, a Soviet economist, in 1947:

“Even the greatest admirers of Keynes and of his theory that loan capital is the main propeller of the industrial cycle, do not see anything new in it…Keynes himself thinks that the ‘novelty’ of his system lies in the equilibrium formula of the economic process, in which the independent and dependent variables are arranged as follows:

Independent variables:

1. Propensity to consume
2. Marginal efficiency of capital
3.Rate of interest
4. Liquidity preference.

Dependent variables:

1. Saving
2. Investment
3. Level of employment.”

Comment. Be specific.

Source:  Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Library of Rare Books and Manuscripts. Economists’ Papers Archives. The Evsey D. Domar Papers, Box 16, Folder “Final Examination, Business Cycles”.

Image source: Domar, Evsey D.“” Webpage at the MIT Museum Website.

Categories
Funny Business M.I.T.

MIT. The Wizard of E52-383C. Grad Student Skit, 1976

 

Today’s addition to the skits written and performed by my cohort of M.I.T. economics graduate students (we joined the program in 1974-75)  was performed in early 1976.  It is a parody of the classic Judy Garland movie The Wizard of Oz.  As coincidence would have it, the faculty’s own contribution to the skit party was a Wizard of Oz parody too. There are so many obscure references in the script that I’ll perhaps prepare an annotated version later. Not to brag, but Paul Samuelson was reported to have said after seeing my performance as the cowardly lion words to the effect “I think that guy might be in the wrong business.”

A parody of Alice in Wonderland set in the Wonderland Institute of Technology in 1975 was written and performed in 1975. In addition to the script I posted a list of my classmates with links to some biographical information where I was able to find something. 

In 1978 many of same people were involved in Casablank, a parody of the movie Casablanca. That script has likewise been transcribed and posted here at Economics in the Rear-view Mirror.

_________________

Cast of characters [corresponding Professor]
in order of appearance with actor’s name when known

Wizard of Mit [Paul Samuelson] played by Paul Krugman
Dorothy [Representative graduate student] played by Margaret Feiger (neé Agnew)
Mailman
Del [Del Tapley, Department Administrator]
Munchkin Labor Force Kid [Robert Hall]
Munchkin Mayor [Evsey Domar] played by William Krasker
Munchkin Adelman [Morris Adelman]
Wicked Witch of the East 
Scarecrow [Robert Solow] played by Jay Helms
Tin Man [Franco Modigliani] played by Dick Startz
Oil Can [Stanley Fischer] played by Jeffrey Frankel
Lion [Jerry Hausman] played by Bud Collier
Narrator
Housewife

_________________

THE WIZARD OF E52-383C

by Messrs. B. Collier, J. Frankel, J. Helms, R. Hill, P. Krugman, D. Startz.

 

Act I
Scene I

Wizard (offstage) Good Evening, Ladies and Gentlemen. I am the Great and Powerful Wizard of Mit. Tonight the Second year class presents a tale of the supernatural—The Wizard of E52-383C. Any resemblance between faculty members and characters in this skit is purely coincidental. Pay no attention to the identifying initials worn by the actors! Our action begins in Kansas where Dorothy, a college senior, has received a series of troubling letters.

 

Dorothy: (picking up and reading letters): I don’t understand it. I’ve been rejected by every grad school I applied to. Chicago…Stanford…Slippery Rock State Teacher’s College…University of Southern North Dakota…Southwestern Virginia College for Small Women…What did I do wrong? I wonder if I should have mentioned on my applications that I have an NSF fellowship?

(FANFARE)

enter Mailman (running): Special delivery! I have a piece of registered mail for Occupant.

Dorothy: That’s me! (opens letter) Why, it’s a letter from MIT. (begins reading)

Mailman (to audience): Dorothy’s letter says: “Dear Sir, Madam, or otherwise: We hear you have received an NSF and are delighted to admit you to our graduate economics program. This acceptance is, of course, based solely on our evaluation of your academic promise and be sure to fill out and return the enclosed financial form immediately.”

Dorothy: Hey, how do you know what it says? Did you get the same letter?

Mailman: Why not? Nobody said that it had to be a one-to-one correspondence.

Dorothy: Well, I guess I’d better go to MIT. But I don’t know how to get there. Excuse me, sir, (turning to Mailman), but can you tell me how I can get to MIT?

Mailman: (solemnly) Study!

 

Scene II

Dorothy: Somehow, I have a feeling we’re not in Kansas anymore.

Del: Hi! What witch are you?

Dorothy: Which what? Who? Huh? Oh! Why, I’m not a witch at all. As a matter of fact, I’ve never even seen a witch, I went to a state university.

Munchkins: Hee hee.

Dorothy: What’s that?

Del: They’re laughing because I am a witch. I’m Del, the good witch of the North.

Dorothy: Oh, I beg your pardon. But who are they?

Del: Those are Munchkins, the little people who live in this land. And you are their national heroine, for you have killed the Wicked Witch of the East Campus. Come out, every one, it’s safe now!

Dorothy: Hello!

Del: Munchkin Hall, from the second floor, would like to give you a present.

Hall (singing and dancing on one foot):

I represent the Labor Force Kids
The Labor Force Kids, The Labor Force Kids,
And on behalf of the Labor Force Kids
I wish to welcome you to Munchkin Land

The Labor Force Kids are honored to present you with a copy of my latest Brookings paper on the Phillips curve (holding paper upside down)

Dorothy: Aren’t you holding that journal upside down?

Hall: Well, most people think it slopes the opposite way, but they’re wrong, as you can tell by looking at the 454 model, which is empirically fitted on one observation.

Dorothy: But are you sure your paper is right?

Hall: Well, there are actually a few—actually, I—uh –as a matter of fact, I’d better warn you that some of the things I told you last term aren’t quite true. But here (taking another BPEA) is my latest Brookings paper on inflation, and I promise that this is my absolute last word on the subject…until next Fall.

enter Domar: On behalf of all the Munchkins, I, the Mayor of the Munchkins, welcome you to our land.

Dorothy: I’m pleased to meet you. But, please, sir, what exactly is a Munchkin?

Domar: Oh, a Munchkin is a sort of peasant. Actually, some Munchkins are workers, but most are peasants. I am the Mayor because I love to talk about peasants.

Dorothy: Why do the Munchkins need a Mayor? Is it hard to keep law and order?

Domar: Oh no, it’s no trouble at all. Munchkins are a friendly, peaceful folk who live in harmony and concord, except for a few who live in Lincoln. The only reason they need a mayor is because Munchkinland is a Mayoritocracy. Why, all the Munchkin laws are in this little book (hands Dorothy a book)

Dorothy: It’s awfully heavy for such a little book.

Hall: That’s because they’re all iron laws.

A Munchkin: Now let us all rejoice and tell happy stories!

Hall: 14.454!

(laughter)

Adelman: 14.124!

(laughter)

Dorothy: I don’t get it.

Domar: Oh, around here all you have to do is mention some course numbers and everyone thinks it’s funny.

Dorothy: Can I try it?

Domar: Be my guest.

Dorothy: 14.383

(everyone starts crying)

Domar: Why did you tell such a sad story? You’ve upset everyone!

(shrieks, rumbles)

Wicked Witch: Who killed my sister?

Dorothy: I thought you said she was dead!

Del: This is her sister, the Wicked Witch of the West.

Dorothy: You have two wicked witches?

Hall: O yes, you wouldn’t believe the trouble we’ve had around here because of doubles witching!

Wicked Witch: Who killed my sister? Was it you?

Dorothy: But I didn’t mean to.

Wicked Witch: I’ll get you, my pretty, and your little dog too!

Dorothy: What little dog?

Wicked Witch: You’re supposed to have a little dog!

Dorothy: Well you can’t expect us to reproduce the movie in Toto!

Del: You are in great danger, my dear, and you had better go and seek out help.

Dorothy: Who can help me?

Del: Perhaps the great Wizard of Mit can.

Dorothy: Can he pull a rabbit out of a hat?

Del: Well, he’s no Hal Varian, he can only do half a rabbit at a time.

Dorothy: Sounds like hare-splitting to me. But how do I find him?

Hall: It’s easy: just follow the gray cement.

Dorothy: (looking at ground) Follow the gray cement…follow the gray cement…(bumps into wall) Hey! Your were wrong, this path doesn’t lead anywhere.

Hall: Yes, I realized it wasn’t true as soon as I said it, but I decided not to tell you.

Adelman: Before you go, I, as the chief Munchkin expert on the oil industry, will make a prophecy: you will go safely to Mit and he will return you to Kansas.

Dorothy: Why does being an oil expert mean that you can see the future?

Adelman: Everyone knows there’s lots of prophets in the oil industry.

Dorothy: I sure hope this turns out better than some of your other predictions.

Del: Now my dear, you’d better start on your way to Mit.

Dorothy: How do I get there? And no funny business this time!

Del: Let’s see. I know I have it written down here somewhere (rummaging on table; picks up envelope, looks on back) Oh yes, here it is. All you must do is follow the yellow brick road…to Government center, change for the Green Line to Park Street, then take the Red Line to Kendall.

Dorothy: Follow the yellow brick road…follow the yellow brick road…

All: (singing)

Follow the yellow brick road
Follow the yellow brick road
Follow the, follow the, follow the, follow the,
Follow the yellow brick road

You’re off to see the Wizard,
The Wonderful Wizard of Mit
We hear he is a wonderful WizThough most of his stuff is—ahem!

If ever oh ever a Wiz there was
The Wizard of Mit is one because,
Because, because, because, because….

(everyone looks around in confusion, shrugs shoulders, and walks off stage).

 

ACT II
Dorothy Meets the Scarecrow

(Scarecrow is standing as if held up by a pole, his arms stretched out. Enter Dorothy)

Dorothy: Follow the yellow brick road…follow the yellow brick road…? But there’s a fork in the road! Where do I go now?

Scarecrow: You could go down the golden rule path. (He points left.)

Dorothy: (startled) What was that? There’s no one here but a scarecrow!

Scarecrow:  Or, you could go down the turnpike. (He points right.)

Dorothy: (to the audience) Wasn’t he pointing the other way?

Scarecrow: Of course, some people just can’t differentiate between the two. (He points both ways.)

Dorothy: You did say something, didn’t you? (Scarecrow looks silly pointing both ways:) Are you doing that on purpose or can’t you make up your mind?

Scarecrow: That’s just the trouble—I can’t make up my mind—I haven’t got a brain…only straw. (He says sadly.)

Dorothy: How can you talk if you haven’t got a brain?

Scarecrow:  I don’t know (thoughtful pause). But you’ll find there’re lots of people around here without brains who do an awful lot of talking.

Dorothy: What do you mean by that?

Scarecrow:  I may not have a brain, but I have enough sense not to answer that question. Besides, it’d be tasteless, and we’re leaving that sort of stuff to Perloff and the fourth year class.

Dorothy: But won’t they get into big trouble for that?

Scarecrow: Maybe so, but at least they can run away—I’m stuck here on this pole.

Dorothy: Oh, that must be very uncomfortable—what do you do up there all day?

Scarecrow: Well, everything I see reminds me of sex, but I’m trying to keep it out of this skit.

Dorothy: Here. (She walks over to him.) Maybe I can help you (Scarecrow acquires a lecherous grin.)…get down, that is.

Scarecrow: If you could bend the nail down I might fall off. (She does so, and the scarecrow falls down and flops around a bit.) Oh, thank you! Thank you! You really know how to knock down a straw man—you’ll do fine here. But I’m still a failure because I haven’t got a brain.

Dorothy: What would you do with a brain if you had one?

Scarecrow: (aside) I think that’s a cue for a song.

Dorothy: But you can’t sing—I heard you in rehearsal.

Scarecrow: You’re not kidding! But neither can anyone else in this skit, so people had better just get used to it. Besides, the audience seems pretty juiced up anyway.

I could wile away the hours
Reading Robert Clower
Or even J. M. Keynes

It would be no enigma
When things grew at rate sigma
If I only had a brain.

I could put down Milton neatly
And Franco quite discreetly
They’d suffer boundless pain

I could do a lot of thinkin’
I could be like Don Patinkin
If I only had a brain.

Oh I
Could tell you why
Growth theory’s such a bore
And what god made grad students for (?)
And then I’d sit
And think some more.

I could solve for optimality
With primal and duality
And never feel the strain

I could normalize the vector
That describes the public sector
If I only had a brain.

Dorothy: (running off) …oh my god…

Scarecrow: Wait! (shouting, running after her) You didn’t even introduce yourself!

Dorothy: Oh, yes …I’m Alice…I mean Dorothy.

Scarecrow: What are you doing here?

Dorothy: I’m going to see the Wonderful Wizard of Mit to ask him to help me get home.

Scarecrow: Where’s your home?

Dorothy: It’s one of those places where ivy doesn’t grow—you’ve probably never heard of it.

Scarecrow: (slowly, with tone of contempt) Oh, yes… but how did you ever get here from there ?…Well, no matter…Hey, do you think this Wizard of yours could help me get a brain?

Dorothy: Probably not. No one around here seems to have nearly enough brains for himself—much less enough to give away.

Scarecrow: But isn’t it worth a try? Hey, look—maybe he has one but he’s just not using it very much—then he’d never miss it if he gave it to me.

Dorothy: You’re right! (excitement builds!) Come along then!

Scarecrow: Hooray! We’re off to see the Wizard!

(Dorothy and Scarecrow exit, skipping and singing, “We’re off to see the Wizard….)

 

ACT III
Tin Woodsman Scene

(Tin man on stage, Dorothy & Scare crow walk in

Tin Man: (with mouth closed) Oil can.

Dorothy: What was that?

Tin Man: (more clearly) Oil can.

Scarecrow: I think he said “oil can”.

Dorothy: Where would we find an oil can in the middle of the forest?

(Oil can hops in: harmonica fanfare)

Dorothy: What a coincidence!

Oil Can: Not really, I was out in Chicago waiting for this to happen. You see, we left the Tin Man in a seminar room all by himself…

Dorothy: …and he was so lonely he cried and rusted shut?

Oil Can: He kept right on talking and was bored stiff.

(Oil Can and Dorothy loosen up the Tin Man)

Tin Man: …yes by the way it works in my model…

Dorothy: (interrupts) I have a question.

Tin Man: Yes?

Dorothy: You look very peculiar for a Tin Man. Everyone else in the room uses at least two axes and you don’t even have one.

Tin Man: Well the reason I can do that is I find an axe isn’t so good. No, a two man saw is much more efficient.

Oil Can: The truth is he can’t cut down a tree without a co-author.

Dorothy: (to Oil Can) You have a very interesting accent. You sound just like someone I know but I can’t quite place it. Hmmm…I know who it is! You sound just like Jeremy Bulow.

Tin Man: I promise from now on I’m going to be witty and entertaining and I will try to maintain a high rate of interest.

Scarecrow: That doesn’t tell us much. You promising to set a high rate of interest is like the young man who swears to lead a virtuous life. You still don’t know what he’s going to do with his hands.

Tin Man: I’d like to tell you a few more characteristics of my life’s story, but I see it’s five o’clock and we’re out of time.

Oil Can: That’s ok, this skit goes until 5:30.

Dorothy: You do that one more time and we’re sending you back to Chicago.

Tin Man: The reason I keep talking about my model is because I haven’t got a heart.

Dorothy: Do you mean that when the tinsmith made you he left out a heart? How sad.

Tin Man: Oh no, I had one originally. But you see I thought Milton needed one a lot more than I did, so I gave it to him. Then he sold it to the University of Chicago Art Gallery.

Dorothy: Huh?

Oil Can: Both the gallery and Uncle Milton have always wanted to hang a Modigliani.

Dorothy: Why do you keep on talking about your model when you should show a little restraint?

(into song sung by Tin Man except where indicated)

There’s a money demand equation
a free reserve relation
difficult it ain’t.

Class attention I’d be keepin’
And there’d be nobody sleepin’
If I only showed restraint.

I do model simulation
of disintermediation
the notion’s really quaint.

I could talk to Kenneth Arrow
or even Robert Barro
If I only showed restraint.

Riddle me
economy
above a voice cries low

(Dorothy) Wherefore art thou, Franco?

I estimate!
(thump, thump)

(Scarecrow) I integrate!

I’d forget about consumption
study peasants like the Munchkin
be quiet as a saint.

(Oil Can) I’d have time to teach you theory
Students wouldn’t get so weary
If I only showed restraint.

Dorothy: Are you always around to take care of the Tin Man?

Oil Can: What do you take me for, a one night Stan?

Dorothy: Which way to Mit?

Tin Man: (In Italian) I think it’s that way. (point)

Scarecrow: Sheer madness.

Dorothy: Yes, that way would be better.

Scarecrow: Sheer madness and a Talmudic argument.

Dorothy: Well then, how about that way?

Scarecrow: Sheer madness, a Talmudic argument, and if God had intended us to go that way. She would have put up a sign post.

Oil Can: Never mind, Mit lies that way.

Dorothy: How can you be so sure that road will converge to Mit?

Oil Can: Elementary, it’s the perfect foresight path.

 

ACT IV
Cowardly Lion Scene

Dorothy: Oh my, the path leads us into this forest. Do you think that there are any wild animals there?

Scarecrow: Maybe a lion or two, nothin’ to get worried about.

Dorothy: Lions! Do you think we’ll meet any?

Tin Man: Don’t worry Dorothy, we’ll protect you.

Scarecrow:  (to Tin Man) But who will protect us?

Tin Man: Shhh. Besides, the only lion that lives around here is the economist’s best friend—the regression lion.

Dorothy:  A regression lion? I’ve never heard of one of those before. Are you sure they won’t attack us?

Scarecrow: I don’t know for sure but there’s a pretty harmless one called OLS, it’s BLUE.

Tin Man: That’s a lion of a different color.

Scarecrow: Of course, there is always the GLS…, it’s ferocious.

Dorothy:  What color is GLS?

Scarecrow: Blue.

Dorothy:  So how will we be able to tell them apart?

Scarecrow: Sometimes they’re the same thing.

Tin Man: But the meanest and baddest lions in the forest are (pause, then whisper) FIML.

Dorothy: OLS?

Scarecrow: (nodding his head) GLS.

Tin Man: FIML.

Dorothy: Oh my!

All: OLS, GLS, FIML…

Dorothy: Oh my!

All: OLS, GLS, FIML…

Dorothy: Oh my!

(Repeat the above chant with Dorothy’s ‘Oh my!’ several times, faster and faster. Go around in circles so that the three are facing the entrance/exit and they are heading towards the entrance when out pops the lion roaring, Dorothy screams.)

Lion: RRRRRROOOAR!!! (to Tin Man) Hah, so you’re trying to hold the money workshop in the forest without inviting me.

Tin Man: But, but….

Lion: Just don’t let it happen again, hey Tin Man who’s the chick with the clown?

Dorothy: (scared) I’m not a chick, and he’s not a clown, he’s a scarecrow. And he’s smart too, so you’d better be careful.

Lion: So ya think you’re smart do ya’? (Scarecrow shakes his head “no”.) Oh yeah, well put ‘em up, wanna see who can prove that three stage least squares is asymptotically efficient? (Scarecrow is shaking and on his knees, begging, and shaking his head) See, he’s scared. Hah! Com on ya dummy, I’ll let you prove it in thirty lines, I’ll do it in less than ten. Ah, come on scarecrow, I’ll let ya use my colored chalk, I’ll use white chalk, I’ll even erase the board for myself. (Scarecrow is on the ground paralyzed with fear. To Dorothy…) See, he ain’t so smart.

Tin Man: You really shouldn’t act this way…

Lion: Don’t criticize my acting. Will you shut up or do I have to turn you into a sculpture for the East Campus? I wonder what you would look like with your head put on backwards?

Dorothy: (running behind and pulling his tail) Don’t hurt Tin Man, he just can’t restrain himself, it’s not his fault. You shouldn’t make fun of Scarecrow’s scarcity of wit either. Do you think you’re perfect?

Lion: (starts crying) Ah why’d you have to go and pull my tail, I wasn’t trying to hurt nobody. I was just having my own sick, perverted, disgusting fun (bawls some more).

Dorothy: My goodness, what a fuss you’re making. You’re nothing but a big coward.

Lion: You’re right, I am a coward. Just look at the circles under my eyes, I haven’t slept in weeks.

Tin Man: Why don’t you try reading Patinkin?

Lion: I can’t, I’m afraid the suspense would kill me.

Scarecrow: Maybe the Wizard could help you. He’s going to give me a brain and him restraint and he’ll help get Dorothy out of here.

Lion: (To Dorothy) You think he could do it?

Dorothy: He’s a Wizard isn’t he? Oh, do come with us, it’s worth a try, come on.

Lion. OK, it would really be terrific if the Wizard could give me courage (he lapses into song….)

“IF I ONLY HAD MORE NERVE”

When I’d speak I wouldn’t mumble,
I would seem so meek and humble.
All that you would observe.
And I’d answer all your queries
When I’d lecture on time series,
If I only had more nerve.

I’m afraid there’s no denyin’
that this regression lion
Can’t even draw a curve.
But I know that this kitty
Could give lectures truly witty,
If he only had more nerve.

Oh I…..’d be King of Mit,
My realm the whole third floor,
Editor of Econometrica,
And then I would teach
Three-eighty-four!

I would humbly beg your pardon
If I’d seem to come too hard on,
Decorum I’d observe.
And I’d be just like your brother,
No longer a mean mother-…
If I only had more nerve.

Dorothy: I wouldn’t worry if I were you, it took a lot of nerve to sing that song.

Scarecrow: Shall we go to see the Wizard?

Tin Man: Let’s go!

All: (Arm in arm, they go off singing)  We’re off to see the Wizard….

 

(break for commercial)

Narrator: We will return to the Wizard of Mit after station identification.

Housewife: Mothers! You may have compared guns to butter, but are you uncertain what brand of butter to choose? Try new Scotch brand mean-preserving spread. Scotch brand sticks to your bread. Just a wee bit removes the uncertainty as to which side your bread is buttered on. In 9 out of 10 families, it produces a higher level of margarine utility. And, as part of a budget-constrained diet, Scotch brand mean-preserving spread can help preserve your means.

Narrator: Preserve my means of what?

Housewife: Your means of payment.

Narrator:(Snorts) I don’t know what means of payment! I don’t have any bread.

Housewife: So remember mothers, all brands of butter are not indifferent. Next time you are at the supermarket, try Scotch brand mean-preserving spread. You can differentiate it by the little Scotch on the rooks. (Pointing to package.)

Narrator: And speaking of Scots, don’t forget to get your tickets for the Adam Smith Roast, April 12, commemorating the 200thanniversary of the publication of the Wealth of Nations. Join us for an Eve with Adam.
We now return to the Wizard of Mit, already in progress.

 

ACT V
“Waiting for the Wizard”

Scene 1.

Man at door: (Wizard with a Groucho Marx disguise of glasses, nose, and moustache) I’m sorry, but the Wizard is busy, you’ll have to wait here.

Lion: If I had more nerve, I’d tell him a thing or two. He wouldn’t dare talk to the King of Mit like that.

Dorothy: Your majesty, if you were king, you wouldn’t be afraid of anybody?

Lion: Not nobody, not nohow, nuthin’.

Scarecrow: What of non-linear estimation?

Lion: I’d do it on my vacation.

Tin Man: How ‘bout a grad student with a question?

Lion: Wouldn’t even affect my digestion.

Dorothy: Not even errors in variables?

Lion: That wouldn’t be so terriable.

Scarecrow: But what of a fixed-point theorem?

Lion: I wouldn’t even fear ‘em.

(Dorothy, Scarecrow, and Tinman look at each other confused and together say)

All (but Lion): How?

Lion: How?…..Courage.

What makes Jim Tobin cool in inflation?
Courage.
What makes Ken Galbraith so ready to ration?
Courage.
What makes Frank Fisher insulting
Though he’s never here and always consulting?
Courage.
What makes Scarf so easily able
To prove his equilibr’um stable?
What makes Diamond’s neoclassical fable?
Courage.
What makes Domar so concerned with the serf?
Courage.
What lets Lance Taylor know wheat from the turf?
Courage.
What gives Eckaus the decision on money?
What gives Bob Bishop the right to be funny?
Courage.
What makes Hatanka hot?
What puts the “P” in Hall’s P-dot?
What do they got that I ain’t got?

Others: (loud) Tenure!

Lion: You can say that again.

(Out pops Wizard’s head in disguise again)

Man in disguise: You may come in, but please don’t make so much noise.

 

Scene 2.

(Dorothy, Scarecrow, Lion, Tin Man, and Oil Can meet the Wizard

Scarecrow: There’s the wizard!

Dorothy: Oh Wizard can you help us? Can you send me home?

Scarecrow: Can you give me brains?

Lion: Can you give me courage?

Tin Man: Can you give me restraint?

Wizard: (In deep voice) I am the great Wizard of Mit. Of course I can grant your requests for I am faster than hyperinflation, more powerful than an explosive cycle and able to leap tall nonnegativity constraints in a single Cramer-Rao bound.
But first you, Dorothy, must capture a set of the bluest coefficients from the Wicked Witch of the West—and you, Scarecrow, Lion, and Tin Man, must help her.

(Dorothy, Scarecrow, Lion, Tin Man, Oil Can exit, talking with one another about what they are to do)

 

ACT VI
The Castle of the Wicked Witch

(Dorothy, Tinman, Scarecrow, Lion, Oil Can on stage)

Tin Man: This is Harvard, so the Wicked Witch’s castle must be around here somewhere.

Scarecrow: But we haven’t seen any building named Bronwyn Hall.

Dorothy: Oh, this is terrible. We’ll never be able to get those coefficients, and I’ll never be able to go home. (sobs)

Lion: Wait a minute! There’s a computer. I’m sure it will be more than happy to solve our problem for us.

Dorothy: Yes, but how can we use it without an account? Oh, if only someone would give me some computer money! (pause) I said: Oh, if only someone would give me some computer money!

enter Del: Hi! Did I hear you calling for something?

Dorothy: Please, can I have some computer money?

Del: How much do you want?

Dorothy: Twenty-five should be enough.

Del: Oh, that’s alright then. If you want more you’ll have to go see Professor Eckaus. Here you are (opens change purse and gives Dorothy a quarter) (leaves)

Tin Man: Well, now you can run the equation, although I must admit I am rather skeptical about your getting any results. In the last 17 papers I have co-authored on this subject I have failed to find any significant influence of…

Dorothy: (interrupting) Don’t you think we’d better get this over with?

Lion: Now Dorothy, it’s not nice to interrupt someone like that.

Oil Can: You know, Dorothy, if the Regression Lion has to give you lessons in tact, you’re in real trouble.

Dorothy: Well, anyway, let me see what comes out. (Puts quarter in machine, rips off sheet of paper.) Hey this is gibberish! That’s very peculiar.

Lion: Oh, I don’t think it’s peculiar. It fact, it’s quite normal.

Scarecrow: Why is it normal?

Lion: Because I’ve seen it happen lots of times, and anything becomes approximately normal after about 25 observations.

Dorothy: All that it says on this printout is “Error 1039”. Does anyone know what that means?

Lion: No, but we can look it up in the version 2.7 manual.

Dorothy: Well, you do that. I’ll go see if I can find Bill Dellafar (starts to walk offstage, shrieks, is yanked off)

Scarecrow: Error 1039, error 1039, let’s see: it says, “I’ll get you, my pretty, and your little dog too.”

(all look around)

Tin Man: The Wicked Witch must have taken Dorothy!

Scarecrow: But where?

Wicked Witch: Ha ha ha! You know I’m here somewhere, but you’ll never find enough restrictions to identify me!

Lion: Now what are we going to do?

Tin Man: If I knew you were going to ask that question, I would have put it in my model, which I have to believe in, because if I don’t, who will?

Scarecrow: Now look, I don’t have any brains, so I don’t know any econometrics, and I wouldn’t believe it if I did. But I have an idea. What we have here is an identification problem. Now what does that make you think of?

Oil Can: Money!

Scarecrow: Everything you hear makes you think of money. Everything I hear makes me think of sex, but I’m still trying to keep it out of the skit.

Dorothy: (offstage) you’re not trying had enough!

Scarecrow: I mean Frank Fisher.

Lion: But we can’t afford him. He charges 100,000 bucks to testify against witches.

Scarecrow: Yes, but the second year students have never had Fisher, and don’t know him from Irving. If you (pointing to Lion) go around humiliating students and saying incomprehensible things, nobody will know the difference.

Lion: All right, I’ll do it. I’m gonna go in and set the system of equations (1) in the normalized form (4) after deleting the columns corresponding to the a priori known elements of beta and gamma, which will allow us to use equation (14) to derive the Fiml estimator delta-hat in instrumental variable form. And there’s only one thing I want you guys to do.

All: What is it?

Lion: Talk me out of it!

Scarecrow: Okay, let’s go!

(Dorothy comes running out)

Tin Man: Come on Dorothy!

Wicked Witch: You won’t escape me!

(Dorothy trips over wire)

Wicked Witch: What have you done? You’ve pulled my plug! I’m going down, I’m going down…

Tin Man: The Wicked Witch is dead; but now how are we going to get the coefficients?

Scarecrow: Well, since I don’t have a brain, I always cars this HP 55 with me, since it’s the next best thing. Maybe we can calculate them on this.

Dorothy: But will it do everything we need?

Scarecrow: Not by itself, but we have all sorts of special accessories. (While this happens, computer begins moving into audience, saying “Mommy”, “Where’s Browyn Hall?”, etc.)

Lion: For example, we can test for cereal correlation with this (pulls out a box of cereal)

Oil Can: And correct for it using the special CORC attachment! (pulls cork out of bottle, passes bottle around)

Tin Man: We can take t-statistics with these (tea bags)

Lion: And we can perform Chow tests with this! (dog food)

Scarecrow: We can use Almon Lags (almonds), and it will be no problem to scramble the variables (eggs).

Dorothy: Stop! We’ll never get them unscrambled! But can we get a variance?

Oil Can: You’ll have to go to the zoning board for that.

Scarecrow: And this will be only too glad to do hill-climbing for us (climbing gear)

Dorothy: It sure looks like a lot of work.

Scarecrow: That’s true, but it may be what God made graduate students for. Presumably she had somethingin mind.

(computer now speaks to Bronwyn Hall)

Computer: Good evening, Mrs. Hall. Here’s something you thought you’d never see: the very last bug from TSP (gives her bug).

 

ACT VII
Dorothy, Scarecrow, Lion and Tin Man return to the Wizard

 

Dorothy: (places coefficients before Wiz) Are they blue enough? Will they get me back home?

Wizard: That depends on whether the Lerner-Lewis-Leontief-Lousy operator meets the Bishop-Bowley-Bentham-Bogus condition on top of the Samuelson-Savage-Slutsky-Silly contour integrals.

Lion: But the coefficients—will they give me courage?

Wizard: (absent-mindedly) This reminds me of what Cournot said to Bernoulli when they were ruining gamblers in St. Petersburg…

Scarecrow: Please Wizard! Tell us if the coefficients are good enough to give me a brain!

Wizard: Or am I thinking of the time Edgeworth trampled on Pareto’s bordered Hessian and Villy came after him swinging a Markoff chain?

Tin Man: (knocking over poster of wizard to expose man reading Newsweek) Hey, this is no wizard—he’s a fake!

Wizard: Yes I admit—I get all my economics from Newsweek—I don’t understand those things I say any more than anyone else does.

Dorothy: You mean you don’t know what Shephard’s lemma is?

Wizard: I’ve never even seen a sheep.

Lion: You don’t understand the Wong-Viner envelope?

Wizard: I’ve never even been in a Chinese stationery store.

Dorothy: Then you can’t get me back home!

Lion: You can’t give me courage!

Scarecrow: Or me a brain!

Tin Man: Or me restraint!

Dorothy: I can’t believe that all the Munchkins have been saying how great you are when you’re a complete phony.

Wizard: I’m sorry, my dear, but it’s true. I’m an exact, pure humbug with or without the social contrivance of Munchkins. Now, Scarecrow, Lion, and Tin Man. Don’t get excited. There’s one thing that will help you all—when you have it the lack of brains, courage, and restraint doesn’t matter at all.

Scarecrow, Lion, Tin Man: (together) What is it?

Wizard: (sings)

I’m a dullard and a coward
and my math’s not so high-powered
my column’s not so wise.
Though I made a lot of money
No one thought my jokes were funny
‘Til I won the Nobel prize.

Though my thought is quite as narrow
as that of Kenneth Arrow
my ego’s twice his size.
Though I make a silly blunder
No one ever seems to wonder
How I won the Nobel prize.

refrain:

Koopmans, Kantorovich, Frisch
Tinbergen—I’m better than them all.
Next to me they scarcely count at all
I love me so
And you should know…

If you want a commendation
Just give me a small donation.
I’ll tell all sorts of lies.
So you see you can be winners
even though you’re just beginners
When you win your Nobel prize.

Scarecrow, Lion, Tin Man: (together) Oh, thank you Wizard!

Wizard: It was nothing. But Dorothy, how are we going to get you back to Kansas?

Dorothy: Kansas? What’s all this about Kansas—I want to go back to Australia.

THE END

Source: Personal copy of the script of Irwin Collier.

Image: Left to right: Paul Krugman as the Wizard of Mit, Jeffrey Frankel as Oil Can, Margaret (Feiger) Agnew as Dorothy, Irwin Collier as Lion, Dick Startz as Tin Man.  From Irwin Collier files (photographer unknown).

Categories
Exam Questions Harvard

Harvard. Final Exams for International Economic Relations. Haberler and Harris, 1936-37

 

 

Reading lists for Harvard’s International Economic Relations two semester sequence for the academic year 1939-40 taught by Gottfried Haberler, Seymour Harris, and Wassily Leontief have been transcribed and posted earlier.  For the 1936-37 course I have only found the reading period assignments and the final exams for both semesters. 

________________________

Course Enrollment

[Economics] 43a 1hf. (formerly 9a). Associate Professors Haberler and Harris, and other members of the department.—International Economic Relations, I. Theory of International Trade.

Total 70: 4 Graduates, 48 Seniors, 11 Juniors, 3 Sophomores, 4 Others.

 

[Economics] 43b2hf. (formerly 9a). Associate Professors Haberler and Harris, and other members of the department.—International Economic Relations, II. Commercial Policy.

Total 62: 5 Graduates, 45 Seniors, 5 Juniors, 3 Sophomores, 4 Others.

 

Source:  Harvard University. Report of the President of Harvard College, 1936-37, p. 92.

________________________

Reading Period First Semester
Economics 43a

Read one from each group:

  1. Marshall, Money, Credit and Commerce, pp. 98-190.
    Ohlin, Interregional and International Trade, pp. 1-138.
  2. Graham, Exchanges, Prices and Production in Hyper-Inflation Germany, pp. 97-238.

Reading Period Second Semester
Economics 43b

Read one of the following:

  1. Rope, German Commercial Policy
  2. Iverson, International Capital Movements, pp. 1-301 and pp. 454-512.
  3. World Trade Barriers in Relation to Agriculture
  4. a. Haight, French Import Quotas and
    b. Beverage, Tariffs, the Case Examined Chs. 1 thru 10.

Source:  Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003. HUC 8522.2.1) Box 2, Folder “Economics, 1936-37”.

________________________

1936-37
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
ECONOMICS 43a

Answer one question from Group I, one question from Group II, and two questions from Group III.

Group I

  1. What use does Marshall make of the relation of demand and supply in international trade?
  2. What is the difference, if any, between Ohlin’s and the Classical approach?

Group II

  1. What is the meaning of the “comparative cost doctrine” if there are not two, but many export and import goods
    1. with constant cost in all industries
    2. with increasing cost in all industries
    3. in terms of opportunity cost?
  2. The market condition of demand, supply, price and quantity for a particular commodity in two countries A and B is given by this diagram.

    1. Suppose trade is opened between the two countries. What will be the influence on the price, quantities produced and consumed in both countries and how much will be exported from A to B, assuming that there is no transportation cost involved.
      Answer in words and show graphically.
    2. After trade has been opened, a duty is imposed in B whose height (on this diagram) is measured by a vertical distance of, say, one half inch. What will be its influence on prices and quantities produced, consumed and traded between A and B?
      Answer in words and sketch graphically.

Group III

  1. Assume you calculate the balance of international payments for a country during a particular year. The result is the following:
Net debits Net credits
Merchandise and Services 200
Tourist expenditures 100
Long-term capital 100
Short-term capital 200
Interest, Dividends 150
Gold movements 50 ….
Total 450 350

a) Enumerate a few possible explanations of the discrepancy between credits and debits.
b) In a recent book by J. E. Meade, Economic Analysis and Policy, you find the following statement: “If all the items in the Balance of Payments are properly and completely recorded, the total of all the items on the receipt side must be equal to the total of all the items on the payments side; the Balance of Payments must balance” (p. 216). Give your comments on this statement.
c) How can the above statement be reconciled with the statement frequently found that “the balance of payment is in disequilibrium?”

  1. Discuss the effects of exchange depreciation upon prices.
  2. Is the breakdown of the gold standard to be associated primarily with internal developments or with such external factors as large capital movements? Discuss.

Mid-Year.  1937.

 

Source:  Harvard University Archives. Harvard University. Examination Papers (HUC 7000.28 vol. 79). Papers Printed for Final Examinations: History, History of Religions, …, Economics, …, Military Science, Naval Science. January-June, 1937.

 

________________________

1936-37
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
ECONOMICS 43b

Answer THREE of the first five questions, and ONE of the questions 6 to 9.

  1. When did the United States adopt the principle of the unconditional most-favored-nation treatment? Discuss the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the conditional and unconditional most-favored-nation clause.
  2. Discuss the differences and similarities between quotas and duties and the comparative merits of the two systems as methods for the restriction of imports and protection of home industries.
  3. Suppose an industry subject to decreasing cost; if production could be increased, costs per unit of output would fall. Production can, however, not be increased, because of foreign competition. Discuss whether and when in such circumstances an import duty can be justified on economic grounds.
  4. Discuss the mechanism of capital movements or reparation payments under a gold and under a paper standard. How do you account for wide difference of opinion among authorities concerning the practicability of large transfers of capital or reparations? Have recent discussions added anything new to the theory of capital movements? In answering, relate your discussion as much as possible to a concrete experience.
  5. Comment on one of the following:
    1. The international position of the United States in the thirties;
    2. The international position of Great Britain in the thirties;
    3. The international position of Great Britain at the end of the nineteenth century.In giving your answer, make some practical suggestions for attaining international equilibrium.
  6. Discuss (1) Germany’s recent commercial policies or (2) the operation and effects of clearing agreements.
  7. Can protection mitigate unemployment? (Beveridge.)
  8. Discuss briefly Iverson’s criticism of the classical approach towards capital movements, and comment on Iverson’s own contributions.
  9. What has the effect of trade barriers been upon trade in agricultural commodities and upon prices of these commodities? Relate your answers to the policies of one country.

Final. 1937.

Source:  Harvard University Archives. Harvard University. Examination Papers (HUC 7000.28 vol. 79). Papers Printed for Final Examinations: History, History of Religions, …, Economics, …, Military Science, Naval Science. January-June, 1937.

Image Source:  Harvard Class Album 1942.

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Economist Market Johns Hopkins Statistics

Johns Hopkins. H.B. Adams invites Walter Willcox to enroll as PhD student, 1890

 

The Cornell statistician Walter Willcox received his Ph.D. from Columbia University for his dissertation on the statistics of divorce. What I find interesting in the following two letters from Professor Herbert B. Adams at Johns Hopkins University were the modest formal requirements to be awarded a Ph.D. at Johns Hopkins in 1890.

Willcox’s advanced coursework elsewhere would have been given full transfer credit (in today’s terms) so that a single year residence, dissertation, and presumably a final doctoral examination would have been necessary for him to receive the degree.

Also interesting is to read that all the Hopkins’ Ph.D.’s from the Department of History and Politics (included political economy) graduated in June had “good positions before the summer was over”.

______________

Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Md., December 4, 1890.

My dear Mr. Willcox,

I have your letter of December 2 regarding your possible residence in Baltimore during the remainder of this year. Would it not be a good plan for you to secure our degree of Doctor of Philosophy? You have studied so long and under such good conditions that I should think you might easily obtain our degree by one year’s residence. You would then be in a much better position to obtain a good academic chair. Hopkins men are in constant request, at least in my Department of History and Politics. All of our eight doctors graduated last June obtained good positions before the summer was over. One of our former students who went to Heidelberg and took his degree has now returned to Baltimore and is waiting for a job. Only day before yesterday I was able to put two wandering trustees into communication with this young candidate and I hope the interview will result in his appointment to a professorship of history in a Western college.

You ought to make a combination of history, philosophy, and political science. Our requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy embrace three years of strictly university work. The last of the three must be spent in residence. Perhaps you have already taken a doctor’s degree and I am talking into the air. In any case I think residence here for a few months would very much help your academic prospects.

Very sincerely yours,
[signed]
H. B. Adams

______________

Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Md., December 13, 1890.

Walter F. Willcox, Esq.,
Walden, Mass.

My dear Mr. Willcox:

I have your letter of December 10, and note what you say regarding your thesis. Probably the best place for original investigation in this line of study is in the Department of Labor in Washington, D.C. I presume Col. Wright, the Commissioner of Labor would willingly afford you facilities for your work. I do not know that our library is especially rich in materials on the divorce question. You must apply to the head centre of information on that subject, Mr. Samuel Dike, Secretary of the Divorce Reform League. I presume you know him already.

Our second term begins in February. The cost of living here is about $35 a month. If you are going to take your doctor’s degree at Columbia it would hardly be expedient to enter as a regular student in our department. You had better come as a free lance and spend a good deal of your time in Washington. Enclosed please find a programme of the next meeting of the American Historical Association in the Federal City.

We have a recess at the Hopkins from the 24thof December to the 5thof January. It would be a very good thing for you to come to Washington, if you can afford it and attend the meetings of the Economic Association as well as the Historical and settle down in this part of the country for the rest of the year. I enclose a programme of the Economic Association.

Very cordially yours,
[unsigned]

Source:  U.S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. The Papers of Walter Willcox, Box 3, Folder: General Correspondence A-C

Image Source:Walter F. Willcox, ca. 1900-1910  . Cornell University Library. Digital Collections.

Categories
Harvard Suggested Reading Syllabus

Harvard. Second year graduate economic theory. Leontief, 1956-57

 

 

In an earlier post I provided the outline, reading lists and exam questions (only for Economics 202a) for the second year graduate course, “Economic Theory II”, Economics 202a and 202b, taught by Wassily Leontief in 1948-49. The following course outline with reading assignments is for the year 1956-57.  The course in both years has essentially the same readings for the first semester. The second semester of 1956-57 does add an entirely new section “Principles of Dynamics”. I have highlighted in blue boldface additions to the reading assignments in the 1956-57 course compared to the 1948-49 version.

 

Economics in the Rear-view Mirror thanks Juan C. A. Acosta who found these Leontief reading lists in the Franco Modigliani Papers (Box T6) at the Duke University Economists’ Papers Project and has graciously shared them for transcription here. 

__________________________

Wassily Leontief

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Ec. 202a
ECONOMIC THEORY
Fall Term 1956-57

The following outline covers the first semester of the two semester course.

I.     Analysis of Production and the Theory of a Firm:

  1. Costs; total, average, marginal.
    Theory of the multiple plant firm.
    Revenue; total, average, marginal.
    Long and short run analysis
    Supply under competitive and monopolistic conditions.
  2. Production function, marginal productivity, increasing and decreasing returns.
    Stocks and flows.
    Joint products.
    Demand for factors of production.
    Discontinuous relationships and non-marginal analysis (Linear Programming).
    Internal and external economies.
  3. Production over time.

Reading assignments:

Oscar Lange, “The Scope and Method of Economics,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. XIII, (1), 1945-46, pp. 19-32.

E. A. G. Robinson, Structure of Competitive Industry, Chs. II, VII, VIII, pp. 14-35, 107-133.

E. H. MacNiece, Production, Forecasting, Planning and Control, 292 pp. This book presents a concise description of the actual operation of a manufacturing enterprise and thus supplies the factual background for the theory of the firm.

K. E. Boulding, Economic Analysis, (revised edition, 1948) Chapters 20-26, 31, and 32; or (3rded., 1955) Chapters 23-29, 34, and 35.

E. H. Chamberlin, “Proportionality, Divisibility, and Economies of Scale,”Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, 1948, pp. 229-262.

R. Frisch, “Alfred Marshall’s Theory of Value,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXIV, No. 4, November 1950, pp. 495-524.

K. E. Boulding, “The Theory of the Firm in the Last Ten Years,” The American Economic Review, Vol. XXXII, No. 4, December 1942, pp. 791-802.

A. Lerner, Economics of Control, Chs. 15, 16, 17, pp. 174-211.

National Bureau of Economic Research, Cost Behavior and Price Policy, Ch. VII, pp. 142-169; Appendix C, pp. 321-329.

W. W. Cooper, “A Proposal for Extending the Theory of the Firm,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1951, pp. 87-109.

Robert Dorfman, “Mathematical or ‘Linear’ Programming,” American Economic Review, December 1953, pp. 797-825.

A. G. Hart, Anticipations, Uncertainty and Dynamic Planning, reprinted 1951, 98 pp.

 

II.    Theory of the Household:

  1. Theory of utility and indifference lines analysis.
    Individual demand, prices and income.
    Dependent and independent, competing and complementary, superior and inferior goods.
  2. Measurability of utility.
    “Marginal utility of money,” Consumer surplus.
    Interpersonal interdependence in consumers’ behavior.
    Economic theory of index numbers.
    Choices involving risk.

Reading assignments:

J. Hicks, Value and Capital, Part I, Chs. I-III, pp. 1-54.

K. E. Boulding, Economic Analysis, (Revised edition, 1948) Chapters 33, 34; or (3rded., 1955), Chapter 36 and 37.

Duesenberry, Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer Behavior, Chapters I-III, pp. 1-46.

J. R. Hicks, A Revision of Demand Theory, Parts I and II, also the summary and conclusion.

A. A. Alchian, “The Meaning of Utility Measurement,” American Economic Review, March 1953, pp. 26-50.

G. Katona, Psychological Analysis of Economic Behavior, Part II, #1-7, pp. 63-149.

 

III. Theory of Market Relationships:

  1. Pure competition; individual and market supply and demand curves.
    Stability of market equilibrium, statics and dynamics.
    Monopoly and price discrimination.
  2. Monopolistic competition.
    Duopoly, oligopoly, bilateral monopoly, etc.
    “Theory of games.”

Reading assignments:

A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, Book V, Chs. III, V.

E. H. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, Chs. II, III, IV, and V.

Joan Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect Competition, Chs. 15 and 16.

Robert Triffin, Monopolistic Competition and the General Equilibrium Theory, Chs. I and II.

William Fellner, Competition Among the Few, Chs. II-V.

W. H. Nicholls, Imperfect Competition within Agricultural Industries, Ch. 18.

Leonid Hurwicz, “The Theory of Economic Behavior,” American Economic Review, December, 1945, pp. 909-925.

 

IV.  General equilibrium theory:

  1. Basic Concepts of a General Equilibrium Theory.
    Data and variables. Price system and general interdependence. Linear model of a general equilibrium system.

Reading assignments:

O. Lange, The Economic Theory of Socialism, pp. 65-72.

Cassel, The Theory of Social Economy, Vol. I, Ch. IV, pp. 134-155.

E. H. Phelps Brown, Framework of the Pricing System, in particular chapters dealing with general equilibrium theory.

T. W. Schultz, Agriculture in an Unstable Economy, Ch. I, pp. 60-70; Ch. IV, pp. 128-137.

R. S. Eckaus, “The Factor Proportion Problem in Underdeveloped Areas,” The American Economic Review, September 1955, pp. 539-565.

___________________________

ECONOMICS 202b
ECONOMIC THEORY
Spring Term, 1956-57

V.  Economics of Welfare

  1. Individual maximum and social welfare.
  2. Efficiency and distributive justice.
  3. Efficiency of the purely competitive system.
    Monopoly and economic welfare.
    External economies.
  4. Pricing and allocation for public enterprise.

READING ASSIGNMENTS:

J. Hicks, “The Foundation of Welfare Economics,” Economic Journal, December 1939, pp. 696-712.

Meade and Hitch, An Introduction to Economic Analysis and Policy, Part II, Chs. VI-VII, pp. 159-220.

Coase, “Note on Price and Output Policy,” Economic Journal, Vol. LV, April 1945, pp. 112-113.

Samuelson, “Evaluation of Real National Income,” Oxford Economic papers, Jan. 1950.

T. Scitovsky, “The State of Welfare Economics,” The American Economic Review, Vol. XLI, June 1951, pp. 303-315.

 

VI. Capital and Interest

  1. Stock and Flow Concepts.
    Productivity of Capital.
    Period of production and “turnover” of capital.
  2. Theory of saving.
    Risk and uncertainty.
  3. Partial equilibrium theory of interest.

READING ASSIGNMENTS:

Edward F. Denison, “Theoretical Aspects of Quality Change, Capital Consumption, and Net Capital Formation,” in Problems of Capital Formation, Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 19, National Bureau of Economic Research 1957, pp. 215-260.

Robert Eisner, “Interview and Other Survey Techniques and the study of Investment,” in Problems of Capital Formation (same as above)

Irving Fisher, The Theory of Interest, Chs. VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XVI, XVII, and XVIII. 1930.

Readings in the Theory of Income Distribution(Blakiston, 1946)

F. Knight, “Capital and Interest,” pp. 384-417.
Keynes, “The Theory of the Rate of Interest,” pp. 418-424.
D. H. Robertson, “Mr. Keynes and the Rate of Interest,” pp. 425-460.

John Rae, John, New Principles of Political Economy, 1834, Chs. I-V.

Irving Fisher, Nature of Capital and Income, Chs. I, IV, V, XIV, XVII, Macmillan, 1906.

Friedrich & Vera Lutz, The Theory of Investment of the Firm, 1951.

Joel Dean, Capital Budgeting,1951, Chs. VI, VII.

 

VII: Principles of Dynamics

  1. Change over time.
    Period analysis.
    Continuous change
  2. Dynamic stability and instability.

READING ASSIGNMENTS:

W. Baumol, Economic Dynamics, Chs. I-VII, pp. 1-136.

P. Samuelson, “Dynamics, Statics and Stationary State,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, February 1943, pp. 58-68 (also reprinted in Readings in Economic Analysis, Vol. 1, edited by N. V. Clemens).

K. E. Boulding, A Reconstruction of Economics, Ch. I, pp. 3-26.

Erik Lindahl, Introduction to the Study of Dynamic Theory, pp. 21-73 in Studies in the Theory of Money and Capital.

 

VIII: Economic Development and Accumulation of Capital

  1. Dynamic interrelation of income, investment and the rate of interest.
  2. Linear interrelation of income, investment and the rate of interest.
    Non-linear theory of economic development.

READING ASSIGNMENTS:

Bresciani-Turoni, “The Theory of Saving,” Economica; Part I, Feb. 1936, pp. 1-23; Part II, May 1936, pp. 162-181.

Schelling, “Capital Growth and Equilibrium,” American Economic Review, Dec. 1947, pp. 864-876.

Harrod, “An Essay in Dynamic Theory,” Economic Journal, March 1939, pp. 14-33.

Pigou, Economic Progress in a Stable Economy,” Economica, August 1947, pp. 180-188.

Stern, “Capital Requirements in Progressive Economies,” Economica, August 1945, pp. 163-171.

A. Sweezy, “Secular Stagnation?” in Harris, Postwar Economic Problems, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1943, pp. 67-82.

Hansen, “Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth,” American Economic Review, March 1939, pp. 1-15.

Also, Baumol, see above under VII.

 

IX: Keynesian Theory and Problems

  1. Over-all outlines of the General Theory.
    Wage and price “stickiness.”
    Demand for money.
  2. Saving and “oversaving.”
    Multiplier principle.

READING ASSIGNMENTS:

A. P. Lerner, The Economics of Control, Chs. 21, 22, and 25.

__________, “The Essential Properties of Interest and Money,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1952, pp. 172-93.

J. M. Keynes, General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Chs. 1, 2, 8 &18.

G. Haberler, Prosperity and Depression, Ch. 8.

 

Source:  Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library. Economists’ Papers Archive. Papers of Franco Modigliani. Box T7.

___________________________

Reading assignments in the 1948-49 reading list that were not included in the 1956-57 reading list:

 

I.     Analysis of Production and the Theory of a Firm:

I. Fisher, “A Three-Dimensional Representation of the Factors of Production and Their Remuneration Marginally and Residually,”Econometrica, October, 1939.

George Stigler, “Production and Distribution in the Short Run,” Journal of Political Economy, 1939, pp. 305-327. Reprinted in Readings in the Theory of Income Distribution, pp. 119-142.

Joe S. Bain, The Economics of the Pacific Coast Petroleum Industry, Part I, Ch. V, pp. 84-114.

III. Theory of Market Relationships:

Carl Kaysen, “A Revolution in Economic Theory?” The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. XIV (I), 1946-47, p. 1-15.

Jakob Marschak, “Theory of Games,” Journal of Political Economy, April, 1946, pp. 97-115.

V.  Economics of Welfare

Meade, J. E., and Fleming, J. M.: Price and Output Policy of State Enterprise,” Economic Journal, Vol. LIV, December 1944, pp. 321-339.

VI. Capital and Interest

Kuznets: “On Measurement of National Wealth,” Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 2, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1936, pp. 3-61.

Kaldor: “Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Recent Controversy on The Theory of Capital,” Econometrica, July 1937, pp. 201-233.

IX: Keynesian Theory and Problems

Domar: Expansion and Employment,” American Economic Review, March 1947, pp. 34-55.

___________________________

Image Source:  Wassily Leontief in Harvard Class Album 1964.

 

Categories
Economists Gender Germany Irwin Collier M.I.T. Yale

Farewell lecture of Irwin Collier, FU-Berlin. July 4, 2018

The ceremonial bookends to a professorship in a German university consist of an inaugural and a farewell lecture. I spoke before a public that included the six disciplines represented in the John-F.-Kennedy Institute for North American Studies (besides economics: political science, sociology, history, cultural studies and literature) as well as colleagues from the economics and business faculty of Freie Universität Berlin. Those attending included first-year undergraduates through the oldest cohorts of emeritus professors. I needed a lecture to keep the filled hall alert for 45 minutes on a particularly warm Berlin summer afternoon. I chose the fourth of July because there was no World Cup soccer on the day to compete with.

The ceremony began with an introduction by the Institute’s director, Professor Christian Lammert, who provided a comparative analysis of the twitter activity of President Donald Trump and me. It is a great way to get laughs and a gentle way to roast an honoree. Try it at your next official function, you’ll be glad you did.

Next a local American folksinger, John Shreve, warmed up the crowd for me with two songs, after which I took to the lectern and presented the following remarks. 

________________________

“Reflections on academic communities, clans, and clubs”

Abschiedsvorlesung of Prof. Irwin Collier, Ph.D.

John-F.-Kennedy Institute for North American Studies
Freie Universität Berlin
4 July 2018

One of the self-granted privileges of age, is to talk about oneself under the altruistic guise of sharing experience. And for this I beg your indulgence. On the other hand this is a farewell lecture, what else could you really expect? Now you needn’t worry that I am about to spew the cumulated bile of an underappreciated, unfortunate scholar bitter at the prospect of sealing his academic obscurity with a ceremony where others are about to celebrate his exit. While as delightful as it would be to speak long-repressed truth to the powers-that-be, this occasion lends itself to thoughtful reflection. No, instead I’ll offer from my own experience a few simply illustrative stories that most of you can relate to either through direct personal experience or have heard within your personal information bubbles.

Before getting started, let me make one thing pedantically clear: when I use the words “community”, “clan”, and “club” in what follows, but especially those latter two words, they are only to be understood as short-hand, metaphorical labels. I trust there is no need for attempting Über-precision in what is after all only offered as a series of personal reflections. My intention in speaking of communities, clans, and clubs is to offer you a simple alliterative triad that has a better chance of surviving into long-term memory than, say, “communities, tribes, and networks”, though that is what I actually mean, to be honest.

When I say academic both as adjective and noun, it is in the sense of having to do with individual membership in “the Academy” broadly understood.  I have always liked how the words “scholar and scientist” fit comfortably within the single German word “Wissenschaftler” and the Academy for me has its foundation in the Humboldtian dual mandate of research and instruction. We, the scholars and scientists of universities, have answered the call to follow that dual mandate. Of course knowledge gets produced outside the hallowed halls of the university and there are plenty of institutions that exist with the sole mission of advanced instruction. As an economist I have mostly good things to say about such division-of-labor and specialization.  But personally, I have spent about a half-century studying or working within a university setting, and half that time here at Freie Universität, so my preference is clearly revealed to serve that dual mandate.

Having a career-long interest in the history of economics, I have often had occasion to consider the life of scholars among scholars. While the filiation of ideas typically takes center stage in histories of economics (by this I mean the chronicle of how Adam Smith’s ideas begat those of David Ricardo and Thomas Robert Malthus, that in turn begat the ideas of John Stuart Mill, that begat innovations by William Stanley Jevons, on to the synthesis by Alfred Marshall and so on up to the present day), sometimes historians of economics explore the ideas of economists within particular historical contexts (e.g., the Progressive Era, the New Deal or the Thatcher-Reagan revolution) or within the specific policy debates of their times (protectionism, industrial policy, social insurance, monetary policy rules). This afternoon I will be guilty of thinking aloud about the social context of the creation and diffusion of scientific methods and knowledge generally. Since I am an economist, presumably what I have to say fits my home discipline best. Nonetheless I would wager at least one free lunch that the structures and mechanisms I have identified are present at least in some modified form elsewhere in the Academy.

Now somewhere in my unordered college papers that have followed me from New Haven to Cambridge, Massachusetts down to Princeton, then Houston and finally a transatlantic trip to Berlin in 1994, followed by three moves within the greater Berlin area there must be the original acceptance letter I received from Yale in the Spring of 1969.  One phrase in that letter has been etched into my memory, namely, that I was thereby welcomed into the “community of scholars”. I can smile now when thinking about the enthusiasm and naiveté of that boy turning man about to embark on his journey of academic life. A “community of scholars” turns out to have been what I had sought and what I was convinced I found in the undergraduate life of Yale College. When I first explored the stacks in the tower of Sterling Memorial Library and argued about philosophy and politics in beer-fueled bull-sessions into the night with my roommates and classmates, I felt at one with a much larger academic community, not merely that of the Yale microcosm but one extending to the authors of century-old books with uncut pages waiting to be discovered in the stacks. As far as the larger academic community in that thin slice of the historical present, well, I felt cosmopolitan to a fault. I saw no higher calling than that of the scholar/scientist. Excellence was not about winning a phi-beta-kappa key for display, it was about serving a higher purpose within that greater community of scholars. I believed that the true academic freely contributed and imbibed from the ever growing pool of human knowledge and was free from lesser motives. Life-work balance could not be an issue, the life and work of an academic were simply an identity.

Two modifications of my scholar’s life plan resulted from changes in scenery: an internship in Washington DC and later graduate school along the Charles River in Cambridge, Mass.

During my early undergraduate years I had little concern for applying knowledge for good, it seemed too much like engineering. Two spells in Washington, D.C. as an intern at the Council of Economic Advisers during the highpoint of the Watergate crisis taught me much about the importance of the work of policy wonks, a concept that only gained currency decades later during the Clinton Administration. My respect grew for the leaves of absence for public service or earlier work in the war effort (WWII) that I found was quite common among my professors.  Had plan A, serving the university dual mandate, not have worked, I probably would have pursued my personal happiness with a plan B, working as a government economist perhaps in the Department of the Treasury, the Bureau of Labor Statistics or Bureau of the Census and this afternoon’s ceremony would most likely be taking place in some office building in the District of Columbia. But it was still clear under either Plan A or Plan B, I would need further training.

Graduate School at M.I.T. marked a transition to a higher concentration of economics than I would have ever considered possible and looking back can hardly believe I survived with any dignity. Graduate coursework was not conceived according to the tenets of liberal arts to broaden the mind. Quite to the contrary, the graduate coursework at M.I.T. was an intellectual boot-camp, where the brain got trained without ever so much as a doubt on the part of the drill-sergeants or the recruits themselves whether this was a good way to educate a professional economist.  You want to be a Navy Seal, OK, it’s your choice…and if it turns out to be too much for you to handle, ring the bell, take your M.A. and leave honorably. Of course I am exaggerating, but I do recall a West-Point graduate in my class who declared that graduate school was the most academic freedom that he had ever enjoyed. Incidentally, that M.I.T. classmate turns up in Michael Lewis’ The Big Short as having been the chief risk officer for Morgan Stanley during the financial meltdown in 2008. I’ll add here that another classmate was a principal in Long-Term Capital Management when that famous hedge fund crashed and burned in 1998. I became an expert on the East German economy and we all know what happened there in 1989. You can see the pattern, but I digress…

Clearly I wouldn’t be standing here before you today had I not survived the rigors of graduate school. In a meantime that spans not quite a half-century I have come to the realization that a “community of scholars” is actually only a Platonic ideal, something as unreal yet appealing as the Garden of Eden, the legend of King Arthur’s court in Camelot or the utopian socialisms that fired the imaginations of radical progressives in the second half of the 19th century. And yet, my experience from dealing in an academic setting, having had contact with many permutations of human natures and across a few societies, has not at all discouraged me from the quixotic quest of building or becoming a part of a genuine community of scholars. The fundamental question we all face is how to get nearer there from here. Plot spoiler: this is my farewell lecture so that can gets kicked down the road for you young folks here.

My thesis is that real existing research and instruction take place in a world spanned by two basic types of institutional frameworks, that we can call clans and clubs for short. Just as there is a spectrum of virtuous behavior along which we, our friends, rivals, and enemies can be placed, clans and clubs differ in the degree to which they help meet the criteria of a “community of scholars”.

So what constitutes an ideal or a genuine community of scholars? (1) Inclusivity. There is no frontier between us and them with respect to the search for knowledge and understanding other than a sharp boundary separating magical thinking from those in the community for whom the collection and honest interpretation of evidence and logical thinking constitute the supporting pillars for science and scholarship.  (2) Meritocratic. There is not a fixed caste system within the community of scholars. It is not a hive with a queen, drones and worker bees. Results from the mixture of individual genius, creativity, good fortune, insight, and discovery are recognized, appropriated, and honored by the community. The demographic fact of overlapping generations results in a natural ordering of junior to senior, but the filial piety of Confucianism must yield the right-of-way to the Wunderkinder in the community of scholars. (3) Self-critical. By this I mean members of a community of scholars share a categorical imperative with respect to criticizing our own work as we criticize that of others. This is important because the accumulation of knowledge and understanding is but an imperfect ratchet. Any one of us, repeat…anyone, has the capacity to pursue dead-ends, and even to forget lessons once learned.  (4) Team spirited. Yet even with all that humility we still have a capacity to cry Eureka upon discovery and other members of the community rejoice at the sound of that cry.

Undoubtedly I have missed a few items in my proposed check list of criteria. But it is easy to see their necessity to be included in any such list by considering what a university would look like when the polar opposite cases occur, where (1´) exclusivity (2´) impermeable stratification (3´) immunity from doubt and/or criticism (4´) Schadenfreude are the rule. Sounds a bit like a sequel to A Handmaid’s Tale without the dramatic costuming doesn’t it?

The essence of club and clan is captured in the Groucho Marx quip “I wouldn’t want to be a member of any club that would have me as a member” and the familiar expression, “You can choose your friends but not your family”.  While I grant that there is a process of selection and self-selection to graduate schools that bears a resemblance to the formal admission procedure for joining a club, there is a good reason to distinguish between the two. In the case of a club you are accepted or rejected for who and what you are.  When you enter, you are a member, a peer. In contrast for a clan, the selection criteria can be quite distinct from the requirements to attain full clan membership.  The network from club membership is valuable to you as a member, but the clan becomes a part of your identity.

But before we talk about this psychological transformation of identity, allow me a brief historical word here.

My research over the past several years has focused on the evolution of graduate training in economics. Both from my own experience but also from listening to colleagues as well as reading random biographical and autobiographical accounts, I became convinced that the critical transmission of the tools of research and the ultimate values that provide the background for the selection of “interesting” questions takes place in graduate schools and there the formation of scholarly character embedded within a network of graduates becomes recognizable as a “school”.  This interest led to an inaugural grant from the Institute for New Economic Thinking for me to begin exploring university archives for documentary material that would prove useful for marking the evolution of economic theories and methods actually acquired by successive cohorts of professional economists in different universities. The research question was to identify the forces that have contributed to the convergence of economics into a contemporaneous mainstream of common scope and methods.

It was in Germany where the modern university seminary for science and scholarship emerged and it provided the ultimate model for research training at the graduate level. And that academic DNA from those seminaries was carried across the Atlantic to the emerging great universities of the United States. Johns Hopkins, Harvard, Columbia, Chicago and points west all profited from the ambitious young scholars and scientists who had been “made in Germany”. The leading role played by Germany will come again when we turn to clubs.

The clan or tribe has played an enormous role in the history of economics. Just to name a few instances, there was the grand Methodenstreit between Carl Menger of Vienna and Gustav von Schmoller of Berlin in the late 19th century on the relative merits of deduction vs. induction (sort of chicken-or-the-egg debate). The debate was ultimately won in a scientific sense by Menger but the academic street-fighter Schmoller had much greater success in occupying the professorial chairs in the German-language areas of Europe for several generations.

Other notable debates between “schools” of economics include the capital debate between the “two Cambridges” of the 1950s and 1960s, Keynesian fiscalism vs. Chicago monetarism, especially in the 1960s, fresh- vs. salt-water macroeconomics more recently, and there is the always evergreen controversy between Austrian economics (which I note in its present form is neither Austrian nor economics) and wherever the mainstream happens to find itself.   There have been cases in economics where Saul turns into Paul well along in the career. But such late breaks, such as that from the Keynes critic hired by Harvard to the man who brought Keynes to America, Alvin Hansen, or from neo-classical darling to radical economist, Stephen Marglin in the 1960s, have been rare. These are news stories much as “man bites dog” is news, because “dog bites man” is considerably less newsworthy.  The correlation between where and how you have been trained and your research style/policy positions is strong and robust. But of course you ask, is it really causation or a case of post-hoc-ergo-propter-hoc inference when there is really a background factor responsible for both?

So what leads me to assert the strong identification of scholar with the school? My pop-psychological explanation is that the intense training and focus of a graduate education brings a young scholar up to humanity’s frontier of knowledge for the first time. That frontier advances rapidly and only a few, certainly not all Ph.D.’s, will move fast enough or long enough to remain on that frontier. Nonetheless that moment of arrival at the hilltop and looking out on the vast, uncharted landscape before you for the first time is a profound life-altering experience in adulthood and there is a warm-fuzzy object that you bond with — it is not a parent, rather it is the collectivity of the professors from whom you have learned and been guided and the authors of the books and papers you have digested in the course of your studies. Sure, later we all pass through a form of intellectual puberty and develop a hypersensitivity to all our professors’ faults. I think back: God there were some really awful teachers, I have witnessed examples of narcissism unchained! Etc.  One of my dearest professors upon hearing that Herbert Simon was awarded a Nobel prize in economics actually said “He can’t be any good, I haven’t read anything he has written.” Later in our careers we might have our own Mark Twain moment: “When I was a boy of 14, my father was so ignorant I could hardly stand to have the old man around. But when I got to be 21, I was astonished at how much the old man had learned in seven years.”

OK, time for a quick summary of what I have been rambling on about thus far. It appears that I had the enormous good fortune to have stumbled into what seemed a virtual academic heaven on earth.  Following that formative period when I acquired my scholarly/scientific values together with a box of analytical tools, it was time for Hänschen-klein to march off into the real world. I was an apprentice turned journeyman sorcerer, a fledgling member of a clan of economists associated with the Yale-MIT axis. Had you asked me at the time what it meant, I would have answered it was really no more than a pedigree, if anything, a signal as to the quality of the people who taught me. Gradually, I learned as I interacted in a professional context with people trained at other places and in other traditions, this Yale-MIT axis signaled belonging to a well-defined clan. Think of West Side Story, the gangs of Sharks and Jets, just without the dancing.

The first inkling I had about the influence of where you learned your economics was as an undergraduate during my Council of Economic Advisers time when a fellow intern, a graduate student from UCLA, derisively commented on the fact that I had waited hours to watch the Watergate Hearing for Nixon’s chief-of-staff H.R. Haldeman, “queues are inefficient”. Subtext: a market should have been created to let a price mechanism allocate the scarce space to the highest bidders.  Since he was my first observation, I thought it was the individual effect talking, i.e., he was just a jerk. But then later another UCLA man, a senior professor at the University of Houston when I was an assistant professor there, nonchalantly dismissed a vast swath of applied economic analysis as we interviewed young people at the annual job market, “Nobody believes welfare economics…”  I recall my first serious encounter with German ordo-liberalism at the University of Siegen. Hearing so much praise for Walter Eucken and his Freiburg school that inspired the policy architects who brought us the German social-market economy led me to read some of his work.  I felt like I was listening to folks speaking German in some remote alpine valley.

The point of these examples is that it was beginning to look to me that how and where you were trained had a major impact on the sorts of questions you asked and the style of argument and the forms of evidence you accepted. Thinking back I expected the sorts of political differences and research strategies would be more-or-less randomly distributed across departments. People, and I stress economists are people, are a heterogeneous bunch, simply put, “a mixed bag”. But even allowing for concentration of the one or other paradigm for research, couldn’t we expect serious scholars to outgrow their apprentice years as they would become exposed to inter-university variation? In a statistical sense I interpreted what I observed, namely, knowing where someone had been trained had “too much” explanatory power for what a mature university research economist would think about economics. You could see a definite family resemblance across the clan. What I still don’t really understand was why academic disputes between clans have almost invariably escalated to the intensity of a shooting feud between the Hatfields and McCoys. But then again, I’m the sort of guy who is still shocked that people are so rude to each other on twitter. The working hypothesis perhaps is best expressed in the adage, “Academic politics are so vicious because the stakes are so low.”

Time for another short historical break before reflecting on networks or clubs that academics have established.

Economics became an easily identifiable collective pursuit of truth for the first time in the middle of the 18th century at the court of Louis XV at Versailles where the French Physiocrats coalesced into a self-conscious school for the purpose of enlightened economic policy. They actually called themselves les économistes and they even had their own journal. Their time on the world stage was brief, the French Revolution scattered the school to the winds, and one member, DuPont de Nemours settled in the United States where his son founded the gunpowder business that ultimately became the DuPont corporation. Incidentally Thomas Jefferson’s idealization of the yeoman farmer and contempt for the mercantile classes was a reflection of his reading Physiocratic texts. In England in the nineteenth century political economy was passionately debated among gentlemen in clubs. Members would read their Hume, Smith, Ricardo and Malthus to join the chatter and contribute to the literary magazines of the time debating economic policy.  From about 1935 through 1950 the gradual expansion of mathematical and statistical tools had become such a critical part of the kit of the professional economist that political economy or economics was no longer “clubbable” in the literal sense.

But even before the shift to mathematical and statistical methods had become complete, substitutes for the club were found in the extra-university learned societies, professional associations, and regularly recurring conference groups. All of these networks had established admission procedures to establish whether a potential peer brought the right stuff to the table.

Just as the modern research seminar goes back to the university seminaries of Germany, the Verein für Socialpolitik was officially founded at its conference in Eisenach in October 1873 a year after an initial conference a year earlier also in Eisenach on the “soziale Frage” (social question). This association brought economists, lawyers and government statisticians together. Now some twenty-three standing field committees span the scope of economic research in the German language area. Thanks to a retired colleague, Wolfram Fischer, I received an invitation to become a member of the standing committee for the history of economics. For these standing committees one is invited to present a paper and is voted membership.  The Verein itself used to be the sort of association that members had to propose candidates whose approval then was voted upon.

The very same American students who studied in the German seminaries of economics during the last third of the 19th century, returned to become founding members of the American Economic Society, that unlike the Verein für Socialpolitik, which was long to have a sharp anti-Manchester capitalism profile, reached out to their classic liberal colleagues who initially resisted joining forces. From its early years the American Economic Association was a bigger tent than the Verein für Socialpolitik.

Two other societies worth mention are the international Econometric Society that was dedicated to the use of mathematical and formal statistical modeling in economics. It was first organized in December 1930 in Cleveland, Ohio with Joseph Schumpeter chairing a meeting of sixteen people who elected Irving Fisher of Yale as its president. The Econometric Society then met officially for the first time the following September in Lausanne. Not quite four decades later dissatisfaction with the scope of mainstream economics that focused excessively on “plenty” and with too little attention to its distribution and almost none to issues of power and politics, the Union of Radical Political Economy was founded in 1968 (This year celebrating its fiftieth anniversary at the University of Massachusetts in Amherst).

In the course of the Allied Social Sciences Meeting every year, field associations organize their panels where the networks of colleagues meet.  Of course no list of clubs would be complete without mentioning the Mt. Pelerin Society founded by economists along with historians and philosophers at the invitation of Friedrich Hayek in 1947 and which formed a bedrock of neoliberalism, long before it was fashionable.

As we say, birds of a feather, flock together and the communication among researchers working on similar topics, using similar methods, interested in the same kinds of evidence is necessary for the success of the cooperative endeavor. These networks allow sub-fields to achieve scales impossible to expect in all but the largest and richest university settings. Indeed stepping back and regarding the research output of these professional clubs whose membership spans university, disciplinary, territorial bounds, few of us would want to go back to the high days of the London Political Economy Club or even the early days of the relatively exclusive professional societies requiring formal nomination for membership.

At this point I need to insert a big fat German “Aber…” (But…). The clans and clubs of economics (and economics is hardly unique here) have a diversity problem with respect to, I’ll limit myself to the United States here, race, ethnicity, and gender. In the course of my INET funded research, I have examined archived economics departmental records of M.I.T. from the 1970s dealing with the recruitment and subsequent performance of students from traditional black colleges and of women admitted to the program. Something that struck me was the sheer experimental willingness of this overwhelmingly white, male and politically liberal department to expand the numbers of blacks and women in the economics Ph.D. program. Of course M.I.T., sitting at the apex of the economics graduate programs at that time, was able to recruit easily. But after several years, the realization set in that to avoid the creation of a Zwei-Klassensystem (twin tracks) the recruiting pools needed to be equalized and this would require a strategic switch to recruiting aggressively and exclusively from elite undergraduate programs. Having been an observer-participant from a time that I can now witness again in an archival light, I appreciate the dilemma felt by the M.I.T. economics department then between increasing the inclusivity of the clan but only at the cost of an increased risk of failure for precisely those new groups who had been previously overlooked.

Let us shift focus now from entry to the clan to the issue of gender diversity in the clubs or professional networks.  [Due to unexpected turbulence, the captain has turned on the fasten seat belt sign.] Last year a dynamite paper originally submitted as a Berkeley senior thesis was published by Alice H. Wu “Gender Stereotyping in Academia: Evidence From Economics Job Market Rumors Forum”. Ms. Wu processed more than a million posts from the anonymous online message board econjobrumors.com.  It is as close to systematic eavesdropping around a water cooler that can be done legally. It turns out that the ordered list of the thirty words most uniquely associated with women were (warning: NSFW): [read list very quickly] “hotter, lesbian, bb (internet speak for “baby”), sexism, tits, anal, marrying, feminazi, slut, hot, vagina, boobs, pregnant, pregnancy, cute, marry, levy, gorgeous, horny, crush, beautiful, secretary, dump, shopping, date, nonprofit [?!], intentions, sexy, dated and prostitute”. The analogous men-words included: [read slower] “juicy, keys, adviser, bully, prepare, fought, wharton, austrian, checkers, homo [!], genes, mathematician, advisor, burning, pricing, philly, band, nobel, amusing, greatest, textbook, goals, irate”–with the singular exception of a homophobic slur, not nearly so much to be ashamed of in guy gossip…about guys. But even before the publication of Wu’s paper, the active standing Committee on the Status of Women in the Economics Profession of the American Economic Association was addressing issues of sexual harassment and drafting of codes of conduct. Manels (i.e., panels consisting of only men) still occur quite regularly at professional meetings but the outcry cannot be overheard. Let us just say, the situation regarding the issue of gender falls seriously short of the Platonic community of scholars, but it is not hopeless. I say this as a member of Yale’s first four-year coeducational class — looking back a half-century the differences for the better are truly striking.

I see the shortfall in meeting the criterion of inclusivity less to be found either on the race or gender fronts where important corners have been turned. The greater problem seems to me to be one of a relentless trend in which we observe the homogenization of particular methods and approaches to the exclusion of others. For a five-year old with a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

Today’s heterodoxy can improve the quality of the flow in the mainstream as well as vice-versa. Loyalty to the clan is only a virtue to the extent that your clan is up to good. Besides the obligation to expose one’s future students to a wide-range of views, as good as we feel and as justly we might think that we can adequately summarize “the other side”, we Hatfields are probably a poor substitute for the real McCoy.

Calls for broadening the curriculum clash with the budgetary realities forcing faculties to choose a balance between breadth and depth in the coverage of fields and methods. But my decades in this business have led me to conclude that we have less to fear from the tragic constellation of beer budgets and champagne tastes than we have to fear from the narcissistic gene of scholars, present company excluded of course (I want to be able to eat lunch in Dahlem in the future!). That narcissistic gene leads even top scholars to attempt to clone themselves into entire faculties. My hope is that a pragmatic tolerance and taste for diversity in paradigms can trickle down from senior to junior and through all levels of instruction.

In their modern clubs scholars find kindred spirits, it is there scholars can find honest peer review.  So what could possibly go wrong?  Well here is where we need a second, a vertical dimension to understand what is happening. In a race for status, gatekeepers and judges play an important role. The old question necessarily arises, who will guard the guards? Can we be confident that the norms of the Platonic community of scholars will be able to weather the winds of rivalry for the zero-sum game of status or of self-interested competition for scarce resources?

One expects economists to talk about money. So let’s talk about it in this context. My father once wisely told me when he thought that I was getting too academically big for my real-world britches: brains don’t hire money, money hires brains.   Expressed in terms a Marxist might appreciate:  my father apparently believed that the reproduction cycle goes Money—Brains—Money rather than Brains—Money—Brains. Besides putting the horse (money) before the cart (brains), I can only mention en passant that large private concentrations of wealth can and have been used to support research programs of a particular political stripe just as an unequal distribution in wealth can and has been used for disproportionate political influence (i.e. violating the essential democratic symmetry of one citizen, one vote / one voice). I’ll just mention the documented ability of the Koch brothers to have funneled enormous funds into George Mason University that had strings attached with respect to faculty hires that no self-respecting faculty member could possibly support.

Before I start foaming at the mouth, I pause to bid my colleagues here this afternoon to reflect on the distance they perceive between the Platonic ideal of an academic community and their personal experience.

A lecture title that signals “reflections” is an open confession that no attempt has been made for rigorous argument. My somewhat random walk defies summary. Still I have been raised to think that it is prudent to leave one’s audience with a nugget to share when they leave, in the event that someone should ask what I, the speaker, had to say.

For me (and I am sure for many in this room) the happiest and most productive times were in those moments when I felt firmly embedded within an environment approaching a community of scholars. Academic life has taught me that such communities are mostly figments of some philosopher’s imagination. The work of a scholar, when not the fruit of a monastic life-style, is conducted within clans and clubs. My experiences from a career in university life and listening to the experiences of others have led me to the conclusion that “academic community” is analogous to genius, and when or if ever it really exists, it is extremely rare and probably the result of rather random dependent paths of history rather than the result of conscious human intention. My plea, especially to the undergraduate and graduate students in the room, is not to sink into cynicism once you discover for yourselves that your professors and their professors, that researchers in private or government laboratories, that senior researchers in think-tanks happen to display the shortcomings I have identified in clubs (especially, exclusivity regarding who gets admitted) and clans (especially, an allegiance where blood is thicker than water). Clubs can open themselves and clans can indeed coexist peacefully and even intermarry. Rival research programs need not have to end in blood feuds like the Hatfields and McCoys. While my pursuit of happiness is found in the pursuit of truth, due diligence demands that all of us sharing that pursuit keep a watchful eye on those serving as the gate-keepers of our clubs.

So much for my reflections. Allow me a few personal words in closing.

*  * *  *

One enters and remains in our imperfect community of scholars, in part on one’s own merits but more importantly due to those who trusted that ex post merit would justify ex ante support. These scholars, near colleagues, friends and family members are too numerous to mention outside of an extended written memoir. But without them the arc of my academic life would have ended far short of Freie Universität Berlin. Fostering the development of latent or raw talent made the difference for me and my hope is that I have played a similar role in the academic lives of others.

I have had the pleasure of working with both colleagues and staffs of the Faculties of Business and Economics and the John-F.-Kennedy Institute. Secretaries like our own Kerstin Brunke have provided that first line of defense known as the front office and they deserve medals for valor. Good cheer and a quite competency have served as a wonderful complement to my management-challenged ways of dealing with the world outside.  From the offices of administration in the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences to the bowels of the libraries, I have had a reasonably blessed time. Perhaps we only survive in a Burgfrieden, a truce in times of trouble, but I cannot say that I have suffered either severely or disproportionately. At this point of my professional life I am so happy for the continued emotional and intellectual support provided by my wife, the psychiatrist Prof. Isabella Heuser-Collier, whose own Abschiedsvorlesung at Berlin’s Charité I eagerly await some two years from now.

General Douglas MacArthur immortalized the refrain from an old barracks song in his farewell address to the U.S. Congress in April 19, 1951: “Old soldiers never die, they just fade away.” In that spirit, beginning this September at Bard College Berlin I shall fade to teaching half-time with an increased emphasis on the history of economics. This will give me significantly more time for transcribing and curating archival artifacts for my blog Economics in the Rear-view Mirror (www.irwincollier.com). I don’t really believe in the prospects of a happy hunting ground in the sky, but as a member of the greater academic community going forward, I find the prospect of my work surviving in a happy virtual cloud in the sky a spur for me to continue my work. I once toyed with the idea of slipping a $100 bill into the library copy of my M.I.T. Ph.D. dissertation to reward an anonymous anybody who has decided to fish the dissertation from the safe obscurity of the Dewey library stacks. Now the thought occurs to me that perhaps leaving a bitcoin in the cloud somewhere buried in my blog would be a legacy worthy of a scholar of the early 21st century.

I thank you for your attention this afternoon but especially for being with me now at this cusp of my academic life-cycle.

 

Categories
Chicago Exam Questions Problem Sets Suggested Reading Syllabus

Chicago. Price Theory. Reading Assignments, Problems, Exam. Friedman, 1951-52

 

According to the class roll kept by Milton Friedman, we know that Gary Becker attended his graduate price theory course Economics 300A in the Autumn quarter of 1951 (presumably Becker then took 300B during the Winter quarter of 1952, but I could not find that quarter’s roll in Friedman’s papers). This post even has Friedman’s partial answer key for the True/False/Uncertain questions for Economics 300B!

The reading assignments for the two-quarter core price theory sequence taught by Milton Friedman in 1948 , and in 1958 have been posted earlier (1946 300A only).  This post gives the reading assignments with open and gated links where available (some of the papers are only available at the gated jstor.org). These can be compared to the readings for the price theory course Friedman taught at Columbia in 1939-40. 

I have put in boldface the 1951 additions to make a comparison with the 1948 version easier. Worth noting: an asterisk designates optional and not required reading.

Only one item was dropped from the 1948 reading list:

Meyers, A. L. Elements of Modern Economics, ch 5, 7, 8, 9.

The October 1951 version of the Reading Assignments for Economics 300A and B was published as an appendix to J. Daniel Hammond’s “The development of post-war Chicago price theory” in The Elgar Companion to Chicago School Economics, edited by Ross  B. Emmett, pp. 7-24. This Hammond article offers much context and is very much worth consulting.

______________________________

October, 1951

Economics 300A and B
Reading Assignments by M. Friedman

(Notes:

  1. It is assumed students are familiar with material equivalent to that contained in George Stigler,  The Theory of Price. [Revised edition, 1952] or Kenneth Boulding, Economic Analysis [Third edition, 1955].
  2. Readings marked with asterisk (*) are recommended, not required.)

Knight, F. H., The Economic Organization, esp. pp. 1-37. HB172.K73.
Keynes, J. N., The Scope and Method of Political Economy, ch. I and II, pp. 1-83. HB171.K45.
Hayek, F. A., “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” American Economic Review, Sept., 1945; Reprinted in Individualism and Economic Order. HB1.A6.

Marshall, Alfred, Principles of Economics, Bk III, ch 2, 3, 4; Bk V, ch 1,2. HB171.M36.
Friedman, Milton, “The Marshallian Demand Curve,” Journal of Political Economy, December 1949. YF6.
Schultz, Henry, The Meaning of Statistical Demand Curves, pp. 1-10. HB201.S398.
Working, E. J. “What do Statistical ‘Demand Curves’ Show?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, XLI (1927), pp. 212-27. HB1.Q3.
Knight, F. H. Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, ch 3. HB601.K7. 1940.
*Lange, O., “On the Determinateness of the Utility Function”, Review of Economic Studies, Vol I (1933-34), pp. 218 ff. HB1.R45.
*Allen, R.G.D.,The Nature of Indifference Curves, Ibid, pp 110 ff. HB1.R45.
Hicks, J. R., Value and Capital, Part I (pp 11-52). HB171.H64.
*Wallis, W. A., and Friedman, Milton, The Empirical Derivation of Indifference Functions, in Lange et al, Studies in Mathematical Economics and Econometrics. HB99.C5.
*Friedman, Milton and Savage, L. J., The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk,Journal of Political Economy LVI (August 1948) pp. 279-304. HB1.J7.

 

Marshall, Book V, ch 3, 4, 5, 12, Appendix H. HB171.M36.
Robinson, Joan, Economics of Imperfect Competition, ch 2. HB201.R65.
Clark, J. M., The Economics of Overhead Costs, ch 9. HB195.C62.
Viner, Jacob, Cost Curves and Supply Curves, Zeitschrift fuer Nationaloekonomie, Bd III (Sept, 1931), pp 23-46. H5.Z55.
Friedman, Milton, “The Relationships Between Supply Curves and Cost Curves,” (dittoed) YF9.
Chamberlin, Edward, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, ch 3, sec. 1, 4, 5, 6; ch 5. HB201.C44.
Harrod, R. F. Doctrines of Imperfect Competition, Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1934, sec. 1, pp. 442-61. HB1.Q3.
Stigler, G. J., “Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect,” Lecture 2 in Five Lectures on Economic Problems. HB171.S82.
*Triffin, Robert, Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory, esp. Part II. HD41.T8 and H31.H33, v. 67.
*Robinson, E. A. G., The Structure of Competitive Industry. H045.R732.
*___________________, Monopoly. H041.R65.
*Plant, Arnold, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions,” Economica, Feb, 1934. HB1.E42.
*Dennison, S. R., “The Problem of Bigness,” Cambridge Journal, Nov. 1947. Y03.

 

Marshall, Book IV, ch 1, 2, 3; Bk V, ch 6. HB171.M36.
Clark, J. B., The Distribution of Wealth, Preface, ch 1, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 23.
Mill, John Stuart, Principles of Political Economy, Book II, ch 14. HB171.M667.
Hicks, J. R., The Theory of Wages, ch 1-6. HD4909.H63.
Smith, Adam, The Wealth of Nations, Bk I, ch 10. HB161.S652.
Marshall, Bk VI, ch 1-5. HB171.M36.
Friedman, Milton, and Kuznets, Simon, Income from Independent Professional Practice, Preface, pp. v to x; ch 3, Sec 3, pp. 81-95, ch 4, Sect 2, pp. 118-137, App, Sec 1 & 3, pp. 142-151, 155-61. HD4965.U5F8.
Knight, F. H. “Interest” in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, also in Ethics of Competition. H04965.U5F8.
Keynes, J. M. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, ch 11-14. HB171.K46.
Weston, J.F., “A Generalized Uncertainty Theory of Profit,” American Economic Review, March, 1950, pp. 40-60. HB.A6.

 

Cassell, Gustav, Fundamental Thoughts in Economics, ch. 1, 2,3. Ch. 1, 2, 3. HB 179.C283.
_________________, The Theory of Social Economy, ch 4. HB179.C283.
J. R. Hicks, Mr. Keynes and the ‘Classics’; A Suggested Interpretation”, Econometrica, vol 5, April 1937, pp. 147-159. HB1.E23, v. 5.
Franco Modigliani, Liquidity Preference and the Theory of Interest and Money,” Econometrica, vol 12, No. 1 (Jan 1944) esp. Part I, sec. 1 through 9, sec 11 through 17, Part II, sec 21. HB1.E23, v.12.
A. C. Pigou,The Classical Stationary State, Economic Journal, vol 53, December, 1943, pp. 343-51. HB1.E3, v. 53.
____________, Economic Progress in a Stable Environment,” Economica, 1947, pp. 180-90.HB1.E42, v. 14.
Patinkin, Don, “Price Flexibility and Full Employment,” American Economic Review, XXXVIII, 4, Sept. 1948, pp. 543-64. YP6.

 

Source: Hoover Institution Archive, Milton Friedman Papers, Box 77, Folder 1 “University of Chicago, Economics 300 A & B”.

___________________

Economics 300A
Autumn, 1951
PROBLEMS FOR READING PERIOD

  1. In an anti-trust case against the Aluminum Company of America, Judge Learned Hand argued that the Aluminum Company could be regarded as having essentially a complete monopoly on aluminum despite the existence of a highly competitive market in secondary or reclaimed aluminum (made from scrap) accounting for about one-third of the total aluminum used for fabrication. He justified this conclusion on the grounds that all secondary aluminum derives ultimately from primary aluminum produced earlier and hence that the Aluminum Company through its control of the output of primary aluminum indirectly controlled the quantity of scrap available.

            Evaluate the economic validity of this argument. To simplify your analysis assume that a single firm, say the Aluminum Company of America, has a complete monopoly of primary aluminum; that aluminum for fabrication comes from primary aluminum and secondary aluminum; and that primary and secondary aluminum are perfect substitutes. Indicate in detail how to determine the optimum price for the Aluminum Company to charge and the optimum output for it to produce if (a) the secondary aluminum is refined and sold by a large number of firms under competitive conditions; (b) it has a complete monopoly of secondary aluminum as well.

            Hand’s conclusion presumably is that the price of aluminum would be the same in cases (a) and (b). Is he correct? If not, would it be higher in case (b) than in case (a)? Lower?

 

  1. It is widely argued that entrepreneurs engaged in a number of different activities somehow have a “competitive advantage” over entrepreneurs engaged only in one even if no technical economies are achieved by combining the activities. This general argument and the supposed advantage take many different forms: sometimes it is that one activity provides a “guaranteed” market for another activity; sometimes that one activity provides financing or capital for another; sometimes that a monopoly in one line confers an advantage in another. A recent example of this reasoning is contained in a report by The Chicago Daily news financial columnist on November 20, 1951 that Sears-Roebuck had completed an arrangement with Kaiser-Frazer to market an automobile under the name of “Allstate.” The columnist commented “also there is the Allstate Insurance Company, a wholly owned subsidiary, which would benefit heavily through liability and other policies written in connection with the sales of an Allstate automobile….Some of the gossip around Detroit has been to the effect that the Allstate would have Sears batteries and tires and certain other Sears accessories as original equipment—which would mean more business for these departments of the company.”

(a) The key question is, of course, whether the financial incentive to Sears to market an automobile is greater because it owns the subsidiary companies than it would be if it did not own them. You will find it helpful in answering this question to consider first two intermediate questions: (b) Given that Sears does own the subsidiary companies and that it is going to market an automobile under its name, is it in its own interests to require that the car be equipped with accessories produced by its companies? (c) To require that cars it sells be insured by its own insurance company?

            In answering both questions (a) and (b), consider separately two cases: (1) The subsidiary companies can be regarded as operating under highly competitive conditions; (2) the subsidiary companies can be regarded as having a monopoly of the products they produce. Do the conclusions depend on the assumption made about competitive conditions? Assume throughout that there are no “technical” economies from combining the various activities.

 

Source:  Hoover Institution Archives. Papers of Milton Friedman. Box 76, Folder 76.9.

___________________

Economics 300A
Final Examination
December 17, 1951

  1. (15 points)
    (a) Appraise: “Recent studies of domestic consumption in low-cost municipalities demonstrate that the demand for electric current is highly elastic, expanding rapidly as the cost declines. The national average consumption of the United States was 604 kilowatt-hours in 1933. The average charge to consumers on October 1, 1934, for the whole country is reported as 5.4 cents per kilowatt-hour. In Seattle where the average cost is 2.58 cents, the average consumption is 1,098 kilowatt-hours. In Tacoma, the charge is 1.726 cents and the consumption 1,550. In 26 cities of Ontario, the average charge is 1.45 cents and the consumption 1,780. Finally, in Winnipeg, where the average net charge is only 8 mills per kilowatt-hour the average per capita consumption exceeds 4,000 kilowatt-hours.” (Report of the National Resources Board, December 1, 1934, Government Printing Office, 1934, p. 39.)

(b) Will a specific tax (a tax of a specified number of dollars per physical unit) on a commodity raise its price more or less than an equivalent ad valoremtax (a tax of a specified percentage of the price)? Assume that the commodity is produced and sold under competitive conditions.

  1. (15 points) (a) Figure 1 gives the locus of points of tangency between indifference curves and budget lines parallel to ab (and cd). ABCDEFGH is therefore and “expansion path” or curve showing the quantity of X and Y and individual would buy at different incomes and constant relative prices. Fill in the following table with as precise statements as are deducible from Fig. 1 by observation without measurement:

 

 

 

Segment

Income elasticity of

Good is Superior (S), Inferior (I), or Uncertain (U)

X

Y X

Y

AB
BC
CD
DE
EF
FG
GH

(b) ABCDEF in Figure 2 is the locus of points of tangency between indifference curves and budget lines representing different money prices for X but the same money price of Y and money income (i.e. budget lines like ab and ac rotating about a). Fill in the following table with as precise statements as are deducible from Fig. 2 by observation without measurement.

Segment

Income elasticity of Good is Superior (S), Inferior (I), or Uncertain (U)
X Y X Y
AB
BC
CD
DE
EF

 

  1. (20 points) “Monopolistic competition robs the old concept of industry (and also the Chamberlinian group) of any theoretical significance…The value of these groupings is only a concrete, empirical one…Which firms shall be included in any one group will have to be decided, not on an a prioribasis, but after an empirical survey of market realities…In the general pure theory of value, the group and the industry are useless concepts…When the study of competition is freed from the narrowing assumptions of pure competition, only two terms remain essential for the analysis: the individual firms, on the one hand; the whole collectivity of competitors on the other.” (Triffin)

(a) Explain why “monopolistic competition robs the old concept of industry…of any theoretical significance.”
(b) Explain the general position summarized in this quotation and discuss it critically.

  1. (20 points) Find the mistakes (there are at least six) in the accompanying diagram showing long and short run marginal and average cost curves, and explain the general principle corresponding to each particular mistake.

 

  1. The accompanying diagram showing a set of indifference curves between income and work is part of a diagram given by Boulding in Economic Analysis in his discussion of the effects of various types of direct taxation, and reproduced by Schwartz and Moore in the March 1951 American Economic Review. The latter write, “Given O Q2Qas a rate of pay, the equilibrium position is Pwhere the rate of pay is equal to the MRS between leisure and income. Let us assume that we are to collect a tax from this individual equal to OL. One method of collecting the tax would be to levy a poll tax, leaving the rate of pay unaltered, as LP5. Another direct tax would be a proportional income tax represented by OSPwhich would have the effect of lowering (flattening) the rate of ‘take-home’ pay. To extract the same amount of revenue as the poll tax does, this rate of pay must be tangent to an indifference curve at an intersection with LP5. Thus P2Q= OL. Since the rate of ‘take-home’ pay is flatter, Pmust lie below and to the left of P5; i.e. less effort is expended and the worker enjoys a smaller net income. More important, his welfare is diminished because he must be on a lower indifference curve…Given the premises of the conventional indifference curve pattern, this must necessarily be true.”

(a):

(1) Why do the indifference curves in the diagram slope positively?
(2) How can you justify their being drawn concave upwards?
(3) The statement that OQ2Qis “a rate of pay” is of course wrong. OQ2Qis a line. Reword the statement so it is accurate.
(4) What do the authors mean by MRS?

(b) If we suppose the diagram to stand for a “representative” individual, or one of a society of identical individuals all to be taxed alike, the last sentence in the quotation is false: the authors’ welfare conclusion does not follow from their premises and arguments. Point out the fallacy in the proof.

(c) Under what conditions is the authors’ welfare conclusion valid? Can you give a proof of your statement?

 

Source:  Hoover Institution Archives. Papers of Milton Friedman. Box 76, Folder 76.9.

___________________

 

Economics 300B
Winter, 1952
PROBLEM FOR READING PERIOD

Available evidence tentatively indicates that (1) average income of white families living in the same size city is roughly the same in the North and the South; (2) the wage rate of a white worker in any given occupation is higher in the North than in the South for cities of the same size; (3) property income is roughly of equal importance for white families in the North and the South.

For purposes of this question, accept these as correct statements of fact. Can you suggest any way of reconciling the apparent contradiction among them? Presumably, any reconciliation will turn on the larger fraction of negroes and greater discrimination against them in the South than in the North.

Spell out your suggestion in detail, explaining the theoretical links if any between the higher fraction of negroes and greater discrimination, on the one hand, and the indicated results on the other. Indicate how the validity of your suggestion would be tested.

 

Source:  Hoover Institution Archives. Papers of Milton Friedman. Box 76, Folder 76.10.

___________________

ECONOMICS 300B
Final Examination
March 12, 1952

    1. (35 points) Indicate whether each of the following statements is true (T), false (F), or uncertain (U), and state briefly the reason for your answer. It is to be understood that in each question the appropriate “other things” are to be held constant.
      1. The imposition of a minimum wage for labor of type X higher than the preceding wage leads to an increase in the number of laborers of type X employed. It follows that labor of type X is hired under monopsonistic conditions. [True]
      2. Under both competition and monopoly in the product market, marginal value product of a factor to a firm is equal to marginal physical product of the firm times marginal revenue to the firm from the sale of the product. [True]
      3. Marginal productivity analysis shows that, in the absence of monopsony, a laborer gets as a wage his marginal value product. If this analysis is correct, it follows that unions can raise wages in the absence of monopsony only if they either make each worker more efficient, or increase demand for the product, or make the demand for the product more elastic. [False]
      4. The law of variable proportions (or diminishing returns) is contradicted by the fact that agricultural output of this country has increased tremendously despite a decrease in the proportion of the working population on farms. [False]
      5. The rate of interest is equal to the rate of time preference of consumers. [True]
      6. At present levels of operation, three quarters of the total cost of the XYZ railroad is overhead cost that does not vary with traffic, only one quarter is variable cost. It follows that marginal cost is much less than average cost. [False]
      7. The demand curve of an individual firm for a factor of production is identical with its marginal value productivity curve for the same factor of production. [False]
      8. The demand curve of a firm for a factor of production is a meaningless concept if the firm is a monopsonistic purchaser of that factor. [True]
      9. A declining long run supply curve is impossible in a competitive industry. [False]
      10. Marginal factor cost is equal to the price per unit of a factor whenever the product market is competitive. [False]
      11. According to the theory of joint demand, the absolute value of the elasticity of derived demand for a factor of production will be smaller the more inelastic the supply of that factor. [False]
      12. The fact that individuals do not choose occupations solely on the basis of their pecuniary attractiveness helps explain why the supply curve of labor for a particular occupation has an elasticity greater than zero. [True]
      13. If all types of services were used only in fixed proportions, a marginal-productivity theory would be neither necessary nor possible. [False]
      14. Our society is often described as a “profit” economy or “profit-maximizing” economy. The word “profit” is here used in the same sense as in the uncertainty theory of “profit.” [False]
      15. “Profit” as defined in the uncertainty theory of profit is the expected return to any factor assuming uncertainty over and above the guaranteed expected income it can obtain if it assumes no uncertainty. [False]
      16. If one income is higher than another before income tax it will also be higher after a progressive income tax, provided only that the marginal tax never exceeds 100%. It follows that if one accepts the theory that individuals act as if they sought to maximize their income, he must also accept the conclusion that such taxes do not alter individual’s actions and hence are not shifted. [False]

17 and 18. A minimum wage law is repealed. The wage rate of a class of workers hired under competitive conditions was equal to the minimum before repeal and falls after repeal. It follows that:

      1. The total wage bill for this class of labor will rise, remain constant, or fall, according as the elasticity of demand for labor of this class is greater than, equal to, or less than unity in absolute value. [True]
      2. The quantity of labor of this class employed will fall, remain constant, or rise according as the elasticity of supply of labor of this class is positive, zero, or negative. [False]
      3. The great technological improvements in the past few decades in the production of synthetic fibers (rayon, nylon, etc.) and associated decline in their relative price has, among other effects, tended to raise the price of meat in general, especially of lamb and mutton. [True]
      4. At the same time, stringent rationing of meat consumption in Great Britain, by tending to offset this effect, has improved the competitive position of the synthetic fiber industry, and so enabled it to expand more than otherwise. [True]
  1. (15 points) “The wages of every class of labour tends to be equal to the net product due to the additional labour of the marginal labourer of that class.
    “This doctrine is not a theory of wages: but is a useful part of a theory.” (Marshall)(a) What does Marshall mean by “net product”? [4] By “Marginal labourer”?[4]
    (b) Explain and evaluate the second sentence in the quotation. [7]
  2. (15 points) It is frequently argued that a tax on a product imposed at the manufacturing level involves a greater burden on consumers than a tax yielding the same revenue imposed at the retail level because the tax is “pyramided,” i.e., the “margins” of wholesalers and retailers are viewed as given percentages of purchase price and so, it is argued, price will tend to rise not only by the tax but also by the “margins” on the tax.
    Evaluate this argument.
  3. (10 points) The price of nylon thread for use in making women’s hosiery was recently lowered drastically when DuPont decided to make much larger quantities available. The resulting decline in the price of hosiery was viewed by at least some manufacturers and retailers as a misfortune and as portending smaller profits for themselves. Were they right? In the short run? In the long run? Justify your answers.
  4. (10 points) A subsidy of $X is paid per acre of land devoted to growing soy beans. Will this lead to a rise or to a decline in the yield per acre on land devoted to growing soy beans prior to the introduction of the subsidy? Justify your answer.
  5. (15 points)
    (a) What is the Pigou effect?[4] What relevance does it have to the theory of the rate of interest?[4]
    (b) List some economic decisions that would be affected by a change in the rate of interest. Indicate why they would be affected and if possible the direction of the effect. [7]

 

Source:  Hoover Institution Archives. Papers of Milton Friedman. Box 76, Folder 76.10.

Image Source: Milton Friedman (undated). University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf1-06230, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.