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Harvard. Economic Principles and Public Policy. Syllabus, readings, questions. Schelling, 1981

In my opinion Thomas C. Schelling (1921-2016) has achieved something greater than the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel (2005). The history of economics will remember him as the very model of a modern thinking economist’s economist.

The earlier post for the reading list and final exams from his 1970 Harvard course “Conflict, Coalition and Strategy” has been viewed nearly 19,000 times, making it the highest single post in the eleven year history of Economics in the Rear-view Mirror.

The purpose of today’s post is to provide a digital, transcribed version of Schelling’s 1981 course materials for “Economic Principles and Public Policy” assembled from a PDF file of the scanned copy of this material compiled and published by Ed Tower in his Eno River Press Collection in Economics. In this form, it will be even easier to access, search, copy, and paste from. 

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Where to Find the Motherload

The Eno River Press Collection in Economics, compiled by Duke professor (now emeritus) Ed Tower, is the motherload of syllabi, problems sets, and exams from economics courses taught over roughly two decades at the end of the 20th century. Thanks to the initiative of Steven Medema, this material has been digitized and made available as .pdf files:  1980 (15 vols.); 1981 (25 vols.); 1990 (25 vols.); 1995 (25 vols.). There is an analogous set of volumes, likewise available in business administration.

Professor Ed Tower came to Duke in 1974. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard in 1971. He has held appointments at the Australian National University, the University of Auckland in New Zealand, the Economics Institute, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, the Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration, Nanjing University in the Peoples’ Republic of China, and Simon Fraser University in Canada. He has also consulted on economic development problems at the World Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development, and in Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, and Sudan, and has written on development problems in Malaysia, the Peoples’ Republic of China, and Taiwan.
Source: Duke Economics Department, WWW Resource.

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Undergraduate Course

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Economic Principles and Public Policy
Economics 1021
Spring 1981

T. C. Schelling

Course Outline and Reading Assignments

All readings listed are assigned; none are optional.

Books Required to Purchase:

Robert H. Haveman and Julius Margolis, Public Expenditure and Policy Analysis, second ed. (paperback), Rand McNally, 1977.

Robert Dorfman and Nancy Dorfman, Economics of the Environment, second ed., W.W. Norton and Company, 1977.

Richard Goode, The Individual Income Tax, revised ed. (paperback), The Brookings Institution, 1976.

Charles L. Schultze, The Public Use of Private Interest,
The Brookings Institution, 1977.

Arthur M. Okun, Equality and Efficiency, The Brookings
Institution, 1975.

T.C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior, W.W. Norton and Company, 1978.

Harold M. Hochman, The Urban Economy, W.W. Norton and Company, 1976.

Book Required to Obtain:

Your Income Tax, Publication 17, Internal Revenue Service,
not for sale.

Note: The class meets in lecture 13 times before Spring Recess. Reading assignments for the 8 meetings after Spring Recess will be distributed later.  Sections will meet each week except the first week and the week before Spring Recess.

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Outline and Readings
Pages Meetings
I. Lives and Decisions 136
(Cumul-ative totals in parentheses)
3
  1. Chase, Samuel B., (ed.), Problems in Public Expenditure Analysis, The Brookings Institution, 1968, pp. 127-176.
  2. Vaupel, James W. and John D. Graham, “Egg in Your Bier?”, The Public Interest, No. 58, Winter 1980, pp. 3-17.
  3. Zeckhauser, Richard, “Procedures for Valuing Lives,” Public Policy, Fall 1975, pp. 419-464.
  4. Lave, Lester B. and Eugene P. Seskin, “Air Pollution and Human Health,” in Robert Dorfman and Nancy S. Dorfman, Economics of the Environment, 2nd ed., W.W. Norton & Co., pp. 422-449.
II. Policy: Why Things May Not Take Care of Themselves 177 (313) 2 (5)
  1. Haveman, Robert H. and Julius Margolis, Public Expenditure and Policy Analysis, 2nd ed., 1977, Introduction, pp. 1-24.
  2. Davis, Otto A. and Morton I. Kamien, “Externalities, Information and Alternative Collective Action,” H and M, pp. 82-104.
  3. Schelling, T.C., Micromotives and Macrobehavior, W.W. Norton & Co., 1978.

Ch. 1, “Micromotives and Macrobehavior,” 9-43.
Ch. 3, “Thermostats, Lemons, and Other Families of Models,” 83-133.
Ch. 4, “Sorting and Mixing:  Race and Sex,” 137-155.
Ch. 6, “Choosing Our Children’s Genes,” 193-203.

  1. Steiner, Peter O., “The Public Sector and the Public Interest,” in H and M, pp. 27-40.
III. Examples of Market Failure 214 (527) 2 (7)
The Environment

  1. Ruff, Larry E., “The Economic Common Sense of Pollution,” in D and D, pp. 41-58.
  2. Dales, J.H., “The Property Interface,” in D and D, pp. 172-186.
  3. Dales, J.H., “Land, Water, and Ownership,”in D and D, pp. 229-244.
  4. Mishan, E.J., “Property Rights and AmenityRights,” in D and D, pp. 245-251.
  5. Schelling, T.C., “Prices as Regulatory Instruments for Environmental Protection,”JFK School of Government, December 1980.
  6. Goldman, Marshall I., “The Convergence ofEnvironmental Disruption,” in D and D, pp. 312-325.

The City

  1. Baumol, W.J. & Wallace E. Oates, “The CostDisease of the Personal Services and the Quality of Life,” pp. 57-73, in The Urban Economy by Harold M. Hochman, W.W. Norton and Co., 1976.
  2. Thompson, Wilbur, “The City as a DistortedPrice System,” pp. 74-86, in The Urban Economy.
  3. Alonso, William, “Urban Zero Population Growth,” pp. 164-179 in The Urban Economy.
IV. Helping People 118 (645) 3 (10)
The Conflict Between Equity and Incentives

  1. Tobin, James, “The Case for an Income Guarantee,” The Public Interest, Summer 1966, pp. 31-41.
  2. Schorr, Alvin L., “Against a Negative Income Tax,” and James Tobin, “A Rejoinder,” The Public Interest, Fall 1966, pp. 110-119.
  3. Weisbrod, Burton A., “Collective Action andthe Distribution of Income:  A Conceptual Approach,” in H & M, pp. 105-131.
  4. Products Liability:  Bexiga vs. Havir Mfg.Corp., Harvard Law Review, Vol. 86 (March1973), pp. 923-931.
  5. Implications of Guaranteeing Medical Care,Institute of Medicine, 1975, Schelling et al., pp. 23-37, 39-44, 53-57.

Cash, Kind, or Rationing

  1. Tobin, James, “On Limiting the Domain of Inequality,” The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 13 (October 1970), pp. 263-277.
  2. Thurow, Lester C., “Cash Versus In-Kind Transfers,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May 1974, pp. 190-195.
  3. Frieden, Bernard J., “Housing Allowances:  An Experiment That Worked,” The Public Interest, No. 59, Spring 1980, pp. 15-35.
V. Case Study: Day Care 68 (713) 0 (10)
  1. Nelson, Richard R., The Moon and The Ghetto, W.W. Norton and Co., 1977, pp. 83-103.
  2. Rivlin, Alice, “Federal Support for Child Care:  An Analysis of Options,” in H & M, pp. 442-475.
  3. Bruce-Briggs, B., “‘Child Care,’ The FiscalTime Bomb,” The Public Interest, #49, Fall 1977, pp. 87-102.
VI. Review Questions 0 (713) 1 (11)
Spring 1981
Course Plan

WEEK OF

SECTION

2/2

No sections

2/9

Problem: Right Turn on Red

2/16
[Washington’s B-Day]

Quiz

2/23

Hour Exam:
Lives, Policy, Environment, City

3/2

Problem: Moral Hazard

3/9

Quiz

3/16

15 Questions Due

3/23

****** RECESS ******

3/30

Hour Exam:
Helping People, Cash v Kind, Day Care, Crime, Energy

4/6

Problem: Tax

4/13

Quiz: Tax

4/20

Quiz: Tax

4/26

****** READING PERIOD ******

Source:  Economics Reading Lists, Course Outlines, Exams, Puzzles & Problems compiled by Edward Tower. Vol. 20 (July 1981): Public Choice, Political Economy, and the Economics of Public Policy & Law, pp. 133-137.

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ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES
AND PUBLIC POLICY

M-228 & ECONOMICS 1021
Spring 1981

T. C. Schelling
Harvard University

The Income Tax

            These questions are prompted by a reading of the Form 1040. Some of the questions will be discussed in class, some are for your reflection and study. The purpose is to alert you to the kinds of questions and issues that almost any line in the tax form can raise. Several hours can be devoted to the economic philosophy underlying income taxes, discerning intention, recognizing administrative com-promise, analyzing incentives, and evaluating the income tax as an instrument to achieve a variety of goals. It need not be viewed as a coherent philosophy or a set of integrated and compatible purposes; searching for inconsistencies or obsolete details, and reflecting on historical processes and political compromises, are part of the exercise.

Page 1 of Form 1040

  1. Why “income rather than “wealth?”
    What difference does it make whether income or wealth is the subject of the tax?
  2. Why is the calendar year the unit of accounting?
    What provisions modify this annual slicing?
    What would be an ideal accounting period, or is there one?
    What incentives result from slicing time into annual units?
  3. Should a married couple be treated as a single unit, as two persons, or allowed some choice in how to file?
    Do you perceive any incentives on marriage and divorce?
  4. What reason can you think of for the extra exemption for the blind, not for the deaf or the crippled?
    Why might blindness be exactly equivalent to one dependent?
    Should blindness be treated as an exemption or a tax credit?
    What are the differences between this kind of help for the blind and cash grants not related to income?
  5. Should the allowance for a dependent be a constant amount of income, irrespective of bracket? Should it instead be graduated, so that the differential between a large and small family at high income is greater than the differential at a lower income? Should it be a tax credit rather than an exemption?
  6. Is there an implied philosophy about family, children, and birth, in this treatment of dependents? Does it imply that children are:

1) a consumer good,
2) an insurable accident,
3) a productive asset,
4) a social obligation?

Are there incentives on family size or timing due to this treatment of dependents?

  1. What is the argument for including capital gains as a kind of income? Alternatively, what is the argument for not treating them the same as income?
    Why distinguish long-term from short-term? Is this an anti-gambling or anti-speculation bias? Is it expected or intended to have incentives on the holding of securities?
    Why are only “realized” gains taxed, so that if your stock or property rises in value you pay no tax unless you sell it?
    What are the incentives: do people get “locked in” to property holdings that have risen in value, having to hold it rather than exchange it for other stock and property?
    Why is a special exemption made for the sale of one’s own house?
  2. Should gambling gains and losses be treated like any other income?
    Should they be ignored altogether and left untaxed?
    Does the treatment discriminate against “pure” gambling but not against gambling on the commodity or stock market?
    Is this treatment consistent with the increasing popularity of state lotteries, off-track and on-track betting, etc.?
    What effect will the treatment of gambling gains and losses have on the ability of legal gambling to compete with illegal gambling?
  3. Can you guess what kinds of “employee business expenses” a typical university professor will take credit for on his tax return? Do you expect any incentives, such as the likelihood of having better office equipment, more telephone extensions, better personal libraries, if they are tax-deductible?

Schedule A

  1. Itemized deductions: Is there a single rationale for the items deductible? Is it:
      1. to get at a better accounting of income
      2. to encourage expenses of the kinds that have been made deductible.
      3. to compensate for special hardships and obligations;
      4. or what?
  2. Why is medical care somewhat deductible?
    How does treatment of medical care discriminate between the poor and the well-to-do?
    Could you estimate the “cost” to the Internal Revenue Service (or to other taxpayers if they would have to make it up in higher tax rates) of this treatment of medical care?
    If you could redistribute an equivalent amount, to compensate people for an injury and illness and disability, would you rather distribute it in a manner unrelated to income or income taxes?
    Can you find a plausible explanation of the quantitative treatment of medical care: e.g., 1/2 of insurance premiums; excess over 3% of income; subtracting out 18 in line 3; etc.
  3. How would you prefer to treat funeral expenses? Should sanitary or tasteful disposal of a dead body be treated as a terminal medical expense? Can you think of good reasons for the actual treatment of this item?
  4. What contributions are tax-deductible, and why?
    Is this equivalent to a subsidy of churches by the federal government?
    Is the object to stimulate contributions?
    Is this a useful way to decentralize federal subsidies, by a system of “matching grants” to anybody who wants to support his favorite charity?
    Who has more leverage in determining where the IRS makes its contributions, a poor or a rich person?
  5. What do you think are the most questionable “contributions,” the ones about which it is hard to decide whether they are within the spirit of the income tax?
    Is it a “contribution” if I make a sizable gift to a private school in hopes that they will give priority admissions to my children?
    Can I unload a library that I’ve grown tired of, and treat it as a cash “gift” to the University?
    Suppose I make the gift and the recipient throws it away?
    Suppose I make a “gift” to a nursing home that is really a disguised bill for the care of an aged relative, but the nursing home winks and lets me “pay” the bill in a tax-deductible way?
  6. Why should the interest you pay be deductible? (Interest you receive is taxable.) Does this put a distortion in the incentive structure–regarding, say, mortgaged homes vs. outright ownership–or does it eliminate a distortion?
  7. Is the treatment of “casualty losses” equivalent to insurance handled by the Treasury?
    Does it discriminate in favor of the rich, the poor, the property-less, or the property owners?
    Could the treatment of casualty losses have any influence on the insurance that people purchase?
    If I smash my car and somebody else’s, and he sues me for damage and I pay, should both parts of the loss be deductible, or only the damage to my own car?
  8. Why allow deductions for taxes paid to state and local government but not other federal taxes?

General Questions

  1. It has been argued that employees of the federal government ought not to pay income tax: they are simply returning part of their salary. If they were exempted from tax we could lower their pay to the “after taxes” level, saving them the trouble of making out returns and the IRS the trouble of processing them. Do you see objections to that procedure?
    Do your objections apply equally to state taxation of incomes earned in state employment?
  2. Children who are eighteen or younger count as dependents, no matter how much income they had. Should we reexamine this age, as voting ages, draft ages, and ages over which juvenile courts have jurisdiction change as the years go by, and with the increasing independence of teenage “dependents?”
    A child with income abruptly ceases to be a dependent at age nineteen. Would there be advantage in having dependency taper off gradually?
  3. In earlier years, military combat pay was excluded from taxable income.
    Why would the federal government prefer to do it that way rather than with an outright pay increase?
    It has recently been proposed to exempt all military pay from federal taxation. What are the reasons for and against?
  4. If you and your employer both pay a percentage of your salary into a retirement fund, should your part not be treated as income and subject to taxation? Should his?
    If the retirement fund invests it, should the accrual of interest and dividends to your retirement account be currently taxable?
    How much flexibility should the IRS allow you in putting part of your income into a retirement fund, temporarily beyond reach of the income tax?
    Suppose your retirement fund permits you to withdraw from it in an emergency? Does that make it just an investment fund to escape the income tax?
    Suppose you cannot withdraw it but you can borrow against it.
    Is it only a pretense that it is still there and you have not drawn it down to spend it?
    What general purpose do you see in permitting contributions to a retirement account to evade immediate taxation, but not any other form of saving that is invested for the sake of deferred consumption? Is this just another subsidy for incentives, or is there some logical reason to exempt this contribution, as being not “earned” until one is legally able to draw on it after retirement?
  5. Consider some income that is not subject to tax–either legally immune, or just practically uncollectible (evasion being easy and people willing to evade in the belief that others do).
    Specifically, tips to waiters and waitresses. who do you think benefits from untaxed tips?
    What do you think the effect is on waiters’ wages and the prices of restaurant meals? Does your answer depend on the income earned by waiters?
    Think of some untaxed fee or salary supplement in a high income bracket, and answer the same question–e.g., untaxed fees of abortionists when abortion was illegal.
    Can you make any general proposition about who benefits to what extent when any identifiable kind of income goes untaxed, either because it is legally exempt or because the tax is regularly evaded?

Beneficiaries and Incentives

  1. Select some disadvantaged or underpriviledged group that you would like to help with extra income at government expense.
    1. What is the best device you can think of that might be incorporated in the income tax to serve that purpose?
    2. Compare that income-tax measure with the best alternative measure (not involving the income tax) that would serve the same purpose.
    3. How much of the tax benefit (i.e. the tax loss to the government) is likely to go to the people whom you did not especially wish to receive the benefit? How serious an inefficiency is that?
    4. How many of the people you would like to help are not reached by your proposed tax measure, and how serious is that inefficiency?
  2. Select an activity that you would like to stimulate at government expense.
    1. What is the best device you can think of that might be incorporated in the income tax to serve that purpose?
    2. Compare that income-tax measure with the best alternative measure (not involving the income tax) that would serve the same purpose.
    3. How much of the tax benefit is likely to go to taxpayers whose activity is unaffected by your income-tax measure?
    4. How would you estimate the amount of the desired activity (measured perhaps in the increase in taxpayer expenditure on it) induced per dollar of lost tax revenue?
  3. Discuss the incentives in the income tax that affect the following. Indicate the direction in which they affect it, the likely magnitude of the effect, and the desirability of the incentive effect:
    1. owning a home, or renting;
    2. doing work around the house rather than hiring it done;
    3. diverting wages and salaries into institutionalized retirement arrangements;
    4. choosing among savings accounts, bonds, stocks, and real estate;
    5. purchasing collision-damage auto insurance;
    6. having another child;
    7. housewives taking full-time jobs and getting sitters, housekeepers, cleaning help, etc., to take care at home;
    8. choosing one’s occupation.
  4. What in the income tax do you think affects the way Harvard University is administered? (For example, the health service, retirement arrangements, providing expenses rather than income to faculty, granting scholarships).
  5. Income Tax Work Incentives
    It has been argued that an income tax induces people to work less because it reduces their net hourly compensation. A person who can do extra work at $7.50 per hour may not do it if he keeps only $5.
    It has also been argued that an income tax induces people to work more because it lowers their net income for any amount of work they do; to maintain desired standards of living the income tax leaves them no choice but to work more.
    How would you resolve the dispute, either choosing one of these two points of view, denying them both, or finding some reconciliation between these two opposing arguments?
  6. Taxes and the Ability to Pay
    It has been argued that the income tax is unique among taxes in discriminating according to “ability to pay.” why, then, should there be additional taxes unrelated to the ability to pay? There are other taxes and they add up to as much as the income tax. Of course, in politics nobody’s perfect, and we needn’t be surprised that “ability to pay” is honored and violated at the same time. Still, there may be good reasons why an income tax is not or cannot be relied on as the sole source of revenue.
      1. How successfully does it tax people on their “ability to pay?”
      2. Give some good reasons for not expecting the income tax to be able to serve as the unique, universal, all-purpose tax.
    1. Child Dependency Allowance
      The present income tax allowance for children is that $1000 per child can be deducted from income before calculating the tax. In taxes saved, a child is worth more in a high-tax bracket than in a low bracket. On the other hand, the expenses attributable to an extra child for a family with an income of $15,000 is probably much closer to the $1000 allowance than are the expenditures attributable to an extra child in a family of similar size with an income of $60,000.
      It can be argued that the difference between no children and three children at a family income of $60,000 is far greater than the $1000 per child allowed as untaxable income, and that it makes sense to enlarge that allowance at higher incomes.
      It can also be argued that raising the allowance at higher incomes will reduce the progressivity of the tax, allowing just another benefit to wealthier families while poorer families would get no such relief.

      1. Explain how you would choose between these two points of view, or reconcile them, in recommending how to handle children in the income tax.
      2. would your answer to (a) be any different if the dependency allowance were a tax credit rather than a deduction from income?
  1. A tax is called “progressive” if the amount paid rises more than proportionally to income, “regressive” if less, and “proportional” if the ratio of tax to income is uniform. The word “progressive” also suggests “fair” or “liberal” and “progressive income tax” tends to have both meanings. with either meaning it is sometimes hard to determine which among two or more tax schedules, or changes in a tax schedule, or more or less “progressive,” or exactly what change in rates should be characterized as preserving the same progressivity.
    Below are six income-tax schedules.
    Indicate how you would go about ranking them, or comparing them, in their “progressivity.”
    Would you need to know something about the underlying distribution of income to make the comparison?
    If so, explain.
Income Bracket $000 Percentage rate on income in bracket
A B C D E F
0 – 6 0 0 0 0 0 17
6 – 12 15 10 10 0 0 29
12 – 24 20 15 13 30 5 27
24 – 48 30 25 20 30 31 45
48 – 100 50 45 33 60 45 58
100 – 200 75 70 50 70 73 79

Compared with Schedule A:

Do one or more of the schedules raise or lower all taxes in the same proportion? Which ones?

Do one or more raise or lower all taxes by the same proportion of income? Which ones?

Do one or more raise or lower all income after taxes in the same proportion? Which ones?

Does one or more of them have the same progressivity as A?

Do any two of them have the same progressivity as each other?

Among them all, including A, which is least progressive and which most, and how do you rank the others?

NOTE: Because the rates go stepwise, any change will affect somewhat differently people at different points within a bracket. I suggest you make the comparisons at the bracket limits, i.e. at $6, $12, $24, $48, $100, and $200.

Source: “The Income Tax”. Photocopy reproduced in Economics Reading Lists, Course Outlines, Exams, Puzzles & Problems compiled by Edward Tower. Vol. 12 (July 1981): Public Finance Exams, Puzzles & Problems, pp. 9-17.

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T. C. Schelling/Harvard University
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES
AND PUBLIC POLICY
Spring 1981

Ec. 1021
M- 228
EXAM QUESTIONS FROM EARLIER YEARS
  1. Proposed Policies for Evaluation
  2. Swine Flu Vaccination
  3. 55-Mile Speed Limit
  4. Worth of Saving Lives
  5. Crime Rates and Police Coverage
  6. Fire Protection
  7. Smoking in Class
  8. Saturday Sections
  9. Apartment House Heating
  10. Deposit on Cans and Bottles
  11. Smoking in Class: Another Room
  12. Library Air Conditioning
  13. State-University Tuition
  14. Nursery Schools
  15. Youth Fare
  16. Welfare and Work Incentives
  17. Dining Hall Problem
  18. University Parking
  19. Vouchers, Goods- (services)-in-Kind, or Cash
  20. Gasoline Mileage
  21. Elasticity of Response
  22. Property-Tax Exemption for Veterans
  23. Incentive Effects of Private Insurance
  24. Overbooked Airline
  25. Environment in the USA and the USSR
  26. Insurance and “Moral Hazard”
  27. Common Property
  28. The City
  29. Child Care

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

  1. Proposed Policies for Evaluation

      Without reaching any final conclusion about any of the actual or proposed policies listed below, indicate for each of them one or two important considerations that this course has brought to your attention.

      1. Individual fire-detection units have been developed that emit a distinctive noise when fire occurs in a dwelling; they cost about $35. It is proposed that federal funds be offered to the states for refunding $20 per unit, for up to two such units, to any landlord or homeowner purchasing such equipment, in any state that, through its fire-safety authority or its regulation of the fire insurance industry, makes such detection devices mandatory or that severely penalizes the insurance rates of homes without them.
      2. Public provision to low-income persons with specific disabilities, and to the low-income very elderly, of “taxi vouchers,” useable in payment of metered taxi fares, redeemable in cash from the taxi company, in some standard amount calculated to cover some minimum number of trips per month for which such disabled and elderly people would need transportation by automobile.
      3. Cheap postal rates on books.
      4. Free eyeglasses for schoolchildren who need them, li parent’s or guardian’s income is below some specified level (as documented by income tax return).
      5. Free admission to selected Harvard football games for non-academic employees of the University.
      6. Requirement that any disability benefits generally available to company employees be provided also for some specified length of time for pregnancy and child-birth.
      7. The restriction, as presently in Cambridge, of most side street parking to local residents, enforced by parking fines for all vehicles without local-resident stickers,
      8. A provision that Harvard clerical, secretarial, and similar non-teaching staff be authorized, with the permission of their immediate supervisors, to enroll for grade and credit in one undergraduate Harvard course during each academic year, at no charge and with official time off from regular duties during class hours.
      9. Requirement that all new apartment buildings provide separate metering of heat in each individual apartment, with separate thermostat or other controls on heat use.
      10. Preferential hiring of veterans in government jobs.
      11. Federal program to finance welfare benefits so that benefits will be uniform among all 50 states.
      12. Free gymnasium-locker-shower and other athletic facilities made available to all employees of a large corporation, as a fringe benefit of likely value to employee health.
      13. On days when the weather makes it advisable to curtail sharply the volume of traffic on the Mass. Turnpike Extension (from the western suburbs to downtown Boston) put into effect, by radio announcement, the standby rule that cars will be admitted to the turnpike only if the first digit of the license plate is odd or even according as the date of the month is odd or even.
      14. Income-tax deduction or credit for home insulation expenditure.
      15. Life insurance equal to $50 thousand if single, $100 thousand if married, plus $25 thousand for each dependent child, for firemen and policemen killed in the line of duty.
      16. Unemployment compensation treated as “insurance” and not taxable as income.
      17. “Gasoline stamps” (patterned after food stamps) that low-income owners of registered cars and trucks can purchase at a discount, in limited quantities, as a cushion against the impact on low-income people of a federal gasoline tax.
      18. Mandatory deposit of 25¢ on every beer or soft-drink container purchased in Massachusetts, can or bottle, to be refunded upon return to any store where beer or soft drinks are sold, together with requirement that all containers sold in the state carry distinctive ineradicable markings to prevent wholesale turn-in of cans and bottles from outside the state.
      19. Mandatory $25 per year (for three years) increase in automobile insurance premium for every moving traffic for “safe” the proceeds used to reduce insurance rates drivers.
      20. The extra federal income-tax exemption for the blind.
      21. Federal income-tax deduction for contributions to schools.
      22. Rent control for persons over 65, for the disabled, and for certain other disadvantaged tenants.
      23. Exemption from minimum-wage law for youths under 17.
  1. Swine Flu Vaccination

      It is nearly forgotten now, but put youself back to January 1977: Forty million people had received swine flu vaccine. It was not clear whether an epidemic of swine flu might yet occur, and there was no final judgment on whether the vaccine itself entailed significant risk. Anywhere from 40 to 400 people were thought to have possibly died in consequence of the vaccine itself. It had been feared that a flu epidemic might ki11 40,000.

      A characteristic of vaccination is that the more successful the program, the less protection anyone needs. If everyone is vaccinated, you don’t need to be. And if the epidemic is averted, vaccination deaths may outweigh flu deaths.

      An important possibility in that January was that there remained a serious risk of swine flu but no sign of it yet, and that the publicity about some real or imagined fatal complications had made doctors afraid to offer the shots, patients reluctant to receive them, and health officials afraid to recommend them.

      Suppose it were January 1977 and you were convinced that comprehensive vaccination could entail some hundreds of deaths from the vaccine, that it could reduce flu deaths by tens of thousands if an epidemic were otherwise going to occur, and that the chance of an epidemic was about one in five if vaccination were discontinued.

      How would you evaluate the risks and benefits of stopping or proceeding with the program?

      What suggestions could you make on ways to induce people to get themselves vaccinated?

  1. 55-Mile Speed Limit

      The nationwide 55 mph speed limit that went into effect in 1974 was associated with a reduction in traffic fatalities for which no other explanation has been found. Suppose it becomes established that that speed limit, if enforced, will save three or four thousand lives per year with a commensurate reduction in injuries and automobile damage, but at some cost in truck and auto travel time and some cost of enforcement.

      The deaths and injuries, to say nothing of automobile damage, are worth taking seriously. The costs of slower transport and the lost work or leisure time have to be taken seriously. But I do not know whether the costs and benefits of enforcing the speed limit make the speed limit a good bargain in lives saved, a disproportionate nuisance for a minor reduction in mortality, or a toss-up.

      1. How would you help me reach a decision?
      2. Indicate the numerical information you would want to gather and how you would use it in estimating benefits and costs.
  1. Worth of Saving Lives

            Consider a costly program that is expected to reduce the likelihood of death within some identifiable segment of the population, and thus reduce statistically the number of deaths within that part of the population. In addressing the question of what it is worth to save those lives, i.e. to reduce those deaths, via that program, an important question is, Worth to whom? Who cares, and how much?

            Outline the way you would go about identifying the relevant interested or affected parties–individuals or governments–and how you might investigate the extent of their interest, especially the money value of their interest.

  1. Crime Rates and Police Coverage

      It has been observed that in some cities the incidence of armed robbery and illegal violence is kept at a low level by an effective response of the police, who, having a low level of violence to contend with, provide a deterrent likelihood of quick arrival. In other cities of similar social and geographic character the incidence of violence is so high that the police cannot answer calls promptly or investigate each incident. There is often no convincing explanation for the much greater prevalence of violent crime in the one case compared with the other-except, of course, the difference in effectiveness of police coverage. Yet examination shows that the numbers of police do not differ widely in the two situations.

      On the analogy of the “tipping” model, develop an analysis that could explain this phenomenon.

  1. Fire Protection

      Fire protection is nearly everywhere a city-government or town-government responsibility in the United States. It is (a) financed out of taxes and (b) provided by town employees using town equipment. By contrast, fire insurance is a private activity, homeowners buying it from private companies. Evidently there is a belief that the market cannot meet the need for fire protection: either people won’t subscribe or private firms won’t offer it. Or maybe there is just a custom that nobody questions.

      1. What are some plausible reasons why fire protection might not be left to “the market”?
      2. Do you think some of these reasons are decisive, and fire protection needs to be organized as it is?
      3. Can you think of any alternative approaches to fire protection that might be worth experimenting with?
  1. Smoking in Class

      In “The Economic Common Sense of Pollution” Ruff discusses the idea of charging people for their polluting activity, rather than simply prohibiting or permitting it. A familiar form of pollution is smoking in enclosed places where non-smokers are present.

      Suppose a special section of some class meets regularly in the evening. Some members of the class want to smoke; others complain of poor ventilation and object to any smoking. Somebody proposes that smokers might pay for the privilege of smoking.

      It is known that you have given some thought to the “pricing” of pollution, and you are asked whether it makes sense to charge for smoking and, if so, how to determine how much to charge and what to do with the proceeds.

Discuss it.

  1. Saturday Sections

      A course instructor generously offered to meet Saturday morning with interested members of the class to go over the week’s material, answer questions, etc.. Attendance was meager for a few weeks but picked up as the semester wore on, and by late in the term most of the class was showing up Saturday morning. The following year, the instructor made the same arrangement; attendance was meager for a few weeks and then fell off until only a few loyal participants were left. Even they were gone by the end of the semester.

      The instructor is perplexed at how one class was so eager while the other lost even the little interest it had. He is looking over the enrollments for the two years to see whether he can distinguish anything about the composition of the classes that would explain the difference. He wonders what to expect if he tried it once more. He’ll be happy for any advice you can give him.

  1. Apartment House Heating

      It is expected that many apartment buildings, especially among the lower-rent apartments, may again be unable to obtain as much heating fuel this winter as in past years, It is characteristic of apartments, especially the cheaper ones, that there is no metering of the heat consumed by individual tenants. If nobody takes steps to reduce heat consumption the building may run out of fuel for several days at a time, with frozen pipes and frozen people. If somebody takes steps to reduce the heat absorbed by his own apartment, usually nobody will notice–not his neighbors, not the landlord.

      Nobody has a good idea of how much reduction in heat consumption by individual apartments will be needed, as measured by anything the tenant can measure–e.g., room temperature, radiator temperature, etc. Some apartments require more heat than others to maintain the same temperature. (Corner apartments require more heat.) Some families have elderly people, babies, sick people. Some apartments are vacant most of the day, some are occupied all day.

      Nothing in any tenant’s lease makes any provision for heat control, rationing, rebates or extra charges.

      You are asked by some concerned tenants to help work out a reasonable way to minimize the risk of acute discomfort and danger due to exhaustion of fuel.

      Analyze the problem. State what data you would need in order to proceed. Outline at least one solution you would pro-pose, or several alternatives. And indicate how you might persuade tenants and landlord to accept your proposal in the event they fail to appreciate its merits or exaggerate its defects.

  1. Deposit on Cans and Bottles

      Legislation has been introduced to require a deposit on every beer or soft drink can or bottle, the deposit returnable upon return of the container. There are interests in favor and interests opposed. There is rarely discussion of how large the deposit should be–five or ten cents seems to be what people expect. The stated purposes are primarily to reduce littering and secondarily to conserve materials and energy by re-using containers or recycling materials.

      What would you want to take into account–and what facts would you want to investigate–if it were up to you to choose and justify the amount (or amounts, if variable) that the deposit should be, if there were to be a deposit.

  1. Smoking in Class: Another Room

      Consider a classroom of students among whom some like to smoke, some find it disagreeable, and some don’t care. There is dispute whether smoking should be prohibited. (It has traditionally been permitted but complaints have been frequent.) An alternative room is available, one with an air conditioning system that will mitigate the smoke nuisance for both smokers and non-smokers.

      The air-conditioned room costs extra, and the extra cost will have to be borne by the students.

      1. How would you determine whether the air-conditioned room is worth the cost? Be explicit about your criterion of “worth.”
      2. How would you propose the extra cost be paid–by which students and in what proportions?
  1. Library Air Conditioning

      A group of citizens has tried to get the town to spend $20,000 to air condition the library. They argue that the building is hot and stuffy in summer and the utilization of the library and the quality of the experience are diminished. For two years the proposal has gone before the town’s governing body, and both times it has been defeated. The opposition argues that the tax rate is out of hand anyway and this is a frill that will benefit a few at the expense of everyone.

      The question will arise next year and the town leaders want to put this issue to rest. They have no axe to grind, just want the question settled. You have been requested to prepare an analysis and a recommendation.

      1. How would you frame the issue for analysis?
      2. What data would you want to evaluate different choices?
      3. Are there sources of money other than town-wide tax support that you would consider?
  1. State-University Tuition

      Radio station WBZ editorially has opposed the principle that a state university ought to charge residents a tuition of only one-fifth the usual tuition at comparable private universities, arguing that student loans and occasional scholarships coupled with regular tuition payments would be more justifiable.

      A recent court decision called into question the right of state universities to charge higher tuitions to nonresidents than to residents of the state.

      Evaluate the idea of low tuition for state residents at state universities, with attention to the following questions:

      1. Why should tuition be low compared with other universities?
      2. Why should tuition be subsidized only at the state university and not at any university in the state?
      3. Why should tuition be low only for residents of the state?
      4. Why should tuition not be similarly subsidized for state residents who get their education at colleges outside the state?

      Be sure to discuss who benefits and who loses, what the effect may be on college attendance, and what the effect may be on attendance at the state university.

  1. Nursery Schools

      Some of the most expensive private schools, from nursery schools to colleges, provide scholarships for a few children whose parents could not afford the tuition. The system is challenged as inappropriate charity by some tuition-paying parents, and defended by others as a way of sharing privileges that only a few can otherwise afford. Nursery schools are usually not endowed, so the costs of scholarships are borne by the parents who pay tuition for their own children.

      If you were asked to speak on this issue at a meeting of nursery school parents, on grounds that you have taken this course, what are the main points you would make to help the parents think about the issue?

  1. Youth Fare

      The Civil Aeronautics Board gave notice that “youth fare” had to be terminated. (Youth fare was lower fares for young people, usually with some loss of priority to the youths taking advantage of it.) The argument was that youth fare discriminates against other passengers.

      Discuss the “discriminatory pricing” represented by the youth fare, indicating who is likely to gain and who to lose, with what effect on average fare, volume of travel, passenger convenience, and so forth.

      Identify any significant distributional implications of the particular groups or classes that appear to gain and to lose.

      What do you consider to be the chief socio-economic or other characteristic of “youth” that one ought to have in mind in considering the merits of youth fare?

  1. Welfare and Work Incentives

      If a welfare program assures every eligible family a specified minimum income, providing the difference between actual earnings and that minimum, the incentive and the opportunity to work gainfully are said to be impaired by a “100 percent income tax.” But without some assured minimum many families will fall below any decent standard of living.

      1. Explain the basic dilemma.
      2. Discuss proposed solutions.
      3. Evaluate the difficulty of finding an ideal solution to the problem.
  1. Dining Hall Problem
    1. Evaluate these alternative ways to distribute food and to assess costs in a graduate school dining hall.
      1. At every mealtime there is a fixed menu. Everybody gets the same meal and the same quantities. Total cost is divided equally among all those eligible to use the dining hall.
      2. As in No. 1 there is a fixed menu, but everybody eats as much as he pleases. The total amount of food is the same as in No. 1; and if some take more than their share and none take less, the last to arrive will face shortages. The cost is assessed in equal shares.
      3. Substantial variety is offered; everybody helps himself to whatever he likes, as much as he likes; adequate supplies are made available. Everybody is assessed an equal share of the total cost.
      4. A cheap meal is offered free; a variety of more expensive meals can be purchased a la carte. The cost, less the proceeds, is divided among the members.
      5. Same as No. 1, but the menu is fixed for each day of the week and known to all. People are charged only for the meals they eat, and may eat elsewhere. All meals count the same in everybody’s monthly bill.
    2. What difference will it make—
      1. if individual dishes (and beverages, rolls, etc.) are in such form that they can be shared, given away, or traded among diners;
      2. if every member is issued a specified number of transferable guest passes each month;
      3. if every member has a pass, good for each mealtime, and anyone holding the pass will be admitted without further identification.
  1. University Parking

      A university possesses some parking area and finds that the number of employees who need parking has grown to twice the number of spaces available. Alternative public parking off campus is expensive. Numerous proposals have been made about what to do:

      1. Assign non-transferable parking stickers to half the employees. Do this (a) by seniority, (b) by lottery, or (c) any other selection system you propose.
      2. Same as a but let the stickers be sold, traded, or given away by the recipients.
      3. Assign spaces to those who live farthest away where there is no public transportation.
      4. Convert university parking space into public parking lots, charging admission to the general public like any other commercial parking lot.
      5. Give all employees who drive to work one ticket and “sell” parking to university employees at a “price” of two tickets per space, letting everybody choose whether to sell his ticket to another employee or to buy somebody’s ticket and acquire a parking space.

      Make a recommendation and support it with the best argument you can construct. You need not recommend one of the above alternatives, but you must indicate why the scheme you recommend is superior.

  1. Vouchers, Goods- (services) -in-Kind, or Cash

            What are the central issues raised by the choice between giving people (1) such things as food stamps, school vouchers, trash collection vouchers, as against giving them (2) goods in kind, e.g., free lunches, or free schooling, or free trash collection, as against giving them (3) cash. Discuss the principles that should govern the choice, and illustrate your answer by three examples that highlight significant differences. (If you like, use food, schooling, and trash collection. If not, use any three that help you make your points.)

  1. Gasoline Mileage

      A major reason for U.S. dependence on foreign oil is that American automobiles get poor gas mileage. Three alternative remedies might be:

      1. Prohibit production of cars that get less than some specified miles per gallon;
      2. Put a tax on new cars that is related to gas consumption, high on cars with poor mileage while fuel-efficient cars pay a small tax or no tax or even receive a rebate;
      3. Tax gasoline, not automobiles.

            Evaluate the three proposals in terms of what you have learned in this course.

  1. Elasticity of Response

      Some policies are motivated by an interest in changing the way people behave; others are intended to compensate people for the results of the marketplace or for extraordinary misfortune. Few policy measures are without some induced change in behavior, whether the change is intended or not.

      Discuss the “elasticity of response” as a factor in policy evaluation. By “elasticity of response” is meant the degree to which behavior is affected by the policy.

      Discuss the kinds of policies for which a high elasticity will frustrate the policy or make it too expensive, and the kinds that in contrast are justified by a high elasticity.

      Give examples of both kinds. Your examples may be from income taxation, medical insurance, welfare programs, resource conservation, pollution abatement, or any field that interests you.

  1. Property-Tax Exemption for Veterans

      Many states provide benefits to veterans–mortgage guarantees for purchase of homes, civil-service preferences, certain kinds of tax exemption.

      One proposal is that, as a benefit pertinent to young veterans raising families, every veteran should receive some stipulated exemption from property taxes within the state, possibly a specified amount or percentage to be subtracted from the assessed valuation on his property before the tax rate is applied.

      (The mechanisms for this may be complex, since states might have to reimburse towns, which impose most of the property taxes, but suppose that the internal finances can be worked out.)

      Evaluate the proposal.

      Identify the purposes it may serve.

      Identify any important distinctions and details that would make a major difference in the proposal.

      Assuming that some state resources were to be made available for returning veterans, identify one or two alternative proposals that, at about the same aggregate cost, might come closer to meeting the criteria by which you judge such a program.

  1. Incentive Effects of Private Insurance

      An important principle in the analysis of social insurance programs is that incentive effects, many of which will be perverse but some may be beneficial, should be watched out for. Briefly discuss the incentive effects you might want to watch out for–and how you would evaluate them–in any policy designed to encourage, to discourage, or to rely on, the following kinds of private insurance that might be available in the market.

      Assume that in each case the insurance pays compensation in cash.

      Give some thought to who does the insuring–e.g., the customer’s own heating-oil company in (c).

      1. Insurance against loss due to burglary.
      2. Insurance against being convicted of burglary.
      3. Insurance against running out of heating fuel.
      4. Insurance against receiving a grade lower than some specified grade in a graduate course.
      5. Insurance against running out of gasoline during a gasoline shortage (for any reason).
      6. Insurance against losing money in the resale of a house in a “declining neighborhood.”
      7. Insurance against auto collision during hazardous driving conditions.
      8. Insurance against the cost of emergency help in the event of dead batteries, flat tires, or being trapped by snow in one’s driveway.
      9. Insurance against all medical costs incurred during a hospital stay.
  1. Overbooked Airline

      An airline oversubscribes a flight and by scheduled flight time has 140 passengers with valid reservations and only 120 seats on the plane, which will depart two hours late because of late arrival, so there are nearly two hours in which to decide what to do. There are no established rules to cover the situation. The airline has no record of the dates on which people made their reservations. The passengers have been informed of the situation but not told what the airline proposes to do. You are to advise the airline right now.

      Pick one among the following procedures, or make up a procedure of your own that is not on this list, and defend it by comparing it with what you think are the most serious or attractive alternative procedures listed.

      1. Issue boarding passes randomly by drawing names out of a hat, making clear to the passengers that the names have been shuffled to guarantee randomness.
      2. Announce that the flight will be delayed until 20 people have either cancelled their reservations or made other arrangements, boarding the 120 still remaining.
      3. Have everyone hand sealed bids for places on the plane. The highest 120 bids are selected and the money collected. The amount collected is distributed among some or all of the 140 passengers in any manner you choose–equal shares to everyone, equally to those who did not bid high enough to get on, or whatever seems appropriate to you.
      4. Announce that spaces will be allotted according to the dates when reservations were made, the earliest 120 reservations to be given seats on this flight, and call out 120 names as though the airline actually had those dates available.
      5. Simultaneously raise the price of going tonight and lower the price for going tomorrow until you find a pair of prices at which:
        1. exactly 120 wish to go tonight, and
        2. the airline breaks even, that is the discount to the 20 who go tomorrow equals, in total, the surcharge on the 120 who go tonight.
      6. Issue 120 boarding passes by random selection—making clear the passengers understand that the names have been shuffled and the selection is random–but announce that the boarding passes are transferable, passengers may transact any business they wish with their boarding passes–e.g., a couple travelling together that obtains only one pass may attempt to buy a second pass or to sell the one they have and go together later.

Additionally, answer the following:

      1. Which among these procedures would be more acceptable if everybody knew in advance what the standard procedure would be in this situation?
      2. Which among these procedures would be less attractive if everybody knew in advance what the procedure would be.
      3. Which procedures are most likely, if they are the acknowledged general rule for these situations, to induce the airline to book the right number of people for each flight? (By the way, what is the right number for each flight that the airline ought to book?)
  1. Environment in the USA and the USSR

      In his chapter on Environmental Disruption, Marshall Goldman compares environmental destruction in the Soviet Union with that in the United States, finding not only that there is such a problem in both countries but that the specific occurrences look much alike. It is often supposed that in the United States businesses will disregard the environmental damage which they do because they are in pursuit of profit; it is often supposed that no such motives would obtain in a socialist economy. It may come as a surprise that in an economic system without the profit motive there is similar disregard for the environment.

      How does Goldman explain the parallelism in the way the environment fares at the hands of these two dissimilar social and economic systems? How persuasive do you find his analysis?

  1. Insurance and “Moral Hazard”

      It is often argued that insurance may be self-defeating because of “moral hazard,” the tendency for people, once insured against some risk, to skimp precautions against the risk. People whose homes are insured against fire take fewer precautions against fire than if they had no insurance; people insured against theft may decorate their homes with more valuable objects than if they were uninsured.

      For the contrary it is also argued that insurance frees people from the necessity to go to expensive lengths to guard against fire or theft, and that what is sometimes derrogated as “moral hazard’ is merely the efficient substitution of insurance for the more expensive alternative, protection. Better to pay $1 per $1,000 of home value per year to cover the cost of a house or two destroyed by fire than to spend $3 per $1,000 of value in protection, especially when the protection is imperfect.

      Evidently these two views of insurance conflict. Presumably they conflict whether the insurance is privately purchased on the market or publicly provided by government. If you were asked which of the two views is the correct one, or are both views in the wrong, what answer would you give?

  1. Common Property

In his article on a “Common-Property Resource: The Fishery,” Scott Gordon (in the book edited by Dorfman and Dorfman) likens the problem of the fishery to that of hunting and trapping, the drilling for petroleum from a common underground pool, and the use of common pasture for private animals in the medieval “common.”

State succinctly the nature of the general problem of common-property resources of the kind he investigates.

Give an example or two of your own.

Indicate some of the ways that these different variants of the same general problem may be solved.

  1. The City

Wilbur Thompson, in the article contained in Hochman’s, The Urban Economy, refers to “The City as a Distorted Price System.

Can you explain what he means by this characterization?

Can you give a few examples?

What does he say (or imply) ought to be done about it?

Do you have an opinion on that?

  1. Child Care

In her article on federal support for child care, in the Haveman and Margolis book, Alice Rivlin cites figures that “acceptable” day care for a pre-school or school-age child would cost around $2,000 per year. The figures were from 1968; with inflation it might be over $3,000 now. Among the arquments in favor of federal support for day care is the desirability of permitting comparatively poor mothers to work out of the house and augment their earnings.

Rivlin discusses the issue of extending federally financed day care to middle-income families (up to $12,000 per year at the time she wrote, equivalent to perhaps $16,000 now). If you do, she says, it’s expensive. If you don’t, you have the equivalent of a high “income tax” on poor women’s earnings.

Explain the dilemma.

Is it the same as the “welfare dilemma” discussed in connection with the negative-income tax?

How would the dilemma be affected if the women were given cash that they could spend on day care or on anything else they might prefer to spend it on?

Source:  Thomas C. Schelling, Economic Principles and Public Policy (Harvard, Spring 1981). Exam Questions from Earlier Years. Photocopy reproduced in Economics Reading Lists, Course Outlines, Exams, Puzzles & Problems compiled by Edward Tower. Vol. 12 (July 1981): Public Finance Exams, Puzzles & Problems, pp. 18-38.

Image Source: File photo from 1983 Harvard News Office. The Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. “In Memoriam: Thomas C. Schelling, 1921–2016”

 

Categories
Exam Questions Harvard Public Finance

Harvard. Advanced Public Finance. Description, enrollment and final examination. Bullock, 1912-1913

Adam Smith appears in eight of the seventeen semester examination questions for Charles Jesse Bullock’s course on comparative public finance in 1912-13.

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Earlier Advanced Public Finance

Links to earlier course material for advanced course in public finance from Harvard, 1905-06 through 1911-12.

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ECONOMICS 31
Course Description
1912-13

[Economics] 31 (formerly 16). Public Finance. Mon., Wed., and (at the pleasure of the instructor) Fri., at 10. Professor Bullock.

The course is devoted to the examination of the financial institutions of the principal modern countries, in the light of both theory and history. One or more reports calling for independent investigation will ordinarily be required. Special emphasis will be placed upon questions of American finance. Ability to read French or German is presupposed.

Source: Harvard University. Division of History, Government, and Economics, Courses of Instruction, 1912–13, p. 67.

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ECONOMICS 31
Course Enrollment
1912-13

[Economics] 31 (formerly 16). Professor Bullock. — Public Finance.

Total 7: 6 Graduates; 1 Junior.

Source: Harvard University. Reports of the President and the Treasurer of Harvard College, 1912-13, p. 58.

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ECONOMICS 31
Mid-year Examination
1912-13

  1. In estimating the pressure of public expenditures what considerations need to be taken into account?
  2. State and discuss the so-called laws of the increase of public expenditures.
  3. Discuss critically Smith’s, Wagner’s, Cohn’s, and Seligman’s classifications of public revenues.
  4. In what branches of expenditures may a decrease be expected either immediately or ultimately? Give reasons.
  5. Compare the opinions of Smith and Bastable concerning revenue from domains.
  6. Compare the opinions of Smith and Mill concerning justice in taxation.
  7. Compare the opinions of Smith and Mill concerning the best system of taxation for Great Britain.
  8. What is the opinion of Leroy-Beaulieu concerning the present and future of revenues from (a) domains, (b) public industries?
  9. What is the opinion of Eheberg concerning the present and future of revenues from (a) domain, (b) public industries?

Source: Harvard University. Mid-year examinations, 1852-1943. Box 9, bound volume Examination Papers, Mid-Years 1912-13. 

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ECONOMICS 31
Year-end Examination
1912-13

  1. How far does the present British system of taxation conform to the maxims of Adam Smith?
  2. How far does the present French system of taxation conform to Smith’s maxims?
  3. How far does the present Prussian system of taxation conform to Smith’s maxims?
  4. How far would the single tax on land values conform to Smith’s maxims?
  5. Compare the general property tax in Switzerland with the same tax in the United States.
  6. What changes in the general property tax have occurred in the United States in recent years?
  7. Discuss fully the opinions of Leroy-Beaulieu or Eheberg concerning the income tax.
  8. Discuss fully the opinions of Leroy-Beaulieu or Eheberg concerning the inheritance tax.

Source: Harvard University Examinations. Papers set for final examinations in history, history of science, government, economics, philosophy, social ethics, education, fine arts, music in Harvard College (June 1913), pp. 55-56.

Image Source: Beginning of Chapter II, Part II of Book V of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. This is where to find Smith’s four maxims on taxation.

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Earlier Advanced Public Finance Courses

1905-06. Public Finance (advanced course).
1908-09. Public Finance (advanced course).
1910-11. Public Finance (advanced course).
1911-12. Public Finance (advanced course).

Categories
Exam Questions Harvard Public Finance Suggested Reading Syllabus

Harvard. Public Investment. Description, enrollment, exam. Marglin et al. 1966-1967

The scope of this interdisciplinary course from the mid-1960s is genuinely breathtaking. With his Harvard Ph.D. (1965) still fresh [Thesis: “Decentralized Resources Allocation With a Modicum of Increasing Returns.”], Stephen Marglin was on his famed meteoric rise to tenured professorship when he co-taught the following course on public investmen with political scientists and civil engineers.

For a later observation on his intellectual journey, see the brief profile article in The Harvard Crimson (14 November 2019) on “The Black Sheep of Harvard Economics” from which the image above has been clipped. He’s come a long way.

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Course Announcement

Economics 112 (formerly Government 257a). Public Investment: Techniques for Relating Economic Objectives, Engineering Analysis, and Government Planning (Offered Jointly with the Graduate School of Public Administration)

Half course (fall term). Th., 2-4, and a two-hour meeting to be arranged.
Assistant Professor S. Marglin and Professors Arthur Maass and H. A. Thomas.

New methods of economic, engineering, and governmental analysis in public investment planning. Techniques include those for converting broad community objectives into specific criteria used to design public projects. Emphasis on systems analysis.

Source:  Harvard University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Courses of Instruction for Harvard and Radcliffe, 1966-1967, p. 110.

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Course Instructors

Stephen Alan Marglin (1938- ) Assistant Professor of Economics.

Arthur Aaron Maass (1917-2004), Frank G. Thomson Professor of Government.

Harold A. Thomas, Jr. (1913-2002), Gordon McKay Professor of Civil and Sanitary Engineering.

Peter P. Rogers (1937-2018) (Ph.D. in Engineering 1966) Lecturer in Systems Analysis in the Graduate School of Design and a research associate in the Center for Population Studies.

George Herman Quester (1936-2023), Instructor of Government.

Henry D. Jacoby (1935-), Harvard economics Ph.D. 1967. Instructor of Economics.

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Fall Term
1966-67

Economics 112

PUBLIC INVESTMENT: TECHNIQUES FOR RELATING ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES, ENGINEERING ANALYSIS, AND GOVERNMENT PLANNING.

Assistant Professor S. Marglin, Professors A. Maass and H. A. Thomas, Drs. P. Rogers and G. Quester, and Mr. H. Jacoby.

Course Outline

A.    Formulating Public Investment Criteria Date
1. Introduction SM Sep. 29
2. Production and the Theory of the Firm HJ Oct. 4
Objectives: National Income and Its Distribution SM Oct. 6
3. Consumption and the Theory of the Household HJ Oct. 11
Selection of the Unit of Analysis and the Definition of Benefits and Costs HJ Oct. 13
4. Intertemporal Criteria HJ Oct. 18
Interest Rates and Uncertainty SM Oct. 20
5. Markets, Economic Efficiency and Welfare HJ Oct. 25
The Design Process: Methods of Analysis and Problems of Measurement HJ Oct. 27
B.     Objectives of Public Investment
1. Alternative Concepts of the Public Interest GQ Nov. 1
Multiple Objectives in Public Investment Programs AM Nov. 3
2. Concepts of Decision Making GQ Nov. 8
The Weighting of Objectives in the Political Process AM Nov. 10
C.     Applying Criteria in Project Design
1. The Mathematics of Optimization PR Nov. 15
Mathematical Models: Deterministic Models HAT Nov. 17
2. The Techniques of Systems Analysis PR Nov. 22
(To be announced) Nov. 29
Mathematical Models: Stochastic Models HAT Dec. 1
3. Computation Laboratory PR Dec. 6
Simulation HAT Dec. 8
(To be announced) Dec. 13
D.    Summary and Conclusions All Dec. 15
Problem Sets

Problem set #1 is due on November 1.
Problem set #2 is due on December 1.
Problem set #3 is due on January 12.

Source: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003, Box 9, Folder “Economics, 1966-1967”.

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Fall Term
1966-67

Economics 112

PUBLIC INVESTMENT:
TECHNIQUES FOR RELATING ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES, ENGINEERING ANALYSIS, AND GOVERNMENT PLANNING.

Reading List

Recommended for purchase:

Maass, Hufschmidt, Dorfman, Thomas, Marglin, Fair, Design of Water-Resource Systems (1962).

All other readings on Reserve at Littauer or Lamont Libraries
Optional readings are starred

Readings for October 4:

P. Samuelson, Economics (4th or 5th edition), Chapters 24 & 26 (including appendices).

R. Dorfman, The Price System, Chapters 1 & 2 (1964).

Readings for October 6:

K. Boulding, “The Economist and the Engineer: Economic Dynamics of Water Resource Development,” in S. Smith and E. Castle (eds.) Economics and Public Policy in Water Resource Development (1964).

W. Heller, “Reflections on Public Expenditure Theory,” in Edmund Phelps, ed., Private Wants and Public Needs(1962).

J. Krutilla and O. Eckstein, Multiple Purpose River Development, Chapter 2 (1958).

J. Krutilla, “Welfare Aspects of Benefit-Cost Analysis,” 69 Journal of Political Economy 226-235 (1961).

S. Marglin, Public Investment Criteria, pp. 1-36 (1965).

Readings for October 11:

R. Dorfman, The Price System, Chapter 3 (1964).

T. Scitovsky, Welfare and Competition, Chapter IV, pp. 51-65 (1951).

Readings for October 13:

S. Marglin, Public Investment Criteria, pp. 37-46, 91-100 (1965).

R. Haveman, Water Resource Investment and the Public Interest, Chapters 3, 4, 5 (1965).

J. Tinbergen, The Design of Development, pp. 36-41, 76-87 (1958).

*Maass, Hufschmidt, et. al., Design of Water-Resource Systems, pp. 40-87 (1962).

Readings for October 18:

P. Samuelson, Economics (4th or 5th edition), Chapter 29 (including appendix).

I. Fisher, The Theory of Interest, Chapters V & VI (1930).

H. Bierman and S. Smidt, The Capital Budgeting Decision, Chapters 2 & 3 (1960).

Readings for October 20:

S. Marglin, Public Investment Criteria, pp. 46-77 (1965).

J. Krutilla and O. Eckstein, Multiple Purpose River Development, Chapter 2, pp. 32-40, and Chapter 4 (1958).

R. McKean, Efficiency in Government Through Systems Analysis, Chapter 4 (1958).

Maass, Hufschmidt, et. al., Design of Water-Resource Systems, pp. 129-158 (1962).

J. Hirshleifer, “Efficient Allocation of Capital in an Uncertain World,” 54 AER 77-85 (1964), and comment by P. Samuelson, 95-96.

*J. Hirshleifer, “Investment Decision Under Uncertainty — Choice-Theoretic Approaches,” 79 QJE 509-536 (1965).

*J. Hirshleifer, “Investment Decisions Under Uncertainty: Applications of the State-Preference Approach,” 80 QJE 252-277 (1966).

Readings for October 25:

P. Samuelson, Economics (4th or 5th edition), pp. 678-689.

R. Dorfman, The Price System, Chapters 4-6 (1964).

J. Graaff, Theoretical Welfare Economics, Chapters 1-3 (1957).

Readings for October 27:

Maass, Hufschmidt, et. al., Design of Water-Resource Systems, Chapter 3, pp. 88-118, and Chapter 5 (1962).

J. Rothenberg, “Urban Renewal Programs” in R. Dorfman, ed., Measuring Benefits of Government Investments(1965). Also skim the other articles in this collection.

Readings for November 1:

C. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy, Chapter 14.

R. Dahl and C. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, pp. 25-56.

A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, pp. 3-74, 279-300.

Madison, The Federalist, No. 10.

D. Truman, The Governmental Process, Chapters 1, 2, 12 & 16.

Readings for November 3:

Maass, “Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevance to Public Investment Decisions,” 80 QJE 208-226 (1966). Readpp. 208-218.

R. Musgrave, “The Public Interest: Efficiency in the Creation and Maintenance of Material Welfare,” Chapter 9 in Nomos 5: The Public Interest, C. Friedrich, ed. (1962).

G. Colm, “The Public Interest: Essential Key to Public Policy,” Chapter 10 in Nomos 5 (1962).

Maass, Hufschmidt, et. al., Design of Water-Resource Systems, Chapter 15 (1962).

C. Lindblom, “Decision-Making in Taxation and Expenditures” and Comments by A. Bergson and G. Colm, in Public Finances: Needs, Sources and Utilization (NBER Conference) pp. 295-336 (1961).

Readings for November 8:

R. Dahl and C. Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare, pp. 57-88, 294-368.

A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, pp. 114-163, 260-276.

E. Banfield, Political Influence, Chapter 12.

Readings for November 10:

A. Maass, “Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevance to Public Investment Decisions,” 80 QJE 208-226. Read pp. 218-226.

D. Major, Decision Making for Public Investment in Water Resources Development, Chapters 2 & 6 (1965).

S. Dola, Passaic Valley Flood Control, mimeo (1965).

Readings for November 15:

R. Dorfman, “Mathematical or ‘Linear’ Programming: A Non-Mathematical Exposition,” 43 AER 797-825 (1953).

G. Hadley, Linear Programming, Chapter 1, pp. 1-21 (1962).

S. Gass, Linear Programming (2nd edition), Chapter 1, pp. 3-19 (1964).

*J. Henderson and R. Quandt, Microeconomic Theory, Appendices A2 & A3 (1958).

*P. Rogers, “A Note on Maximization,” mimeo (1964).

Readings for November 17:

H. A. Thomas and R. Revelle, “On the Efficient Use of High Aswan Dam for Hydropower and Irrigation,” in Management Science, Vol. 12, No. 8 (1966).

R. Dorfman, “Mathematical Analysis: Design of the Simple Valley Project,” in G. S. Tolley and F. E. Riggs (eds.) Economics of Watershed Planning (1960).

D. Kendrick, “Programming Investment with Interdependent Projects,” Center for International Studies, M.I.T., mimeo, pp. 1-16 (Jan. 1966).

Readings for November 22:

Maass, Hufschmidt, et. al., Design of Water-Resource Systems, Chapter 3, re-read pp. 129-158, and Chapter 12 (1962).

J. Kemeny and J. Snell, Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences, Appendix C, pp. 128-131.

*G. Hadley, Nonlinear and Dynamic Programming, Chapter 10, pp. 350-375 (1964).

*J.D.C. Little, “The Use of Water Storage in a Hydroelectric System,” J. Oper. Res. Soc. Am. 187 (1955).

*P. Massé, Optimal Investment Decisions, Chapter 7, pp. 320-335 (1962).

Readings for December 1:

Maass, Hufschmidt, et. al., Design of Water-Resource Systems, Chapter 13, pp. 524-539, and Chapter 14 (1962).

M. B. Fiering, “The Nature of the Storage-Yield Relationship,” Symposium on Streamflow Regulation for Quality Control, U.S.D.H.E.W., pp. 243-253 (June 1965).

Readings for December 6:

R. Fano and F. Corbató, “Time Sharing on Computers,” in Scientific American, Sept. 1966, pp. 128-148. Also flip through other articles in this issue.

Readings for December 18:

Maass, Hufschmidt, et. al., Design of Water-Resource Systems, Chapter 10 (1962).

G. Orcutt, “Simulation: A Symposium,” 50 AER 893-907 (1960).

G. Orcutt et. al., Microanalysis of Socioeconomic Systems, Chapters 1, 2 & 14 (1961).

M. Hufschmidt and M. B Fiering, Simulation Techniques for Design of Water-Resource Systems, Chapter 2 (1966).

Source: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003, Box 9, Folder “Economics, 1966-1967”.

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HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Department of Economics

Final Examination
Economics 112

February 1, 1967

Answer any four of the following six questions.  All questions are of equal weight.  Please place each of your answers in a separate bluebook, and put your name on the cover of each book.

  1. “If lump sum transfers were administratively feasible, governments would be well advised to plan all investments to maximize profits, counting profits in the same way that private enterprise does.”
    Comment in the light of income redistribution and merit-want objectives, market imperfections (such as monopoly) and other considerations you think relevant.
  1. “If the government’s social rate of interest based on time preference differs from the marginal productivity of investment in the private sector, it is wrong to use the social rate of interest to plan public investment. The error arises from the fact that using the social rate of interest precludes the government from taking into account the value of private alternatives to public investment.”
    Comment.
  1. The problem is to compare and evaluate two ways of designing and authorizing public works projects:

(1) There are no useful legislated standards, so that engineers must use their engineering judgment for design. Projects so designed are then considered by policy makers (President and Congress) for inclusion in omnibus authorizing bills.

(2) Policy makers initiate, debate, and adopt standards for design of projects.  Engineers design them, and any projects that conform to the standards are considered to be authorized.

Assume that partisan mutual adjustment is the criterion for comparing and evaluating the two design methods — i.e., that “bargaining is at the heart of the governmental process.”  Compare and evaluate the design methods using the criterion given.

Evaluate the utility of partisan mutual adjustment as the evaluative criterion for this specific problem.

  1. Economists assume that the individual behaves selfishly on issues relevant to his monetary income; yet they ask political scientists to define an explicit public interest function as if such a function were of more than academic significance for participants in the legislative process.Is this inconsistent, or is there some political value to specifying an explicit public interest to be contrasted with the personal preferences of individuals?
  1. “Simulation methods are more useful for the planning of large scale public investment projects than the analytic methods of mathematical programming.”
    Discuss this statement and give your reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with it.
  1. The following simple model of a water resource system involves two reservoirs and two uses.One use is for domestic water supply for which no monetary benefit function is available but a water requirement is specified; the other use is one for which there is a direct market value.

The two reservoirs are shown in the sketch together with outflow vectors.  The outflow from Reservoir A can only be used for meeting the water supply requirement.  The outflow from Reservoir B can be routed to either or both uses.  All flows are assumed to be non-stochastic.  The following cost and benefit functions are assumed:

cost function for reservoir A                C1 = a+x2 dollars,

cost function for reservoir B                C2 = b+½(y+z)2 dollars,

benefit function for other use               B = pz dollars,

where

x = safe yield of reservoir A,

y = portion of safe yield of reservoir B diverted to municipal supply,

z = portion of safe yield of reservoir B diverted to other use,

p = price per unit of flow to other use, and

a,b = the given constants.

The municipal water requirement is

R = x+y .

The problem is to find the sizes of x, y and z which maximize the net economic benefits of the system subject to the water supply constraint.  Write the Lagrangean function for the constrained optimization and indicate how you could find the optimal design of the system and the marginal imputed value of municipal water supply.

Would the design be different if we merely asked for a least cost design?

Source: Harvard University Archives. Papers Printed for Mid-Year Examinations. History, History of Religions, Government, Economics, …. January 1967.

Categories
Exam Questions Harvard Public Finance

Harvard. Public finance. Description, enrollment and final exams. Bullock, 1912-1913

 

The two half-courses in public finance were merged into a two semester sequence at Harvard in 1912-13. Still at the helm, Charles Jesse Bullock.

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Public Finance pre-1912/13

Links to earlier course material for Public Finance from Harvard, 1883-84 through 1911-12.

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ECONOMICS 5
Course Description
1912-13

[Economics] 5 (formerly 7a and 7b). Public Finance, including the Theory and Methods of Taxation. Mon., Wed., Fri., at 9. Professor Bullock.

This course covers the entire field of public finance, but emphasizes the subject of taxation. After a brief survey of the history of finance, attention is given to public expenditures, commercial revenues, administrative revenues, and taxation, with consideration both of theory and of the practice of various countries. Public credit is then studied, and financial legislation and administration are briefly treated.

Systematic reading is prescribed, and most of the exercises are conducted by the method of informal discussion. Candidates for distinction will be given an opportunity to write theses.

Graduate students are advised to elect Economics 31.

Source: Harvard University. Division of History, Government, and Economics, Courses of Instruction, 1912–13, p. 61.

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ECONOMICS 5
Course Enrollment
1912-13

Economics 5. Professor Bullock. Public Finance, including the Theory and Methods of Taxation.

Total 25: 6 Seniors, 14 Juniors, 4 Sophomores, 1 Other.

Source: Harvard University. Reports of the President and the Treasurer of Harvard College, 1912-13, p. 57.

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ECONOMICS 5
Mid-year Examination
1912-13

  1. In two countries the total public expenditure is, respectively, $18 and $16 per capita. In the former the local expenditure is one-third of the total, in the latter it is one half. The composition of the revenues, national and local, is assumed to be practically the same in the two countries. What conclusions do these data justify concerning the comparative pressure exerted by public expenditures in the two countries, and what further data would be necessary for a complete estimate of such pressure?
  2. What methods can you suggest for reducing public expenditures in any or all of their branches?
  3. Compare the views of Smith, Rau, and Bastable concerning revenue from domains.
  4. Discuss the proposition that income is the normal source of taxation.
  5. Discuss fully the proportion [sic] that public expenditure is unproductive.
  6. Discuss fully the incidence of customs duties.
  7. Discuss fully the incidence of a general tax on interest.
  8. To what extent is the weight of national or local taxation in the United States likely to be reduced by revenue from other sources.

Source: Harvard University. Mid-year examinations, 1852-1943. Box 9, bound volume Examination Papers, Mid-Years 1912-13.

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ECONOMICS 5
Year-end Examination
1912-13

  1. Explain and discuss critically the methods employed in the taxation of land in Germany, France, Great Britain, Australia, and the United States.
  2. Compare the general property tax with the general income tax, considering both the theory and the practical operation of these taxes.
  3. Compare the French, Prussian, and British systems of direct taxation.
  4. Compare the British system of indirect taxation with those of France and the United States.
  5. Discuss the taxation of mortgages in the United States.
  6. What changes in the taxation of personal property have recently occurred in the United States?
  7. Compare the British, Prussian, and Italian income taxes.
  8. Outline what you consider a satisfactory theory of the just apportionment of public charges.

Source: Harvard University Examinations. Papers set for final examinations in history, history of science, government, economics, philosophy, social ethics, education, fine arts, music in Harvard College (June 1913), p. 44.

Image Source: J. Norman Lynd’s “The Free American Citizen” on the cover of Puck, v. 72, no. 1856 (1912 September 25). Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Washington, D.C.

Illustration shows an American citizen sitting at a table, eating a meal; every item on the table and almost every item in the dining room and kitchen in the background, has a tag on it indicating at what percent that item has been taxed, for instance, the tag on the salt and pepper shakers states “Tax 33 per cent”, the tag on a potato or the fork he is using to eat it with states “Tax 40 per cent”, the tag on the table cloth states “Tax 45 per cent”, the tag on a teapot on the stove in the kitchen states “Tax 45 per cent”, and an insert shows a tombstone with a tag that states “Tax 50 per cent”.

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Earlier public finance exams
at Harvard

1883-84. Political Economy 7. Comparison of the financial systems of France, England, Germany, and the U.S. Taught by Charles F. Dunbar

1884-85. Political Economy 7. Comparison of the Financial Systems of France, England, Germany, and the U.S. [Omitted 1884-85].

1884-85. Political Economy 8. History of financial legislation in the U.S. taught by Charles F. Dunbar

1885-86. Political Economy 8. Financial history of the U.S. taught by Charles F. Dunbar

1886-87. Political Economy 7. Public finance and banking taught by Charles F. Dunbar

1886-87. Political Economy 8. Financial history of the U.S. taught by Charles F. Dunbar [Exams not (yet) found]

1887-88. Political Economy 7. Taxation, public debts, and banking taught by Charles F. Dunbar

1887-88. Political Economy 8. History of financial legislation in the U.S. taught by Charles F. Dunbar

1888-89. Political Economy 7. Taxation, public debts, and banking taught by Charles F. Dunbar

1888-89. Political Economy 8. History of financial legislation in the U.S. taught by Charles F. Dunbar

1889-90. Political Economy 7. Public Finance and Banking. Omitted.

1889-90. Political Economy 8. History of financial legislation in the U.S. taught by Adolph Caspar Miller

1890-91. Political Economy 7. Public finance and taxation taught by Charles F. Dunbar.

1890-91. Political Economy 8. History of financial legislation in the U.S. taught by William Morse Cole.

1891-92. Political Economy 71. Theory and methods of taxation  taught by Charles F. Dunbar [Mid-year examination not found]

1891-92. Political Economy 8. History of fnancial legislation in the U.S. taught by Charles F. Dunbar.

1892-93. Economics 71. Theory and methods of txation taught by Charles F. Dunbar.

1892-93. Economics 72. Financial administration and public Debts taught by Charles F. Dunbar.

1893-94. Economics 8. History of financial legislation of the U.S. taught by Charles F. Dunbar.

1894-95. Economics 7. Theory and methods of taxation (first semester) and financial administration and public debts (second semester) taught by Charles F. Dunbar.

1895-96. Economics 7. Financial administration and public Debts taught by John Cummings.

1895-96. Economics 8. History of financial legislation of the U.S. taught by J. A. Hill.

1896-97. Economics 16. Topics in the financial legislation of the U.S. taught by Charles F. Dunbar.

1897-98. Economics 71. Theory and Methods of Taxation taught by Frank William Taussig, Readings, Exams.

1898-99. Economics 16. Topics in the financial legislation of the U.S. taught by Charles F. Dunbar.

1899-1900. Economics 7a. Financial administration and public Debts taught by Charles F. Dunbar.

1899-1900. Economics 7b. Theory and methods of taxation taught by Frank William Taussig.

1900-01. Economics 7a and 7b. Not offered.

1901-02. Economics 7a and 7b. Financial administration; taxation [undergraduate] taught by Charles Jesse Bullock

1902-03. Economics 7b. Theory and methods of taxation with reference to local taxation [undergraduate] taught by Edward Dana Durand, Readings, Exam and Durand biography.

1902-03. Economics 16. Financial history of the United States taught by Prof Henry Brayton Gardner of Brown University.

1903-04. Economics 7b. Theory and methods of taxation taught by Frank William Taussig.

1903-04. Economics 16.  Financial history of the United States taught by Charles Jesse Bullock

1904-05. Economics 7a. Introduction to public finance [undergraduate] taught by Charles Jesse Bullock

1904-05. Economics 7b. Theory and methods of taxation [undergraduate] taught by Charles Jesse Bullock

1904-05. Economics 16. Financial history of the United States taught by Charles Jesse Bullock

1905-06 Economics 7.  Public finance [undergraduate] taught by Charles Jesse Bullock

1905-06 Economics 16. Public finance [advanced] taught by Charles Jesse Bullock

1906-07 Economics 16. Public finance and taxation taught by Charles Jesse Bullock

1907-08 Economics 16. Public finance and taxation taught by Charles Jesse Bullock

1908-09 Economics 7. Public finance [undergraduate] taught by Charles Jesse Bullock

1908-09 Economics 16. Public finance [advanced course] taught by Charles Jesse Bullock

1909-10 Economics 7. Public finance and taxation taught by Charles Phillips Huse [biographical information included]

1909-10 Economics 16. American taxation [advanced course] taught by Charles Jesse Bullock and Charles Phillips Huse.

1910-11 Economics 7 2hf. Public finance considered with special reference to the theory and methods of taxation. taught by Charles Phillips Huse, assisted by Wilfred] Eldred and Roscoe Russell Hess.

1910-11 Economics 16 Public finance (advanced course) taught by Charles Jesse Bullock.

1910-11 Economics 17 2hf.  Municipal finance taught by Charles Phillips Huse.

1911-12 Economics 7a 1hf. Introduction to Public Finance taught by Charles Jesse Bullock.

1911-12 Economics 7b 2hf. The Theory and Methods of Taxation taught by Charles Jesse Bullock.

1911-12 Economics 16. Public finance (advanced course) taught by Charles Jesse Bullock.

 

Categories
Exam Questions Harvard Public Finance

Harvard. Advanced Public Finance. Description, enrollment and final examination. Bullock, 1911-1912

As has been noted in other posts for the 1911-12 academic year at Harvard, the archival collection of final exams is incomplete with respect to the first semester of two semester courses such as Economics 16 “Public Finance (advanced course)” taught by Charles J. Bullock. The 1910-11 year post (linked below) gives the mid-year and year-end final exams for the course. Other than warning to “Mind the gap”, there is little to be done other that to hope that a copy of the mid-year exam pops up in some other archival location.

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Earlier Advanced Public Finance

Links to earlier course material for advanced course in public finance from Harvard, 1905-06 through 1910-11.

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Course Description
1911-12

[Economics] *16. Public Finance (advanced course). Mon., Wed., (and at the pleasure of the instructor) Fri., at 10. Professor Bullock.

The course is deroted to the examination of the financial institutions of the principal modern countries, in the light of both theory and history. One or more reports calling for independent investigation will ordinarily be required. Special emphasis will be placed upon questions of American finance. Ability to read French or German is presupposed. Undergraduates are admitted only by consent of the instructor.

Source: Division of History, Government, and Economics: 1911-12 (1st ed.). Official Register of Harvard University, Vol. VIII, No. 23 (June 15, 1911), p. 66.

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Course Enrollment
1911-12

Economics 16. Professor Bullock. — Public Finance (advanced course).

Total 13: 11 Graduates, 1 Senior, 1 Junior.

Source: Harvard University. Report of the President of Harvard College, 1911-1912, p. 64.

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ECONOMICS 16
Year-end Final Examination
1911-12

  1. Discuss the present status of the benefit theory of taxation.
  2. Discuss the present status of the theory of progressive taxation.
  3. Discuss the various reasons advanced to explain the failure of the general property tax in the United States. What light does Swiss experience throw on this problem?
  4. Discuss the principal methods proposed for remedying the defects of the general property tax in the United States.
  5. Discuss the incidence of taxes on wages and interest, also of taxes on regulated public service corporations.
  6. Discuss the present status of excise taxation in France, Great Britain, and the United States.
  7. Compare the views of Adam Smith and Bastable concerning the economic effects of public debts.
  8. Compare the history of the British debt with that of the French debt during the nineteenth century.

Source: Harvard University Archives. Harvard University — Examination papers, 1873-1915. Box 6. Bound volume, Examination Papers, 1912. Harvard University Examinations. Papers Set For Examinations in History, History of Science, Government, Economics […], p. 59.

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Earlier Advanced Public Finance Courses

1905-06. Public Finance (advanced course).
1908-09. Public Finance (advanced course).
1910-11. Public Finance (advanced course).

Image Source: Charles Jesse Bullock in the Harvard Class Album 1915. Colorized by Economics in the Rear-view Mirror.

Categories
Exam Questions Harvard Public Finance

Harvard. Theory and Methods of Taxation. Description, Enrollment, Final Exam. Bullock, 1911-1912

Comparative national taxation systems gave this Harvard public finance course dedicated to the nuts and bolts of taxation an international flair.

Fun fact: While Benjamin Franklin did indeed write in a 1789 letter that “Our new Constitution is now established, everything seems to promise it will be durable; but, in this world, nothing is certain except death and taxes.” The certainty of death and taxes was a notion that had been in the air (indeed in print) earlier, e.g. in Christopher Bullock’s farce, The Cobler of Preston.

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Earlier Harvard courses
on Public Finance and Taxation

Links to earlier course material for Public Finance and Taxation 1883/4 through 1910/11.

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Course Description
1911-12

[Economics] 7b 2hf. The Theory and Methods of Taxation. Half-course (second half-year). Mon., Wed., Fri., at 9. Professor Bullock.

In this course the theory of taxation is first examined; then the tax systems of the United States and leading countries of Europe are studied. Finally proposals for reforming the methods employed in the United States are considered historically and critically.

The course will be conducted in the same manner as Economics 7a, and admission is subject to the same conditions. Students who do not elect this course at the beginning of the year will be admitted in February only with the consent of the instructor.

Source: Division of History, Government, and Economics: 1911-12 (1st ed.). Official Register of Harvard University, Vol. VIII, No. 23 (June 15, 1911), pp.63-64.

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Course Enrollment
1911-12

Economics 7b 2hf. Professor Bullock. — The Theory and Methods of Taxation.

Total 37: 2 Graduates, 10 Seniors, 16 Juniors, 9 Sophomores.

Source: Harvard University. Report of the President of Harvard College, 1911-1912, p. 64.

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ECONOMICS 7b
Year-end Examination
1911-12

  1. Discuss fully the doctrine that income is the normal source of taxation.
  2. Discuss the expediency of using taxation as a means of regulating the distribution of wealth.
  3. How should the burden of taxation be distributed?
  4. Discuss the incidence of the tax on mortgages in the American states.
  5. State and explain four criticisms urged by Seligman against the single tax. State and explain the replies Mr. Shearman has made to these criticisms.
  6. Discuss the taxation of personal property in the United States and in Switzerland.
  7. Compare the British and the Prussian income taxes.
  8. Compare the custom taxes of France, Great Britain, and Germany.

Source: Harvard University Archives. Harvard University — Examination papers, 1873-1915. Box 6. Bound volume, Examination Papers, 1912. Harvard University Examinations. Papers Set For Examinations in History, History of Science, Government, Economics […], pp. 53-54.

Image Source:  Origin of the observation of the the inevitability of death and taxes: “You lye, you are not sure; for I say, Woman, ’tis impossible to be sure of any thing but Death and Taxes — therefore hold your Tongue, or you shall both be soundly whipt—Sure I know my Office⁠⁠—Give me some Sack⁠—Lord, how I sweat!” from The Cobbler of Preston by Christopher Bullock, p. 21.

Categories
Exam Questions Harvard Public Finance

Harvard. Introduction to Public Finance. Description, Enrollment, Final Exam. Bullock, 1911-1912

 

For those trained to think of sovereign kings subject to a government budget constraint that boils down to the use of some combination of taxing the peasants, borrowing from the grand houses of international banking, debasing the currency, and rents paid for the use of royal land to finance any particular level of government spending, it seems odd to divide a two semester sequence into a semester devoted to taxation and another semester for all the other items in that government budget constraint. But that was the way the field was divided at Harvard under Charles Jesse Bullock in the first part of the 20th century. 

This post is for Economics 7a, the non-taxation parts of public finance.

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Public Finance pre-1911/12

Links to earlier course material for Public Finance from Harvard, 1883-84 through 1910-11.

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Course Description
1911-12

[Economics] 7a 1hf. Introduction to Public Finance. Half-course (first half-year). Mon., Wed., Fri., at 9. Professor Bullock.

This course covers the general field of public finance exclusive of taxation. After a brief survey of the history of public finance, the following subjects are studied: public expenditures, public revenues other than taxes, public debts, financial administration, and financial legislation. Attention is given both to the theory and to the practice of various countries.

A systematic course of readings is prescribed, and most of the exercises are conducted by the method of informal discussion. Candidates for honors will be given an opportunity to write theses. The course is open only to students who have passed in Economics 1. Graduate students are advised to take Economics 16. Course 7a is not open to students who in the year 1910-11 elected Economics 7, but such students may be admitted to Economics 1b with the consent of the instructor.

Source: Division of History, Government, and Economics: 1911-12 (1st ed.). Official Register of Harvard University, Vol. VIII, No. 23 (June 15, 1911), p. 63.

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Course Enrollment
1911-12

Economics 7a 1hf. Professor Bullock. — Introduction to Public Finance.

Total 24: 3 Graduates, 5 Seniors, 11 Juniors, 4 Sophomores, 1 Others

Source: Harvard University. Report of the President of Harvard College, 1911-1912, p. 64.

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ECONOMICS 7a
Mid-year Final Exam
1911-12

Omit any question except the last.

  1. Discuss fully the proposition that increasing public expenditures are a sign of advancing civilization.
  2. Compare the policy of our federal government with regard to revenue from public domains with the policy of Prussia.
  3. To what extent in the United States and elsewhere has the weight of taxation been reduced by revenue from public industries?
  4. What light does the history of the United States Post Office throw upon the character and tendencies of public management of industries? Does the postal service of other countries reveal different or similiar tendencies?
  5. What policy would you advocate in fixing the prices charged by public industries? If your policy would not be the same under all circumstances, state what it would be under each of the different sets of circumstances that may be assumed to exist.
  6. Present what seems to you to be a satisfactory theory of the economic effects of public debts; then state and criticize four other theories which you have studied.
  7. “The truth is that all newly produced goods are at the outset disposable capital. All are created for the same purpose, the immediate or more remote satisfaction of needs; they are already destined to be capital, and must, therefore, be considered as capital. To take away any part of them is as truly a destruction of capital, as the destruction of capital previously accummulated would be.”
    What does this passage suggest to you? Criticise it.
  8. Of the writers upon public finance whose works you have read, which four impress you as the most important? State what each of these four writers contributed to the science, and explain why he deserves the rank you assign him.

Source: Harvard University Archives. Harvard University — Examination papers, 1873-1915. Box 6. Bound volume, Examination Papers, 1912. Harvard University Examinations. Papers Set For Examinations in History, History of Science, Government, Economics […], pp. 52-53.

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Earlier public finance exams
at Harvard

1883-84. Political Economy 7. Comparison of the financial systems of France, England, Germany, and the U.S. Taught by Charles F. Dunbar

1884-85. Political Economy 7. Comparison of the Financial Systems of France, England, Germany, and the U.S. [Omitted 1884-85].

1884-85. Political Economy 8. History of financial legislation in the U.S. taught by Charles F. Dunbar

1885-86. Political Economy 8. Financial history of the U.S. taught by Charles F. Dunbar

1886-87. Political Economy 7. Public finance and banking taught by Charles F. Dunbar

1886-87. Political Economy 8. Financial history of the U.S. taught by Charles F. Dunbar [Exams not (yet) found]

1887-88. Political Economy 7. Taxation, public debts, and banking taught by Charles F. Dunbar

1887-88. Political Economy 8. History of financial legislation in the U.S. taught by Charles F. Dunbar

1888-89. Political Economy 7. Taxation, public debts, and banking taught by Charles F. Dunbar

1888-89. Political Economy 8. History of financial legislation in the U.S. taught by Charles F. Dunbar

1889-90. Political Economy 7. Public Finance and Banking. Omitted.

1889-90. Political Economy 8. History of financial legislation in the U.S. taught by Adolph Caspar Miller

1890-91. Political Economy 7. Public finance and taxation taught by Charles F. Dunbar.

1890-91. Political Economy 8. History of financial legislation in the U.S. taught by William Morse Cole.

1891-92. Political Economy 71. Theory and methods of taxation  taught by Charles F. Dunbar [Mid-year examination not found]

1891-92. Political Economy 8. History of fnancial legislation in the U.S. taught by Charles F. Dunbar.

1892-93. Economics 71. Theory and methods of txation taught by Charles F. Dunbar.

1892-93. Economics 72. Financial administration and public Debts taught by Charles F. Dunbar.

1893-94. Economics 8. History of financial legislation of the U.S. taught by Charles F. Dunbar.

1894-95. Economics 7. Theory and methods of taxation (first semester) and financial administration and public debts (second semester) taught by Charles F. Dunbar.

1895-96. Economics 7. Financial administration and public Debts taught by John Cummings.

1895-96. Economics 8. History of financial legislation of the U.S. taught by J. A. Hill.

1896-97. Economics 16. Topics in the financial legislation of the U.S. taught by Charles F. Dunbar.

1897-98. Economics 71. Theory and Methods of Taxation taught by Frank William Taussig, Readings, Exams.

1898-99. Economics 16. Topics in the financial legislation of the U.S. taught by Charles F. Dunbar.

1899-1900. Economics 7a. Financial administration and public Debts taught by Charles F. Dunbar.

1899-1900. Economics 7b. Theory and methods of taxation taught by Frank William Taussig.

1900-01. Economics 7a and 7b. Not offered.

1901-02. Economics 7a and 7b. Financial administration; taxation [undergraduate] taught by Charles Jesse Bullock

1902-03. Economics 7b. Theory and methods of taxation with reference to local taxation [undergraduate] taught by Edward Dana Durand, Readings, Exam and Durand biography.

1902-03. Economics 16. Financial history of the United States taught by Prof Henry Brayton Gardner of Brown University.

1903-04. Economics 7b. Theory and methods of taxation taught by Frank William Taussig.

1903-04. Economics 16.  Financial history of the United States taught by Charles Jesse Bullock

1904-05. Economics 7a. Introduction to public finance [undergraduate] taught by Charles Jesse Bullock

1904-05. Economics 7b. Theory and methods of taxation [undergraduate] taught by Charles Jesse Bullock

1904-05. Economics 16. Financial history of the United States taught by Charles Jesse Bullock

1905-06 Economics 7.  Public finance [undergraduate] taught by Charles Jesse Bullock

1905-06 Economics 16. Public finance [advanced] taught by Charles Jesse Bullock

1906-07 Economics 16. Public finance and taxation taught by Charles Jesse Bullock

1907-08 Economics 16. Public finance and taxation taught by Charles Jesse Bullock

1908-09 Economics 7. Public finance [undergraduate] taught by Charles Jesse Bullock

1908-09 Economics 16. Public finance [advanced course] taught by Charles Jesse Bullock

1909-10 Economics 7. Public finance and taxation taught by Charles Phillips Huse [biographical information included]

1909-10 Economics 16. American taxation [advanced course] taught by Charles Jesse Bullock and Charles Phillips Huse.

1910-11 Economics 7 2hf. Public finance considered with special reference to the theory and methods of taxation. taught by Charles Phillips Huse, assisted by Wilfred] Eldred and Roscoe Russell Hess.

1910-11 Economics 16 Public finance (advanced course) taught by Charles Jesse Bullock.

1910-11 Economics 17 2hf.  Municipal finance taught by Charles Phillips Huse

Image Source: The original Seal of the Department of the Treasury, designed in 1778. The Latin inscription is an abbreviation for the phrase Thesauri Americae Septentrionalis Sigillum, which means “The Seal of the Treasury of North America.” 

 

Categories
Exam Questions Harvard Public Finance

Harvard. Municipal Finance. Course description, enrollments, final exam. Huse, 1910-1911

Meet Charles Phillips Huse

1883. Born March 3 in Worcester, MA. Attended Springfield High School. Springfield, MA.

1904. A.B. Harvard.

1905. A.M. Harvard.

1907. Ph.D. Harvard. Thesis: The Financial History of Boston from 1822 to 1859.

1908-09. Instructor in Economics, Dartmouth College.

1909-11. Instructor in Economics at Harvard.

1911-14. Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Missouri.

1914-20. Assistant Professor of Economics, Boston University.

1920-53. Professor of Economics, Boston University.

1958. Died July 13 in Belmont, MA.

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

Professor Huse economizes on our nerves as he never did on ice cream or time. His peculiar humor relieves a mental struggle with Gresham’s Law, and his unchanging method nets a return of old quiz questions yearly rejuvenated on each anniversary of their first propounding. This holds true in the long run. That will be all for this time.

Source: Boston University Yearbook, The Hub 1924, p. 32.

One of the greatest and most worth while experiences in Dr. Huse’s life came in 1910 when he went to Washington to aid the National Monetary Commission. His task was to read the volumes written by the Commission and, as each volume was published, to prepare press statements for the newspapers. Partly as a result of the work of this Commission, the Federal Reserve Act was passed. While he was in Washington he had the opportunity of seeing the public buildings and of taking trips into the surrounding country to places of interest.

Source: Boston University Yearbook, The Hub 1927, p. 18.

________________________

Course Enrollment
1910-11

Economics 17 2hf. Dr. Huse. — Municipal Finance.

Total 21: 3 Graduates, 11 Seniors, 5 Juniors, 1 Sophomore, 1 Other.

Source: Harvard University. Report of the President of Harvard College, 1910-1911, p. 50.

________________________

Course Announcement and Description
1910-11

[Economics] 17 2hf.  Municipal Finance. Half-course (second half-year). Mon., Wed., and (at the pleasure of the instructor) Fri., at 10. Dr. Huse.

In this course the expenditures, revenues, and debts of American municipalities will be considered. A comparative study of the financial policies of various cities will be made and consideration given to the views of writers on public finance for the purpose of ascertaining, as far as possible, the principles which should govern municipal administration. Every member of the course will be expected to make a study, under the guidance of the instructor, of the finances of his own city, and will give to the class the results of his work.

This course is open only to those students who have had Economics 7 or 16.

Source: History and Political Science, Comprising the Departments of History and Government, and Economics, 1910-11. Published in the Official Register of Harvard University. Vol. VII No. 23 (June 21, 1910), p. 60.

________________________

ECONOMICS 17
Year-End Examination, 1910-11

Questions 3 and 4 each count one-third. 
  1. Would the acquirement of the right to tax the property of Harvard University be for the best interests of Cambridge?
  2. What are the provisions limiting the tax rate and the amount of indebtedness in Massachusetts cities and towns? What has been their effect? What can be said for and against their retention?
  3. Write upon two of the following topics: —
    1. The effect of Boston’s incorporation upon its finances.
    2. The state’s control of Boston’s finances.
    3. The finances of the Metropolitan Water District.
    4. The Tweed ring.
    5. The reasons for the proposed union of Tonawanda and North Tonawanda, New York.
  4. The following figures relating to the finances of Gloucester, Mass. are taken from the 1907 report on the Statistics of Municipal Finances (Mass.).

RECEIPTS

Revenue

$515,018.71

General

$388,286.05

(Taxes, property and poll

333,368.41)

Commercial

126,732.66

(Water

90,176.38)

Non-Revenue

512,755.54

Offsets to outlays

3,197.42

Municipal indebtedness

444,350.39

Loans, general purposes

$71,000.00

Loans, public service enterprises

40,000.00

Temporary loans, including tax loans

320,000.00

Premiums

1,002.50

Unpaid warrants or orders, current year

12,347.89

Agency and Trust

65,207.73

Total receipts

$1,027,774.25

Balance on hand,
beginning of year

44,081.43

Grand Total

$1,071,855.68

PAYMENTS

Maintenance

$435,983.66

Departmental

$394,447.38

Public service enterprises

40,787.48

(Water

40,767.48)

Cemeteries

748.80

Interest

81,915.13

Loans, general purposes

40,705.96

Loans, public service enterprises

41,209.17

Outlays

61,829.86

Departmental

50,805.79

Public service enterprises (water)

11,024.07

Municipal indebtedness

413,997.72

From revenue

110,428.89

Temporary loans, including tax loans

295,000.00

Warrants or orders, previous years

8,568.83

Agency and Trust

64,437.88

Total payments

$1,058,164.25

Balance on hand,
end of year

13,691.43

Grand Total

$1,071,855.68

Outstanding indebtedness classified by character of obligation,
Loans for general purposes

$642,225.00

Loans for public service enterprises

1,137,000.00

Temporary tax loans

200,000.00

Warrants or orders

12,347.89

$1,991,572.89

Valuation $22,083,852, Population 26,011.

Make a critical study of the finances of Gloucester as revealed by these figures.

Source: Papers set for Final Examinations in History, Government, Economics, …, Landscape Architecture, Music in Harvard College. June 1911, pp. 52-54. In Harvard University Archives, Examination papers, 1873-1915 (HUC 7000.25). Box 9. Examination Papers, 1910-11.

Image Source: Boston University yearbook, 1927.

Categories
Exam Questions Harvard Public Finance

Harvard. Public Finance. Course description, enrollment, semester exams. Bullock, 1910-1911

The field of public finance, especially with regard to issues of taxation, was covered at Harvard in the early decades of the 20th century by Professor Charles Jesse Bullock. 

From 1906: Selected Readings in Public Finance edited by Charles Jesse Bullock (Boston: Inn & Company).

From 1910: Short bibliography on public finance “for serious minded students” by Bullock

________________________

Earlier versions of the course
by year and instructor

1906-07

https://www.irwincollier.com/harvard-public-finance-and-taxation-enrollments-and-final-exams-bullock-1906-1907/

1907-08

https://www.irwincollier.com/harvard-public-finance-and-taxation-exams-bullock-1907-1908/

1908-09

https://www.irwincollier.com/harvard-examinations-in-public-finance-especially-taxation-bullock-1908-1909/

1909-10 (half-course, American Taxation)

https://www.irwincollier.com/harvard-american-taxation-course-description-enrollment-and-final-exam-bullock-and-huse-1909-1910/

________________________

Course Announcement and Description
1910-11

[Economics] 16 Public Finance (advanced course). Mon., Wed., Fri., at 9. Professor Bullock.

This course is designed for graduate students and for undergraduates who are especially interested in public finance. It cannot be elected by students who have taken Economics 7 [Public Finance course exclusively offered to undergraduates], except by express consent of the instructor.

The course is devoted to the examination of the financial institutions of the principal modern countries, in the light of both theory and history. One or more reports calling for independent investigation will ordinarily be required. Special emphasis will be placed upon questions of American finance.

Source: History and Political Science, Comprising the Departments of History and Government, and Economics, 1910-11. Published in the Official Register of Harvard University. Vol. VII No. 23 (June 21, 1910), pp. 60.

________________________

Course Enrollment
1910-11

Economics 16. Professor Bullock. — Public Finance (advanced course).

Total 7: 5 Graduates, 1 Senior, 1 Junior.

Source: Harvard University. Report of the President of Harvard College, 1910-1911, p. 49.

________________________

ECONOMICS 16
Mid-year Examination, 1910-11

  1. Discuss briefly the classifications of public revenues offered by Smith, Cohn, Bastable, and Seligman.
  2. Discuss the course of development of three classes of public expenditures in the nineteenth century.
  3. Analyze the effects of non-commercial expenditures, with a view to supplying the data necessary for judging of the legitimacy of such expenditures.
  4. What policy should a modern state pursue with respect to public ownership of arable land, forests, and mines?
  5. What fiscal policy would you favor for the following public industries: the post office, railroads, water works, gas works?
  6. What has been the position of commercial revenues in national and local budgets since 1850?
  7. In what departments of public service and to what extent should fees be used by a modern state?
  8. Discuss the relation of taxation to benefits.

Source: Harvard University Archives. Harvard University, Mid-year Examinations, 1852-1943. Box 8, Bound vol. Examination Papers, Mid-Years, 1910-11.

________________________

ECONOMICS 16
Year-End Examination, 1910-11

  1. Discuss double taxation in the United States.
  2. Discus the taxation of incomes in Switzerland and the United States.
  3. Discuss the past and present status of the property tax in Europe.
  4. Discuss the past and present status of the property tax in the United States.
  5. Discuss briefly the history of excise taxation in Europe during the nineteenth century.
  6. Discuss the present custom revenues of Great Britain, France, and Germany.
  7. Discuss the incidence of taxes on mortgages in the American states.
  8. Discuss state supervision of the assessment of property in the American states.

Source: Papers set for Final Examinations in History, Government, Economics, …, Landscape Architecture, Music in Harvard College. June 1911, p. 52. In Harvard University Archives, Examination papers, 1873-1915 (HUC 7000.25). Box 9. Examination Papers, 1910-11, p. 52.

Image Source:  No Income Tax! by Charles Jay Taylor illustrator on the cover of Puck (24 January 1894).   “Print shows a scene at the ‘Income Tax Office’ with a crowd clamoring at the door where a notice states ‘One at a Time’; inside, a wealthy man is standing by a desk, on the floor at his feet, in his hat, are papers labeled ‘Personal Property Tax Sworn Off’, ‘Tax on Capital Sworn Off’, and ‘Tax on Investments’, he kisses the Bible while a government official sits at the desk with his right hand raised.” Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C.

Categories
Harvard Public Finance Syllabus

Harvard. Syllabus of public lectures on taxation by Simon Newcomb. December 1879

 

The following outline of three lectures given by Simon Newcomb at Harvard in December 1879 was found in a grab-bag folder of undated course material from the department of economics. A quick plunge into the online newspaper archive newspapers.com was enough to find a public announcement of the lecture to nail down the date. 

One of the missions of Economics in the Rear-view Mirror, is to enter such obscure artifacts into the digital record. For fun I try to imagine Newcomb giving a TED talk…or a TikTok dance video.

__________________________

Simon Newcomb’s Methodenstreit with Richard Ely in 1884 has been transcribed and posted earlier.

Links to works by Simon Newcomb can be found at The History of Economic Thought website.

Newcomb’s 1909 obituary in The Times provides a snapshot of his life.

The biographical memoir written by W. W. Campbell for the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 is of course more complete.

__________________________

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
Lectures on Taxation.

Professor SIMON NEWCOMB of Washington will give three lectures on Taxation in Sanders Theatre, on MONDAY, Dec. 8, WEDNESDAY, Dec. 10, and FRIDAY, Dec. 12, at 7 ½ P. M.

The public is invited.

AMORY T. GIBBS, Secretary

Dec. 1, 1879.

Source: Boston Evening Transcript, 2 December 1879, p. 5

__________________________

SYLLABUS OF
MR. NEWCOMB’S LECTURES ON TAXATION.

LECTURE I

The object of the course is the study of the comparative effects of different methods of raising revenue. This study is to be conducted in the same way as if the operation of natural causes alone were to be considered.

The object of taxation is the diversion of a portion of the industrial activity of the country from private to public objects.

The questions involved are not those of the absolute merits of different systems, but only their relative merits.

The expenditure of revenue is necessarily connected with the subject, because the effect of a tax depends as much upon how it is to be expended, as upon how it is to be collected.

Distribution of Indirect Taxes

Relative advantages of direct and indirect taxation.

Problem: To what extent can a tax levied on the activities of one person be transferred by him to others with whom he exchanges services?

Classification of Taxes: —

(1.) On persons.

(2.) On Production.

(3.) On accumulated wealth.

Each of these three divisions subdivided into two classes.

(α.) Taxes on totals of persons or things.

(β.) Taxes on selected persons or things.

Taxes in class (α) whether (1) poll taxes, (2) income taxes, (3) uniform property taxes, not directly transferable, but must be borne by the payers. Hence,

Class (α) includes taxes which are commonly considered direct;

Class (β) those which are indirect.

CASE I. The full amount of a tax can be added to the price of commodities when this addition causes no falling off in the demand. Digression on relations of price and demand, and the conditions on which they depend. Put,

P, the supposed price at which an untaxed commodity C, may be sold,

Q, the corresponding demand, or quantity sold at the price P in a unit of time.

ΔP, an increment of price, added on account of the tax.

ΔQ, the corresponding decrement in the quantity which can be sold,
so that at the price P + ΔP can be sold Q – ΔQ.

If ΔQ is small compared with ΔP, we may call the commodity C insensitive; if large, sensitive.

CASE II. When the demand is sensitive to a rise of price, one of two results must follow.

(α.) Production diminished till price is restored.

(β.) Price raised by only part of the tax, and the latter divided between producer and consumer. The result which must follow depends upon how far the production is monopolized.

LECTURE II.

Digression on natural monopolies with respect to the distribution of taxation under Case II. of the preceding lecture.

Tax upon gross production reducible to an income tax.

An income tax is the fairest of all, could it be fairly assessed and collected. But, in practice, the difficulty of defining aggregate income is such that this tax is most unfair.

The ultimate general effect of taxation upon industry is nearly the same on whatever articles the tax is levied. But on special classes of persons and industries the effect may be different.

In general, the person who cannot change his employment or the articles he consumes will be most affected.

In order that the equilibrium may be least disturbed, commodities which may be substituted for each other should be equally taxed.

Is there any transfer of a tax upon a commodity beyond the producer and consumer? Answer: Not in general. A tax on tobacco, for instance, is paid entirely by the consumer of tobacco.

Taxes on Accumulation.

A tax on capital would be equivalent to one on total production if adjusted, not to the capital itself, but to the income derivable from it. But our actual taxes on capital are enormously greater than if thus adjusted.

Can a property tax be transferred? The answer is dependent on the law of accumulation of capital. Ultimately the tax is paid by the community through a discouragement of saving and a consequent raising of the rate of interest.

LECTURE III.

Hints on Systems of Taxation.

Popular delusion that a tax should be capable of being evaded because those who are least able to pay can then escape. No large class of articles consumed exclusively by the poor.

(1.) The great point in which our systems of state taxation differ from those founded on Adam Smith’s first principle is that, in the latter, ability is measured by revenue, whereas we measure it by accumulated wealth.

(2.) Abroad, municipal taxes are paid by the tenants, and not by the owners. But, owing to our short leases, it is better among us that the owner pay.

(3.) Personal property should not be taxed for municipal purposes. Is right that, in levying state taxes, general ability to pay should be considered. But our attempt to collect a uniform percentage on all kinds of property from every one is a failure.

(4.) Objects of taxation should be sought for which indicate the wealth of the owner. There is no inherent necessity that taxes should be proportioned to value.

Source: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003. Box 10, Folder “Economics, undated (5 of 5)”.

Image Source: Simon Newcomb in Leading American Men of Science, David Starr Jordan, ed. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1910. Page 363.