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Exam Questions Philosophy Political Economy Suggested Reading Syllabus Yale

Yale. Economics of Democratic Politics. Readings, essay questions, final exam. Rose-Ackerman, 1980

Further jewels (transcribed below) from the Ed Tower collection of economics course materials come from the 1980 course taught at Yale by Susan Rose-Ackerman on the economics of democratic politics. I have used Claude to read, transcribe and follow the formatting of the original Tower pdf file downloaded from Duke. This gives me more time for curating and searching for more content and not just for leisure!

_______________________________

Susan Rose-Ackerman
Economics 488a (693a) / E&PS 202a
Fall, 1980
ML 313     Undergraduate Course

THE ECONOMICS OF
DEMOCRATIC POLITICS

All reading for the course is on reserve at both Cross Campus and Social Science Libraries. There will also be a xeroxed package for sale at Gnomen Copy.

Every week, I will distribute a set of discussion questions (not problem sets) to think about as you do the reading for the next week. Three times during the term, each student will write a short paper (about 5 pages) on one of these questions. The papers are to be turned in to my secretary by 5 p.m. on the Tuesday before the topic is discussed in class. This will give me time to read the papers before class. At the end of the course, there will be a take-home final exam.

Students who wish to use this seminar as a way to fulfill their writing requirement for the economics major should speak to me individually. Students who wish to write a longer term paper may do so and can be excused from some of the short papers, but must still take the exam. I would, however, like to try to coordinate the term papers with the classwork. Graduate students taking the course for credit should also speak with me so that I can be sure that they are not asked to duplicate material they already know.

My office is in Room 114 in the ISPS building at 111 Prospect and my secretary is in Room 117. Office hours are Monday from 2 – 4 p.m. or make an appointment at some other time (afternoons are preferable). My telephone number is 436-1087.

_______________________________

Susan Rose-Ackerman
Econ. 488a (693a) / E&PS 202a
Yale University
Fall, 1980
Wednesday, 2:30 – 4:30
ML 313

SYLLABUS
THE ECONOMICS OF
DEMOCRATIC POLITICS

BOOKS AT COOP:

Mueller, Dennis C., Public Choice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979.

Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper and Row, 1957.

Calabresi, Guido and Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices, Norton, 1978.

Miller, J. and B. Yandle, Eds., Benefit-Cost Analyses of Social Regulation. Case Studies from the Council for Wage and Price Stability, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 1979.

Arnold, Douglas R., Congress and the Bureaucracy, Yale University Press, 1979.

OPTIONAL:

Fiorina, Morris, Congress Keystone of the Washington Establishment, Yale University Press, 1977.

Sen, A.K., Collective Choice and Social Welfare, North Holland.

Rose-Ackerman, Susan, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy, Academic Press, 1978.

DATEI.INTRODUCTION: THE ROLE OF THE STATE: CORRECTING MARKET “FAILURES” OR MAKING “FAIR” COLLECTIVE CHOICES

9/10 1.Mueller, Chapters 1 and 2.

 II.WEALTH MAXIMIZATION, UTILITY MAXIMIZATION, AND EQUALITY

 A.Wealth Maximization vs. Utility Maximization

  1.Review of Public Goods Theory and Welfare Economics

(Opt)a)F. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance Rand McNally, 1973, Chapter 2.

(Opt)b)W. Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations Analysis, 4th Ed., Chapter 21. (General Equilibrium and Welfare Economics), Sections 1-14, pp. 496-531.

(Opt)c)R. Musgrave and P. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 2nd Ed., Chapter 3.

9/17 2.Ronald Dworkin, “Is Wealth a Value?;” Anthony Kronman, “Wealth Maximization;” and Richard Posner, “The Value of Wealth,” Journal of Legal Studies (1980) 9: 191-252.

9/24B.Equality and Utility

  1.Douglas Rae, “The Egalitarian States: Notes on a System of Contradictory Ideals,” Daedalus (Fall 1979) 108: 37-54.

  2.A.P. Lerner, Economics of Control, Chapter 3.

 (Opt)3.A.K. Sen, On Economic Inequality, Clarendon Press, Oxford, Chapter 1.

  4.Paul Samuelson, “A.P. Lerner at Sixty,” Review of Economic Studies (June 1964) reprinted in Collected Scientific Papers of Paul A. Samuelson, 3: 647-650, part 7 only.

  5.Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State, Yale Press, 1980, Chapter 1, Sections 1-6.

 (Opt)6.Mueller, Chapters 12 (on Rawls) and 13 (on Harsanyi).

 (Opt)7.Sen, Chapter 9.

 III.DIRECT DEMOCRACY

10/1A.Voting Rules

  1.Mueller, Chapter 3 (Chapter 5 is optional).

 (Opt)2.R. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance, McGraw-Hill, 1959, Chapter 6.

  3.R. Niemi and W. Riker, “The Choice of Voting Systems,” Scientific American (June 1976) 234: 21-27.

 (Opt)4.J. Buchanan and G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1962, Chapter 10, 131-145.

10/8B.Justifications for Majority Rule

  1.Mueller, Chapter 11.

 (Opt)2.Sen, Chapter 10 (unstarred).

 (Opt)3.Douglas Rae, “Decision Rules and Individual Values in Collective Choices,” American Political Science Review (1969) 63: 40-56.

  4.Ackerman, Chapter 9, parts 60, 61, 62, 64.

10/15
C.New Voting Systems: Demand Revealing Schemes

(1/2)

  1.Mueller, Chapter 4.

  2.T.M. Tideman and G. Tullock, “A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices,” Journal of Political Economy (December 1976) 84: 1145-1160.

 (Opt)3.V.L. Smith, “The Principle of Unanimity and Voluntary Consent in Social Choice,” Journal of Political Economy (December 1977) 85: 1125-1140.

 IV.REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

10/15A.Electoral Competition

(1/2)

10/22 1.Mueller, Chapter 6, pp. 97-120.

  2.J. Schumpeter, “The Classical Doctrine of Democracy,” and “Another Theory of Democracy,” Chapters 21 and 22 of Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3rd Ed., Harper, 1950, 250-283.

  3.Downs, pp. 1-141.

  4.Rose-Ackerman, Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 11.

  5.Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Inefficiency and Reelection,” Kyklos (1980) 33: 287-307.

 (Opt)6.David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, Yale University Press, 1974.

10/29B.Legislators, Voters and Interest Groups: Is It Rational to Participate in Politics?

  1.Mueller, pp. 120-124.

  2.Downs, pp. 260-276.

  3.Mancur Olson, “A Theory of Groups and Organizations,” Chapter 1 of Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard, 1965, pp. 5-52.

  4.Brian Barry, “Political Participation as Rational Action,” Chapter 2 of Barry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy, Collier-MacMillan, 1970, pp. 13-40.

  5.Benn, Stanley E., “The Problematic Rationality of Political Participation,” in Laslett and Fishkin, Eds., Philosophy, Politics and Society, 5th Series, Yale University Press, 1979, pp. 291-312.

 (Opt)6.A.K. Sen, “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory,” Philosophy and Public Affairs (Summer 1977) 6: 317-344.

 C.Exit, Voice and Disloyalty [sic]

 (Opt)1.Mueller, Chapter 7.

 (Opt)2.Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Harvard Press, 1970.

[11/5,11/12]D.Legislative-Bureaucratic Interaction

  1.Mueller, Chapter 8.

  2.William A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Aldine, 1971, Chapters 1, 2, 17-21 (pp. 3-23, 189-290).

  3.Albert Breton and Ronald Wintrobe, “The Equilibrium Size of a Budget Maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen’s Theory of Bureaucracy,” Journal of Political Economy (Feb 1975) 83: 195-207.

  4.W. Niskanen, “Bureaucrats and Politicians,” and J. Margolis, “Comments,” Journal of Law and Economics (Dec 1975) 18: 617-660.

 (Opt)5.M. Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment, Yale University Press, 1977.

  6.M. Fiorina, and R. Noll, “Voters, Legislators and Bureaucracy: Institutional Design and the Public Sector,” American Economic Review – Papers and Proceedings (May 1978) 68: 256-260.

  7.Douglas R. Arnold, Congress and the Bureaucracy, Yale University Press, 1979. Part I (pp. 3-91); Chapters 8 and 9 (pp. 165-216); Chapters 6 and 7 are optional.

  8.R. Musgrave, “Leviathan Cometh or Does He?,” mimeo.

[11/19]E.Policy Analysis and Politics

 (Opt)1.Musgrave and Musgrave, Chapters 7 and 8 on expenditure evaluation.

 (Opt)2.Charles Schultze, The Politics and Economics of Public Spending, Brookings Institute, Washington, 1968.

  3.Miller and Yandle, selected chapters.

12/3V.SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS AND HARD CHOICES: ARROW AND CALABRESI

  1.Mueller, Chapters 9, 10 and 14.

 (Opt)2.Kenneth J. Arrow, “Values and Collective Decision Making,” in Philosophy, Politics and Society (1967), Laslett and Runciman, Eds.

 (Opt)3.Sen, Chapters 1-3, 5, 7 (unstarred chapters).

  4.G. Calabresi and P. Bobbitt, Tragic Choices, W.W. Norton, 1978, omit Chapter 6 and pp. 64-78.

_______________________________

Economics 488a (693a) / E&PS 202a
Susan Rose-Ackerman
Fall, 1980

QUESTIONS FOR SEPTEMBER 17

WEALTH MAXIMIZATION
vs. UTILITY MAXIMIZATION

If you need a review of public goods theory and welfare economics, read some of the material in II.A.1. (Be sure you know what Pareto Optimality means.)

The discussion will center on the reading in II.A.2. Begin with Kronman’s article and then read the (longer) article by Dworkin followed by Posner’s comments. In Dworkin, parts V and VI (pp. 205-219) are optional.

Kronman and Dworkin criticize Richard Posner’s contention that society should try to maximize wealth. Do you agree with Posner that wealth maximization is a happy compromise between utilitarianism and Pareto superiority? Why or why not?

Posner is especially concerned with using wealth maximization as a criterion in judicial decisions. Others, however, have proposed it as a criterion in other areas of economic life. Thus, macroeconomists are often concerned with maximizing GNP or National Income. Policy analysts use methods that seek to maximize the dollar value of net benefits. Criticize or defend these benefit measures in the light of Dworkin’s and Kronman’s arguments.

_______________________________

Rose-Ackerman
E&PS 202a
Fall, 1980

QUESTIONS FOR SEPT. 24

EQUALITY AND UTILITARIANISM

1)Be sure you understand Lerner’s argument on pp. 29-32. Then discuss the role of information in Lerner’s conclusion that utilitarian calculations imply the equal division of a given amount of total income among the population. How does Samuelson’s argument differ from Lerner’s?

2)Douglas Rae lists several contradictory meanings of equality. How might a conversation based on Bruce Ackerman’s three principles resolve these issues? How does Lerner resolve them? Hint: Some of Rae’s quandaries are simply assumed away by Lerner.

(a)Consider in particular Rae’s discussion of equality and value. On p. 47-49, Rae contrasts two tests:

TEST A: Is X as well off with what X gets as Y is with what Y gets?

TEST B: Is X as well off with what X gets as X would be with what Y gets? (Likewise, is Y as well off with what Y gets as he would be with what X gets?)

Suppose you had to pick one or another of these “tests.” How would you do it? How would Lerner, Ackerman and Posner do it?

You may write on either (1) or (2). If you pick (2), you may concentrate on the issues raised in (2a). Papers should be about five pages long and should be turned in before 5:00 p.m. on Tuesday, September 23. There is an envelope for the papers on my secretary’s door (Room 117, 111 Prospect).

_______________________________

Econ 488a (693a) / E&PS 202a
Rose-Ackerman
Fall, 1980

QUESTIONS FOR OCTOBER 1

You may write on any one of the questions below.

1)Should the trading or selling of votes be permitted in a direct democracy that uses majority rule to make choices? Explain your position.

2)Mueller (following Buchanan and Tullock) states that: “Were there no costs associated with the unanimity rule itself, it would obviously be the optimal rule, since it minimizes … external decision costs.” Do you agree? Why or why not?

3)Economists (to quote Musgrave) have frequently been concerned “with finding a technique by which individuals can be induced to reveal their true preferences on matters of budget policy.” When can majority rule meet Musgrave’s criterion? What else might one want voting systems to do besides reveal preferences? Might a system be “fair” even if it is not capable of providing good information to policymakers about voters’ preferences?

4)Do you agree with Gordon Tullock that majority rule leads to an oversupply of government services? Explain your answer.

5)Does “logrolling” solve the problem of voting cycles?

6)Consider the Table on p. 65 in Mueller. Should Muskie have been the 1972 Democratic Party nominee? Why or why not?

_______________________________

Econ. 488a (693a) / E&PS 202a
Rose-Ackerman
Fall, 1980

QUESTIONS FOR OCTOBER 8

1)Comment on the following assertion: Majority rule should not be used to make collective choices because of the likelihood of voting cycles.

2)Bruce Ackerman claims to have resolved the tension between democratic rule and the protection of individual rights. Has he?

You may write on either question.

_______________________________

Econ. 488a (693a) / E&PS 202a
Rose-Ackerman
Fall 1980

QUESTIONS FOR OCTOBER 15

1.Do you agree with Tideman and Tullock that demand revealing schemes “are superior to other processes” for making social choices?

2.What are the essential differences between a representative democracy and a direct democracy? Do the arguments in favor of the unanimity rule carry over to the votes of legislative representatives? What about the arguments for and against majority rule?

3.Explain why a system with three political parties has very different properties from a system with two parties. What are the special advantages (and disadvantages) of a two-party system?

READING:

In Mueller, pp. 69-71 are optional. Tideman and Tullock’s article is a fuller discussion of the demand revealing scheme discussed on pp. 72-84 in Mueller. In Part IV, read Mueller, Schumpeter and as much Downs as you can.

_______________________________

Econ. 488a (693a) / E&PS 202a
Rose-Ackerman
Fall 1980

QUESTIONS FOR OCTOBER 22

READING:

Finish Downs and read my article and the selected chapters from the corruption book (Chapter 3 is most important).

1.In Downs’ model, political parties single-mindedly seek reelection. In Rose-Ackerman’s book on corruption, politicians seek both income and reelection. In both models, however, the information available to voters and politicians is a key variable. Because voters are poorly informed, Downs concludes on p. 136 that “rational behavior by political parties tends to discourage rational behavior by voters.” Rose-Ackerman states (p. 29) that “the impact of voter ignorance on corruption is not straightforward: While sometimes it makes bribery more likely than in … idealized models …, it is also quite possible that it will lead to a less corrupt political system.” Do you agree with these conclusions? Criticize the theories as logical, consistent exercises and as tools for understanding the American political system.

2.Develop a model law regulating and/or subsidizing the campaign spending of American political candidates. Explain why you think your proposed law is desirable based on Downs, on Rose-Ackerman’s book and article and on your knowledge of American politics.

3.Will a representative democracy that uses majority rule voting in the legislature make Pareto Efficient choices? Discuss. Ignore, for now, the further problems of carrying out the laws using the government bureaucracy.

_______________________________

Susan Rose-Ackerman
Econ. 488a (693a) / E&PS 202a

QUESTIONS FOR OCTOBER 29

1.Is it rational to vote? Compare your own answer with Downs’ answer, Barry’s critique of Downs, and Benn’s alternative response. How would you answer the question posed by Benn on p. 310? “If it makes no appreciable difference to outcomes how or whether a given individual expresses his attitudes, why should he not choose some private or less exacting mode of expression, like singing political songs in the bath, or some mode that he chooses quite at random to count as expressing his attitude — slowing down, say, as he drives past the Post Office?”

2.When is it rational to make a campaign contribution or engage in a lobbying campaign designed to affect legislative outcomes? Compare Olson and Barry’s discussion of this issue. What do you think?

***

If anyone wishes to write on a question for October 22, they may do so as long as they move beyond the class discussion.

_______________________________

Econ. 488a (693a) / E&PS 202a
Rose-Ackerman
Fall 1980

QUESTIONS FOR NOVEMBER 5 AND 12

LEGISLATIVE – BUREAUCRATIC INTERACTION

READING:

November 5:Mueller, Chapter 8, pp. 148-167; Breton and Wintrobe and the two readings by Niskanen.

November 12:    Fiorina and Noll, Arnold, Mueller, pp. 167-170, and Musgrave.

On November 5, we will discuss Niskanen’s theory of the budget-maximizing bureaucrat and various critiques and extensions of this view.

On November 12, we expand the analysis of legislative-bureaucratic interactions to include Fiorina’s theory and Arnold’s empirical work. We then go on to consider the interchange between Buchanan and Brennan, on one side, and Musgrave on the other, over whether government is “too big.”

NOVEMBER 5

1)Critically assess Niskanen’s theory of bureaucracy as presented in his 1971 book. (The theory is presented in simple terms in both Mueller and Breton and Wintrobe.) Do you think that he successfully responded to the criticisms of his book in the 1975 article? In thinking about these questions, distinguish between theoretical difficulties per se and doubtful empirical claims.

2)Niskanen’s reform proposals in Chapters 17-21 seek to increase the competitive pressures on government. Criticize these proposals on distributional and efficiency grounds.

3)Niskanen’s model of a budget-maximizing bureaucrat obviously cannot apply to top officials in regulatory agencies such as the ICC or the FCC. What alternative theories appear plausible to you? Do they apply with equal force to agencies that regulate a single industry such as communications or the airlines and to agencies like the EPA and OSHA that regulate one piece of the behavior of firms in many industries?

NOVEMBER 12

1)Fiorina states that “Contrary to what is popularly believed, the bureaucrats are not the problem. Congressmen are. The Congress is the key to the Washington establishment.” Criticize this conclusion in the light of Niskanen’s and Arnold’s analyses of the link between the bureaucracy and the legislature.

2)The reading in IV.D stresses the links between the bureaucracy and the legislature. Downs, in An Economic Theory of Democracy, however, ignores the bureaucracy. How would Downs’ theory have to be modified to take account of the issues discussed by Niskanen, Fiorina and Noll, and Arnold?

3)Critically assess the debate between Buchanan-Brennan and Musgrave. What kind of evidence would be decisive? Does Buchanan and Brennan’s argument imply that a constitutional amendment should be passed to limit the size of the government budget? What might such an amendment say?

_______________________________

Rose-Ackerman
Econ. 488a (693a) / E&PS 202a
Fall, 1980

QUESTIONS FOR NOVEMBER 19

READING:

In Yandle and Miller, read two of the following chapters: 5, 8, 9, 10 or 11. Be sure to read Musgrave and Musgrave if you need to learn the basics of cost-benefit analysis. Schultze is optional although you may be interested in looking at Schultze’s assessment of cost-benefit analysis.

QUESTION:

The reports in Yandle and Miller were all prepared by economists on the staff of the Council on Wage and Price Stability. They are critiques of regulations proposed by various agencies. Choose one of the assessments (preferably chosen from 5, 8, 9, 10 or 11) and write your own critique of the Council report. In other words, suppose you are a White House staffer, trained in economics, who must advise the President on what policy to follow. You can consider economic efficiency, the distribution of costs and benefits, the quality of information available and the political feasibility of the Council’s recommendations. I, of course, realize that you only have the Council report to go on and that you, therefore, may not have information about all these issues.

_______________________________

Rose-Ackerman
Econ. 488a (693a) / E&PS 202a
Fall 1980

QUESTIONS FOR DECEMBER 3

SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS
AND HARD CHOICES:
ARROW AND CALABRESI

1)Study the proof of Arrow’s impossibility theorem in Mueller, Chapter 10. What are the implications of this result for normative theories of state action? In particular, how do cost-benefit criteria violate Arrow’s conditions?

2)Calabresi and Bobbitt discuss “tragic choices.” What is a tragic choice? Discuss ways in which Calabresi’s “paradox of first order sufficiency” leads to “inconsistent” valuation of life across different policy areas. What do you think would be the consequences of valuing life in a “consistent” way? To answer this question you have to explain what you mean by a “consistent” valuation.

3)Is there any relationship between Calabresi and Bobbitt’s analysis of “tragic” choices and Arrow’s impossibility result? In particular, consider Calabresi and Bobbitt’s “cycle strategy” (Chapter 7). Does it violate Arrow’s conditions? If it does, do you care? What do you think of this way of resolving “tragic” choices?

4)In “Values and Collective Decisionmaking” (p. 231-2) Arrow writes: “Let me conclude by suggesting one type of use of irrelevant alternatives, which may be termed ‘extended sympathy.’ We do seem prepared to make comparisons of the form: Action x is better (or worse) for me than action y is for you. This is probably in fact the standard way in which people make judgments about appropriate income distributions; if I am richer than you, I may find it easy to make the judgment that it is better for you to have the marginal dollar than for me … The principle of extended sympathy as a basis for interpersonal comparisons seems basic to many of the welfare judgments made in ordinary practice. It remains to be seen whether an adequate theory of social choice can be derived from this and other acceptable principles.” What do you think about the idea of using “extended sympathy” to make welfare judgments?

_______________________________

Rose-Ackerman
Fall 1980

FINAL EXAMINATION

THE ECONOMICS OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICS

(ECONOMICS 488a (693a) / E&PS 202a)

DUE:

24 Hours after you pick up the test. Type or write legibly.

DIRECTIONS:

Answer one question in Part I, two questions in Part II and the question in Part III. The question in Part III will be weighted more heavily than the others.

There is no specific page limit but verbosity, long summaries of the reading and platitudes will not be appreciated. You will notice that some of the questions are identical or close to some of our weekly topics. If you wrote a paper on that topic or a closely related one, you may not answer that question on this exam.

Choose questions that cover the course as broadly as possible so you do not repeat yourself. You may use course reading and class notes to help you think about the questions. Obviously, you should not talk about the exam with other students who have not yet taken it.

PART I

ANSWER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING SIX QUESTIONS:

(1)Is there,in fact, no reasonable way of collectively ranking a set of alternatives, the conclusion of Arrow’s theorem? If you agree, then how should a group faced with a collective choice problem proceed? If you disagree, describe a “reasonable” method of choice, and defend it against Arrow, Niemi and Riker, etc.

(2)Should the trading or selling of votes be permitted in a direct democracy that uses majority rule to make choices? Explain your position.

(3)Mueller (following Buchanan and Tullock) states that: “Were there no costs associated with the unanimity rule itself, it would obviously be the optimal rule, since it minimizes … external decision costs.” Do you agree? Why or why not? Do the arguments in favor of the unanimity rule carry over to the votes of legislative representatives?

(4)Economists (to quote Musgrave) have frequently been concerned “with finding a technique by which individuals can be induced to reveal their true preferences on matters of budget policy.” When can majority rule meet Musgrave’s criterion? What else might one want voting systems to do besides reveal preferences? Might a system be “fair” even if it is not capable of providing good information to policymakers about voters’ preferences?

(5)Does “logrolling” solve the problem of voting cycles? Explain.

(6)Will a representative democracy that uses majority rule voting in the legislature make Pareto Efficient choices? Ignore the further problems of carrying out the laws using the government bureaucracy.

PART II

ANSWER TWO OF THE FOLLOWING SIX QUESTIONS BUT DO NOT ANSWER BOTH 1 AND 2.

(1)Cost-benefit analysis seeks to maximize the dollar value of net benefits. What is the relationship between the cost-benefit criterion and utilitarianism? How does cost-benefit analysis violate Arrow’s conditions?

(2)Some people have suggested that cost-benefit analysts weight the benefits accruing to poor people higher than the benefits accruing to more wealthy people. What normative position is implied by this procedure? Do you think it would be a good idea to use weighted cost-benefit analysis as a way to make public choices.

(3)Do you agree with Tideman and Tullock that demand revealing schemes “are superior to other processes” for making social choices? Explain.

(4)When is it rational to make a campaign contribution or engage in a lobbying campaign designed to affect legislative outcomes? Compare Olson and Barry’s discussion of this issue. What do you think? Should the government regulate lobbying and campaign contributions?

(5)Niskanen’s model of a budget-maximizing bureaucrat obviously cannot apply to top officials in regulatory agencies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Communications Commission. What alternative theories appear plausible to you? Do they apply with equal force to agencies that regulate a single industry such as communications or the airlines and to agencies like the Environmental Protection Administration that regulate one piece of the behavior of firms in many industries?

(6)The reading in IV.D stresses the links between the bureaucracy and the legislature. However, in An Economic Theory of Democracy, Downs ignores the bureaucracy. How would Downs’ theory have to be modified to take account of the issues discussed by Niskanen, Fiorina and Noll, and Arnold?

PART III

EVERYONE MUST ANSWER THIS QUESTION.

This course has combined reading on normative theories of state action with positive models of how government will behave. The basic normative positions we considered are:

(1)Wealth maximization

(2)Utilitarianism

(3)Equalization of satisfaction levels

(4)Ackerman’s “Liberal State” theory

(5)Efficiency, i.e. an incomplete rule which argues only that society should be on the Pareto frontier

(6)Procedural “fairness,” e.g. the conditions underlying May’s theorem or Arrow’s conditions

(7)Calabresi and Bobbitt’s interest in supressing conflicts of values.

Suppose that one takes a realistic view of the self-interested behavior of bureaucrats, elected officials, voters, and organized interest groups (based on Part IV of the course). Now pick three normative positions taken from the above list or take two from the list and add a third which expresses your own beliefs. For each one, discuss how you would wish to organize the political-economic system so that the normative goal could be approximately achieved even though citizens and political actors are basically self-interested. If this does not seem possible, point to the weak links. My paper in Kyklos and Corruption, pp. 228-235 illustrate how one might do this for two different principles.

Source: Digitized photocopy reproduced in Economics Reading Lists, Course Outlines, Exams, Puzzles & Problems compiled by Edward Tower. Vol. 20 (July 1981): Public Choice, Political Economy, and the Economics of Public Policy & Law, pp. 98-118.
The Eno River Press Collection in Economics, compiled by Duke professor (now emeritus) Ed Tower, is the motherload of syllabi, problems sets, and exams from economics courses taught over roughly two decades at the end of the 20th century. Thanks to the initiative of Steven Medema, this material has been digitized and made available as .pdf files:  1980 (15 vols.); 1981 (25 vols.); 1990 (25 vols.); 1995 (25 vols.). There is an analogous set of volumes, likewise available in business administration.

Image Source: Joseph Christian Eyendecker (1874-1951), “Democrat and Republican”, painting at the Lucas Museum of Narrative Art, a copy was published in Saturday Evening Post, Oct. 17, 1936.

Categories
Political Economy Syllabus Yale

Yale. Reading list for Altruism and Corruption. Rose-Ackerman, 1978

As the course syllabus from 1978 transcribed below shows, Susan Rose-Ackerman has studied corruption for most of a half of century and we can see from a recent press release (a few days ago!) that her beat goes on.

Altruism was covered in the first part of the course, before the subject of corruption was treated. Today Yale undergraduates would probably christen the course Gifts and Grifts”.

Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman has contributed a chapter to a comprehensive handbook on corruption studies. She is Henry R. Luce Professor Emeritus of Jurisprudence, Law School and Department of Political Science, and Professorial Lecturer in Law. The book, “Handbook of Research Methods for Corruption Studies” — edited by Michael Johnston and published by Edward Elgar— offers a comprehensive analysis of the current state of corruption studies by asking four key questions: What do we want to do? What questions should we ask? How, and where, should we look for answers? And where do we go from here?

Source: Yale Law School. “Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman Examines Anti-Corruption Reform in New Handbook” November 10, 2026.

______________________________

Topics in Political Economy:
Altruism and Corruption


Susan Rose-Ackerman
Yale University

Econ 459aFall 1978

(E&PS 224a)2:20 – 4:10 p.m. Thursday

Undergraduate CourseSeminar Rm., 70 Sachem St.

* = in package of readings

9/7I.Introduction: Hidden Assumptions in Economic Models

9/14, 21II.Altruism:

 A.Gift Giving as a Quality Control Device: Blood and Lemons

1.R.M. Titmuss, The Gift Relationship, Pantheon Books, New York, 1971, pp. 11-89, 142-157, 195-246.

*2.K. Arrow, “Gifts and Exchanges,” in E.S. Phelps, ed. Altruism, Morality and Economic Theory, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1975, reprinted from Philosophy and Public Affairs (1972) 1: 343-362

*3.P. Singer, “Altruism and Commerce: A Defense of Titmuss Against Arrow,” Philosophy and Public Affairs (1973) 2: 312-320.

*4.G. Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (August 1970) 84: 488-500.

*5.R. Kessel, “Transfused Blood, Serum Hepatitis and the Coase Theorem,” Journal of Law and Economics (October 1974) 17: 265-290.

6.R. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics (1960) 3: 1-44.

*7.H. Sapolsky and S. Finkelstein, “Blood Policy Revisited — A New Look at ‘The Gift Relationship’” The Public Interest (Winter 1977) 46: 15-27.

9/28B.Requiring Altruism and Outlawing Sales

*1.E. Landes and R. Posner, “The Economics of the Baby Shortage,” Journal of Legal Studies (June 1978) 7: 323-348.

*2.W. Landes and R. Posner, “Altruism in Law and Economics”, American Economic Review – Papers and Proceedings (May 1978) 68: 417-421

10/5, 12C.Why are People Altruistic?

*1.A. Sen, “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory,” Philosophy and Public Affairs (Summer 1977) 6: 317-344

2.B. Bolnick, “Toward a Behavioral Theory of Philanthropic Activity,” in Phelps, ed., 197-225.

2.Sociobiology

*a.J. Hirshleifer, “Competition, Cooperation and Conflict in Economics and Biology,” American Economic Review – Papers and Proceedings May (1978) 68: 238-243

*b.G. Becker, “Altruism, Egoism and Genetic Fitness,” Journal of Economic Literature (Sept. 1976) 14: 817-826.

3.Psychology

*a.R. Brandt, “The Psychology of Benevolence and its Implication for Philosophy,” Journal of Philosophy (August 12, 1976) 73: 429-453

b.J.Macaulay and L. Berkowitz , ed., Altruism and Helping Behavior Academic Press, N.Y., 1970, skim

*4.Indoctrination: B. Ward, The Socialist Economy, Random House, N.Y., 1967, 102-128.

10/19D.The Non-Profit Organization:

*1.B. Weisbrod, “Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit Sector in a Three Sector Economy,” in E. Phelps, ed., Altruism, Morality, and Economic Theory, 171-195.

2.H. Hansmann, “The Role of Non-Profit Enterprise,” Yale University, mimeo, 1978.

3.A. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty Harvard Univ. Press, 1970.

*4.J. Buchanan, “An Economic Theory of Clubs,” Economica ( Feb. 1965) 32: 1-14

10/26-1/2III.Corruption

 A.The Relationship Between Bribes and Gifts.

1.Edward Van Roy, “On the Theory of Corruption,” Economic Development and Cultural Change (October 1970) 19: 86-110.

2.Gunnar Myrdal, “Corruption as a Hindrance to Modernization in South Asia,” in A. Heidenheimer, ed., Political Corruption, Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1970, 229-242.

3.M. McMullan, “Corruption in the Public Services of British Colonies and Ex-Colonies in West Africa,” in Heidenheimer, ed., 317-330.

*4.D. Burnham, “How Police Corruption is Built into the System” in L. Sherman, ed., Police Corruption, Anchor Books, Garden City, N.Y., 1974, 305-314.

10/26 – 1/2B.The Pure “Rip-off” Model of Government.

*1.O. Johnson, “An Economic Analysis of Corrupt Government with Special Application to Less Developed Countries,” Kyklos (1975) 28: 47-61.

2.J. Waterbury, “Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime” World Politics (July 1973) 25: 534-555.

3.J.C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1972, Chapters 6 and 7.

*4.R. Wolfinger, “Why Political Machines Have Not Withered Away and Other Revisionist Thoughts,” Journal of Politics (May 1972) 34: 365-398.

11/2, 9C.Corruption, Campaign Financing and the Legislature

1.S. Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy, Academic Press, N.Y., 1978, pp. 1-58, 74-79.

*2.R.J. Barro, “The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model,” Public Choice (Spring 1973) 14: 19-42.

3.S. Peltzman, “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,” Journal of Law and Economics (August 1976) 19: 211-240.

4.M. Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment, Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, 1977.

*5.M. Fiorina and R. Noll, “Voters, Legislators and Bureaucracy: Institutional Design in the Public Sector,” American Economic Review – Papers and Proceedings (May 1978) 68: 256-260.

11/16, 30D.Market Organization Issues and Bureaucratic Corruption

*1.A. Kreuger, “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,” American Economic Review (June 1974) 64: 291-303.

2.S. Rose-Ackerman, Corruption, pp. 85-92, 109-120, 132-234.

3.J. Bhagwati, ed., Illegal Transactions in International Trade North-Holland-American Elsevier, Amsterdam and New York, 1974.

*4.E. Banfield, “Corruption as a Feature of Government Organization,” Journal of Law and Economics, (December 1975) 18: 587-605.

5.J. Margolis, “Public Policies for Private Profits: Urban Government,” in Hochman and Peterson, eds., Redistribution through Public Choice, Columbia University Press, N.Y., 1974.

6.N. Leff, “Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption,” in Heidenheimer, ed., 510-520.

12/7E.Corruption and Law Enforcement

*1.G. Becker and G. Stigler, “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and Compensation of Enforcers,” Journal of Legal Studies (January 1974) 3: 1-19.

*2.B.P. Pashigian “On the Control of Crime and Bribery,” Journal of Legal Studies (June 1975) 4: 311-327.

3.L. Sherman, ed., Police Corruption, Skim introduction, Sections III, IV, VI.

Source: Digitized photocopy reproduced in Economics Reading Lists, Course Outlines, Exams, Puzzles & Problems compiled by Edward Tower. Vol. 20 (July 1981): Public Choice, Political Economy, and the Economics of Public Policy & Law, pp. 119-122.
The Eno River Press Collection in Economics, compiled by Duke professor (now emeritus) Ed Tower, is the motherload of syllabi, problems sets, and exams from economics courses taught over roughly two decades at the end of the 20th century. Thanks to the initiative of Steven Medema, this material has been digitized and made available as .pdf files:  1980 (15 vols.); 1981 (25 vols.); 1990 (25 vols.); 1995 (25 vols.). There is an analogous set of volumes, likewise available in business administration.

Image Source: Yale Law School. “Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman Examines Anti-Corruption Reform in New Handbook” November 10, 2026.

Categories
Exam Questions Harvard History of Economics Syllabus

Harvard. Reading list and semester exams. History of economics. O.H. Taylor, 1962-1963

Overton Hume Taylor (1897-1987) served as the Harvard economics department’s one-man show of PPE interdisciplinarity at both the undergraduate and graduate level for two decades covering the middle of the 20th century. He was a native of Craig, Colorado, received his B.A. at the University of Colorado in 1921 and Ph.D. from Harvard in 1928. He held the rank of instructor at Harvard 1929-1960 and ultimately promoted to professor, 1960-64. He retired from Harvard in 1964, going on to teach at Vanderbilt University for five years. He moved to live with his brother (Angus Taylor) in Kensington, California four months before dying of cancer. His wife, Edith Meyer Taylor (1905-1984), was an expert on cerebral palsy (Psychological Appraisal of Children with Cerebral Defects, 1959).

Previously posted course materials for the history of economic thought and socialism taught by Overton Hume Taylor at Harvard.

____________________________

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Department of Economics

Professor Taylor

Economics 105
Outline
Autumn 1962

  1. Sept. 24-Oct. 5. Introductory; Political and Economic Life and Thought in the West in Classical Antiquity, the Middle Ages, and Early Modern Times.

Reading due October 5:

      1. O. H. Taylor, Philosophies and Economic Theories, in Economics and Liberalism.
      2. G. H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory, first 4 chapters.
      3. J. A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, Part II, chapters 1 and 2.
      4. Plato’s Republic, 1st 4 ‘books’, especially ‘book 2’.

Mon. Sept. 24.  Introductory lecture, about the course, and the background of Plato’s thought.

Wed. Sept. 26. Plato vs. “capitalism” and democracy.

Fri. Sept. 28. Aristotle’s philosophy, ethics, politics, and economics.

Mon. Oct. 1. Later antiquity — Stoicism and Roman Law — Christianity and Western Civilization — Medieval Europe — and Scholasticism.

Wed. Oct. 3. From medievalism to modernity; Hobbes; and Mercantilism.

Fri. Oct. 5. Discussion.

  1. Oct. 8-19. Locke; the Enlightenment; the Physiocrats; and the Psychological  — and — Ethical Theories of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Adam Smith.

Reading due October 19:

      1. O. H. Taylor, 1st 3 essays in Economics and Liberalism.
      2. O. H. Taylor, 1st 3 chapters in A History of Economic Thought.
      3. J. Locke, 2nd Treatise on Civil Government, chapters 2-9 inclusive.

Mon. Oct. 8. The 17th century intellectual revolution and the 18th century enlightenment; modern science and philosophy, and rational ethics and politics; and the classical liberalism, natural law version.

Wed. Oct. 10. Locke’s philosophy, ethics, and political philosophy.

[Fri. Oct. 12. Holiday]

Mon. Oct. 15. The philosophy and economics of the Physiocrats.

Wed. Oct. 17. The psychological — and — ethical theories of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Adam Smith.

Fri. Oct. 19. Discussion.

  1. Oct. 22 – Nov. 2. Adam Smith’s Economics, and Benthamism

Reading due November 2:

      1. O. H. Taylor, A History of Economic Thought, chs. 4 and 5.
      2. A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1st 7 chapters.

Mon. Oct. 22. Adam Smith on national wealth and the causes of its growth.

Wed. Oct. 24. A. Smith on value, prices, and the ‘natural’ working of the free, competitive economy.

Fri. Oct. 26. A. Smith on wages and profits.

Mon. Oct. 29. Benthamism — the classical liberalism, utilitarian version.

Wed. Oct. 31. Benthamism (2).

Fri. Nov. 2. Discussion

  1. Nov. 5 – Nov. 16. Classical Economics — Malthus and Ricardo.

Reading due November 16:

      1. O. H. Taylor, A History of Economic Thought, chs. 6, 7, 8.
      2. J. M. Keynes, essay on Malthus, in [Essays in Biography, 1933]
      3. D. Ricardo, Works, ed. Sraffa, vol. 1, Principles of Economics, 1st 6 chapters.

Mon. Nov. 5. The Malthusian theory of population growth and poverty.

Wed. Nov. 7. Ricardo vs. A. Smith on value and prices.

Fri. Nov. 9. Ricardo on economic growth — wages, profits, and rents — and the stationary state.

Mon. Nov. 12. Ricardo vs. Malthus on over-saving and inadequate demand — Say’s Law of Market

Wed. Nov. 14. Ricardian — classical economics; comments.

Fri. Nov. 16. Discussion.

  1. Nov. 19-30. J. S. Mill’s Philosophy, Ethics, Politics, and Economics.

Reading due November 30:

      1. O. H. Taylor A History of Economic Thought chs. 9, 10.
      2. J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, and On Liberty.
      3. J. S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Bks. I chs. 4, 5, 10, 11, 12; and Bk. II chs. 1, 2, 4, 11, 15, 16.

Mon. Nov. 19. Introductory, about Mill; and Mill’s vs. Bentham’s utilitarian ethics.

Wed. Nov. 21. Mill on liberty, and the evolution of 19th century liberalism.

Fri. Nov. 23. Mill’s economics, I; production, capital, economic growth, and the stationary state.

Mon. Nov. 26. Mill’s economics II; distribution of wealth, socialism, private property, agrarian reform, and natural – competitive wages, profits, interest, and rent.

Wed. Nov. 28. Mill’s economics III; the role of the state.

Fri. Nov. 30. Discussion.

  1. December 3- Marxism.

Reading due December 14:

      1. O. H. Taylor, A History of Economic Thought, ch. 11.
      2. J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Part I.
      3. P. M. Sweezy, Theory of Capitalist Development, Parts I, II except (omit) chap. 7.

Mon. Dec. 3. Introductory, about socialism, Marx, and Marxism.

Wed. Dec. 5. Hegel and Marx, philosophies of history.

Fri. Dec. 7. The Marxian economic interpretation of history, and theory of class struggles.

Mon. Dec. 10. Marxian economics I. Theory of value, wages, and “capitalist” incomes.

Wed. Dec. 12. Marxian economics II. Theory of capital accumulation and economic progress, the falling profit rate, recurrent depressions, and the growth of monopolies.

(Last few sessions before Christmas holidays left unscheduled here.  Room to “catch up”, complete discussion of Marxism.)

Reading Period Assignment

John Stuart Mill. Principles of Political Economy, Book III.

____________________________

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Department of Economics

Economics 105
Examination
January 26, 1963

Professor O. H. Taylor

Write half-hour essays on six of the following subjects including No. 7.

  1. Adam Smith’s theory of ‘sympathy’ and ‘the moral sentiments,’ and his theory of a socially well-working economic system ruled by competition and the ‘self-interest’ of each individual.
  2. Adam Smith’s and Ricardo’s theories of economic growth.
  3. Adam Smith’s and Ricardo’s theories of value.
  4. Benthamism and classical economics — their similarities and differences, and effects on each other.
  5. Effects of the Malthusian population doctrine on the Ricardian system of economic theory.
  6. J. S. Mill’s views on the roles of (1) institutions and (2) economic ‘laws,’ in affecting the distribution of wealth.
  7. J. S. Mill’s theory of value and the pricing of products in the competitive economy.

Source: Harvard University Archives. Final Examinations—January 1963—Social Sciences (HUC 7000.28, 144 of 284).

____________________________

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Department of Economics

Economics 120
Spring 1963

  1. February 4-15: Marxism

Reading due February 15:

      1. O.H. Taylor, A History of Economic Thought, Chapter 11
      2. Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto
      3. J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Part I.
      4. P.M. Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development, Parts I, II.

Monday, February 4- Introductory Lecture

Wednesday, February 6- “Utopian” Socialism, early 19th c.  Europe, and Marx

Friday, February 8- Hegel and Marx and Marx’s “sociology” of history

Monday, February 11- Marx’s Economics I.

Wednesday, February 13- Marx’s Economics II.

Friday, February 15- Discussion.

  1. February 18-March 1: Victorian Conservative Liberalism and Neo-Classical Economics

Reading due March 1:

      1. O.H. Taylor, A History of Economic Thought, Chapter 12
      2. E. von Böhm-Bawerk, Positive Theory of Capital, Books III, IV
      3. T.N. Carver, Distribution of Wealth, Chapters 2,3,4

Monday, February 18- Introductory Lecture

Wednesday, February 20- “Marginal Utility,” costs and value; the “marginalists” vs Ricardo on value

[Friday, February 22-Holiday]

Monday, February 25- “Marginal productivity” and income distribution; wages; capital and interest

Wednesday, February 27- Marginal Productivity and incomes continued; rent and business profits

Friday, March 1- Discussion

  1. March 4-15:  Marshall

Reading due March 15

      1. O.H. Taylor, A History of Economic Thought, Chapter 13
      2. H.D. Henderson, Supply and Demand, first 5 chapters or
      3. A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, 8th edition, Books III, IV, Chapters 9-13, and V, Chapters 1-5

Monday, March 4- Marshall, Ricardo, and the “revolution”

Wednesday, March 6- Marshall on the law of demand and laws of returns, costs and supply–under competition

Friday, March 8- Marshall on price determination in the short, intermediate and long-run

Monday, March 11- Marshall on competition and monopoly

Wednesday, March 13- Marshall on income distribution

Friday, March 15- Discussion

  1. March 18-29: Democratic Socialism, Communism and Fascism; and Modern U.S. Liberalism and Conservatism

Reading due March 29

      1. O.H. Taylor, A History of Economic Thought, Chapters 14, 15.
      2. — — — —, Economics and Liberalism, Introduction and essays #1-4 incl., 7,9
      3. G.B. Shaw, The Fabian Essays
      4. Crossman and others, New Fabian Essays

Monday, March 18- Western Socialism’s turn away from Marxist Orthodoxy; the Fabians and British Socialism

Wednesday, March 20- From Marxist Orthodoxy continued; European “revisionism”

Friday, March 22- Czarist Russia, Lenin, and Modern Communism

Monday, March 25- Fascism

Wednesday, March 27- The U.S. in and since the 1930’s — Liberalism and Conservatism

Friday, March 29- Discussion

SPRING VACATION

  1. April 8-19: Monopoly and Competition in the Modern Economy

Reading due April 19

      1. O.H. Taylor, A History of Economic Thought, Chapter 16
      2. E.H. Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition, first 5 chapters

Monday, April 8- Competition and Monopoly in the Economy and the Public Interest; the Traditional Views and the New, Modern Analysis

Wednesday, April 10- Product Differentiation and Competing Monopolies

Friday, April 12- Oligopoly

Monday, April 15- Large-scale Organizations, Individual Freedom, Public Control and the Common Welfare

Wednesday, April 17- Discussion

[Friday, April 19, Holiday]

  1. April 22-May 3: Keynesian Economics

Reading due May 3

      1. O.H. Taylor, A History of Economic Thought, Chapter 17
      2. S.E. Harris, The New Economics, Part III.

Source: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003. Box 8, Folder “Economics 1962-63 (1 of 2)”.

Reading Period Assignment

David McCord Wright. Democracy and Progress, 1943.
or
John Maurice Clark. Alternative to Serfdom, 1947 (revised, 1960).

____________________________

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Department of Economics

Economics 120
FINAL EXAM
 June 1, 1963

Write half-hour essays on six questions including No. 7

  1. State incisively, as parts of Marx’s theory of the functioning and development of capitalism, his economic theories on the following topics:value, wages, surplus value, accumulation and concentration of capital, the changing organic composition of capital, and the falling profit rate; and then more fully explain and discuss his theory or theories on one or two of those topics.
  2. Explain and discuss either the marginal utility theory of the pricing of products, or the marginal productivity theory of the pricing of the productive services of labor and of capital, in a competitive economy.
  3. Explain and discuss Marshall’s theory of the long-run normal or equilibrium price of a product produced by a competitive industry, under conditions of decreasing cost with growth of the industry and its market.
  4. Compare and discuss “the classical liberalism” and present day American “liberalism”, with equal attention to their points of agreement and of disagreement.
  5. Explain and discuss (1) the required conditions for the existence of an economic system of ‘pure’ competition, and the sense and way in which such a system, if it could and did exist, would best serve the economic welfare of society as a whole; and (2) how ‘product differentiation’ leads to a system of ‘monopolistic competition’ or ‘competing monopolies’; and the defects and merits of this system, for the economic welfare of society.
  6. Explain and discuss the ideas of ‘Keynesian theory’ on the following points:how growth of the peoples’ incomes affects consumption and saving; how growth of the economy’s stock of capital, through new investments, affects the profitability of further new investments; why and how total demand may become insufficient to sustain ‘full employment’, in an ‘affluent’ society; and how the government should use ‘fiscal policy’ to maintain ‘full employment’?
  7. Write out the principal comments that you want to make on Wright’s Democracy and Progress, or on Clark’s Alternative to Serfdom.

Source: Harvard University Archives. Final Examinations—June 1963—Social Sciences (HUC 7000.28, 147 of 284).

____________________________

Other posts with course material
on the history of economics
taught by Overton Hume Taylor at Harvard

Final exams for “Modern Economic Theory and its Critics”. O.H. Taylor, 1938-39 https://www.irwincollier.com/harvard-final-exams-for-modern-economic-theory-and-its-critics-o-h-taylor-1938-39/

O.H. Taylor’s undergraduate course, Intellectual Background of Economic Thought, 1941 https://www.irwincollier.com/2106-2/

O.H. Taylor’s Final Exam for Intellectual Background of Economic Thought, 1941 https://www.irwincollier.com/harvard-o-h-taylors-final-exam-for-intellectual-background-of-economic-thought-1941/

Outline and final exam. Economic and Political Ideas, Taylor. 2nd term, 1947-48 https://www.irwincollier.com/harvard-outline-and-final-exam-economic-and-political-ideas-taylor-2nd-term-1947-48/

Economic and Political Ideas. O. H. Taylor, 1948 https://www.irwincollier.com/taylor-economic-and-political-ideas-harvard-1948/

Half-year exam for O.H. Taylor’s Economics and Political Ideas, 1949 https://www.irwincollier.com/harvard-half-year-exam-o-h-taylors-economics-political-ideas-1949/

Graduate history of political economy course. Taylor, 1948-49 https://www.irwincollier.com/harvard-graduate-history-of-political-economy-course-taylor-1948-49/

Economics of Socialism. Overton Taylor et al., 1950 Harvard. Economics of Socialism. Overton Taylor et al., 1950

Economics of Socialism, Syllabus and Final Exam. O.H. Taylor, 1953 Harvard. Economics of Socialism, Syllabus and Final Exam. O.H. Taylor, 1953

History of Economics. First semester readings and exams. O. H. Taylor, 1955-56 https://www.irwincollier.com/harvard-history-of-economics-first-semester-readings-and-exams-o-h-taylor-1955-56/

Harvard. Undergraduate economics syllabus. Socialism, O.H. Taylor, 1955 Harvard. Undergraduate economics syllabus. Socialism, O.H. Taylor, 1955

Categories
Exam Questions Harvard Policy Problem Sets Public Finance Suggested Reading Syllabus

Harvard. Economic Principles and Public Policy. Syllabus, readings, questions. Schelling, 1981

In my opinion Thomas C. Schelling (1921-2016) has achieved something greater than the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel (2005). The history of economics will remember him as the very model of a modern thinking economist’s economist.

The earlier post for the reading list and final exams from his 1970 Harvard course “Conflict, Coalition and Strategy” has been viewed nearly 19,000 times, making it the highest single post in the eleven year history of Economics in the Rear-view Mirror.

The purpose of today’s post is to provide a digital, transcribed version of Schelling’s 1981 course materials for “Economic Principles and Public Policy” assembled from a PDF file of the scanned copy of this material compiled and published by Ed Tower in his Eno River Press Collection in Economics. In this form, it will be even easier to access, search, copy, and paste from. 

_________________________

Where to Find the Motherload

The Eno River Press Collection in Economics, compiled by Duke professor (now emeritus) Ed Tower, is the motherload of syllabi, problems sets, and exams from economics courses taught over roughly two decades at the end of the 20th century. Thanks to the initiative of Steven Medema, this material has been digitized and made available as .pdf files:  1980 (15 vols.); 1981 (25 vols.); 1990 (25 vols.); 1995 (25 vols.). There is an analogous set of volumes, likewise available in business administration.

Professor Ed Tower came to Duke in 1974. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard in 1971. He has held appointments at the Australian National University, the University of Auckland in New Zealand, the Economics Institute, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, the Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration, Nanjing University in the Peoples’ Republic of China, and Simon Fraser University in Canada. He has also consulted on economic development problems at the World Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development, and in Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, and Sudan, and has written on development problems in Malaysia, the Peoples’ Republic of China, and Taiwan.
Source: Duke Economics Department, WWW Resource.

_________________________

Undergraduate Course

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Economic Principles and Public Policy
Economics 1021
Spring 1981

T. C. Schelling

Course Outline and Reading Assignments

All readings listed are assigned; none are optional.

Books Required to Purchase:

Robert H. Haveman and Julius Margolis, Public Expenditure and Policy Analysis, second ed. (paperback), Rand McNally, 1977.

Robert Dorfman and Nancy Dorfman, Economics of the Environment, second ed., W.W. Norton and Company, 1977.

Richard Goode, The Individual Income Tax, revised ed. (paperback), The Brookings Institution, 1976.

Charles L. Schultze, The Public Use of Private Interest,
The Brookings Institution, 1977.

Arthur M. Okun, Equality and Efficiency, The Brookings
Institution, 1975.

T.C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior, W.W. Norton and Company, 1978.

Harold M. Hochman, The Urban Economy, W.W. Norton and Company, 1976.

Book Required to Obtain:

Your Income Tax, Publication 17, Internal Revenue Service,
not for sale.

Note: The class meets in lecture 13 times before Spring Recess. Reading assignments for the 8 meetings after Spring Recess will be distributed later.  Sections will meet each week except the first week and the week before Spring Recess.

_________________________

Outline and Readings
Pages Meetings
I. Lives and Decisions 136
(Cumul-ative totals in parentheses)
3
  1. Chase, Samuel B., (ed.), Problems in Public Expenditure Analysis, The Brookings Institution, 1968, pp. 127-176.
  2. Vaupel, James W. and John D. Graham, “Egg in Your Bier?”, The Public Interest, No. 58, Winter 1980, pp. 3-17.
  3. Zeckhauser, Richard, “Procedures for Valuing Lives,” Public Policy, Fall 1975, pp. 419-464.
  4. Lave, Lester B. and Eugene P. Seskin, “Air Pollution and Human Health,” in Robert Dorfman and Nancy S. Dorfman, Economics of the Environment, 2nd ed., W.W. Norton & Co., pp. 422-449.
II. Policy: Why Things May Not Take Care of Themselves 177 (313) 2 (5)
  1. Haveman, Robert H. and Julius Margolis, Public Expenditure and Policy Analysis, 2nd ed., 1977, Introduction, pp. 1-24.
  2. Davis, Otto A. and Morton I. Kamien, “Externalities, Information and Alternative Collective Action,” H and M, pp. 82-104.
  3. Schelling, T.C., Micromotives and Macrobehavior, W.W. Norton & Co., 1978.

Ch. 1, “Micromotives and Macrobehavior,” 9-43.
Ch. 3, “Thermostats, Lemons, and Other Families of Models,” 83-133.
Ch. 4, “Sorting and Mixing:  Race and Sex,” 137-155.
Ch. 6, “Choosing Our Children’s Genes,” 193-203.

  1. Steiner, Peter O., “The Public Sector and the Public Interest,” in H and M, pp. 27-40.
III. Examples of Market Failure 214 (527) 2 (7)
The Environment

  1. Ruff, Larry E., “The Economic Common Sense of Pollution,” in D and D, pp. 41-58.
  2. Dales, J.H., “The Property Interface,” in D and D, pp. 172-186.
  3. Dales, J.H., “Land, Water, and Ownership,”in D and D, pp. 229-244.
  4. Mishan, E.J., “Property Rights and AmenityRights,” in D and D, pp. 245-251.
  5. Schelling, T.C., “Prices as Regulatory Instruments for Environmental Protection,”JFK School of Government, December 1980.
  6. Goldman, Marshall I., “The Convergence ofEnvironmental Disruption,” in D and D, pp. 312-325.

The City

  1. Baumol, W.J. & Wallace E. Oates, “The CostDisease of the Personal Services and the Quality of Life,” pp. 57-73, in The Urban Economy by Harold M. Hochman, W.W. Norton and Co., 1976.
  2. Thompson, Wilbur, “The City as a DistortedPrice System,” pp. 74-86, in The Urban Economy.
  3. Alonso, William, “Urban Zero Population Growth,” pp. 164-179 in The Urban Economy.
IV. Helping People 118 (645) 3 (10)
The Conflict Between Equity and Incentives

  1. Tobin, James, “The Case for an Income Guarantee,” The Public Interest, Summer 1966, pp. 31-41.
  2. Schorr, Alvin L., “Against a Negative Income Tax,” and James Tobin, “A Rejoinder,” The Public Interest, Fall 1966, pp. 110-119.
  3. Weisbrod, Burton A., “Collective Action andthe Distribution of Income:  A Conceptual Approach,” in H & M, pp. 105-131.
  4. Products Liability:  Bexiga vs. Havir Mfg.Corp., Harvard Law Review, Vol. 86 (March1973), pp. 923-931.
  5. Implications of Guaranteeing Medical Care,Institute of Medicine, 1975, Schelling et al., pp. 23-37, 39-44, 53-57.

Cash, Kind, or Rationing

  1. Tobin, James, “On Limiting the Domain of Inequality,” The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 13 (October 1970), pp. 263-277.
  2. Thurow, Lester C., “Cash Versus In-Kind Transfers,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May 1974, pp. 190-195.
  3. Frieden, Bernard J., “Housing Allowances:  An Experiment That Worked,” The Public Interest, No. 59, Spring 1980, pp. 15-35.
V. Case Study: Day Care 68 (713) 0 (10)
  1. Nelson, Richard R., The Moon and The Ghetto, W.W. Norton and Co., 1977, pp. 83-103.
  2. Rivlin, Alice, “Federal Support for Child Care:  An Analysis of Options,” in H & M, pp. 442-475.
  3. Bruce-Briggs, B., “‘Child Care,’ The FiscalTime Bomb,” The Public Interest, #49, Fall 1977, pp. 87-102.
VI. Review Questions 0 (713) 1 (11)
Spring 1981
Course Plan

WEEK OF

SECTION

2/2

No sections

2/9

Problem: Right Turn on Red

2/16
[Washington’s B-Day]

Quiz

2/23

Hour Exam:
Lives, Policy, Environment, City

3/2

Problem: Moral Hazard

3/9

Quiz

3/16

15 Questions Due

3/23

****** RECESS ******

3/30

Hour Exam:
Helping People, Cash v Kind, Day Care, Crime, Energy

4/6

Problem: Tax

4/13

Quiz: Tax

4/20

Quiz: Tax

4/26

****** READING PERIOD ******

Source:  Economics Reading Lists, Course Outlines, Exams, Puzzles & Problems compiled by Edward Tower. Vol. 20 (July 1981): Public Choice, Political Economy, and the Economics of Public Policy & Law, pp. 133-137.

_________________________

ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES
AND PUBLIC POLICY

M-228 & ECONOMICS 1021
Spring 1981

T. C. Schelling
Harvard University

The Income Tax

            These questions are prompted by a reading of the Form 1040. Some of the questions will be discussed in class, some are for your reflection and study. The purpose is to alert you to the kinds of questions and issues that almost any line in the tax form can raise. Several hours can be devoted to the economic philosophy underlying income taxes, discerning intention, recognizing administrative com-promise, analyzing incentives, and evaluating the income tax as an instrument to achieve a variety of goals. It need not be viewed as a coherent philosophy or a set of integrated and compatible purposes; searching for inconsistencies or obsolete details, and reflecting on historical processes and political compromises, are part of the exercise.

Page 1 of Form 1040

  1. Why “income rather than “wealth?”
    What difference does it make whether income or wealth is the subject of the tax?
  2. Why is the calendar year the unit of accounting?
    What provisions modify this annual slicing?
    What would be an ideal accounting period, or is there one?
    What incentives result from slicing time into annual units?
  3. Should a married couple be treated as a single unit, as two persons, or allowed some choice in how to file?
    Do you perceive any incentives on marriage and divorce?
  4. What reason can you think of for the extra exemption for the blind, not for the deaf or the crippled?
    Why might blindness be exactly equivalent to one dependent?
    Should blindness be treated as an exemption or a tax credit?
    What are the differences between this kind of help for the blind and cash grants not related to income?
  5. Should the allowance for a dependent be a constant amount of income, irrespective of bracket? Should it instead be graduated, so that the differential between a large and small family at high income is greater than the differential at a lower income? Should it be a tax credit rather than an exemption?
  6. Is there an implied philosophy about family, children, and birth, in this treatment of dependents? Does it imply that children are:

1) a consumer good,
2) an insurable accident,
3) a productive asset,
4) a social obligation?

Are there incentives on family size or timing due to this treatment of dependents?

  1. What is the argument for including capital gains as a kind of income? Alternatively, what is the argument for not treating them the same as income?
    Why distinguish long-term from short-term? Is this an anti-gambling or anti-speculation bias? Is it expected or intended to have incentives on the holding of securities?
    Why are only “realized” gains taxed, so that if your stock or property rises in value you pay no tax unless you sell it?
    What are the incentives: do people get “locked in” to property holdings that have risen in value, having to hold it rather than exchange it for other stock and property?
    Why is a special exemption made for the sale of one’s own house?
  2. Should gambling gains and losses be treated like any other income?
    Should they be ignored altogether and left untaxed?
    Does the treatment discriminate against “pure” gambling but not against gambling on the commodity or stock market?
    Is this treatment consistent with the increasing popularity of state lotteries, off-track and on-track betting, etc.?
    What effect will the treatment of gambling gains and losses have on the ability of legal gambling to compete with illegal gambling?
  3. Can you guess what kinds of “employee business expenses” a typical university professor will take credit for on his tax return? Do you expect any incentives, such as the likelihood of having better office equipment, more telephone extensions, better personal libraries, if they are tax-deductible?

Schedule A

  1. Itemized deductions: Is there a single rationale for the items deductible? Is it:
      1. to get at a better accounting of income
      2. to encourage expenses of the kinds that have been made deductible.
      3. to compensate for special hardships and obligations;
      4. or what?
  2. Why is medical care somewhat deductible?
    How does treatment of medical care discriminate between the poor and the well-to-do?
    Could you estimate the “cost” to the Internal Revenue Service (or to other taxpayers if they would have to make it up in higher tax rates) of this treatment of medical care?
    If you could redistribute an equivalent amount, to compensate people for an injury and illness and disability, would you rather distribute it in a manner unrelated to income or income taxes?
    Can you find a plausible explanation of the quantitative treatment of medical care: e.g., 1/2 of insurance premiums; excess over 3% of income; subtracting out 18 in line 3; etc.
  3. How would you prefer to treat funeral expenses? Should sanitary or tasteful disposal of a dead body be treated as a terminal medical expense? Can you think of good reasons for the actual treatment of this item?
  4. What contributions are tax-deductible, and why?
    Is this equivalent to a subsidy of churches by the federal government?
    Is the object to stimulate contributions?
    Is this a useful way to decentralize federal subsidies, by a system of “matching grants” to anybody who wants to support his favorite charity?
    Who has more leverage in determining where the IRS makes its contributions, a poor or a rich person?
  5. What do you think are the most questionable “contributions,” the ones about which it is hard to decide whether they are within the spirit of the income tax?
    Is it a “contribution” if I make a sizable gift to a private school in hopes that they will give priority admissions to my children?
    Can I unload a library that I’ve grown tired of, and treat it as a cash “gift” to the University?
    Suppose I make the gift and the recipient throws it away?
    Suppose I make a “gift” to a nursing home that is really a disguised bill for the care of an aged relative, but the nursing home winks and lets me “pay” the bill in a tax-deductible way?
  6. Why should the interest you pay be deductible? (Interest you receive is taxable.) Does this put a distortion in the incentive structure–regarding, say, mortgaged homes vs. outright ownership–or does it eliminate a distortion?
  7. Is the treatment of “casualty losses” equivalent to insurance handled by the Treasury?
    Does it discriminate in favor of the rich, the poor, the property-less, or the property owners?
    Could the treatment of casualty losses have any influence on the insurance that people purchase?
    If I smash my car and somebody else’s, and he sues me for damage and I pay, should both parts of the loss be deductible, or only the damage to my own car?
  8. Why allow deductions for taxes paid to state and local government but not other federal taxes?

General Questions

  1. It has been argued that employees of the federal government ought not to pay income tax: they are simply returning part of their salary. If they were exempted from tax we could lower their pay to the “after taxes” level, saving them the trouble of making out returns and the IRS the trouble of processing them. Do you see objections to that procedure?
    Do your objections apply equally to state taxation of incomes earned in state employment?
  2. Children who are eighteen or younger count as dependents, no matter how much income they had. Should we reexamine this age, as voting ages, draft ages, and ages over which juvenile courts have jurisdiction change as the years go by, and with the increasing independence of teenage “dependents?”
    A child with income abruptly ceases to be a dependent at age nineteen. Would there be advantage in having dependency taper off gradually?
  3. In earlier years, military combat pay was excluded from taxable income.
    Why would the federal government prefer to do it that way rather than with an outright pay increase?
    It has recently been proposed to exempt all military pay from federal taxation. What are the reasons for and against?
  4. If you and your employer both pay a percentage of your salary into a retirement fund, should your part not be treated as income and subject to taxation? Should his?
    If the retirement fund invests it, should the accrual of interest and dividends to your retirement account be currently taxable?
    How much flexibility should the IRS allow you in putting part of your income into a retirement fund, temporarily beyond reach of the income tax?
    Suppose your retirement fund permits you to withdraw from it in an emergency? Does that make it just an investment fund to escape the income tax?
    Suppose you cannot withdraw it but you can borrow against it.
    Is it only a pretense that it is still there and you have not drawn it down to spend it?
    What general purpose do you see in permitting contributions to a retirement account to evade immediate taxation, but not any other form of saving that is invested for the sake of deferred consumption? Is this just another subsidy for incentives, or is there some logical reason to exempt this contribution, as being not “earned” until one is legally able to draw on it after retirement?
  5. Consider some income that is not subject to tax–either legally immune, or just practically uncollectible (evasion being easy and people willing to evade in the belief that others do).
    Specifically, tips to waiters and waitresses. who do you think benefits from untaxed tips?
    What do you think the effect is on waiters’ wages and the prices of restaurant meals? Does your answer depend on the income earned by waiters?
    Think of some untaxed fee or salary supplement in a high income bracket, and answer the same question–e.g., untaxed fees of abortionists when abortion was illegal.
    Can you make any general proposition about who benefits to what extent when any identifiable kind of income goes untaxed, either because it is legally exempt or because the tax is regularly evaded?

Beneficiaries and Incentives

  1. Select some disadvantaged or underpriviledged group that you would like to help with extra income at government expense.
    1. What is the best device you can think of that might be incorporated in the income tax to serve that purpose?
    2. Compare that income-tax measure with the best alternative measure (not involving the income tax) that would serve the same purpose.
    3. How much of the tax benefit (i.e. the tax loss to the government) is likely to go to the people whom you did not especially wish to receive the benefit? How serious an inefficiency is that?
    4. How many of the people you would like to help are not reached by your proposed tax measure, and how serious is that inefficiency?
  2. Select an activity that you would like to stimulate at government expense.
    1. What is the best device you can think of that might be incorporated in the income tax to serve that purpose?
    2. Compare that income-tax measure with the best alternative measure (not involving the income tax) that would serve the same purpose.
    3. How much of the tax benefit is likely to go to taxpayers whose activity is unaffected by your income-tax measure?
    4. How would you estimate the amount of the desired activity (measured perhaps in the increase in taxpayer expenditure on it) induced per dollar of lost tax revenue?
  3. Discuss the incentives in the income tax that affect the following. Indicate the direction in which they affect it, the likely magnitude of the effect, and the desirability of the incentive effect:
    1. owning a home, or renting;
    2. doing work around the house rather than hiring it done;
    3. diverting wages and salaries into institutionalized retirement arrangements;
    4. choosing among savings accounts, bonds, stocks, and real estate;
    5. purchasing collision-damage auto insurance;
    6. having another child;
    7. housewives taking full-time jobs and getting sitters, housekeepers, cleaning help, etc., to take care at home;
    8. choosing one’s occupation.
  4. What in the income tax do you think affects the way Harvard University is administered? (For example, the health service, retirement arrangements, providing expenses rather than income to faculty, granting scholarships).
  5. Income Tax Work Incentives
    It has been argued that an income tax induces people to work less because it reduces their net hourly compensation. A person who can do extra work at $7.50 per hour may not do it if he keeps only $5.
    It has also been argued that an income tax induces people to work more because it lowers their net income for any amount of work they do; to maintain desired standards of living the income tax leaves them no choice but to work more.
    How would you resolve the dispute, either choosing one of these two points of view, denying them both, or finding some reconciliation between these two opposing arguments?
  6. Taxes and the Ability to Pay
    It has been argued that the income tax is unique among taxes in discriminating according to “ability to pay.” why, then, should there be additional taxes unrelated to the ability to pay? There are other taxes and they add up to as much as the income tax. Of course, in politics nobody’s perfect, and we needn’t be surprised that “ability to pay” is honored and violated at the same time. Still, there may be good reasons why an income tax is not or cannot be relied on as the sole source of revenue.
      1. How successfully does it tax people on their “ability to pay?”
      2. Give some good reasons for not expecting the income tax to be able to serve as the unique, universal, all-purpose tax.
    1. Child Dependency Allowance
      The present income tax allowance for children is that $1000 per child can be deducted from income before calculating the tax. In taxes saved, a child is worth more in a high-tax bracket than in a low bracket. On the other hand, the expenses attributable to an extra child for a family with an income of $15,000 is probably much closer to the $1000 allowance than are the expenditures attributable to an extra child in a family of similar size with an income of $60,000.
      It can be argued that the difference between no children and three children at a family income of $60,000 is far greater than the $1000 per child allowed as untaxable income, and that it makes sense to enlarge that allowance at higher incomes.
      It can also be argued that raising the allowance at higher incomes will reduce the progressivity of the tax, allowing just another benefit to wealthier families while poorer families would get no such relief.

      1. Explain how you would choose between these two points of view, or reconcile them, in recommending how to handle children in the income tax.
      2. would your answer to (a) be any different if the dependency allowance were a tax credit rather than a deduction from income?
  1. A tax is called “progressive” if the amount paid rises more than proportionally to income, “regressive” if less, and “proportional” if the ratio of tax to income is uniform. The word “progressive” also suggests “fair” or “liberal” and “progressive income tax” tends to have both meanings. with either meaning it is sometimes hard to determine which among two or more tax schedules, or changes in a tax schedule, or more or less “progressive,” or exactly what change in rates should be characterized as preserving the same progressivity.
    Below are six income-tax schedules.
    Indicate how you would go about ranking them, or comparing them, in their “progressivity.”
    Would you need to know something about the underlying distribution of income to make the comparison?
    If so, explain.
Income Bracket $000 Percentage rate on income in bracket
A B C D E F
0 – 6 0 0 0 0 0 17
6 – 12 15 10 10 0 0 29
12 – 24 20 15 13 30 5 27
24 – 48 30 25 20 30 31 45
48 – 100 50 45 33 60 45 58
100 – 200 75 70 50 70 73 79

Compared with Schedule A:

Do one or more of the schedules raise or lower all taxes in the same proportion? Which ones?

Do one or more raise or lower all taxes by the same proportion of income? Which ones?

Do one or more raise or lower all income after taxes in the same proportion? Which ones?

Does one or more of them have the same progressivity as A?

Do any two of them have the same progressivity as each other?

Among them all, including A, which is least progressive and which most, and how do you rank the others?

NOTE: Because the rates go stepwise, any change will affect somewhat differently people at different points within a bracket. I suggest you make the comparisons at the bracket limits, i.e. at $6, $12, $24, $48, $100, and $200.

Source: “The Income Tax”. Photocopy reproduced in Economics Reading Lists, Course Outlines, Exams, Puzzles & Problems compiled by Edward Tower. Vol. 12 (July 1981): Public Finance Exams, Puzzles & Problems, pp. 9-17.

_________________________

T. C. Schelling/Harvard University
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES
AND PUBLIC POLICY
Spring 1981

Ec. 1021
M- 228
EXAM QUESTIONS FROM EARLIER YEARS
  1. Proposed Policies for Evaluation
  2. Swine Flu Vaccination
  3. 55-Mile Speed Limit
  4. Worth of Saving Lives
  5. Crime Rates and Police Coverage
  6. Fire Protection
  7. Smoking in Class
  8. Saturday Sections
  9. Apartment House Heating
  10. Deposit on Cans and Bottles
  11. Smoking in Class: Another Room
  12. Library Air Conditioning
  13. State-University Tuition
  14. Nursery Schools
  15. Youth Fare
  16. Welfare and Work Incentives
  17. Dining Hall Problem
  18. University Parking
  19. Vouchers, Goods- (services)-in-Kind, or Cash
  20. Gasoline Mileage
  21. Elasticity of Response
  22. Property-Tax Exemption for Veterans
  23. Incentive Effects of Private Insurance
  24. Overbooked Airline
  25. Environment in the USA and the USSR
  26. Insurance and “Moral Hazard”
  27. Common Property
  28. The City
  29. Child Care

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

  1. Proposed Policies for Evaluation

      Without reaching any final conclusion about any of the actual or proposed policies listed below, indicate for each of them one or two important considerations that this course has brought to your attention.

      1. Individual fire-detection units have been developed that emit a distinctive noise when fire occurs in a dwelling; they cost about $35. It is proposed that federal funds be offered to the states for refunding $20 per unit, for up to two such units, to any landlord or homeowner purchasing such equipment, in any state that, through its fire-safety authority or its regulation of the fire insurance industry, makes such detection devices mandatory or that severely penalizes the insurance rates of homes without them.
      2. Public provision to low-income persons with specific disabilities, and to the low-income very elderly, of “taxi vouchers,” useable in payment of metered taxi fares, redeemable in cash from the taxi company, in some standard amount calculated to cover some minimum number of trips per month for which such disabled and elderly people would need transportation by automobile.
      3. Cheap postal rates on books.
      4. Free eyeglasses for schoolchildren who need them, li parent’s or guardian’s income is below some specified level (as documented by income tax return).
      5. Free admission to selected Harvard football games for non-academic employees of the University.
      6. Requirement that any disability benefits generally available to company employees be provided also for some specified length of time for pregnancy and child-birth.
      7. The restriction, as presently in Cambridge, of most side street parking to local residents, enforced by parking fines for all vehicles without local-resident stickers,
      8. A provision that Harvard clerical, secretarial, and similar non-teaching staff be authorized, with the permission of their immediate supervisors, to enroll for grade and credit in one undergraduate Harvard course during each academic year, at no charge and with official time off from regular duties during class hours.
      9. Requirement that all new apartment buildings provide separate metering of heat in each individual apartment, with separate thermostat or other controls on heat use.
      10. Preferential hiring of veterans in government jobs.
      11. Federal program to finance welfare benefits so that benefits will be uniform among all 50 states.
      12. Free gymnasium-locker-shower and other athletic facilities made available to all employees of a large corporation, as a fringe benefit of likely value to employee health.
      13. On days when the weather makes it advisable to curtail sharply the volume of traffic on the Mass. Turnpike Extension (from the western suburbs to downtown Boston) put into effect, by radio announcement, the standby rule that cars will be admitted to the turnpike only if the first digit of the license plate is odd or even according as the date of the month is odd or even.
      14. Income-tax deduction or credit for home insulation expenditure.
      15. Life insurance equal to $50 thousand if single, $100 thousand if married, plus $25 thousand for each dependent child, for firemen and policemen killed in the line of duty.
      16. Unemployment compensation treated as “insurance” and not taxable as income.
      17. “Gasoline stamps” (patterned after food stamps) that low-income owners of registered cars and trucks can purchase at a discount, in limited quantities, as a cushion against the impact on low-income people of a federal gasoline tax.
      18. Mandatory deposit of 25¢ on every beer or soft-drink container purchased in Massachusetts, can or bottle, to be refunded upon return to any store where beer or soft drinks are sold, together with requirement that all containers sold in the state carry distinctive ineradicable markings to prevent wholesale turn-in of cans and bottles from outside the state.
      19. Mandatory $25 per year (for three years) increase in automobile insurance premium for every moving traffic for “safe” the proceeds used to reduce insurance rates drivers.
      20. The extra federal income-tax exemption for the blind.
      21. Federal income-tax deduction for contributions to schools.
      22. Rent control for persons over 65, for the disabled, and for certain other disadvantaged tenants.
      23. Exemption from minimum-wage law for youths under 17.
  1. Swine Flu Vaccination

      It is nearly forgotten now, but put youself back to January 1977: Forty million people had received swine flu vaccine. It was not clear whether an epidemic of swine flu might yet occur, and there was no final judgment on whether the vaccine itself entailed significant risk. Anywhere from 40 to 400 people were thought to have possibly died in consequence of the vaccine itself. It had been feared that a flu epidemic might ki11 40,000.

      A characteristic of vaccination is that the more successful the program, the less protection anyone needs. If everyone is vaccinated, you don’t need to be. And if the epidemic is averted, vaccination deaths may outweigh flu deaths.

      An important possibility in that January was that there remained a serious risk of swine flu but no sign of it yet, and that the publicity about some real or imagined fatal complications had made doctors afraid to offer the shots, patients reluctant to receive them, and health officials afraid to recommend them.

      Suppose it were January 1977 and you were convinced that comprehensive vaccination could entail some hundreds of deaths from the vaccine, that it could reduce flu deaths by tens of thousands if an epidemic were otherwise going to occur, and that the chance of an epidemic was about one in five if vaccination were discontinued.

      How would you evaluate the risks and benefits of stopping or proceeding with the program?

      What suggestions could you make on ways to induce people to get themselves vaccinated?

  1. 55-Mile Speed Limit

      The nationwide 55 mph speed limit that went into effect in 1974 was associated with a reduction in traffic fatalities for which no other explanation has been found. Suppose it becomes established that that speed limit, if enforced, will save three or four thousand lives per year with a commensurate reduction in injuries and automobile damage, but at some cost in truck and auto travel time and some cost of enforcement.

      The deaths and injuries, to say nothing of automobile damage, are worth taking seriously. The costs of slower transport and the lost work or leisure time have to be taken seriously. But I do not know whether the costs and benefits of enforcing the speed limit make the speed limit a good bargain in lives saved, a disproportionate nuisance for a minor reduction in mortality, or a toss-up.

      1. How would you help me reach a decision?
      2. Indicate the numerical information you would want to gather and how you would use it in estimating benefits and costs.
  1. Worth of Saving Lives

            Consider a costly program that is expected to reduce the likelihood of death within some identifiable segment of the population, and thus reduce statistically the number of deaths within that part of the population. In addressing the question of what it is worth to save those lives, i.e. to reduce those deaths, via that program, an important question is, Worth to whom? Who cares, and how much?

            Outline the way you would go about identifying the relevant interested or affected parties–individuals or governments–and how you might investigate the extent of their interest, especially the money value of their interest.

  1. Crime Rates and Police Coverage

      It has been observed that in some cities the incidence of armed robbery and illegal violence is kept at a low level by an effective response of the police, who, having a low level of violence to contend with, provide a deterrent likelihood of quick arrival. In other cities of similar social and geographic character the incidence of violence is so high that the police cannot answer calls promptly or investigate each incident. There is often no convincing explanation for the much greater prevalence of violent crime in the one case compared with the other-except, of course, the difference in effectiveness of police coverage. Yet examination shows that the numbers of police do not differ widely in the two situations.

      On the analogy of the “tipping” model, develop an analysis that could explain this phenomenon.

  1. Fire Protection

      Fire protection is nearly everywhere a city-government or town-government responsibility in the United States. It is (a) financed out of taxes and (b) provided by town employees using town equipment. By contrast, fire insurance is a private activity, homeowners buying it from private companies. Evidently there is a belief that the market cannot meet the need for fire protection: either people won’t subscribe or private firms won’t offer it. Or maybe there is just a custom that nobody questions.

      1. What are some plausible reasons why fire protection might not be left to “the market”?
      2. Do you think some of these reasons are decisive, and fire protection needs to be organized as it is?
      3. Can you think of any alternative approaches to fire protection that might be worth experimenting with?
  1. Smoking in Class

      In “The Economic Common Sense of Pollution” Ruff discusses the idea of charging people for their polluting activity, rather than simply prohibiting or permitting it. A familiar form of pollution is smoking in enclosed places where non-smokers are present.

      Suppose a special section of some class meets regularly in the evening. Some members of the class want to smoke; others complain of poor ventilation and object to any smoking. Somebody proposes that smokers might pay for the privilege of smoking.

      It is known that you have given some thought to the “pricing” of pollution, and you are asked whether it makes sense to charge for smoking and, if so, how to determine how much to charge and what to do with the proceeds.

Discuss it.

  1. Saturday Sections

      A course instructor generously offered to meet Saturday morning with interested members of the class to go over the week’s material, answer questions, etc.. Attendance was meager for a few weeks but picked up as the semester wore on, and by late in the term most of the class was showing up Saturday morning. The following year, the instructor made the same arrangement; attendance was meager for a few weeks and then fell off until only a few loyal participants were left. Even they were gone by the end of the semester.

      The instructor is perplexed at how one class was so eager while the other lost even the little interest it had. He is looking over the enrollments for the two years to see whether he can distinguish anything about the composition of the classes that would explain the difference. He wonders what to expect if he tried it once more. He’ll be happy for any advice you can give him.

  1. Apartment House Heating

      It is expected that many apartment buildings, especially among the lower-rent apartments, may again be unable to obtain as much heating fuel this winter as in past years, It is characteristic of apartments, especially the cheaper ones, that there is no metering of the heat consumed by individual tenants. If nobody takes steps to reduce heat consumption the building may run out of fuel for several days at a time, with frozen pipes and frozen people. If somebody takes steps to reduce the heat absorbed by his own apartment, usually nobody will notice–not his neighbors, not the landlord.

      Nobody has a good idea of how much reduction in heat consumption by individual apartments will be needed, as measured by anything the tenant can measure–e.g., room temperature, radiator temperature, etc. Some apartments require more heat than others to maintain the same temperature. (Corner apartments require more heat.) Some families have elderly people, babies, sick people. Some apartments are vacant most of the day, some are occupied all day.

      Nothing in any tenant’s lease makes any provision for heat control, rationing, rebates or extra charges.

      You are asked by some concerned tenants to help work out a reasonable way to minimize the risk of acute discomfort and danger due to exhaustion of fuel.

      Analyze the problem. State what data you would need in order to proceed. Outline at least one solution you would pro-pose, or several alternatives. And indicate how you might persuade tenants and landlord to accept your proposal in the event they fail to appreciate its merits or exaggerate its defects.

  1. Deposit on Cans and Bottles

      Legislation has been introduced to require a deposit on every beer or soft drink can or bottle, the deposit returnable upon return of the container. There are interests in favor and interests opposed. There is rarely discussion of how large the deposit should be–five or ten cents seems to be what people expect. The stated purposes are primarily to reduce littering and secondarily to conserve materials and energy by re-using containers or recycling materials.

      What would you want to take into account–and what facts would you want to investigate–if it were up to you to choose and justify the amount (or amounts, if variable) that the deposit should be, if there were to be a deposit.

  1. Smoking in Class: Another Room

      Consider a classroom of students among whom some like to smoke, some find it disagreeable, and some don’t care. There is dispute whether smoking should be prohibited. (It has traditionally been permitted but complaints have been frequent.) An alternative room is available, one with an air conditioning system that will mitigate the smoke nuisance for both smokers and non-smokers.

      The air-conditioned room costs extra, and the extra cost will have to be borne by the students.

      1. How would you determine whether the air-conditioned room is worth the cost? Be explicit about your criterion of “worth.”
      2. How would you propose the extra cost be paid–by which students and in what proportions?
  1. Library Air Conditioning

      A group of citizens has tried to get the town to spend $20,000 to air condition the library. They argue that the building is hot and stuffy in summer and the utilization of the library and the quality of the experience are diminished. For two years the proposal has gone before the town’s governing body, and both times it has been defeated. The opposition argues that the tax rate is out of hand anyway and this is a frill that will benefit a few at the expense of everyone.

      The question will arise next year and the town leaders want to put this issue to rest. They have no axe to grind, just want the question settled. You have been requested to prepare an analysis and a recommendation.

      1. How would you frame the issue for analysis?
      2. What data would you want to evaluate different choices?
      3. Are there sources of money other than town-wide tax support that you would consider?
  1. State-University Tuition

      Radio station WBZ editorially has opposed the principle that a state university ought to charge residents a tuition of only one-fifth the usual tuition at comparable private universities, arguing that student loans and occasional scholarships coupled with regular tuition payments would be more justifiable.

      A recent court decision called into question the right of state universities to charge higher tuitions to nonresidents than to residents of the state.

      Evaluate the idea of low tuition for state residents at state universities, with attention to the following questions:

      1. Why should tuition be low compared with other universities?
      2. Why should tuition be subsidized only at the state university and not at any university in the state?
      3. Why should tuition be low only for residents of the state?
      4. Why should tuition not be similarly subsidized for state residents who get their education at colleges outside the state?

      Be sure to discuss who benefits and who loses, what the effect may be on college attendance, and what the effect may be on attendance at the state university.

  1. Nursery Schools

      Some of the most expensive private schools, from nursery schools to colleges, provide scholarships for a few children whose parents could not afford the tuition. The system is challenged as inappropriate charity by some tuition-paying parents, and defended by others as a way of sharing privileges that only a few can otherwise afford. Nursery schools are usually not endowed, so the costs of scholarships are borne by the parents who pay tuition for their own children.

      If you were asked to speak on this issue at a meeting of nursery school parents, on grounds that you have taken this course, what are the main points you would make to help the parents think about the issue?

  1. Youth Fare

      The Civil Aeronautics Board gave notice that “youth fare” had to be terminated. (Youth fare was lower fares for young people, usually with some loss of priority to the youths taking advantage of it.) The argument was that youth fare discriminates against other passengers.

      Discuss the “discriminatory pricing” represented by the youth fare, indicating who is likely to gain and who to lose, with what effect on average fare, volume of travel, passenger convenience, and so forth.

      Identify any significant distributional implications of the particular groups or classes that appear to gain and to lose.

      What do you consider to be the chief socio-economic or other characteristic of “youth” that one ought to have in mind in considering the merits of youth fare?

  1. Welfare and Work Incentives

      If a welfare program assures every eligible family a specified minimum income, providing the difference between actual earnings and that minimum, the incentive and the opportunity to work gainfully are said to be impaired by a “100 percent income tax.” But without some assured minimum many families will fall below any decent standard of living.

      1. Explain the basic dilemma.
      2. Discuss proposed solutions.
      3. Evaluate the difficulty of finding an ideal solution to the problem.
  1. Dining Hall Problem
    1. Evaluate these alternative ways to distribute food and to assess costs in a graduate school dining hall.
      1. At every mealtime there is a fixed menu. Everybody gets the same meal and the same quantities. Total cost is divided equally among all those eligible to use the dining hall.
      2. As in No. 1 there is a fixed menu, but everybody eats as much as he pleases. The total amount of food is the same as in No. 1; and if some take more than their share and none take less, the last to arrive will face shortages. The cost is assessed in equal shares.
      3. Substantial variety is offered; everybody helps himself to whatever he likes, as much as he likes; adequate supplies are made available. Everybody is assessed an equal share of the total cost.
      4. A cheap meal is offered free; a variety of more expensive meals can be purchased a la carte. The cost, less the proceeds, is divided among the members.
      5. Same as No. 1, but the menu is fixed for each day of the week and known to all. People are charged only for the meals they eat, and may eat elsewhere. All meals count the same in everybody’s monthly bill.
    2. What difference will it make—
      1. if individual dishes (and beverages, rolls, etc.) are in such form that they can be shared, given away, or traded among diners;
      2. if every member is issued a specified number of transferable guest passes each month;
      3. if every member has a pass, good for each mealtime, and anyone holding the pass will be admitted without further identification.
  1. University Parking

      A university possesses some parking area and finds that the number of employees who need parking has grown to twice the number of spaces available. Alternative public parking off campus is expensive. Numerous proposals have been made about what to do:

      1. Assign non-transferable parking stickers to half the employees. Do this (a) by seniority, (b) by lottery, or (c) any other selection system you propose.
      2. Same as a but let the stickers be sold, traded, or given away by the recipients.
      3. Assign spaces to those who live farthest away where there is no public transportation.
      4. Convert university parking space into public parking lots, charging admission to the general public like any other commercial parking lot.
      5. Give all employees who drive to work one ticket and “sell” parking to university employees at a “price” of two tickets per space, letting everybody choose whether to sell his ticket to another employee or to buy somebody’s ticket and acquire a parking space.

      Make a recommendation and support it with the best argument you can construct. You need not recommend one of the above alternatives, but you must indicate why the scheme you recommend is superior.

  1. Vouchers, Goods- (services) -in-Kind, or Cash

            What are the central issues raised by the choice between giving people (1) such things as food stamps, school vouchers, trash collection vouchers, as against giving them (2) goods in kind, e.g., free lunches, or free schooling, or free trash collection, as against giving them (3) cash. Discuss the principles that should govern the choice, and illustrate your answer by three examples that highlight significant differences. (If you like, use food, schooling, and trash collection. If not, use any three that help you make your points.)

  1. Gasoline Mileage

      A major reason for U.S. dependence on foreign oil is that American automobiles get poor gas mileage. Three alternative remedies might be:

      1. Prohibit production of cars that get less than some specified miles per gallon;
      2. Put a tax on new cars that is related to gas consumption, high on cars with poor mileage while fuel-efficient cars pay a small tax or no tax or even receive a rebate;
      3. Tax gasoline, not automobiles.

            Evaluate the three proposals in terms of what you have learned in this course.

  1. Elasticity of Response

      Some policies are motivated by an interest in changing the way people behave; others are intended to compensate people for the results of the marketplace or for extraordinary misfortune. Few policy measures are without some induced change in behavior, whether the change is intended or not.

      Discuss the “elasticity of response” as a factor in policy evaluation. By “elasticity of response” is meant the degree to which behavior is affected by the policy.

      Discuss the kinds of policies for which a high elasticity will frustrate the policy or make it too expensive, and the kinds that in contrast are justified by a high elasticity.

      Give examples of both kinds. Your examples may be from income taxation, medical insurance, welfare programs, resource conservation, pollution abatement, or any field that interests you.

  1. Property-Tax Exemption for Veterans

      Many states provide benefits to veterans–mortgage guarantees for purchase of homes, civil-service preferences, certain kinds of tax exemption.

      One proposal is that, as a benefit pertinent to young veterans raising families, every veteran should receive some stipulated exemption from property taxes within the state, possibly a specified amount or percentage to be subtracted from the assessed valuation on his property before the tax rate is applied.

      (The mechanisms for this may be complex, since states might have to reimburse towns, which impose most of the property taxes, but suppose that the internal finances can be worked out.)

      Evaluate the proposal.

      Identify the purposes it may serve.

      Identify any important distinctions and details that would make a major difference in the proposal.

      Assuming that some state resources were to be made available for returning veterans, identify one or two alternative proposals that, at about the same aggregate cost, might come closer to meeting the criteria by which you judge such a program.

  1. Incentive Effects of Private Insurance

      An important principle in the analysis of social insurance programs is that incentive effects, many of which will be perverse but some may be beneficial, should be watched out for. Briefly discuss the incentive effects you might want to watch out for–and how you would evaluate them–in any policy designed to encourage, to discourage, or to rely on, the following kinds of private insurance that might be available in the market.

      Assume that in each case the insurance pays compensation in cash.

      Give some thought to who does the insuring–e.g., the customer’s own heating-oil company in (c).

      1. Insurance against loss due to burglary.
      2. Insurance against being convicted of burglary.
      3. Insurance against running out of heating fuel.
      4. Insurance against receiving a grade lower than some specified grade in a graduate course.
      5. Insurance against running out of gasoline during a gasoline shortage (for any reason).
      6. Insurance against losing money in the resale of a house in a “declining neighborhood.”
      7. Insurance against auto collision during hazardous driving conditions.
      8. Insurance against the cost of emergency help in the event of dead batteries, flat tires, or being trapped by snow in one’s driveway.
      9. Insurance against all medical costs incurred during a hospital stay.
  1. Overbooked Airline

      An airline oversubscribes a flight and by scheduled flight time has 140 passengers with valid reservations and only 120 seats on the plane, which will depart two hours late because of late arrival, so there are nearly two hours in which to decide what to do. There are no established rules to cover the situation. The airline has no record of the dates on which people made their reservations. The passengers have been informed of the situation but not told what the airline proposes to do. You are to advise the airline right now.

      Pick one among the following procedures, or make up a procedure of your own that is not on this list, and defend it by comparing it with what you think are the most serious or attractive alternative procedures listed.

      1. Issue boarding passes randomly by drawing names out of a hat, making clear to the passengers that the names have been shuffled to guarantee randomness.
      2. Announce that the flight will be delayed until 20 people have either cancelled their reservations or made other arrangements, boarding the 120 still remaining.
      3. Have everyone hand sealed bids for places on the plane. The highest 120 bids are selected and the money collected. The amount collected is distributed among some or all of the 140 passengers in any manner you choose–equal shares to everyone, equally to those who did not bid high enough to get on, or whatever seems appropriate to you.
      4. Announce that spaces will be allotted according to the dates when reservations were made, the earliest 120 reservations to be given seats on this flight, and call out 120 names as though the airline actually had those dates available.
      5. Simultaneously raise the price of going tonight and lower the price for going tomorrow until you find a pair of prices at which:
        1. exactly 120 wish to go tonight, and
        2. the airline breaks even, that is the discount to the 20 who go tomorrow equals, in total, the surcharge on the 120 who go tonight.
      6. Issue 120 boarding passes by random selection—making clear the passengers understand that the names have been shuffled and the selection is random–but announce that the boarding passes are transferable, passengers may transact any business they wish with their boarding passes–e.g., a couple travelling together that obtains only one pass may attempt to buy a second pass or to sell the one they have and go together later.

Additionally, answer the following:

      1. Which among these procedures would be more acceptable if everybody knew in advance what the standard procedure would be in this situation?
      2. Which among these procedures would be less attractive if everybody knew in advance what the procedure would be.
      3. Which procedures are most likely, if they are the acknowledged general rule for these situations, to induce the airline to book the right number of people for each flight? (By the way, what is the right number for each flight that the airline ought to book?)
  1. Environment in the USA and the USSR

      In his chapter on Environmental Disruption, Marshall Goldman compares environmental destruction in the Soviet Union with that in the United States, finding not only that there is such a problem in both countries but that the specific occurrences look much alike. It is often supposed that in the United States businesses will disregard the environmental damage which they do because they are in pursuit of profit; it is often supposed that no such motives would obtain in a socialist economy. It may come as a surprise that in an economic system without the profit motive there is similar disregard for the environment.

      How does Goldman explain the parallelism in the way the environment fares at the hands of these two dissimilar social and economic systems? How persuasive do you find his analysis?

  1. Insurance and “Moral Hazard”

      It is often argued that insurance may be self-defeating because of “moral hazard,” the tendency for people, once insured against some risk, to skimp precautions against the risk. People whose homes are insured against fire take fewer precautions against fire than if they had no insurance; people insured against theft may decorate their homes with more valuable objects than if they were uninsured.

      For the contrary it is also argued that insurance frees people from the necessity to go to expensive lengths to guard against fire or theft, and that what is sometimes derrogated as “moral hazard’ is merely the efficient substitution of insurance for the more expensive alternative, protection. Better to pay $1 per $1,000 of home value per year to cover the cost of a house or two destroyed by fire than to spend $3 per $1,000 of value in protection, especially when the protection is imperfect.

      Evidently these two views of insurance conflict. Presumably they conflict whether the insurance is privately purchased on the market or publicly provided by government. If you were asked which of the two views is the correct one, or are both views in the wrong, what answer would you give?

  1. Common Property

In his article on a “Common-Property Resource: The Fishery,” Scott Gordon (in the book edited by Dorfman and Dorfman) likens the problem of the fishery to that of hunting and trapping, the drilling for petroleum from a common underground pool, and the use of common pasture for private animals in the medieval “common.”

State succinctly the nature of the general problem of common-property resources of the kind he investigates.

Give an example or two of your own.

Indicate some of the ways that these different variants of the same general problem may be solved.

  1. The City

Wilbur Thompson, in the article contained in Hochman’s, The Urban Economy, refers to “The City as a Distorted Price System.

Can you explain what he means by this characterization?

Can you give a few examples?

What does he say (or imply) ought to be done about it?

Do you have an opinion on that?

  1. Child Care

In her article on federal support for child care, in the Haveman and Margolis book, Alice Rivlin cites figures that “acceptable” day care for a pre-school or school-age child would cost around $2,000 per year. The figures were from 1968; with inflation it might be over $3,000 now. Among the arquments in favor of federal support for day care is the desirability of permitting comparatively poor mothers to work out of the house and augment their earnings.

Rivlin discusses the issue of extending federally financed day care to middle-income families (up to $12,000 per year at the time she wrote, equivalent to perhaps $16,000 now). If you do, she says, it’s expensive. If you don’t, you have the equivalent of a high “income tax” on poor women’s earnings.

Explain the dilemma.

Is it the same as the “welfare dilemma” discussed in connection with the negative-income tax?

How would the dilemma be affected if the women were given cash that they could spend on day care or on anything else they might prefer to spend it on?

Source:  Thomas C. Schelling, Economic Principles and Public Policy (Harvard, Spring 1981). Exam Questions from Earlier Years. Photocopy reproduced in Economics Reading Lists, Course Outlines, Exams, Puzzles & Problems compiled by Edward Tower. Vol. 12 (July 1981): Public Finance Exams, Puzzles & Problems, pp. 18-38.

Image Source: File photo from 1983 Harvard News Office. The Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. “In Memoriam: Thomas C. Schelling, 1921–2016”

 

Categories
Macroeconomics Northwestern Syllabus Theory

Northwestern. Syllabus for Income and Employment Theory. Clower, 1958

By chance I found the announcement of Robert Clower’s appointment to chair the Northwestern economics department while pimping out the 1958 syllabus for his course on income and employment theory. Some academics are born to be chair, some achieve that chair status, while others need to have the job of chair thrust upon them.

Once you have digested that amuse-bouche, you will be served the main course, Clower’s syllabus below.

_______________________

N.U. Appoints New Chairman in Economics

Robert W. Clower, associate professor of economics at
Northwestern university, has been appointed chairman of the economics department to replace Prof. Richard B. Heflebower, who will be on leave of absence for a year to engage in research.
Professor Clower, 1923 Orrington av., came to the university last year from the state college of Washington, where he was assistant professor since 1952. From 1954 to 1956 he was a visiting professor at the University of Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan.
The research project of Prof. Heflebower is on certain dynamic aspects of price and output determination in markets where sellers are relatively few.

Source: Chicago Sunday Tribune. 3 August 1958.

_______________________

SYLLABUS
Economic Theory:
Income & Employment

Economics C-11
Summer 1958

Instructor: Mr. Clower

General Information and Requirements

Texts:

Kurihara, Introduction to Keynesian Dynamics.
Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money

Supplementary Reading:

A.E.A. Series Readings on the Theory of Income Distribution
A.E.A. Series Readings in Business Cycle Theory
A.E.A. Series Readings in Monetary Theory
Harris, Seymour E., The New Economics
Hansen, Alvin H., Business Cycles and National Income
Duesenberry, J.S., Income, Saving, and the Theory of Consumer Behavior
Domar, E.D., Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth
Hicks, J.R., A Contribution to the Theory of the Trade Cycle
Kurihara, [K.K.] Post Keynesian Economics
Baumol, W.J., Economic Dynamics
Patinkin, D., Money, Interest and Prices
Clower, R.W., “The Dynamics of Investment,” American Economic Review, March, 1954

“Productivity, Thrift and the Rate of Interest,” Economic Journal, March, 1954

Friedman, [M.] A Theory of the Consumption Function
Klein, L.R., The Keynesian Revolution
Lange, O., Price Flexibility and Employment

Lectures will be presented on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday and Friday of each week. Wednesdays will be reserved for midterm examinations and for consultation about projects.

Students should become familiar with the general content of all the works cited above as “Supplementary Reading,” and they should acquire a thorough grasp of relevant portions of these works that are cited in connection with weekly assignments given below. Do not ask for special details; such matters should be settled by each student for himself.

Students are required to submit as projects for the session three short papers (six to twenty typewritten pages) chosen from the following topics:

        1. Keynes and the Classics
        2. The Consumption Function
        3. Keynesian Unemployment
        4. The Inducement to Invest
        5. Growth Models
        6. The Business Cycle

Exact titles are to be decided by the student in consultation with the instructor. Topics may be oriented toward applications, or theory, or both, and may be narrowed down to almost any desired degree. Papers must be submitted in a form fit for publication (see any reputable journal for ideas on this) even though their content may fall well short of this standard. The first essay is due at the end of the fourth week; the second at the end of the sixth week; and third at the end of the final examination (Saturday, August 16, 10:30 – 12:30 a.m.). Late papers will not be accepted. Between one-third and one-half weight will be given to these papers in determining final grades for the course.

Weekly Assignments

Week I.
Introduction.

Text assignments:

Kurihara, Preface and Chapter I;
Keynes, Preface and Book I.

Supplementary readings:

Hansen, Business Cycles, Chapters 1-5, 25-30.
Baumol, Economic Dynamics.
Harris, The New Economics, Parts one and two.
Klein, Keynesian Revolution

Week II.
Consumer Expenditure.

Text Assignments:

Kurihara, Chapter 2;
Keynes, Chapter 6 and Book III.

Supplementary readings:

Kurihara, Post Keynesian Economics
Friedman, Consumption Function
Hicks, Trade Cycle
Duesenberry, Income, Saving, etc.

***Hour Examination: Wednesday, July 2.***

Week III.
Investment Expenditure.

Text assignments:

Kurihara, Chapter 3;
Keynes, Chapters 11 and 12.

Supplementary reading:

Hicks, Trade Cycle.
Clower, “Dynamics of Investment.”
Klein, Keynesian Revolution.

Week IV.
The Rate of Interest.

Text Assignments:

Kurihara, Chapter 4;
Keynes, Chapters 13, 14, 15.

Supplementary readings:

Hicks, “Suggestion for Simplifying Theory of Money,” AEA Monetary Theory.
Modigliani, “Liquidity Preference,” AEA Monetary Theory
Clower, “Productivity, Thrift, and the Rate of Interest.”

***Hour Examination, Wednesday, July 23.***
Covering work of first four weeks of session.

Week V.
Income Determination.

Text assignments:

Kurihara, Chapters 5-7;
Keynes, Chapter 18.

Supplementary readings:

Lange, “The Rate of Interest and the Optimum Propensity to Consume,” AEA Business Cycle Theory.
Hicks, “Keynes and the Classics,” AEA Income Distribution.
Hicks, Trade Cycle.
Hansen, Business Cycles, Part II.

Week VI.
The Comparative Statics and Dynamics of Income Analysis.

Text assignments:

Kurihara, Chapters 8-9;
Keynes, Chapters 19-22.

Supplementary readings:

Hansen, Chapter 22 (by R. M. Goodwin).
Samuelson, “Interactions between the Multiplier and Accelerator,” AEA Business Cycle Theory

Week VII.
Price Flexibility and Employment.

Text assignments:

Kurihara, Chapter 10.

Supplementary readings:

Lange, Price Flexibility.
Patinkin, Money, Interest and Prices, part I, Chapters 1-3; Part II.

Week VIII.
Growth Economics; Concluding Comments.

Text assignments:

Kurihara, Chapters 11-13;
Keynes, Chapter 24.

Supplementary reading:

Domar, Economic Growth.
Harris, The New Economics, Part III.

***Final Examination***
Saturday, August 16, 10:30-12:30
.

Source: Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library. Economists’ Papers Archive. Robert W. Clower Papers. Box 4, Folder “Econ C11. Economic Theory Income and Employment. Exam, Syllabus 1966-67 (sic, also includes this 1958 syllabus)”.

Image Source: Profile of Robert W. Clower, 1926-2011 at The History of Economic Thought website.

Categories
Exam Questions Harvard Public Finance Suggested Reading Syllabus

Harvard. Public Investment. Description, enrollment, exam. Marglin et al. 1966-1967

The scope of this interdisciplinary course from the mid-1960s is genuinely breathtaking. With his Harvard Ph.D. (1965) still fresh [Thesis: “Decentralized Resources Allocation With a Modicum of Increasing Returns.”], Stephen Marglin was on his famed meteoric rise to tenured professorship when he co-taught the following course on public investmen with political scientists and civil engineers.

For a later observation on his intellectual journey, see the brief profile article in The Harvard Crimson (14 November 2019) on “The Black Sheep of Harvard Economics” from which the image above has been clipped. He’s come a long way.

_______________________

Course Announcement

Economics 112 (formerly Government 257a). Public Investment: Techniques for Relating Economic Objectives, Engineering Analysis, and Government Planning (Offered Jointly with the Graduate School of Public Administration)

Half course (fall term). Th., 2-4, and a two-hour meeting to be arranged.
Assistant Professor S. Marglin and Professors Arthur Maass and H. A. Thomas.

New methods of economic, engineering, and governmental analysis in public investment planning. Techniques include those for converting broad community objectives into specific criteria used to design public projects. Emphasis on systems analysis.

Source:  Harvard University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Courses of Instruction for Harvard and Radcliffe, 1966-1967, p. 110.

_______________________

Course Instructors

Stephen Alan Marglin (1938- ) Assistant Professor of Economics.

Arthur Aaron Maass (1917-2004), Frank G. Thomson Professor of Government.

Harold A. Thomas, Jr. (1913-2002), Gordon McKay Professor of Civil and Sanitary Engineering.

Peter P. Rogers (1937-2018) (Ph.D. in Engineering 1966) Lecturer in Systems Analysis in the Graduate School of Design and a research associate in the Center for Population Studies.

George Herman Quester (1936-2023), Instructor of Government.

Henry D. Jacoby (1935-), Harvard economics Ph.D. 1967. Instructor of Economics.

_______________________

Fall Term
1966-67

Economics 112

PUBLIC INVESTMENT: TECHNIQUES FOR RELATING ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES, ENGINEERING ANALYSIS, AND GOVERNMENT PLANNING.

Assistant Professor S. Marglin, Professors A. Maass and H. A. Thomas, Drs. P. Rogers and G. Quester, and Mr. H. Jacoby.

Course Outline

A.    Formulating Public Investment Criteria Date
1. Introduction SM Sep. 29
2. Production and the Theory of the Firm HJ Oct. 4
Objectives: National Income and Its Distribution SM Oct. 6
3. Consumption and the Theory of the Household HJ Oct. 11
Selection of the Unit of Analysis and the Definition of Benefits and Costs HJ Oct. 13
4. Intertemporal Criteria HJ Oct. 18
Interest Rates and Uncertainty SM Oct. 20
5. Markets, Economic Efficiency and Welfare HJ Oct. 25
The Design Process: Methods of Analysis and Problems of Measurement HJ Oct. 27
B.     Objectives of Public Investment
1. Alternative Concepts of the Public Interest GQ Nov. 1
Multiple Objectives in Public Investment Programs AM Nov. 3
2. Concepts of Decision Making GQ Nov. 8
The Weighting of Objectives in the Political Process AM Nov. 10
C.     Applying Criteria in Project Design
1. The Mathematics of Optimization PR Nov. 15
Mathematical Models: Deterministic Models HAT Nov. 17
2. The Techniques of Systems Analysis PR Nov. 22
(To be announced) Nov. 29
Mathematical Models: Stochastic Models HAT Dec. 1
3. Computation Laboratory PR Dec. 6
Simulation HAT Dec. 8
(To be announced) Dec. 13
D.    Summary and Conclusions All Dec. 15
Problem Sets

Problem set #1 is due on November 1.
Problem set #2 is due on December 1.
Problem set #3 is due on January 12.

Source: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003, Box 9, Folder “Economics, 1966-1967”.

_______________________

Fall Term
1966-67

Economics 112

PUBLIC INVESTMENT:
TECHNIQUES FOR RELATING ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES, ENGINEERING ANALYSIS, AND GOVERNMENT PLANNING.

Reading List

Recommended for purchase:

Maass, Hufschmidt, Dorfman, Thomas, Marglin, Fair, Design of Water-Resource Systems (1962).

All other readings on Reserve at Littauer or Lamont Libraries
Optional readings are starred

Readings for October 4:

P. Samuelson, Economics (4th or 5th edition), Chapters 24 & 26 (including appendices).

R. Dorfman, The Price System, Chapters 1 & 2 (1964).

Readings for October 6:

K. Boulding, “The Economist and the Engineer: Economic Dynamics of Water Resource Development,” in S. Smith and E. Castle (eds.) Economics and Public Policy in Water Resource Development (1964).

W. Heller, “Reflections on Public Expenditure Theory,” in Edmund Phelps, ed., Private Wants and Public Needs(1962).

J. Krutilla and O. Eckstein, Multiple Purpose River Development, Chapter 2 (1958).

J. Krutilla, “Welfare Aspects of Benefit-Cost Analysis,” 69 Journal of Political Economy 226-235 (1961).

S. Marglin, Public Investment Criteria, pp. 1-36 (1965).

Readings for October 11:

R. Dorfman, The Price System, Chapter 3 (1964).

T. Scitovsky, Welfare and Competition, Chapter IV, pp. 51-65 (1951).

Readings for October 13:

S. Marglin, Public Investment Criteria, pp. 37-46, 91-100 (1965).

R. Haveman, Water Resource Investment and the Public Interest, Chapters 3, 4, 5 (1965).

J. Tinbergen, The Design of Development, pp. 36-41, 76-87 (1958).

*Maass, Hufschmidt, et. al., Design of Water-Resource Systems, pp. 40-87 (1962).

Readings for October 18:

P. Samuelson, Economics (4th or 5th edition), Chapter 29 (including appendix).

I. Fisher, The Theory of Interest, Chapters V & VI (1930).

H. Bierman and S. Smidt, The Capital Budgeting Decision, Chapters 2 & 3 (1960).

Readings for October 20:

S. Marglin, Public Investment Criteria, pp. 46-77 (1965).

J. Krutilla and O. Eckstein, Multiple Purpose River Development, Chapter 2, pp. 32-40, and Chapter 4 (1958).

R. McKean, Efficiency in Government Through Systems Analysis, Chapter 4 (1958).

Maass, Hufschmidt, et. al., Design of Water-Resource Systems, pp. 129-158 (1962).

J. Hirshleifer, “Efficient Allocation of Capital in an Uncertain World,” 54 AER 77-85 (1964), and comment by P. Samuelson, 95-96.

*J. Hirshleifer, “Investment Decision Under Uncertainty — Choice-Theoretic Approaches,” 79 QJE 509-536 (1965).

*J. Hirshleifer, “Investment Decisions Under Uncertainty: Applications of the State-Preference Approach,” 80 QJE 252-277 (1966).

Readings for October 25:

P. Samuelson, Economics (4th or 5th edition), pp. 678-689.

R. Dorfman, The Price System, Chapters 4-6 (1964).

J. Graaff, Theoretical Welfare Economics, Chapters 1-3 (1957).

Readings for October 27:

Maass, Hufschmidt, et. al., Design of Water-Resource Systems, Chapter 3, pp. 88-118, and Chapter 5 (1962).

J. Rothenberg, “Urban Renewal Programs” in R. Dorfman, ed., Measuring Benefits of Government Investments(1965). Also skim the other articles in this collection.

Readings for November 1:

C. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy, Chapter 14.

R. Dahl and C. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, pp. 25-56.

A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, pp. 3-74, 279-300.

Madison, The Federalist, No. 10.

D. Truman, The Governmental Process, Chapters 1, 2, 12 & 16.

Readings for November 3:

Maass, “Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevance to Public Investment Decisions,” 80 QJE 208-226 (1966). Readpp. 208-218.

R. Musgrave, “The Public Interest: Efficiency in the Creation and Maintenance of Material Welfare,” Chapter 9 in Nomos 5: The Public Interest, C. Friedrich, ed. (1962).

G. Colm, “The Public Interest: Essential Key to Public Policy,” Chapter 10 in Nomos 5 (1962).

Maass, Hufschmidt, et. al., Design of Water-Resource Systems, Chapter 15 (1962).

C. Lindblom, “Decision-Making in Taxation and Expenditures” and Comments by A. Bergson and G. Colm, in Public Finances: Needs, Sources and Utilization (NBER Conference) pp. 295-336 (1961).

Readings for November 8:

R. Dahl and C. Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare, pp. 57-88, 294-368.

A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, pp. 114-163, 260-276.

E. Banfield, Political Influence, Chapter 12.

Readings for November 10:

A. Maass, “Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevance to Public Investment Decisions,” 80 QJE 208-226. Read pp. 218-226.

D. Major, Decision Making for Public Investment in Water Resources Development, Chapters 2 & 6 (1965).

S. Dola, Passaic Valley Flood Control, mimeo (1965).

Readings for November 15:

R. Dorfman, “Mathematical or ‘Linear’ Programming: A Non-Mathematical Exposition,” 43 AER 797-825 (1953).

G. Hadley, Linear Programming, Chapter 1, pp. 1-21 (1962).

S. Gass, Linear Programming (2nd edition), Chapter 1, pp. 3-19 (1964).

*J. Henderson and R. Quandt, Microeconomic Theory, Appendices A2 & A3 (1958).

*P. Rogers, “A Note on Maximization,” mimeo (1964).

Readings for November 17:

H. A. Thomas and R. Revelle, “On the Efficient Use of High Aswan Dam for Hydropower and Irrigation,” in Management Science, Vol. 12, No. 8 (1966).

R. Dorfman, “Mathematical Analysis: Design of the Simple Valley Project,” in G. S. Tolley and F. E. Riggs (eds.) Economics of Watershed Planning (1960).

D. Kendrick, “Programming Investment with Interdependent Projects,” Center for International Studies, M.I.T., mimeo, pp. 1-16 (Jan. 1966).

Readings for November 22:

Maass, Hufschmidt, et. al., Design of Water-Resource Systems, Chapter 3, re-read pp. 129-158, and Chapter 12 (1962).

J. Kemeny and J. Snell, Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences, Appendix C, pp. 128-131.

*G. Hadley, Nonlinear and Dynamic Programming, Chapter 10, pp. 350-375 (1964).

*J.D.C. Little, “The Use of Water Storage in a Hydroelectric System,” J. Oper. Res. Soc. Am. 187 (1955).

*P. Massé, Optimal Investment Decisions, Chapter 7, pp. 320-335 (1962).

Readings for December 1:

Maass, Hufschmidt, et. al., Design of Water-Resource Systems, Chapter 13, pp. 524-539, and Chapter 14 (1962).

M. B. Fiering, “The Nature of the Storage-Yield Relationship,” Symposium on Streamflow Regulation for Quality Control, U.S.D.H.E.W., pp. 243-253 (June 1965).

Readings for December 6:

R. Fano and F. Corbató, “Time Sharing on Computers,” in Scientific American, Sept. 1966, pp. 128-148. Also flip through other articles in this issue.

Readings for December 18:

Maass, Hufschmidt, et. al., Design of Water-Resource Systems, Chapter 10 (1962).

G. Orcutt, “Simulation: A Symposium,” 50 AER 893-907 (1960).

G. Orcutt et. al., Microanalysis of Socioeconomic Systems, Chapters 1, 2 & 14 (1961).

M. Hufschmidt and M. B Fiering, Simulation Techniques for Design of Water-Resource Systems, Chapter 2 (1966).

Source: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003, Box 9, Folder “Economics, 1966-1967”.

_______________________

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Department of Economics

Final Examination
Economics 112

February 1, 1967

Answer any four of the following six questions.  All questions are of equal weight.  Please place each of your answers in a separate bluebook, and put your name on the cover of each book.

  1. “If lump sum transfers were administratively feasible, governments would be well advised to plan all investments to maximize profits, counting profits in the same way that private enterprise does.”
    Comment in the light of income redistribution and merit-want objectives, market imperfections (such as monopoly) and other considerations you think relevant.
  1. “If the government’s social rate of interest based on time preference differs from the marginal productivity of investment in the private sector, it is wrong to use the social rate of interest to plan public investment. The error arises from the fact that using the social rate of interest precludes the government from taking into account the value of private alternatives to public investment.”
    Comment.
  1. The problem is to compare and evaluate two ways of designing and authorizing public works projects:

(1) There are no useful legislated standards, so that engineers must use their engineering judgment for design. Projects so designed are then considered by policy makers (President and Congress) for inclusion in omnibus authorizing bills.

(2) Policy makers initiate, debate, and adopt standards for design of projects.  Engineers design them, and any projects that conform to the standards are considered to be authorized.

Assume that partisan mutual adjustment is the criterion for comparing and evaluating the two design methods — i.e., that “bargaining is at the heart of the governmental process.”  Compare and evaluate the design methods using the criterion given.

Evaluate the utility of partisan mutual adjustment as the evaluative criterion for this specific problem.

  1. Economists assume that the individual behaves selfishly on issues relevant to his monetary income; yet they ask political scientists to define an explicit public interest function as if such a function were of more than academic significance for participants in the legislative process.Is this inconsistent, or is there some political value to specifying an explicit public interest to be contrasted with the personal preferences of individuals?
  1. “Simulation methods are more useful for the planning of large scale public investment projects than the analytic methods of mathematical programming.”
    Discuss this statement and give your reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with it.
  1. The following simple model of a water resource system involves two reservoirs and two uses.One use is for domestic water supply for which no monetary benefit function is available but a water requirement is specified; the other use is one for which there is a direct market value.

The two reservoirs are shown in the sketch together with outflow vectors.  The outflow from Reservoir A can only be used for meeting the water supply requirement.  The outflow from Reservoir B can be routed to either or both uses.  All flows are assumed to be non-stochastic.  The following cost and benefit functions are assumed:

cost function for reservoir A                C1 = a+x2 dollars,

cost function for reservoir B                C2 = b+½(y+z)2 dollars,

benefit function for other use               B = pz dollars,

where

x = safe yield of reservoir A,

y = portion of safe yield of reservoir B diverted to municipal supply,

z = portion of safe yield of reservoir B diverted to other use,

p = price per unit of flow to other use, and

a,b = the given constants.

The municipal water requirement is

R = x+y .

The problem is to find the sizes of x, y and z which maximize the net economic benefits of the system subject to the water supply constraint.  Write the Lagrangean function for the constrained optimization and indicate how you could find the optimal design of the system and the marginal imputed value of municipal water supply.

Would the design be different if we merely asked for a least cost design?

Source: Harvard University Archives. Papers Printed for Mid-Year Examinations. History, History of Religions, Government, Economics, …. January 1967.

Categories
Harvard History of Economics Syllabus

Harvard. Reading list for History of Economics through Ricardo. Probably Ashley, 1899-1900

The Harvard Archives has five folders of undated syllabi/reading lists from the economics department. Every so often as curator of Economics in the Rear-view Mirror I cannot resist the urge to attempt dating artifacts that have been unceremoniously dumped into folders labelled e.g. “Economics, Undated (5 of 5)”. 

The following prescribed reading list can be dated with extremely high probability to the course taught by William James Ashley from the turn of the 20th century (1899-90) for which exams have already been transcribed. I have used square brackets to designate additional bibliographic information.

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Evidence of
(i) Ashley’s course and (ii) 1899-1900

Note the close correspondence of the authors in the prescribed reading list to the course announcement below for the 1897-98 academic year (it was not offered 1898-99 when Ashley was on leave). The course description for 1899-1900 would have been helpful, but I have not located a copy yet.

Economics in the Rear-view Mirror posted a first term reading list in the Harvard Archives for Ashley’s course Economics 11: The Modern Economic History of Europe that has a stamp: “Harvard College Library, Cambridge, Mass. Jan 15, 1900” along with a handwritten note in pencil on the second term’s reading list “1899-1900”. Those semester reading lists bear distinct similarities to the reading list featured in this post, both begin with “Prescribed Reading” and we see that almost all authors of items in the reading list are only identified by last name.

The translation of Turgot’s Réflexions in Ashley’s own series Economic Classics was published in 1898. Also the use of many other texts from Ashley’s Economic Classics as well as his use relevant chapters of his own Economic History are strong evidence that we are dealing with Ashley’s course.

Ashley resigned from Harvard effect September 1, 1901. He did not offer Economics 15 in his final year.

___________________

Course Enrollment

Primarily for Graduates:—

[Economics] 15. Professor Ashley. — The History and Literature of Economics to the close of the Eighteenth Century. Lectures (2 or 3 hours).

Total 11: 6 Graduates, 2 Seniors, 2 Juniors, 1 Sophomore.

Source: Harvard University. Annual Report of the President of Harvard College, 1899-1900, p. 69.

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Cf. Course Announcement
1897-98

[Economics] 15. The History and Literature of Economics to the Close of the Eighteenth Century. Mon., Wed., (and at the pleasure of the instructor) Fri., at 12. Professor ASHLEY.

The course of economic speculation will here be followed, in its relation alike to the general movement of contemporary thought and to contemporary social conditions. The lectures will consider the economic theories of Plato and Aristotle; the economic ideas underlying Roman law; the mediaeval church and the canonist doctrine; mercantilism in its diverse forms; “political arithmetic;” the origin of the belief in natural rights and its influence on economic thought; the physiocratic doctrine; the work and influence of Adam Smith; the doctrine of population as presented by Malthus; Say and the French school; and the beginnings of academic instruction in economics.

The lectures will be interrupted from time to time for the examination of selected portions of particular authors; and careful study will be given to portions of Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Politics (in translation) to Mun’s England’s Treasure, Locke’s Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest, certain Essays of Hume, Turgot’s Réflexions, and specified chapters of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, and Malthus’ Essay . Students taking the course are expected to procure the texts of the chief authors considered, and to consult the following critical works:

Ingram, History of Political Economy; Cossa, Introduction to the Study of Political Economy; Cannan, History of the Theories of Production and Distribution; Bonar, Philosophy and Political Economy; Böhm-Bawerk, Capital and Interest; Taussig, Wages and Capital.

Source: Harvard University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Division of History and Political Science Comprising the Departments of History and Government and Economics, 1897-98, pp. 33-34. 

_____________________________

ECONOMICS 15.

PRESCRIBED READING.

Ingram, History of Political Economy. [Edinburgh: Adam & Charles Black, 1888.]

Taussig, Wages and Capital, pp. 124-215. [New York: D. Appleton and company, 1896.]

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

Plato, The Republic, 368-376, 414-424, 462-465, 473 [note: these are not page numbers but rather text section numbers printed in margins], in the translation either of Jowett or of Davies and Vaughan [London and New York: Macmillan, 1892]; with Jowett’s Introduction. pp. cli-clxxv, clxxxv-cxcii.  [Jowett’s third edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888]

Aristotle, The Politics, Bk. I and Bk. II, 1-7, in Jowett’s translation; with Jowett’s Introduction, pp. ix-xxxvii. [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1885]

The teaching of mediaeval Schoolmen and Canonists; as set forth in Ashley, Economic History, I, pp. 124-159, II, ch. vi.  [2nd edition. 1892-93.]

Mun, England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade. [See this title in Ashley’s “Economic Classics”. London: Macmillan, 1895.]

Locke, Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest. (in Ward, Lock & Co.’s edition of his Essays, pp. 559-614).

Hume, Essays, “Of Commerce” (23), “Of Money” (25), “Of Interest” (26), “Of the Balance of Trade” (27), “Of Taxes” (30). [David Hume. Essays, Literary, Moral, and Political. London: Ward, Lock & Bowden, Limited, printed sometime after Aug 1891 and 1897. https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/100193633].

Turgot, Réflexions sur la formation et la distribution des richesses (in [L.] Robineau’s Turgot [Administration et oeuvres Économiques] in “Petite Bibliothèque Economique” [Paris: Guillaumin et Cie (1889), pp. 46-148; or English translation in Ashley’s “Economic Classics”. London: Macmillan, 1898.]

Adam Smith, “Select Chapters and Passages from The Wealth of Nations [See this title in Ashley’s “Economic Classics”. New York and London: Macmillan, 1895.]

Malthus, “Parallel Chapters of the 1st and 2d editions of An Essay on the Principle of Population” [See this title in Ashley’s “Economic Classics”. New York and London: Macmillan, 1895.]

Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy, ch. I-VI. [See this title in Ashley’s “Economic Classics”: New York and London: Macmillan, 1895.]

J. S. Mill, Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy, II-V. [2nd ed. London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1874.]

Two theses are required: one, before the Christmas Recess, on Mercantilism (illustrated from Mun, or any other important mercantilist writer); the other, before the Spring Recess, on Physiocracy (with a discussion of Turgot’s relation thereto).

Source: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003. HUC(522.2.1) Box 10. Folder “Economics, Undated (5 of 5)”.

Image Source: “Ashley, William James, 1860–” in University and their Sons. History, Influence and Characteristics of American Universities with Biographical Sketches and Portraits of Alumni and Recipients of Honorary Degrees. Editor-in-chief, General Joshua L. Chamberlain, LL.D. Vol II (1899), p. 595.

Categories
Harvard Suggested Reading Syllabus Undergraduate

Harvard. Program for the Sophomore Tutorial. Sept 1965

For the previous post Economics in the Rear-view Mirror transcribed the reading lists and semester exams for the two semester Principles of Economics course (Economics 1) taught at Harvard in 1965-66. A biographical sketch of the faculty member responsible for coordinating the content and organizational structure of the instruction (some lectures, but mostly work in smaller sections), Richard T. Gill, can be found in that post too.

No less important for the course was the position of Head Tutor which was newly filled by Lars G. Sandberg (Harvard A.B. 1961; Harvard Ph.D. 1964), who was presumably the author of the “A Program for Sophomore Tutorial” (fifteen pages!) that Economics in the Rear-view Mirror has transcribed and included below. The program as outlined was designed for those Harvard undergraduates who were taking Economics 1 in their sophomore year, as opposed to their freshman year. Perhaps a document will turn up with information about the sophomore tutorial groups in economics offered to the students who had taken Economics 1 in their Freshman year.

The sophomore tutorial was a component of the larger tutorial system at Harvard College. The junior [Economics 98a and 98b] and senior [Economics 99] tutorial seminars were instituted to prepare for the departmental general examinations. [See the post on the 1964-65 junior tutorial led by Richard Caves: the post on the 1960-61 junior tutorial of Smithies and Chamberlin.] 

_________________________

Origin of Tutorial Instruction in Economics, 1915-16

The Division of History, Government, and Economics introduced an new examination for A.B. candidates with a concentration chosen in the Division.

This examination was devised “not in order to place an additional burden upon candidates for the A.B., but for the purpose of securing better correlation of the student’s work, encouraging better methods of study, and furnishing a more adequate test of real power and attainment.” In their preparation students have from the beginning of the Sophomore year special tutorial instruction.

Source: Harvard University. Report of the President of Harvard College 1915-1916, pp. 75-76.

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More recent backstories on the Sophomore Tutorial for Economics 1

Economics Undergraduate Program Undergoes Extensive Re-evaluation

14 November 1959

…The results of this increased attention are already apparent in changes made this year in Economics 1 and Junior tutorial, Ec. 98. Historical and topical subjects have gained emphasis at the expense of some of the more theoretical and analytical material, which is now consigned to Sophomore tutorial. In former years economic theory was presented in a historical vaccum without any consideration of the evolution of the economic system from a local medieval subsistence economy to the modern international productive system. The first month of Economics 1 is now devoted to filling this gap. Other changes include an increased emphasis upon the problem of underdeveloped countries and the substitution of a three-week study of the economy of the Soviet Union for the former week’s survey of comparative economic systems.

[…]

The changes are clearly tending to make the course less an introduction into the Department and more a General Education course in the social sciences. The stress, in the attempt to interest the non-concentrator through presentation of historical and topical issues, is now upon political economy rather than upon economics. In a liberal arts college such a solution to the problems affecting the discipline seems to be the most logical and rewarding for an introductory course.

Faced, however, with the task of teaching its concentrators some of the methods and techniques of the economist, the department has moved towards increasing utilization of Sophomore and Junior tutorial for this purpose. The analytic material ejected from Ec. 1 has found refuge in Sophomore tutorial, while Ec. 98 (Junior tutorial) although heavily biased towards the empirical is the only course in the Department offering an overall view of the field.

But there is this year, in addition, an increased amount of attention towards policy questions and topical economic issues in both courses, a reflection of the prevalent belief that meaningful economics on the undergraduate level should relate, as Smithies said, “to the great public issues of the day.” In practice these two elements–the analytical tools and the social framework in which they must fit–still remain divorced in these courses, but at least the attempt is being made to integrate them….

Source: The Harvard Crimson, 14 November 1959.

Ec Dept. Appoints New Head Tutor;
Lars Sandberg to Replace Wilkinson

March 24, 1964

Lars G. Sandberg ’61, teaching fellow in Economics, will become the head tutor in the Economics Department next year.

H. Francois Wilkinson, instructor in Economics and the Department’s present head tutor, will be leaving the University next year to become an assistant professor of Economics at Dartmouth.

Main Contact

“The head tutor’s job is an extremely important one to our undergraduate program,” said John T. Dunlop, Chairman of the Department, in announcing the change yesterday. “Undergraduate Economics’ concentrators take their problems to him, by and large since he is the main contact between them and the Department.”

Dunlop went on to say that revisions in the tutorial program for sophomores in the Department were currently under consideration.

“We have a split among our sophomore concentrators between those who have taken Economics 1 during the freshman year and those who haven’t taken the course, or are taking it as sophomores,” Dunlop explained.

Change Next Fall

“It’s possible that we will develop a more standardized program for those who haven’t had any introduction to economics. A committee will be looking over the problem this summer,” he went on, “and we expect that there will be some changes made in the program by next fall.”

Sandberg, a summer graduate in Economics, received the Young and Williams prizes for the best thesis in Economics, and the best overall undergraduate record in the Department, upon his graduation.

Upon taking over as head tutor next fall, he will be promoted to instructor, and will become head section man of Economics 1.

Source: The Harvard Crimson, 24 March 1965.

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Obituary of Lars Gunnarsson Sandberg
(1939-2020)

Lars Gunnarsson Sandberg, 81, of Dublin, a 48-year resident of Upper Arlington, died at Riverside Methodist Hospital on September 29, 2020, with his family at his side.

He was born June 20, 1939, in Uppsala, Sweden, and emigrated to New York City in 1948. He graduated Summa Cum Laude from Harvard College in 1961, where he was awarded the John H. Williams Prize for the top graduating student in Economics, and earned a Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1964. He taught Economics at Harvard and Dartmouth College before becoming a tenured full professor at The Ohio State University from 1970 – 1995. He continued to teach after retirement as an adjunct professor at OSU and Uppsala University. He was an avid reader and spent much of his time in libraries. He enjoyed the arts as much as sporting events, and rarely missed a Masterpiece Theatre show or an OSU football game. He loved boats, and enjoyed many sailing trips with his family on the east coast of Sweden. He was well known for his intelligence, his sharp wit, his down-to-earth nature, and his complete devotion to his family. He will be sadly missed.

He is preceded in death by his parents, Gunnar and Laila Sandberg. He is survived by his wife of 57 years, Joyce Bigelow; son, Per Larsson (Sharon Knight) of San Francisco; daughters, Kerstin Margareta and Elisabet Katarina of Columbus; grandchildren, Erik and Elin; brothers, Bengt (Beatrice Helbling) Sandberg of Oberuzwil, Switzerland, and Per (Karin) Sandberg of Stockholm, Sweden, and many nieces and nephews.

Due to Covid-19, a memorial service will be announced at a later date. Interment is planned in Lunenburg, MA, and Uppsala, Sweden. In lieu of flowers, donations in his memory may be made to PBS or to Friends of the Upper Arlington Public Library.

Source: Dignity Memorial Website.

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Course Announcement

Economics 1. Principles of Economics

Full course. Indivisible. M., W., F., at 12. The major part of the course is conducted in sections. Throughout the year, however, there will be lectures, generally on W., at 12. M., W., and F., at 12 will be the normal hour for section meetings, but sections will be scheduled at other hours. Professor Dunlop, Drs. R. T. Gill, Sanberg and other Members of the Department.

The Department encourages students considering concentration to take this course in their freshman year.

Designed to introduce students to the methods of economic analysis that bear on the issues which confront this country and the world. Will thus serve the needs both of those students who plan no further work in Economics and those who desire to obtain the groundwork for more advanced courses in the field.

Source: Harvard University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Courses of Instruction for Harvard and Radcliffe, 1965-1966, p. 102.

_________________________

Harvard University
Department of Economics
Tutorial Office
September 25, 1965

A Program for Sophomore Tutorial

The attached list of readings is the suggested list for sophomore tutorial groups comprised of students taking Economics 1 during the coming year. The list was prepared at the request of the Department’s Committee on Undergraduate Instruction for the purpose of providing a tutorial program to deepen and enrich the impact of Economics 1.

The suggested program has five sections, corresponding to major sections of Economics 1. Sections one and two are generally designed for the first term and sections three, four and five for the second term. Readings for each of the sections were chosen so as to provide somewhat more material than would be required for three two-hour tutorial meetings. The excess material within each section should provide flexibility in adapting to the needs of individual tutorial groups.

Papers and problem sets of the tutor’s own devising are optional with the suggested program. In planning for these, it should be recalled that tutees are required to prepare a Sophomore Essay during the Spring Term.

Brief comments on a suggested approach to each section have been provided.

SECTION I
Economic History
  1. Henri Pirenne, The Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe.
  2. The Economic Effects of the Navigation Acts on the American Colonies and Their Relationship to the American Revolution
    1. Bernard Bailyn, “Communications and Trade: The Atlantic in the Seventeenth Century,” in H. Scheiber ed., US Economic History: A Reader, pp. 30-40, or JEH, XIII, Fall 1953, pp. 378-87.
    2. Oliver Dickerson, The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution, chap. 1-9, 11.
    3. Lawrence Harper, “The Effects of the Navigation Acts on the Thirteen Colonies,” in Scheiber, op. cit., pp. 41-70, or R. Morris ed., The Era of the American Revolution, pp. 3-39.
    4. Curtis P. Nettels, “British Mercantilism and the Economic Development of the Thirteen Colonies,” JEH, XII, Spring 1952, pp. 105-114.
  3. The Effects of Slavery on the Economic Development of the South
    1. Alfred Conrad and John Meyer, The Economics of Slavery, pp. 43-99, 223-233. Pages 43-99 also appear in the JPE as pp. 95-130, April 1958, and pp. 440-443, October 1958.
    2. Eugene Genovese, “The Significance of the Slave Plantation for Southern Economic Development,” in Scheiber, op. cit., pp.149-161 or Journal of Southern History, Nov. 1962, pp. 422-37.
    3. E. Moes, “Absorption of Capital in Slave Labor in the Ante-Bellum South and Economic Growth,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, October 1961, pp. 535-542.
    4. Robert R. Russel, “The General Effects of Slavery Upon Southern Economic Progress,” JSH, February 1938, p. 34-54.
  4. The Role of the Government in the Development of the US Economy — Especially Transportation Part I — The Ante-Bellum Period
    1. Thomas C. Cochran, “Land Grants and Railroad Enterprise,” JEH, Supplement X, 1950, pp. 53-67.
    2. Carter Goodrich, Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads, chap. 1-4.
    3. K. Henrich, O. Handlin, L. Hartz and M. S. Heath, “”The Development of American Laissez Faire,” Journal of Economic History, Supplement, 1945, pp. 51-100.
    4. Milton S. Heath, “Public Railroad Construction and the Development of Private Enterprise in the South Before 1861,” JEH, Supplement X, 1950, pp. 40-53.
    5. Edward Mason, Economic Planning in Underdeveloped Areas, chap. 2, “Government and Business in 19th Century Development.”
  5. Part II The Post-Bellum Period
    1. Robert Fogel, The Union Pacific: A Case of Premature Enterprise.
    2. Goodrich, op. cit., chap. 5-8.
  6. The Effects of Improved Transportation on US Economic Development
    1. Robert Fogel, Railroads and American Economic Growth, chap. I and VI.
    2. George Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, chap. I-XI, XV, XVI.

Section I places emphasis on problems in American economic history. Pirenne is included because it is so well liked by experienced tutors and because it has been removed from the Economics I reading list within the last few years. It should, if it is at all possible, be used during the first few weeks of the term.

The readings in part B include varying estimates of the costs and benefits to the American Colonies resulting from the Navigation Acts and related British legislation. This problem is important both as history and as an example of commercial policy.

The question of Southern slavery also generates a considerable amount of dispute. Among the suggested readings, Genovese and Moes argue that slavery seriously retarded the economic development of the South, while Conrad, Meyer and Russel remain skeptical. The Conrad and Meyer study is also of considerable interest as a prototype of the “new,” quantitative economic history.

Parts D and E might well be handled in one meeting, half the tutorial group being assigned to the ante-bellum period and the other half to the post-bellum period. There should then be plenty of opportunity to “compare and contrast” policy in the two periods. The most interesting readings from an analytical point of view are the articles on “The Development of American Laissez Faire” and Fogel’s short book on the Union Pacific. The rest of the readings tend to be more descriptive in nature.

Part F uses the introduction and conclusion of Fogel’s rather complex book downgrading the importance of railroads and a standard exposition of US economic history to generate some debate on the role of transport, and therefore government support of transport development, in US economic development. Some attempt might also be made to consider this question in the context of currently underdeveloped countries.

SECTION II
Competition and Modern Industrial Organization
  1. The Concept and Function of the Entrepreneur
    1. Joseph Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development, pp. 74-94.
    2. Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., My Years with General Motors, Introduction and pp. 3-168.
    3. Carl Kaysen, “A Hero of Our Time,” New Republic, February 29, 1964, pp. 21-23; mimeo. available in University Hall 9.
    4. Symposium on Corporate Capitalism, QJE, February 1965, pp. 1-51 and August 1965, pp. 492-499.
  2. Advertising

A supplement containing suggested readings on this topic will be mailed out during October.

  1. Business in Difficulties
    1. Richard Austin Smith, Corporations in Crisis, pp. 13-26, 63-96. (“Introduction” and “General Dynamics: A Crisis of Control” — the Convair 880 case).
    2. John Brooks, The Fate of the Edsel and Other Business Adventures, pp. 17-75. (“The Rise of the Edsel” and “The Fall of the Edsel”).
    3. Ibid., pp. 137-164. (“The Impacted Philosophers” — The GE-electric industry price fixing case.)
    4. Richard Harris, The Real Voice. (Senator Kefauver, The Drug Industry and Legislation).

The purpose of Section II is to illustrate the complex and uncertain environment in which business enterprise must operate. This basic approach has been selected as a counterweight to the relatively abstract treatment of the theory of the firm provided in Economics 1.

The readings in Group A concentrate on the problem of the entrepreneur. The first Schumpeter reading presents his classic theory of the entrepreneurial function. Sloan’s book describes a famous entrepreneurial task: the development of the management system of General Motors. The QJE symposium deals mainly with the relation between corporate control and organization, on the one hand, and corporate behavior on the other.

The Smith reading and the first Brooks’ reading in Group C deal with serious mistakes in business judgement, the former, after a general introduction, with the case of General Dynamics and the Convair 880, and the latter with the failure of the Edsel. The Smith reading is the more analytical. Harris’ book and the second selection in Brooks deal with problems of business ethics. Harris describes the events leading up to the Drug Amendments Act of 1962, and Brooks deals with General Electric’s position in the electric industry conspiracy case.

SECTION III
Policy Problems
  1. The Role of Government
    1. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom
    2. J. K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society

The issues which Friedman and Galbraith discuss may be treated individually and in greater detail.

  1. Equality —The Progressive Personal Income Tax
    1. Milton Friedman, “The Distribution of Income,” Capitalism and Freedom, pp. 161-76.
    2. Walter Blum and H. Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, pp. 104.
    3. Richard Goode, The Individual Income Tax, chap. IV, X, XI, XII, pp. 58-75, 260-318.
  2. Education
    1. Milton Friedman, “The Role of Government in Education,” Capitalism and Freedom, chap. VI, pp. 85-107.
    2. John Vaizey, “Education as Consumption or Investment — a Public or Private Good?” The Economics of Education, pp. 26-36.
    3. Theodore Schultz, The Economic Value of Education, 70 pp.
    4. R. S. Eckaus, “Education and Economic Growth,” in Economics of Higher Education, ed. by Selma Mushkin, pp. 102-128.
    5. Henry Bruton, “The Training of Labor,” Principles of Development Economics, pp. 205-40.
  3. The Costs of Racial Discrimination
    1. Mary Jean Bowman, “Human Inequalities and Southern Development,” Education and the Southern Economy, Supplement to SEJ, July 1965, pp. 73-102.
    2. Gary Becker, The Economics of Discrimination (avoid appendixes)
    3. Barbara Bergman, “The Effect of Discrimination Against Negroes in Employment on the Size and Distribution of Personal Income,” (mimeo. available at University Hall 9)
    4. CEA, “The Economic Cost of Discrimination,” (mimeo. available at University Hall 9)
    5. Alan Batchelder, “Decline in the Relative Income of Negro Men,” QJE, November 1964, pp. 525-548.
    6. Alan Batchelder, “Poverty: The Special Case of the Negro,” AER, May 1965, pp. 530-539.

Section III presents readings on policy issues concerning the degree to which the government should amend certain economic decisions reached in the market place.

The readings in Part A by Friedman and Galbraith are book length statements of two largely opposing viewpoints on this question. Each book covers a large number of issues. Tutors who use Part A should probably assign both books at once, but may wish to devote two meetings to discussing them.

If tutors prefer to focus on particular issues, they may use Parts Band C instead of (or in addition to) Part A. In Part B, the selection by Friedman attacks the progressive income tax; the book by Blum and Kalven dissects the various ‘economic’ arguments for progressivity that have been advanced and concludes that the case for progressivity rests on ethical or aesthetic grounds; the chapters from Goode discuss actual economic effects of the progressive income tax. In part C Friedman and Vaizey debate the economic case for compulsory education. The book by Schultze is a terse description of education as an economic good with many facets. Eckaus and Bruton describe how education and economic growth are related.

The readings on the economics of discrimination include a theoretical exposition of the problem, several articles describing the economic position of the U.S. Negro and finally two different, and differing, estimates of the social economic cost of discrimination.

SECTION IV
Economic Growth and Organization
in Other Countries

Part I: Economic Planning

  1. Planning: Theory versus Harsh Reality
    1. Oskar Lange, “On the Economic Theory of Socialism” in Oskar Lange and Fred M. Taylor, On the Economic Theory of Socialism, pp. 55-129.
    2. Ely Devons, Planning in Practice
  2. Planning: Country Studies
    1. “Use of Models in Programming” and “Aims and Means of Programming” in Gerald Meier, Leading Issues in Development Economics, pp. 465-83.
    2. Everett Hagen, “The Aims and Tools of Economic Development Planning,” in Everett Hagen (ed.), Planning Economic Development, pp. 7-19.
    3. Louis J. Walinsky, “Burma,” and Claire Wilcox, “Pakistan,” in E. Hagen (ed.), Planning Economic Development, 26-51, 52-79.
    4. [4a.] Paul Lemerle, “Planning for Economic Development in France,” in U.N. Planning for Economic Development, II, Studies of National Planning Experience, Part I, Private Enterprise and Mixed Economics, pp. 47-61.
    5. [4b.] C.P. Kindleberger, “The Post-war Resurgence of the French Economy,” in Stanley Hoffman (et. al.), In Search of France, pp. 153-58.
    6. [5.] Pieter de Wolff, “Planning for Economic Development in the Netherlands,” in U.N. Planning for Economic Development (etc.), pp. 133-42.
    7. [6.] Gunnar Myrdal, Challenge to Affluence, Part I, esp. chap. 6 and 7.
  3. Planning: How Pervasive?
    1. Wolfgang Stolper, “Problems of Development Planning” and Gerald Meier, “The State of Development Planning — Note,” in Gerald Meier (ed.) Leading Issues in Development Economics, pp. 491-6, 561-4.
    2. Everett Hagen, “The Nature of a Good Plan and the Machinery for Good Planning” and “Some Difficulties and Some Remedies,” Planning Economic Development, pp. 325-64.
    3. A. Waterston, “Review of Hagen’s Planning Economic Development,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, July, 1965.
    4. Peter Bauer and Basil Yamey, “General Appraisal of the Role of Government” and “Functions of Government,” in The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries, pp. 149-89.
    5. Edward Mason, “Government Initiated Development,” in Economic Planning in Underdeveloped Areas, pp. 40-59.
    6. Joel Dirlan and Andrew Watson, “The Impact of Underdevelopment on Economic Planning,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, May, 1965, pp. 167-94.

Section IV discusses economic planning in theory and in fact.

The reading by Lange in Part A is the classic statement on behalf of market socialism as a system of planning. Devons, on the other hand, describes the actual planning problems encountered in the British aircraft industry during World War II.

The readings in Part B consist of two brief statements of alternative approaches to planning and of six descriptions of how planning is (or might be) done in five countries. The planning practices differ sharply as do the circumstances of the countries described. Tutors may use these differences to illustrate how particular conditions condition the planning methods that are used. Care should be taken to try to define ‘planning.’

Part C contains readings of a more general nature on the question of how much governments in underdeveloped countries should control economic activity in order to promote economic welfare. The viewpoints range from a belief that government activity should be severely limited in principle (Bauer and Yamey), through practical concern about how planning works in practice (Meier, and Dirlam and Watson), to a belief that government planning is both inevitable and desirable (Mason) and feasible (Hagen).

SECTION V
Economic Growth and Organization
in Other Countries

Part II: The Economics of Underdevelopment

  1. Trade and Development
    1. Charles P. Kindleberger, Foreign Trade and the National Econom
  2. Trade and Development
    1. Gottfried Haberler, International Trade and Economic Development.
    2. Ragnar Nurkse, Patterns of Trade and Development.
    3. Werner Baer, “The Economics of Prebisch and ECLA,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Jan. 1962, pp. 169-183.
    4. H. W. Singer, “The Distribution of Gains Between Investing and Borrowing Countries,” American Economic Review, May 1950, pp. 473-494.
  3. Trade and Development
    1. Albert H. Imlah, Economic Elements in the Pax Britannica, chap. 5,6.
    2. William Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan, chap. 1,2,6,7.
  4. Social and Political Aspects of Development
    1. David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society, chap. 1-3, 6,7,10.
    2. Exchange between Sayre [P.] Schatz and [David C.] McClelland, QJE, May 1965, pp. 234-247.
  5. Social and Political Aspects of Development
    1. Edward S. Mason, Economic Planning in Underdeveloped Areas.
    2. Max F. Millikan and Donald L. M. Blackmer, The Emerging Nations.

Of the many possible subjects that could have been chosen for study under this general heading, two have emerged as perhaps most interesting. One is the relationship between international trade and development and the other is the importance of social and political factors in development. Material is provided for three meetings on trade and two on social and political aspects.

Group A consists exclusively of Kindleberger’s book on the relationship between trade and the domestic economy. While it does devote considerable space to the question of economic development, the book is more general than that. It can best be considered as a way of tying the theory of international trade with the nature, problems and progress of the domestic economy.

Group B deals with the theoretical debate concerning the effect of international trade on the underdeveloped countries. Haberler presents a concise and well reasoned defense of free trade and traditional trade theory. Nurkse, on the other hand, points out that this traditional theory is based on 19th century experience that may no longer be valid. The Baer article is a brief, and on the whole sympathetic, presentation of Prebisch’s argument concerning the worsening terms of trade faced by the underdeveloped countries. Singer’s article argues that foreign investment in the production of raw materials in underdeveloped countries is of little or no benefit to the recipient country.

The readings for Group C consist of two case studies. The first is a brief account of British experience with protection and free trade in the 19th century when she was the world’s leading industrial power. The second is a longer and more detailed study of the role of foreign trade in Japanese development up to 1938. These two case studies can be compared with each other and be interpreted in relation to the more theoretical material of Groups A and B.

McClelland’s book, in Group D, presents a sociological view of economic development. It emphasizes the importance of the psychological need for achievement in generating entrepreneurship, a key factor in economic development.

The works assigned in Group E are more general and cover a wider area than McClelland’s book. The Emerging Nations takes a social and political view of development and ends with an analysis of what American policy should be. Mason’s short book, on the other hand, concentrates on the problems of the underdeveloped countries, particularly the need for economic planning and control.

Source: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003, Box 9; Folder: “Economics, 1965-66 (1 of 2)”.

Categories
Exam Questions Harvard Principles Suggested Reading Syllabus

Harvard. Reading Lists and Semester Exams for Principles of Economics. Dunlop, Gill and Sanberg. 1965-1966

Richard T. Gill directed the Harvard economics department’s Juggernaut course Economics 1 (Principles of Economics) for eight years (1958/59-1966/67). He was followed in turn by Otto Eckstein, a.k.a. “Otto Ec-10” (1967/68-1983/84), Martin Feldstein (1984/85-2004/05), and Gregory Mankiw (2005/06-2018/19).

I suspect that the reason for Richard T. Gill’s giving the first six lectures in the Economics 1 (which was taught for the most part in smaller sections) was that an overview of economic history and the history of economics was better provided as a series of briefings than as socratic dialogues. Also few graduate students and junior faculty would have had even minimal exposure and/or interest in those subjects. 

In this post we provide some background to Economics 1 à la Gill and a sketch of the stations of his eclectic career which are followed by the semester readings and exams for the Principles of Economics as taught in the Harvard economics department in 1965-66.

Bonus material: Joseph Shore & Richard T. Gill, Rigoletto — Quel vecchio maledivami & Pari Siamo (1979 recording). Joseph Shore wrote “Richard T Gill was the greatest Sparafucile I ever sang with and this is the best duet I sang in all my Rigoletto shows.” 

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Ec 1: A Monster Becomes an Institution Everything About Ec 1 Pleases Gill Now Except Gen Ed Status

By Richard R. Edmonds
April 12, 1967

Economics 1 has never been unknockable. Students always moan a little about the ultra-general final exam questions and the obscurities of Dorfman’s price theory text. And all but the most even-tempered freshmen at times grow resentful of the inevitable calculus wonk who loudly corrects mistakes in his section man’s graphs. These are minor irritants though. The vast majority of students (95 per cent according to a 1962 Economics Department survey) end up satisfied with Ec 1 and the course hardly seemed a target for radical discontent.

So the prospect of a critique of Economics 1 by the Harvard-Radcliffe Young People’s Socialist League was a bit startling both to those who run the course and those who take it. The eight-page document, released last month, was an anti-climax. Though well-researched and well-written, it blunted the edge of its militancy with too much scholarly prose, and too little focus on how the course should change.

The critique drew mixed reviews. Arthur Smithies, Nathaniel Ropes Professor of Political Economy, thought it raised economic issues that deserved to be considered seriously. Several Ec 1 sectionmen and former sectionmen said they agreed completely with its criticisms of the course. But Richard T. Gill ’48, lecturer in Economics and administrative head of Ec 1 since 1959, didn’t like the critique at all, and his opinion was crucial.

Unruffled

Gill wasn’t ruffled by the sight of a pair of students telling him in print how the course should be run. And though he found the eight pages full of faulty economics, he wasn’t worried about the effect of these errors. What bothered him was what he considered the narrowness of the critique’s “new left” view of economics. The public “dialogue” its authors insistently demanded was just what Gill wanted to avoid. This is Gill’s final year as head of the course and he understandably does not want to leave it in a blaze of artificial controversy over issues he considers trivial.

A month after the critique was issued, it appears to have failed as an instrument of radical reform. At a March 6 Ec 1 staff meeting Gill asked if there was any sentiment for revising the course substantially; only a couple of hands went up. Several of the section men who liked the critique best didn’t even bother to attend. Whether the critique succeeded in exposing serious deficiencies in Economics 1 is still an open question.

Curiously the critique is more a reactionary than a radical document. Though the critique’s author Stephen Kelman ’70 and his confederates would deplore the suggestion that they wanted a return to the good old days, it is ironic that instituting all the practical changes their criticisms implied would make the course much as it was in the late 50’s.

Before Gill took over the course in the spring of 1959, he and three others in the Department submitted a massive plan for revising Ec 1 (their outline for the revised course was more than 20 pages long). Gill acted, he says, because “Economics 1 had settled into a rut; the focus was too much on the system in the United States here and now parts of the course got bogged down in diagramatics so that students were learning tools and not much else.”

During the late ’50’s both the number of students taking Ec 1 and the number concentrating in Economics were declining. Since Gill took over course enrollment has soared from 550 to this year’s all-time high of 829.

Gill made three big changes in Ec 1’s content. He added the section on British industrialism and the classical economists that now fills the first month of the course, as well as the chunk on the Soviet economy (being taught this week and next) and the exhaustive treatment of underdeveloped countries that occupies the rest of the spring.

To make room for the new material, three weeks on distribution (which the critique says is now inadequately treated by a few sentences in Dorfman) were trimmed and the material reinserted in other parts of the course. The other major casualty was a three week section on “alternatives to capitalism” that used to come during reading period, right after the course had developed micro-economic theory and applied it to American capitalism. (It was the critique’s final and most specific charge that socialism receives only “confusing attention” now in Ec 1.)

The history of economic theory is Gill’s special interest, but he says that “personal predilections” only partly explain how Ricardo and Arkwright found their way into an introductory economics course. The first month of Ec 1 is designed, says Gill, “to convey the relativity of present economic conditions to institutions and ideas of the past, to relate economics to the rest of the social sciences.”

The value may be here, but it escapes many students. A survey the Economics Department took in 1962 asked those who took the course whether there should be more or less on each of the 14 topics covered. The pollees voted for more of everything but economic history and Gill accordingly chopped out a third of the material. Some feel he should have gone farther.

“The course has to be introduced with a problem,” says one section man, “but the story of how England got to be the kind of economy it is, is not as germaine as it might be for the majority of students.” Another, who is in his third year teaching the course, says, “At first I couldn’t see any point to it, but now I’m starting to agree with Gill that it’s a good way to get people started.”

Behind the criticisms of Ec 1’s historical material and behind last month’s critique as well is the conviction that the course would be better if it were more political. “This is the only course most people take in economics,” says a section man, “so there ought to be more time on present problems and less on economic tools.” Kelman’s call for more “controversy” in Economics I was based on a similar idea — the course should be constantly examining both sides of economic questions instead of trying to develop an objective economic theory first.

The critique’s vision of an issues-oriented introductory course is not a new idea. In the late ’50’s and early ’60’s Harvard had a Gen Ed course called “Economics of the Citizen” which tried this approach. It never became as popular as the more rigorous Ec 1. Eventually it gained the reputation of being a gut of little substance that the self-respecting avoided. Gill argues that talking explicitly about controversy isn’t always the best way to equip students to talk about political problems — “you can’t just describe economics — you’ve got to get down to working those damn curves to understand the problems.”

Gill’s 1959 plan changed the structure of Ec 1 as well as the material it covers. In the old days Ec 1 lectures were strictly a star show-each of the Department’s great men mounted the podium once and talked for an hour to the crowds below. Though continuity may still be lacking, the lectures under Gill’s regime have a function. They come in blocks instead of being scattered sporadically throughout the term and the blocks give the course more structure than it once had by forcing section men to keep pace with upcoming lectures.

Lectures are scheduled on the kind of material that probably wouldn’t otherwise get covered — background to policy and development questions where vast amounts of knowledge have to be condensed and jammed into a single meeting. The section men are left with huge chunks of the course material — notably microeconomic theory for which they have to develop a teaching approach of their own. This ingenious division of labor, Gill’s biggest improvement, has made the monster course smooth and flexible.

Gill has been the influential figure in giving Ec 1 its present shape, but he doesn’t run the course by himself. Actually Economics 1 is governed like a Harvard in miniature — responsibility is scattered and different kinds of decisions are made at different levels. In the course catalogue, the Department chairman’s name always is listed first — even before Gill’s. Most years the chairman gets no closer to the mechanics of the course than providing section men and giving a couple lectures, but the listing indicates that… [article truncated here]

Source: The Harvard Crimson, 12 April 1967.

_________________________

Touching Basses: The Extraordinary Lives of Richard T. Gill
CLASS OF 1948

By Andrew K. Mandel, CRIMSON STAFF WRITER
June 1, 1998

What happens when you put a prizewinning pugilist, an economist, a world-renowned opera singer, a Harvard House master and a television personality in the same room?

Richard T. Gill ’48 stands alone.

A former Economics 1 professor who led Leverett for 16 years as senior tutor and then master, Gill has written books with Professors Nathan Glazer and Stephan Thernstrom, has sung with all Three Tenors and Beverly Sills, earned The Atlantic Monthly’s short story prize and won a few boxing matches along the way. This all began not long after he entered Harvard College–at age 16.

Gill’s sister says her brother has always been “phenomenal.”

And his wife cannot help but chuckle when she looks back on her “very fascinating, if at times hair-raising” life alongside her husband of 48 years.

Longtime Harvard administrator Fred L. Glimp ’50 says Gill is “as close to a Renaissance man as I’ve ever met,” calling his former colleague “the kind of a guy that–if he weren’t so nice and so kind and impressive in a human way–everybody would hate him because he’s so dog-gone good at almost anything he puts his hand to.”

With Honors

The Long Branch, N.J. native was a product of the Depression, the youngest of three children.

His father Thomas G. Gill worked for a billboard advertising firm hit hard by the economic crisis of the 1930s; Richard lived what he called a “tight, but very happy childhood,” drawn to vocal performance by his mother Myrtle, a music teacher.

Gill met his future wife Elizabeth at a community concert when they were both 15. Their relationship was “stormy off and on,” Elizabeth Gill says, “but ultimately it was on.”

Placing second out of more than 100,000 students in a national American Legion Oratorical Contest in high school, Richard Gill came to Harvard in 1944 and led the Debate Council as its president, winning the College’s Coolidge debate prize and delivering the Class Oration senior year.

A congenial man to interview, Gill was apparently quite the fighter–both behind the podium and in the ring–as an undergraduate.

After Gill accidentally broke someone’s nose in boxing class, the coach of the varsity boxing team approached Gill and encouraged him to fight for Harvard.

Gill also managed to find a niche as a soloist in the Glee Club, the editor of the Student Progressive, the head of the Liberal Union and a member of Phi Beta Kappa junior year.

“I was busy,” Gill acknowledges.

Called away from Cambridge after sophomore year, Gill spent time in the army stationed in Japan, and won the regimental boxing championship, in the middleweight division.

Once back in the Square, Gill graduated summa cum laude in economics, garnering the Palfrey Exhibition (awarded to the most distinguished graduating scholarship student) and a Henry Fellowship to study philosophy and psychology at Jesus College in England.

And though he later earned a Fulbright Fellowship for further study, Gill returned to the States after only a year abroad when his father became ill.

Mastering Harvard

At age 21, Gill became an assistant dean of the College, and claims to be the youngest “baby dean” in Harvard College history.

Awarded his Ph.D. in economics in 1956, Gill directed the largest course at the College, known now as Social Analysis 10: “Principles of Economics.”

And by 1963, after an eight-year stint as senior tutor, Gill and his wife Elizabeth were moving into the master’s residence at Leverett House.

Being administrators during the days of student protests was challenging, the Gills admit.

When strangers threw rocks through the windows of the Gill home and nearly injured their children, Elizabeth Gill was not sure if the protests were directed at her advocacy of increased diversity in Cambridge’s public school teaching staff–or at her husband’s “neanderthal” ideologies.

“It turns out they were my enemies,” she sighs.

Her husband’s commitment to freedom of speech was unpopular in the late ’60s, Gill says.

“I was very much a law-and-order type,” Richard Gill notes.

Gill says one of his Leverett students had interned for President Lyndon B. Johnson, and there was a good chance LBJ would agree to speak at the House senior dinner. (“Not even [famed Eliot House Master] John [H.] Finley [’25] could’ve topped that,” Gill laughs.)

Ultimately, Johnson declined the offer–and Gill, who faced “the sharpest of criticisms” from some Faculty members for extending an invitation to the commander-in-chief during the Vietnam War, concedes that the president’s arrival “would have caused a riot.”

The Making of a Star

At the same time protesting at Harvard had begun to take center stage, Gill found his way to the spotlight.

A heavy smoker for many years, Gill decided to quit in favor of private voice lessons, where he practiced furiously.

In May of 1967, Gill appeared as the Count in the Leverett House Opera’s The Marriage of Figaro. The production–“the most charming I have ever been a part of,” Gill beams–was organized by the student-directoral team of John Lithgow ’67 and John C. Adams ’69.

The Crimson review of Figaro was quite positive.

“Master Richard Gill, who plays the Count, would be well worth hearing by himself. His voice is as majestic as his hearing; he is at once dramatic and agile,” the student reviewer wrote. “If his tone quality were only a little more variable, if he could sound sweet and smooth when necessary, he would be unassailable.”

Spending a year on sabbatical in England, Gill sang regularly–away from the “fear of failure in front of my Harvard colleagues”–and was encouraged to perform professionally.

By 1971, he could not resist auditioning for the New York City Opera–just to see how good he was.

He was deemed extremely good–and eventually accepted a trial position as a basso with the Manhattan opera company in 1971.

The contract paid $75 a night, and Gill was guaranteed a grand total of two performances.

It was “risky” to say the least, but Gill says he and his wife agreed that they “had to just go for it.”

Armed with a sizable advance on a large economics textbook Gill was commissioned to complete, the couple announced their departure to nonplussed Dean of the Faculty John T. Dunlop in the spring.

Their three sons were supportive of the career change, and their youngest transferred high schools when the Gills moved to Allendale, N.J.

“We were sort of oblivious to the real risks he took,” says son Peter S. Gill ’78, who was unfazed upon noticing that his sixth-grade anthology of short stories contained works by James Thurber, Ogden Nash and Richard Gill. “We always thought this was typical for him.”

“If I failed, there was no way to return to Harvard,” says Richard Gill, noting he would have opted to teach in “somewhere like Honolulu or Wyoming” if he bombed in New York. “Harvard is no place to come after you stub your toe violently.”

Gill’s toe did just fine.

Earning the rare distinction of moving from the New York City Opera to the Metropolitan Opera by virtue of the Met’s invitation, Gill performed as a principal artist from day one.

The former Harvard House master became a world-class opera singer overnight, travelling from Pittsburgh to Amsterdam to Carcacas in a 14-year career spanning dozens of operas. His performance stirred Variety magazine to use the words “Richard T. Gill” and “tour de theatre” in the same sentence.

In the mid ’80s, Gill added another section to his resume. Combining the scholarship of his Harvard days with the glamour of the opera, Gill found a home in the television studio, helping to create ECONOMICS U$A, a 28-program public broadcasting television series for which he served as an on-air analyst.

The Encore Academic

By 1992, Gill had written several economic textbooks, as well as a sociological work entitled Our Changing Population with Professor of Education and Social Structure Emeritus Nathan Glazer and Winthrop Professor of History Stephan Thernstrom. His latest work, Posterity Lost: Progress, Ideology and the Decline of the American Family, was published last year.

Gill will discuss his book in one of the symposia planned for the class of 1948 on Wednesday.

But first, Gill will perform with the Boston Pops as their featured vocalist tomorrow evening.

“He’s Mr. Eclectic,” son Peter says.

When asked to explain his wild versatility, Richard Gill jokes that one must have “a certain limited intelligence to try so many things.”

Originally considering life as a lawyer, after serving a year in the Army as a teenager, “I had a reconsideration of my lifelong goals,” Gill says. “I can only applaud this decision in retrospect.”

Source: The Harvard Crimson, 1 June 1998.

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Course Announcement

Economics 1. Principles of Economics

Full course. Indivisible. M., W., F., at 12. The major part of the course is conducted in sections. Throughout the year, however, there will be lectures, generally on W., at 12. M., W., and F., at 12 will be the normal hour for section meetings, but sections will be scheduled at other hours. Professor Dunlop, Drs. R. T. Gill, Sanberg and other Members of the Department.

The Department encourages students considering concentration to take this course in their freshman year.

Designed to introduce students to the methods of economic analysis that bear on the issues which confront this country and the world. Will thus serve the needs both of those students who plan no further work in Economics and those who desire to obtain the groundwork for more advanced courses in the field.

Source: Harvard University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Courses of Instruction for Harvard and Radcliffe, 1965-1966, p. 102.

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ECONOMICS I
1965-66
Readings for the Fall Term

*To be purchased by students

Adams, W. (ed.), The Structure of the American Economy (Third Edition)

*Caves, R., American Industry: Structure, Conduct, Performance

Committee for Economic Development, An Adaptive Program for Agriculture

Council of Economic Advisers, Report to the President on Steel Prices

*Dorfman, R. The Price System

*Gill, R., Economic Development: Past and Present

Hanson, A., Business Cycles and National Income

Heilbroner, R., The Making of Economic Society (paperback)

Heilbroner, R., The Worldly Philosophers (paperback; revised edition)

Joseph, M.L., et.al., Economic Analysis and Policy

Koivisto, W.A., Principles and Problems of Modern Economics

Mantoux, P., The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century

Meier & Baldwin, Economic Development

Phelps, E.S., Private Wants and Public Needs

Rees, A., The Economics of Trade Unions

*Schultze, C.L., National Income Analysis

Smith, A., Wealth of Nations

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

ECONOMICS 1

All lectures will be given at 12 noon in Lowell Lecture Hall. Section assignments will be posted outside University Hall 9 at 9:00 a.m. on Thursday, September 30. If any conflicts develop, resectioning will be held in University Hall 9 on Monday, October 4, and Tuesday, October 5, from 2:00 to 4:00 p.m.

Lectures: Dr. Gill Sections
Mon., Sept. 27 Fri. or Sat., Oct. 1 or 2
Wed., Sept. 29 Mon. or Tues., Oct. 4 or 5
Wed. or Thurs., Oct. 6 or 7
Fri., Oct. 8 Mon. or Tues., Oct. 18 or 19
Mon., Oct. 11
Wed., Oct. 13
Fri., Oct. 16

Hour Exam, Wed. Oct. 20 at 12 noon

Sections meeting at 12 noon will take the hour exam in their regular classrooms; sections meeting at other hours will take the exam in Lowell Lecture Hall at 12.

There will be occasional lectures later in the term which will be announced in sections and in the Crimson.

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

ECONOMICS I
Fall Term 1965-66

  1. Introduction: Problems and Concepts (Sept. 27 to Oct. 2)

Reading:

Koivisto, Principles and Problems of Modern Economics, Chaps. 1 & 3

  1. Historical Development and the Doctrine of Laissez-Faire (Oct. 4 & Oct. 19)
    1. Historical Foundations of Industrial Society

Readings:

Gill, Economic Development, Chaps. 1-4

Heilbroner, The Making of Economic Society, Chaps. 1-3

Mantoux, The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century, Part II

    1. The Classical Economists and the Doctrine of Laissez-Faire

Readings:

Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers (revised ed.), Chaps. 1-4, 6

Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Bk. I, Chaps. 1 & 2; Bk. IV, Chaps. 2 & 3, Part II

Meier & Baldwin, op. cit., Ch. I

October 20, Hour Exam on Parts I & II

  1. Markets and Industrial Organization (October 22 to December 18)
    1. Competitive Markets
      1. The Concept of the “Invisible Hand”
      2. Theory of the Firm
      3. Household Behavior
      4. Market Structure

Reading:

Dorfman, The Price System (last two chapters at the discretion of the instructor)

    1. Modern Industrial Organization
      1. Introduction

Reading:

Caves, American Industry, Ch. I

      1. Market Behavior

Readings:

Caves, op. cit., Chaps. 2 & 3

Adams, Structure of the American Economy, Chaps. 5 & 10

Council of Economic Advisers, Report to the President on Steel Prices

      1. Market Regulation

Reading:

Caves, op. cit., Chaps. 4-6

      1. Unions and Collective Bargaining

Readings:

Koivisto, op. cit., Ch. 21

Rees, Economics of Trade Unions, Chaps. 3 & 4

Joseph, Economic Analysis and Policy, Sections 41-46

      1. Agriculture

Readings:

CED, An Adaptive Program for Agriculture

Joseph, op. cit., Section 38

  1. The Economy in the Aggregate (Jan. 3 to Jan 28): Introduction to National Income Analysis
    1. Business Fluctuations and Depressions

Readings:

Hansen, Business Cycles and National Income, Chaps. 1-2

Joseph, op. cit., Sections 13-16

    1. The Determinants of National Income

Reading:

Schultze, National Income Analysis, Chaps. 2,3, & 4

Source: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003, Box 9; Folder: “Economics, 1965-66 (1 of 2)”.

_________________________

1965-66
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Midyear Examination
January 26, 1966

ECONOMICS I
(Three hours)

Answer all questions

  1. (20 minutes)

The major classical economists opposed the Corn Laws. What arguments of classical economic theory could be used to defend this position? In what respects were these arguments particularly relevant to British conditions in the early 19th century?

  1. (20 minutes)

The government decides to pay 20 percent of the cost of all food consumed.
(Do not worry about the source of the funds.) Illustrate the effects this policy would have on the consumption patterns and the standard of living of a typical consumer.

  1. (30 minutes)

Suppose the government legislates a significant increase in the minimum wage for a given industry. Taking a typical profit-maximizing firm in an industry with freely competitive product and factor markets, initially in long-run equilibrium, trace the effects of this law on the use of labor, the use of other factors of production, the firm’s cost curves, and its output. What changes would one be likely to observe in the industry as a whole over a longer period of time? In what ways would such a policy affect the “efficient” allocation of resources in the economy?

  1. (30 minutes)

Show how the following phenomena operate as barriers to entry:

    1. scale economies
    2. absolute cost barriers
    3. product differentiation

Illustrate each of the above types of barriers to entry with references to the assigned reading.

  1. (20 minutes)

The demand for labor is said to be derived from the demand for the products which it produces. Show in what sense this is true. How might knowledge of this demand relationship be useful to a union in determining its wage demands?

  1. (20 minutes)

Using supply and demand analysis, discuss the operation of:

      1. an acreage limitation on a given agricultural commodity
      2. a law which requires that the commodity cannot be sold below a given price (which is higher than the present market price)
      3. a subsidy paid by the government to the farmer growing the commodity of a given number of cents per bushel grown
  1. (40 minutes)
GNP-GNI Personal Income Disposable Income Consumption Corporate Profits Indirect Taxes
300 240 200 190 36 24
350 280 233 220 42 28
400 320 267 250 48 32
450 360 300 280 54 36
500 400 333 310 60 40

Government spending is initially 80.
Private investment is 70.

    1. Given the above information, determine the equilibrium level of GNP. Show how you arrived at your answer. In what sense is this an “equilibrium” level?
    2. Why is Gross National Product (GNP) equal to Gross National Income (GNI)?
    3. Must the income and expenditures of each major sector of the economy — private individuals, business, and the government — balance in equilibrium? How do they compare in the above example?
    4. What is the Marginal Propensity to Consume out of GNP in the above example? What is the income multiplier?
    5. Suppose that full-employment GNP is at a level of 450. What change in government spending is necessary to achieve it, it no other relationship in the economy changes? What would this do to the government balance (surplus or deficit) in the new equilibrium position?

Source: Harvard University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Papers Printed for Mid-Year Examinations [in] History, History of Religions, Government, Economics, … , Naval Science, Air Science. January, 1966.

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ECONOMICS I
1966
Readings for the Spring Term

*To be purchased by students

Agarwala & Singh, The Economics of Underdevelopment

Bergson, A., The Economics of Soviet Planning

*Campbell, R., Soviet Economic Power

Domar, E., Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth

*Duesenberry, J., Money and Credit: Impact and Control

“Eckstein, A., “On the Economic Crisis in Communist China,” Foreign Affairs, July 1964.

*Eckstein, O., Public Finance

Friedman, M., Capitalism and Freedom

*Gill, R., Economic Development

Goldman, M., “Economic Controversy in the Soviet Union,” Foreign Affairs, April 1963.

Goldwin, R., Why Foreign Aid?

Hirschman, A., The Strategy of Economic Development

*Johnson, L., The Economic Report of the President, 1966

*Kenen, P., International Economics

Krause, L., The Common Market

Kuznets, S., Postwar Economic Growth

Leeman, W., Capitalism, Market Socialism and Central Planning

Lewis, J., Quiet Crisis in India

Mason, E., Economic Planning in Underdeveloped Areas: Government and Business

Nurkse, R., Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries

Phelps, E., Private Wants and Public Needs

Rostow, W., The Economics of Take-off into Sustained Growth

*Schultze, C., National Income Analysis

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

ECONOMICS I
Spring Term 1965-66
  1. The Economy in the Aggregate, Part II: Analysis of the Problems of Economic Stability and Growth (February 7 – April 1)
    1. The Determinants of National Income – Review

Reading:

Schultze, National Income Analysis, Chs. 2-4 (review)

    1. Public Finance and Government Expenditure

Readings:

Eckstein, Public Finance, Chs. 1-2, 5-8

Phelps, Private Wants and Public Needs, Chs. by Galbraith, Bator, Hayek, and Break.

    1. Money and Monetary System

Readings:

Schultze, National Income Analysis, Ch. 5

Duesenberry, Money and Credit, Chs. 1-8

Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chs. 3 & 5

    1. The Dynamics of Growth

Reading:

Domar, Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth, Ch. 4
(also in American Economic Review, March 1947, pp. 34-55)

    1. Economic Growth in Advanced Countries

Readings:

Schultze, National Income Analysis, Ch. 6

Kuznets, Postwar Economic Growth, Lecture II

    1. International Trade

Readings:

Kenen, International Economics, Chs. 1-5

Krause, The Common Market, Introduction

    1. Problems of Government and Economic Policy

Reading:

The Economic Report of the President, 1966

(Spring Recess April 3 – April 10)

  1. Economic Growth and Organization in Other Countries (April 11 – May 19)
    1. The Soviet Economy
      1. Introduction: The Theory of Planning

Readings:

Mason, Economic Planning, Ch. 3

Leeman, Capitalism, Market Socialism…, Ch. by Leontief

Bergson, The Economics of Soviet Planning, Ch. 14

      1. Growth and Organization of the Soviet System

Reading:

Campbell, Soviet Economic Power, Chs. 1-8

      1. Outlook for the Future

Readings:

Campbell, Soviet Economic Power, Ch. 9

Goldman, “Economic Controversy in the Soviet Union,” Foreign Affairs, April 1963

Kuznets, Postwar Economic Growth, Lecture IV

    1. Economic Growth of Underdeveloped Areas
      1. The Underdeveloped Economy

Readings:

Gill, Economic Development, Ch. 5

Kuznets, “Underdeveloped Countries and the Pre-industrial Phase in the Advanced Countries,” in Agarwala & Singh

      1. The Process of Economic Growth

Readings:

Rostow, “The Take-off into Self-sustained Growth,” in Agarwala & Singh

Kuznets, “Notes on the Take-off,” in Rostow, Ch. 2

      1. Issues in How to Induce Economic Growth

Readings:

Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation, Ch. 1

Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development, Chs. 2 & 4

      1. Case Studies — India and China

Readings:

Lewis, Quiet Crisis in India, Chs. 2, 3, & 6

Eckstein, A., “On the Economic Crisis in Communist China,” Foreign Affairs, July 1964

Gill, Economic Development, Ch. 6

      1. Foreign Aid and International Trade

Readings:

Goldwin, Why Foreign Aid?, pp. 10-32, 90-108, & 131-140

Kenen, International Economics, Ch. 6

  1. Conclusion: Problems and Prospects (May 20 – May 23)

No Readings

NOTE: Resectioning to remove class conflicts will be held in University Hall 9 on Monday, February 7 and Tuesday, February 8 from 2:00 to 4:00 p.m.

Source: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003, Box 9; Folder: “Economics, 1965-66 (1 of 2)”.

_________________________

1965-66
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Final Examination
June, 1966

ECONOMICS I
(Three hours)
  1. (60 minutes)

Suppose inflationary pressures lead to price increases in several sectors of the economy. What steps should the Federal Government take to restrain these inflationary pressures? How might other economic objectives be jeopardized by efforts to control the inflation? How might your views on the question of “social balance” of the public versus the private sector affect your policy proposals for dealing with the inflationary problem? If the country in question were the United States in 1966, would you have to take into account the balance of payments situation in making your policy decisions?

  1. (30 minutes)

Define and relate four of the following five pairs of terms:

    1. Full employment surplus – balanced budget multiplier
    2. Preconditions – take-off
    3. Allocational efficiency of taxation – equity of taxation
    4. G.A.T.T. – E.E.C.
    5. A budget deficit financed by Treasury sales of bonds in the open market – a Federal Reserve open market sale of bonds
  1. (30 minutes)

In The Good Society (1936) Walter Lippmann wrote:

“It may be predicted confidently that if ever the time comes when Russia no longer feels the need of mobilization military build-up and forced industrialization), it will become necessary to liquidate the planning authority and to return somehow to a market economy.”

Do recent economic reforms in the Soviet Union support this statement? What advantages might an increased role of markets in the U.S.S.R. have for that economy?

  1. (30 minutes)

“If one thing is certain it is that the path to development of the modern poor country will be very different from that of the earlier developers of the West. The problems are different and so also are the mechanisms for solving these problems.”
Discuss this question, giving specific examples to illustrate your points.

  1. (30 minutes)

Choose one of the following questions:

    1. Country X has three nationalized industries: railways, steel production, lighthouses.
      What should be the price and output policies of each industry if efficient allocation of resources were the national goal? How would each industry be financed? How would the results compare with a free market organization in these industries?
    2. In Australia, with no foreign trade, wool costs $5.00 per unit and cloth costs $12.00 per unit. In India, with no foreign trade, wool costs 10 rupees per unit and cloth costs 12 rupees per unit.
      If the cost of shipping a unit of either wool or cloth from one country to the other is $2.00, would trade take place? Explain.
      If it costs $2.00 to ship a wool unit, what is the cost of shipping cloth at which there will no longer be any gain from trading?

Source: Harvard University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Papers Printed for Final Examinations [in] History, History of Religions, Government, Economics, … , Naval Science, Air Science. June, 1966.

Image Source: Master of Leverett House, Richard T. Gill in The Harvard Class Album 1966.

Categories
Comparative Economic Systems Exam Questions Harvard Socialism Suggested Reading Syllabus

Harvard. Readings and Final Exam for Comparative Economic Systems. Bergson, 1968

Who among us has not tried to sneak a little wit into the formulation of a final exam question? Abram Bergson was a very serious scholar who, the record has shown, was not endowed with a funny bone in his body. Still, he was capable of calling a theoretical market socialist community, “Shangri-Lange” in the exam for his course on comparative economic systems. At least he gave it a try.  

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Miscellaneous Bergsonia

A photo of Abram Bergson when he was a teen-aged undergraduate at Johns Hopkins University.

1946-47 biographical note on Bergson who was a fellow of the Social Science Research Council.

Bergson’s reading assignments for his Columbia course Structure of the Soviet Economy in 1954-55.

Bergson’s reading lists and exams for “Normative Aspects of Economic Policy” at Harvard.   Spring term 1959; Spring term 1960.

Bergson’s Harvard reading list for Economics of Socialism, Spring term 1977.

Paul Samuelson’s memorial biography of Abram Bergson for the National Academy of Sciences in 2004.

For Bergson’s work in Soviet Economic Studies see John Hardt, “Abram Bergson’s Legacy: 1914-2003”.

___________________________

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

Economics 131
Comparative Economic Systems
Spring Term, 1967-68

Part I
INTRODUCTION

  1. Background
  2. The Theory of Socialist Economics

Paul A. Samuelson, Economics, 6th ed pp. 17-24. 620-631.

Robert Dorfman, The Price System. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. 1964, Ch. 6.

O. Lange, “On the Economic Theory of Socialism,” in B. Lippincott, ed., On the Economic Theory of Socialism, Minneapolis, 1938.

F. A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, London, 1948, Ch. IX.

A. Bergson, Essays in Normative Economics, Cambridge, Mass., 1966, pp. 216-236.

Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, International Publishers ed., New York, 1938, pp. 3-23.

W. N. Loucks, Comparative Economic Systems, 7th ed., New York, 1965, pp. 108-120 (5th ed., pp. 98-110; 6thed., pp. 93-105.

Part II
SOCIALIST PLANNING IN THE USSR

  1. Economics of the Industrial Enterprise

J. Berliner, “The Informal Organization of the Soviet Firm.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1952; reprinted in F. Holzman, Readings on the Soviet Economy, Chicago, 1962.

A. Bergson, The Economics of Soviet Planning, New Haven, Conn., 1964, Ch. 5, and pp. 287-297.

  1. General Planning

R. W. Campbell, Soviet Economic Power, 1st ed., Cambridge, Mass., 1960, ch. 5.

A. Bergson, Economics of Soviet Planning, Chs. 1, 3, 7, 8, 13.

G. Grossman, “Scarce Capital and Soviet Doctrine,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1953, reprinted in Holzman, Readings.

M. Bornstein, “The Soviet Price System,” The American Economic Review, March 1962; reprinted in M. Bornstein and D. Fusfeld. The Soviet Economy, Homewood, Ill., 1962.

A. Nove, The Soviet Economy, New York, 1961, ch. 3.

L. Smolinski, “What Next in Soviet Planning,” Foreign Affairs, July 1954

R. W. Campbell, “Marx, Kantorovich, and Novozhilov,” in Slavic Review, October 1961; reprinted in H. Shaffer, The Soviet Economy, New York, 1963.

M. Goldman, “Economic Controversy in the Soviet Union,” Foreign Affairs, April 1963; reprinted in M. Goldman, Comparative Economic Systems, New York, 1964.

A. Bergson. “The Current Soviet Planning Reforms,” in A. Balinky et al., Planning and the Market in the USSR, Rutgers, 1967.

Part III
EASTERN EUROPEAN VARIANTS

  1. Economic Reform in Poland and Czechoslovakia

S. Wellisz, The Economics of the Soviet Bloc, New York 1964. Chs. 2 and 6.

L. Smolinski, “Reforms in Poland,” Problems of Communism, July-August 1966.

J. M. Montias, “Economic Reform in Perspective,” Survey, April 1966.

  1. Market Socialism in Yugoslavia

J. M. Fleming and V. R. Sertic, “The Yugoslav Alternative,” International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, July 1962; reprinted in Goldman, Comparative Economic Systems.

E. Neuberger, “The Yugoslav Investment Auctions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1959.

A. Waterston, Planning in Yugoslavia, Baltimore, Md., 1962, pp. 50-82.

B. Ward, “The Nationalized Firm in Yugoslavia,” and comments on this by G. Macesich and H. G. Grubel, American Economic Review, May 1965, No. 2.

J. Vanek and J. M. Montias, “Planning in Yugoslavia,” in National Bureau of Economic Research, National Economic Planning, New York, 1967, pp. 379-381, 394-407.

Part IV
VARIETIES OF CAPITALIST EXPERIENCE

  1. The Laissez-Faire Ideal

Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago, 1962, omitting Ch. IV.

  1. The British Nationalized Enterprise

C. A. R. Crosland, “The Private and Public Corporation in Great Britain,” in E. S. Mason, The Corporation in Modern Society, Cambridge, Mass., 1959.

F. Cassell, “The Pricing Policies of the Nationalized Industries,” Lloyd’s Bank Review, October 1965; reprinted in A. H. Hanson, Nationalization: A Book of Readings, London, 1963.

  1. French Planning

Pierre Massé, “French Methods of Planning,” Journal of Industrial Economics, November 1962; reprinted in M. Bornstein, Comparative Economic Systems, Homewood. Ill., 1965.

Vera Lutz, French Planning, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., May 1965.

A. Schonfield, Modern Capitalism, New York, 1965, Ch. VIII.

  1. The Swedish Alternative

Alan G. Gruchy, Comparative Economic Systems, Boston 1966, pp. 357-375, 385-393, 395-416, 423-437.

Part V
COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE

  1. Inequality

A. Bergson, Essays in Normative Economics, Ch. 8.

A. Bergson, The Economics of Soviet Planning, Ch. 6.

  1. Comparative Growth

A. Bergson, “Reliability and Usability of Soviet Statistics: A Summary Appraisal,” American Statistician, June-July 1953; reprinted in Holzman, Readings.

R. W. Campbell, Soviet Economic Power, 2nd ed., Boston, Mass., 1966, Ch. 6.

A. Maddison, “Soviet Economic Performance,” Banca Nazionale del Laboro Quarterly Review, March 1965.

M. Ernst, “Overstatement of Industrial Growth in Poland,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1965.

Y. Vanek, “Yugoslav Economic Growth and Its Conditions,” and connents by N. Spulber, American Economic Review, May 1963, No. 2.

A. Bergson, “The Great Economic Race: USSR v. USA,” Challenge, March 1963, reprinted in Goldman, Comparative Economic Systems.

Janet Chapman, Real Wages in Soviet Russia Since 1928, Cambridge, Mass.,1963, Chs, IX and X.

  1. Economic Merit

A. Nove, The Soviet Economy, New York, 1961, Ch. 12.

A. Bergson, The Economics of Soviet Planning, Ch. 14.

O. Hoeffding, “State Planning and Forced Industrialization,” Problems of Communism, November-December 1959; re-printed in Holzman, Readings.

Jan Tinbergen, “Do Communist and Free Economies Show a Converging Pattern,” Soviet Studies, April 1961.

Peter Wiles, “Convergence: Possibility and Probability,” in Balinky et al., Planning and the Market in the USSR.

Source: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003, Box 9; Folder: “Economics, 1967-68”.

___________________________

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Department of Economics

Economics 131: Professor Bergson
Final Examination
June 3, 1968

Part I (counts 25%)

Answer one and only one of two.

  1. In Marxiana, a socialist community, the economy is organized in accord with the Competitive Solution except in one particular: the Central Planning Board (CPB) seeks to apply the labor theory of value rather than western marginal theory. What operating rules might the CPB be expected to establish for the manager of an industrial enterprise? How might the managers’ behavior then differ from that under the unmodified Competitive Solution? What is implied for economic efficiency?
  2. In the socialist community of Shangri-Lange, the Competitive Solution is applied without qualification. Discuss the possible economic consequences of a government decision to increase defense spending. Consider in particular the consequences for each of the following:
    1. The government budget;
    2. The rate of interest;
    3. The general level of consumers’ goods prices;
    4. Economic efficiency.

Part II (counts 50%)

Answer two and only two of four.

  1. “As the Soviet experience shows, an interest rate is really not needed for investment project appraisal. So long as one selects the project that minimizes the cost of producing the desired output, there can be no economic waste, and this the Soviet project designers have sought to do from the very beginning of the Five Year Plans.” Discuss.
  2. “That Soviet planning is highly inefficient becomes self-evident when we consider one simple fact: the gross national product per employed worker in the USSR in 1960 was but 24-40 per cent of that in the United States in the same year.” Do you agree? Explain your answer carefully.
  3. “However much or little socialism and capitalism have converged generally, there can be no question that the Yugoslavs have by now practically reverted in all but name to a form of capitalism.” Discuss with special reference to Yugoslav enterprise management.
  4. “French planning surely has been an unqualified success. The record of French post-war growth is itself sufficient evidence of this.” Discuss.

Part III (counts 25%)

  1. Explain briefly four and only four out of seven items:
    1. “Safety factor”; “simulation”
    2. Indicative planning
    3. Milton Friedman on government policy toward “technical (natural) monopolies”
    4. “Occupational wage scale” in determination of Soviet wage differentials
    5. Dynamic versus static efficiency
    6. Average versus marginal cost pricing for coal under the British National Coal Board
    7. “Horizontal” and “Vertical” Modernization Commissions in French Planning.

NOTE: Please indicate on outside cover of your first bluebook the numbers of the questions that you answer

Source: Harvard University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Papers Printed for Final Examinations [in] History, History of Religions, Government, Economics, … ,Aerospace Studies, June 1968.