Further jewels (transcribed below) from the Ed Tower collection of economics course materials come from the 1980 course taught at Yale by Susan Rose-Ackerman on the economics of democratic politics. I have used Claude to read, transcribe and follow the formatting of the original Tower pdf file downloaded from Duke. This gives me more time for curating and searching for more content and not just for leisure!
_______________________________
Susan Rose-Ackerman
Economics 488a (693a) / E&PS 202a
Fall, 1980
ML 313 Undergraduate Course
THE ECONOMICS OF
DEMOCRATIC POLITICS
All reading for the course is on reserve at both Cross Campus and Social Science Libraries. There will also be a xeroxed package for sale at Gnomen Copy.
Every week, I will distribute a set of discussion questions (not problem sets) to think about as you do the reading for the next week. Three times during the term, each student will write a short paper (about 5 pages) on one of these questions. The papers are to be turned in to my secretary by 5 p.m. on the Tuesday before the topic is discussed in class. This will give me time to read the papers before class. At the end of the course, there will be a take-home final exam.
Students who wish to use this seminar as a way to fulfill their writing requirement for the economics major should speak to me individually. Students who wish to write a longer term paper may do so and can be excused from some of the short papers, but must still take the exam. I would, however, like to try to coordinate the term papers with the classwork. Graduate students taking the course for credit should also speak with me so that I can be sure that they are not asked to duplicate material they already know.
My office is in Room 114 in the ISPS building at 111 Prospect and my secretary is in Room 117. Office hours are Monday from 2 – 4 p.m. or make an appointment at some other time (afternoons are preferable). My telephone number is 436-1087.
_______________________________
Susan Rose-Ackerman
Econ. 488a (693a) / E&PS 202a
Yale University
Fall, 1980
Wednesday, 2:30 – 4:30
ML 313
SYLLABUS
THE ECONOMICS OF
DEMOCRATIC POLITICS
BOOKS AT COOP:
Mueller, Dennis C., Public Choice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979.
Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper and Row, 1957.
Calabresi, Guido and Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices, Norton, 1978.
Miller, J. and B. Yandle, Eds., Benefit-Cost Analyses of Social Regulation. Case Studies from the Council for Wage and Price Stability, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 1979.
Arnold, Douglas R., Congress and the Bureaucracy, Yale University Press, 1979.
OPTIONAL:
Fiorina, Morris, Congress Keystone of the Washington Establishment, Yale University Press, 1977.
Sen, A.K., Collective Choice and Social Welfare, North Holland.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy, Academic Press, 1978.
DATEI.INTRODUCTION: THE ROLE OF THE STATE: CORRECTING MARKET “FAILURES” OR MAKING “FAIR” COLLECTIVE CHOICES
9/10 1.Mueller, Chapters 1 and 2.
II.WEALTH MAXIMIZATION, UTILITY MAXIMIZATION, AND EQUALITY
A.Wealth Maximization vs. Utility Maximization
1.Review of Public Goods Theory and Welfare Economics
(Opt)a)F. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance Rand McNally, 1973, Chapter 2.
(Opt)b)W. Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations Analysis, 4th Ed., Chapter 21. (General Equilibrium and Welfare Economics), Sections 1-14, pp. 496-531.
(Opt)c)R. Musgrave and P. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 2nd Ed., Chapter 3.
9/17 2.Ronald Dworkin, “Is Wealth a Value?;” Anthony Kronman, “Wealth Maximization;” and Richard Posner, “The Value of Wealth,” Journal of Legal Studies (1980) 9: 191-252.
9/24B.Equality and Utility
1.Douglas Rae, “The Egalitarian States: Notes on a System of Contradictory Ideals,” Daedalus (Fall 1979) 108: 37-54.
2.A.P. Lerner, Economics of Control, Chapter 3.
(Opt)3.A.K. Sen, On Economic Inequality, Clarendon Press, Oxford, Chapter 1.
4.Paul Samuelson, “A.P. Lerner at Sixty,” Review of Economic Studies (June 1964) reprinted in Collected Scientific Papers of Paul A. Samuelson, 3: 647-650, part 7 only.
5.Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State, Yale Press, 1980, Chapter 1, Sections 1-6.
(Opt)6.Mueller, Chapters 12 (on Rawls) and 13 (on Harsanyi).
(Opt)7.Sen, Chapter 9.
III.DIRECT DEMOCRACY
10/1A.Voting Rules
1.Mueller, Chapter 3 (Chapter 5 is optional).
(Opt)2.R. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance, McGraw-Hill, 1959, Chapter 6.
3.R. Niemi and W. Riker, “The Choice of Voting Systems,” Scientific American (June 1976) 234: 21-27.
(Opt)4.J. Buchanan and G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1962, Chapter 10, 131-145.
10/8B.Justifications for Majority Rule
1.Mueller, Chapter 11.
(Opt)2.Sen, Chapter 10 (unstarred).
(Opt)3.Douglas Rae, “Decision Rules and Individual Values in Collective Choices,” American Political Science Review (1969) 63: 40-56.
4.Ackerman, Chapter 9, parts 60, 61, 62, 64.
10/15
C.New Voting Systems: Demand Revealing Schemes
(1/2)
1.Mueller, Chapter 4.
2.T.M. Tideman and G. Tullock, “A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices,” Journal of Political Economy (December 1976) 84: 1145-1160.
(Opt)3.V.L. Smith, “The Principle of Unanimity and Voluntary Consent in Social Choice,” Journal of Political Economy (December 1977) 85: 1125-1140.
IV.REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
10/15A.Electoral Competition
(1/2)
10/22 1.Mueller, Chapter 6, pp. 97-120.
2.J. Schumpeter, “The Classical Doctrine of Democracy,” and “Another Theory of Democracy,” Chapters 21 and 22 of Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3rd Ed., Harper, 1950, 250-283.
3.Downs, pp. 1-141.
4.Rose-Ackerman, Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 11.
5.Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Inefficiency and Reelection,” Kyklos (1980) 33: 287-307.
(Opt)6.David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, Yale University Press, 1974.
10/29B.Legislators, Voters and Interest Groups: Is It Rational to Participate in Politics?
1.Mueller, pp. 120-124.
2.Downs, pp. 260-276.
3.Mancur Olson, “A Theory of Groups and Organizations,” Chapter 1 of Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard, 1965, pp. 5-52.
4.Brian Barry, “Political Participation as Rational Action,” Chapter 2 of Barry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy, Collier-MacMillan, 1970, pp. 13-40.
5.Benn, Stanley E., “The Problematic Rationality of Political Participation,” in Laslett and Fishkin, Eds., Philosophy, Politics and Society, 5th Series, Yale University Press, 1979, pp. 291-312.
(Opt)6.A.K. Sen, “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory,” Philosophy and Public Affairs (Summer 1977) 6: 317-344.
C.Exit, Voice and Disloyalty [sic]
(Opt)1.Mueller, Chapter 7.
(Opt)2.Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Harvard Press, 1970.
[11/5,11/12]D.Legislative-Bureaucratic Interaction
1.Mueller, Chapter 8.
2.William A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Aldine, 1971, Chapters 1, 2, 17-21 (pp. 3-23, 189-290).
3.Albert Breton and Ronald Wintrobe, “The Equilibrium Size of a Budget Maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen’s Theory of Bureaucracy,” Journal of Political Economy (Feb 1975) 83: 195-207.
4.W. Niskanen, “Bureaucrats and Politicians,” and J. Margolis, “Comments,” Journal of Law and Economics (Dec 1975) 18: 617-660.
(Opt)5.M. Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment, Yale University Press, 1977.
6.M. Fiorina, and R. Noll, “Voters, Legislators and Bureaucracy: Institutional Design and the Public Sector,” American Economic Review – Papers and Proceedings (May 1978) 68: 256-260.
7.Douglas R. Arnold, Congress and the Bureaucracy, Yale University Press, 1979. Part I (pp. 3-91); Chapters 8 and 9 (pp. 165-216); Chapters 6 and 7 are optional.
8.R. Musgrave, “Leviathan Cometh or Does He?,” mimeo.
[11/19]E.Policy Analysis and Politics
(Opt)1.Musgrave and Musgrave, Chapters 7 and 8 on expenditure evaluation.
(Opt)2.Charles Schultze, The Politics and Economics of Public Spending, Brookings Institute, Washington, 1968.
3.Miller and Yandle, selected chapters.
12/3V.SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS AND HARD CHOICES: ARROW AND CALABRESI
1.Mueller, Chapters 9, 10 and 14.
(Opt)2.Kenneth J. Arrow, “Values and Collective Decision Making,” in Philosophy, Politics and Society (1967), Laslett and Runciman, Eds.
(Opt)3.Sen, Chapters 1-3, 5, 7 (unstarred chapters).
4.G. Calabresi and P. Bobbitt, Tragic Choices, W.W. Norton, 1978, omit Chapter 6 and pp. 64-78.
_______________________________
Economics 488a (693a) / E&PS 202a
Susan Rose-Ackerman
Fall, 1980
QUESTIONS FOR SEPTEMBER 17
WEALTH MAXIMIZATION
vs. UTILITY MAXIMIZATION
If you need a review of public goods theory and welfare economics, read some of the material in II.A.1. (Be sure you know what Pareto Optimality means.)
The discussion will center on the reading in II.A.2. Begin with Kronman’s article and then read the (longer) article by Dworkin followed by Posner’s comments. In Dworkin, parts V and VI (pp. 205-219) are optional.
Kronman and Dworkin criticize Richard Posner’s contention that society should try to maximize wealth. Do you agree with Posner that wealth maximization is a happy compromise between utilitarianism and Pareto superiority? Why or why not?
Posner is especially concerned with using wealth maximization as a criterion in judicial decisions. Others, however, have proposed it as a criterion in other areas of economic life. Thus, macroeconomists are often concerned with maximizing GNP or National Income. Policy analysts use methods that seek to maximize the dollar value of net benefits. Criticize or defend these benefit measures in the light of Dworkin’s and Kronman’s arguments.
_______________________________
Rose-Ackerman
E&PS 202a
Fall, 1980
QUESTIONS FOR SEPT. 24
EQUALITY AND UTILITARIANISM
1)Be sure you understand Lerner’s argument on pp. 29-32. Then discuss the role of information in Lerner’s conclusion that utilitarian calculations imply the equal division of a given amount of total income among the population. How does Samuelson’s argument differ from Lerner’s?
2)Douglas Rae lists several contradictory meanings of equality. How might a conversation based on Bruce Ackerman’s three principles resolve these issues? How does Lerner resolve them? Hint: Some of Rae’s quandaries are simply assumed away by Lerner.
(a)Consider in particular Rae’s discussion of equality and value. On p. 47-49, Rae contrasts two tests:
TEST A: Is X as well off with what X gets as Y is with what Y gets?
TEST B: Is X as well off with what X gets as X would be with what Y gets? (Likewise, is Y as well off with what Y gets as he would be with what X gets?)
Suppose you had to pick one or another of these “tests.” How would you do it? How would Lerner, Ackerman and Posner do it?
You may write on either (1) or (2). If you pick (2), you may concentrate on the issues raised in (2a). Papers should be about five pages long and should be turned in before 5:00 p.m. on Tuesday, September 23. There is an envelope for the papers on my secretary’s door (Room 117, 111 Prospect).
_______________________________
Econ 488a (693a) / E&PS 202a
Rose-Ackerman
Fall, 1980
QUESTIONS FOR OCTOBER 1
You may write on any one of the questions below.
1)Should the trading or selling of votes be permitted in a direct democracy that uses majority rule to make choices? Explain your position.
2)Mueller (following Buchanan and Tullock) states that: “Were there no costs associated with the unanimity rule itself, it would obviously be the optimal rule, since it minimizes … external decision costs.” Do you agree? Why or why not?
3)Economists (to quote Musgrave) have frequently been concerned “with finding a technique by which individuals can be induced to reveal their true preferences on matters of budget policy.” When can majority rule meet Musgrave’s criterion? What else might one want voting systems to do besides reveal preferences? Might a system be “fair” even if it is not capable of providing good information to policymakers about voters’ preferences?
4)Do you agree with Gordon Tullock that majority rule leads to an oversupply of government services? Explain your answer.
5)Does “logrolling” solve the problem of voting cycles?
6)Consider the Table on p. 65 in Mueller. Should Muskie have been the 1972 Democratic Party nominee? Why or why not?
_______________________________
Econ. 488a (693a) / E&PS 202a
Rose-Ackerman
Fall, 1980
QUESTIONS FOR OCTOBER 8
1)Comment on the following assertion: Majority rule should not be used to make collective choices because of the likelihood of voting cycles.
2)Bruce Ackerman claims to have resolved the tension between democratic rule and the protection of individual rights. Has he?
You may write on either question.
_______________________________
Econ. 488a (693a) / E&PS 202a
Rose-Ackerman
Fall 1980
QUESTIONS FOR OCTOBER 15
1.Do you agree with Tideman and Tullock that demand revealing schemes “are superior to other processes” for making social choices?
2.What are the essential differences between a representative democracy and a direct democracy? Do the arguments in favor of the unanimity rule carry over to the votes of legislative representatives? What about the arguments for and against majority rule?
3.Explain why a system with three political parties has very different properties from a system with two parties. What are the special advantages (and disadvantages) of a two-party system?
READING:
In Mueller, pp. 69-71 are optional. Tideman and Tullock’s article is a fuller discussion of the demand revealing scheme discussed on pp. 72-84 in Mueller. In Part IV, read Mueller, Schumpeter and as much Downs as you can.
_______________________________
Econ. 488a (693a) / E&PS 202a
Rose-Ackerman
Fall 1980
QUESTIONS FOR OCTOBER 22
READING:
Finish Downs and read my article and the selected chapters from the corruption book (Chapter 3 is most important).
1.In Downs’ model, political parties single-mindedly seek reelection. In Rose-Ackerman’s book on corruption, politicians seek both income and reelection. In both models, however, the information available to voters and politicians is a key variable. Because voters are poorly informed, Downs concludes on p. 136 that “rational behavior by political parties tends to discourage rational behavior by voters.” Rose-Ackerman states (p. 29) that “the impact of voter ignorance on corruption is not straightforward: While sometimes it makes bribery more likely than in … idealized models …, it is also quite possible that it will lead to a less corrupt political system.” Do you agree with these conclusions? Criticize the theories as logical, consistent exercises and as tools for understanding the American political system.
2.Develop a model law regulating and/or subsidizing the campaign spending of American political candidates. Explain why you think your proposed law is desirable based on Downs, on Rose-Ackerman’s book and article and on your knowledge of American politics.
3.Will a representative democracy that uses majority rule voting in the legislature make Pareto Efficient choices? Discuss. Ignore, for now, the further problems of carrying out the laws using the government bureaucracy.
_______________________________
Susan Rose-Ackerman
Econ. 488a (693a) / E&PS 202a
QUESTIONS FOR OCTOBER 29
1.Is it rational to vote? Compare your own answer with Downs’ answer, Barry’s critique of Downs, and Benn’s alternative response. How would you answer the question posed by Benn on p. 310? “If it makes no appreciable difference to outcomes how or whether a given individual expresses his attitudes, why should he not choose some private or less exacting mode of expression, like singing political songs in the bath, or some mode that he chooses quite at random to count as expressing his attitude — slowing down, say, as he drives past the Post Office?”
2.When is it rational to make a campaign contribution or engage in a lobbying campaign designed to affect legislative outcomes? Compare Olson and Barry’s discussion of this issue. What do you think?
***
If anyone wishes to write on a question for October 22, they may do so as long as they move beyond the class discussion.
_______________________________
Econ. 488a (693a) / E&PS 202a
Rose-Ackerman
Fall 1980
QUESTIONS FOR NOVEMBER 5 AND 12
LEGISLATIVE – BUREAUCRATIC INTERACTION
READING:
November 5:Mueller, Chapter 8, pp. 148-167; Breton and Wintrobe and the two readings by Niskanen.
November 12: Fiorina and Noll, Arnold, Mueller, pp. 167-170, and Musgrave.
On November 5, we will discuss Niskanen’s theory of the budget-maximizing bureaucrat and various critiques and extensions of this view.
On November 12, we expand the analysis of legislative-bureaucratic interactions to include Fiorina’s theory and Arnold’s empirical work. We then go on to consider the interchange between Buchanan and Brennan, on one side, and Musgrave on the other, over whether government is “too big.”
NOVEMBER 5
1)Critically assess Niskanen’s theory of bureaucracy as presented in his 1971 book. (The theory is presented in simple terms in both Mueller and Breton and Wintrobe.) Do you think that he successfully responded to the criticisms of his book in the 1975 article? In thinking about these questions, distinguish between theoretical difficulties per se and doubtful empirical claims.
2)Niskanen’s reform proposals in Chapters 17-21 seek to increase the competitive pressures on government. Criticize these proposals on distributional and efficiency grounds.
3)Niskanen’s model of a budget-maximizing bureaucrat obviously cannot apply to top officials in regulatory agencies such as the ICC or the FCC. What alternative theories appear plausible to you? Do they apply with equal force to agencies that regulate a single industry such as communications or the airlines and to agencies like the EPA and OSHA that regulate one piece of the behavior of firms in many industries?
NOVEMBER 12
1)Fiorina states that “Contrary to what is popularly believed, the bureaucrats are not the problem. Congressmen are. The Congress is the key to the Washington establishment.” Criticize this conclusion in the light of Niskanen’s and Arnold’s analyses of the link between the bureaucracy and the legislature.
2)The reading in IV.D stresses the links between the bureaucracy and the legislature. Downs, in An Economic Theory of Democracy, however, ignores the bureaucracy. How would Downs’ theory have to be modified to take account of the issues discussed by Niskanen, Fiorina and Noll, and Arnold?
3)Critically assess the debate between Buchanan-Brennan and Musgrave. What kind of evidence would be decisive? Does Buchanan and Brennan’s argument imply that a constitutional amendment should be passed to limit the size of the government budget? What might such an amendment say?
_______________________________
Rose-Ackerman
Econ. 488a (693a) / E&PS 202a
Fall, 1980
QUESTIONS FOR NOVEMBER 19
READING:
In Yandle and Miller, read two of the following chapters: 5, 8, 9, 10 or 11. Be sure to read Musgrave and Musgrave if you need to learn the basics of cost-benefit analysis. Schultze is optional although you may be interested in looking at Schultze’s assessment of cost-benefit analysis.
QUESTION:
The reports in Yandle and Miller were all prepared by economists on the staff of the Council on Wage and Price Stability. They are critiques of regulations proposed by various agencies. Choose one of the assessments (preferably chosen from 5, 8, 9, 10 or 11) and write your own critique of the Council report. In other words, suppose you are a White House staffer, trained in economics, who must advise the President on what policy to follow. You can consider economic efficiency, the distribution of costs and benefits, the quality of information available and the political feasibility of the Council’s recommendations. I, of course, realize that you only have the Council report to go on and that you, therefore, may not have information about all these issues.
_______________________________
Rose-Ackerman
Econ. 488a (693a) / E&PS 202a
Fall 1980
QUESTIONS FOR DECEMBER 3
SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS
AND HARD CHOICES:
ARROW AND CALABRESI
1)Study the proof of Arrow’s impossibility theorem in Mueller, Chapter 10. What are the implications of this result for normative theories of state action? In particular, how do cost-benefit criteria violate Arrow’s conditions?
2)Calabresi and Bobbitt discuss “tragic choices.” What is a tragic choice? Discuss ways in which Calabresi’s “paradox of first order sufficiency” leads to “inconsistent” valuation of life across different policy areas. What do you think would be the consequences of valuing life in a “consistent” way? To answer this question you have to explain what you mean by a “consistent” valuation.
3)Is there any relationship between Calabresi and Bobbitt’s analysis of “tragic” choices and Arrow’s impossibility result? In particular, consider Calabresi and Bobbitt’s “cycle strategy” (Chapter 7). Does it violate Arrow’s conditions? If it does, do you care? What do you think of this way of resolving “tragic” choices?
4)In “Values and Collective Decisionmaking” (p. 231-2) Arrow writes: “Let me conclude by suggesting one type of use of irrelevant alternatives, which may be termed ‘extended sympathy.’ We do seem prepared to make comparisons of the form: Action x is better (or worse) for me than action y is for you. This is probably in fact the standard way in which people make judgments about appropriate income distributions; if I am richer than you, I may find it easy to make the judgment that it is better for you to have the marginal dollar than for me … The principle of extended sympathy as a basis for interpersonal comparisons seems basic to many of the welfare judgments made in ordinary practice. It remains to be seen whether an adequate theory of social choice can be derived from this and other acceptable principles.” What do you think about the idea of using “extended sympathy” to make welfare judgments?
_______________________________
Rose-Ackerman
Fall 1980
FINAL EXAMINATION
THE ECONOMICS OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICS
(ECONOMICS 488a (693a) / E&PS 202a)
DUE:
24 Hours after you pick up the test. Type or write legibly.
DIRECTIONS:
Answer one question in Part I, two questions in Part II and the question in Part III. The question in Part III will be weighted more heavily than the others.
There is no specific page limit but verbosity, long summaries of the reading and platitudes will not be appreciated. You will notice that some of the questions are identical or close to some of our weekly topics. If you wrote a paper on that topic or a closely related one, you may not answer that question on this exam.
Choose questions that cover the course as broadly as possible so you do not repeat yourself. You may use course reading and class notes to help you think about the questions. Obviously, you should not talk about the exam with other students who have not yet taken it.
PART I
ANSWER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING SIX QUESTIONS:
(1)Is there,in fact, no reasonable way of collectively ranking a set of alternatives, the conclusion of Arrow’s theorem? If you agree, then how should a group faced with a collective choice problem proceed? If you disagree, describe a “reasonable” method of choice, and defend it against Arrow, Niemi and Riker, etc.
(2)Should the trading or selling of votes be permitted in a direct democracy that uses majority rule to make choices? Explain your position.
(3)Mueller (following Buchanan and Tullock) states that: “Were there no costs associated with the unanimity rule itself, it would obviously be the optimal rule, since it minimizes … external decision costs.” Do you agree? Why or why not? Do the arguments in favor of the unanimity rule carry over to the votes of legislative representatives?
(4)Economists (to quote Musgrave) have frequently been concerned “with finding a technique by which individuals can be induced to reveal their true preferences on matters of budget policy.” When can majority rule meet Musgrave’s criterion? What else might one want voting systems to do besides reveal preferences? Might a system be “fair” even if it is not capable of providing good information to policymakers about voters’ preferences?
(5)Does “logrolling” solve the problem of voting cycles? Explain.
(6)Will a representative democracy that uses majority rule voting in the legislature make Pareto Efficient choices? Ignore the further problems of carrying out the laws using the government bureaucracy.
PART II
ANSWER TWO OF THE FOLLOWING SIX QUESTIONS BUT DO NOT ANSWER BOTH 1 AND 2.
(1)Cost-benefit analysis seeks to maximize the dollar value of net benefits. What is the relationship between the cost-benefit criterion and utilitarianism? How does cost-benefit analysis violate Arrow’s conditions?
(2)Some people have suggested that cost-benefit analysts weight the benefits accruing to poor people higher than the benefits accruing to more wealthy people. What normative position is implied by this procedure? Do you think it would be a good idea to use weighted cost-benefit analysis as a way to make public choices.
(3)Do you agree with Tideman and Tullock that demand revealing schemes “are superior to other processes” for making social choices? Explain.
(4)When is it rational to make a campaign contribution or engage in a lobbying campaign designed to affect legislative outcomes? Compare Olson and Barry’s discussion of this issue. What do you think? Should the government regulate lobbying and campaign contributions?
(5)Niskanen’s model of a budget-maximizing bureaucrat obviously cannot apply to top officials in regulatory agencies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Communications Commission. What alternative theories appear plausible to you? Do they apply with equal force to agencies that regulate a single industry such as communications or the airlines and to agencies like the Environmental Protection Administration that regulate one piece of the behavior of firms in many industries?
(6)The reading in IV.D stresses the links between the bureaucracy and the legislature. However, in An Economic Theory of Democracy, Downs ignores the bureaucracy. How would Downs’ theory have to be modified to take account of the issues discussed by Niskanen, Fiorina and Noll, and Arnold?
PART III
EVERYONE MUST ANSWER THIS QUESTION.
This course has combined reading on normative theories of state action with positive models of how government will behave. The basic normative positions we considered are:
(1)Wealth maximization
(2)Utilitarianism
(3)Equalization of satisfaction levels
(4)Ackerman’s “Liberal State” theory
(5)Efficiency, i.e. an incomplete rule which argues only that society should be on the Pareto frontier
(6)Procedural “fairness,” e.g. the conditions underlying May’s theorem or Arrow’s conditions
(7)Calabresi and Bobbitt’s interest in supressing conflicts of values.
Suppose that one takes a realistic view of the self-interested behavior of bureaucrats, elected officials, voters, and organized interest groups (based on Part IV of the course). Now pick three normative positions taken from the above list or take two from the list and add a third which expresses your own beliefs. For each one, discuss how you would wish to organize the political-economic system so that the normative goal could be approximately achieved even though citizens and political actors are basically self-interested. If this does not seem possible, point to the weak links. My paper in Kyklos and Corruption, pp. 228-235 illustrate how one might do this for two different principles.
Source: Digitized photocopy reproduced in Economics Reading Lists, Course Outlines, Exams, Puzzles & Problems compiled by Edward Tower. Vol. 20 (July 1981): Public Choice, Political Economy, and the Economics of Public Policy & Law, pp. 98-118.
The Eno River Press Collection in Economics, compiled by Duke professor (now emeritus) Ed Tower, is the motherload of syllabi, problems sets, and exams from economics courses taught over roughly two decades at the end of the 20th century. Thanks to the initiative of Steven Medema, this material has been digitized and made available as .pdf files: 1980 (15 vols.); 1981 (25 vols.); 1990 (25 vols.); 1995 (25 vols.). There is an analogous set of volumes, likewise available in business administration.
Image Source: Joseph Christian Eyendecker (1874-1951), “Democrat and Republican”, painting at the Lucas Museum of Narrative Art, a copy was published in Saturday Evening Post, Oct. 17, 1936.
