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Harvard. The Data Resources Inc. connection. Galbraith asks Eckstein, Feldstein, Jorgensen. 1972

 

“As Ed Mason tactfully hints, I’ve had enough lost causes for one year.”–Galbraith

In the following exchange of letters initiated by John Kenneth Galbraith in December 1972 we find multiple instances of seething rage barely concealed under veneers of formal academic politeness. Critical hiring and firing decisions regarding the subtraction of radical voices from the economics department faculty went overwhelmingly for the consolidation of mainstream economics earlier that month and Galbraith appears to have sought a vulnerability of this counterrevolution in its potential for conflicts of interest as he imagined coming from Otto Eckstein’s start-up, Data Resources, Inc. Eckstein’s response provides us with some interesting backstory to DRI. Feldstein and Jorgensen offered their witness testimony regarding this early episode in what would ultimately result in the so-called empirical turn in economics

But even after suffering this tactical defeat, Galbraith’s strategic point was to be confirmed by history:

“I do have one final thought. In accordance with the well-known tendencies of free enterprise at this level, one day one of these corporations is going to go down with a ghastly smash. It will then be found, in its days of desperation or before, to have engaged in some very greasy legal operations. The Department and the University will be held by the papers to have a contingent liability. It will be hard to preserve reticence then. It would have been better to have taken preventative action now.”

The conflict of interest cases brought by the U.S. Department of Justice in 2000 against economics professor Andrei Shleifer and the Harvard Institute for International Development resulted in a settlement that required Harvard to pay $26.5 million to the U.S. government.

_____________________________

On behalf of the Department,
Galbraith wants to know more about DRI

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CAMBRIDGE. MASSACHUSETTS

December 20, 1972

Professor Otto Eckstein
Littauer Center

Professor Martin S. Feldstein
1737 Cambridge Street

Professor Dale W. Jorgenson
1737 Cambridge Street

Dear Otto, Marty and Dale:

It will hardly be news that I have been deeply concerned over the several recent actions of the Department of Economics on appointments as well as the academically less consequential problem of the less than gracious response to those of us who have expressed alarm.

There is an impression, of which you will undoubtedly be sensitive, that the positions of some of those favoring the recent action could reflect, however subjectively and innocently, their corporate involvement in conflict with their academic responsibilities. I do not wish in any way to prejudge this matter or even to be a source of embarrassment. The problem does seem to me sufficiently somber so that in the interest of everyone you no less than the rest of us the circumstances should be clearly known. In this spirit I raise the following questions:

  1. Could you indicate the nature of Data Resources, Inc? I have reference to assets, sales, employees, services rendered, identity of corporate clients and charges.
  2. I believe it can fairly be assumed from general knowledge that the Corporation owes part of its prestige and esteem to association with members of the Harvard Department of Economics. The foregoing being so and reputation being a common property of the Department and Harvard University, could I ask as to your ownership or other interest or other participation of whatever sort and return?
  3. Has the Corporation employed students and nontenured members of the Department of Economics and would you indicate the names?
  4. Could I ask if you have participated in the past in the consideration of Harvard promotion of any such employees, consultants or people otherwise associated with the Corporation and in what cases?
  5. Could past service or inferior service or present or potential utility to the Corporation or extraneous judgment based on business as distinct from academic performance create, again perhaps subjectively, the possibility of a conflict of interest in your passing on Harvard promotions? How have you handled this conflict in the cases in which people with an association, past or present, with the Corporation have been up for Harvard promotion, always assuming that there have been such cases?
  6. In the recruiting of clients for the Corporation, what of the danger that they will be affected by the close relation between the Corporation and the Department? Specifically could there be effort, however subjective, to quell their fears? The radical economists come obviously to mind. But, as you are perhaps aware, even I am not a totally reassuring figure to many businessmen department with too many people of my viewpoint might also evoke alarm. Does safety here suggest that one with major corporate interest disqualify himself on all appointments?
  7. Is there a possibility — I by no means press the point that the kind of economics that serves corporate interest will take on an exaggerated importance when some of our ablest faculty members, and students are working on such problems?

Let me repeat that I ask these questions only for a clarification in which we share a common interest. I do not of course raise the more general question of outside activity. This would come with very poor grace from me — it is indeed the reason why I have sought not to be a charge on university resources,

Yours faithfully,

John Kenneth Galbraith

CC: Professor James S. Duesenberry

Dean John T. Dunlop

JKG:mih

_____________________________

Eckstein provides his answers to Galbraith’s “interesting questions”

Otto Eckstein
24 Barberry Road
Lexington, Mass. 02173
January 8, 1973

Professor J. Kenneth Galbraith
Department of Economics
Harvard University
207 Littauer Center
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

Dear Ken:

Pursuing the habits of a lifetime, you raise interesting questions in your letter of December 20th. Let me answer them by giving you an account of the origins and development of Data Resources, Inc., and of its relations to Harvard. I believe this will respond to all of your questions.

(1) Origins of DRI

As you know, my professional career has largely been devoted to the application of the techniques of economics to actual problems of the U.S. economy. After my most recent period of full -time government service in 1966, my views on the economy were sought by business and financial organizations. I quickly discovered that they made little use of macro economics or econometrics. The gap between macro and micro was unbridged. They typically ignored the overall situation. Econometrics, which always looked to me to be a very practical way to establish quantitative relationships, received little use and remained an academic plaything. I had already discovered in the government that even macro-decisions were made on the basis of very crude quantitative work, without the benefit of the thirty years of methodological development of econometrics.

In mid-1967, I had the idea that the technology of the time-sharing computer provided the missing link that would make it possible to use the modern techniques to improve private and public planning on a day-to-day basis. The time-sharing technology had the potential of overcoming the mechanical hurdles of programming, data punching, batch runs, etc. which had made econometrics a slow process open only to economists of exceptional mechanical aptitude. The time-sharing technology had the potential of bringing high quality data bases to researchers of providing them with the programs that would allow them to develop individual equations and to combine these equations into simulation models, and to evaluate their “satellite” models for historical analysis, contingency analysis and micro-forecasting. Such satellite models might encompass revenues and costs of their own industries or products, the detailed composition of unemployment, regional incomes, and the tax collections of governments.

These satellite models are constructed by users, at their own remote locations, combining their own data with the national data banks on the central computers. The programs allow the construction of the models and their on-line linkage to the centrally managed national models. Once the models are built, the particular company or government can quantitatively assess its own demand, costs, production, etc., assuming a particular macro-situation. It can see its own revenue and cost outlook assuming the central forecast, or alternatively what would happen if the economy should do better or worse. The micro-implications of changes in fiscal or monetary policy are also made apparent.

Besides making the tools that are our main stock-in-trade widely useable in the actual economy, the existence of such a system could accomplish these goals:

(1) There would be a rationally decentralized structure of information flows. The national data banks would be large and accessible, but local private information would remain where it belonged — in the confidential hands of the local analysts best equipped to use it.

(2) Analysis itself would be rationally decentralized. National forecasting could be done centrally with the use of lots of resources and with the benefit of an enormous data base and model collection. Micro forecasting would be done by the user organization itself.

(3) Micro-analysis would consider macro-environments as quantitative inputs. If the macro-forecasts are better than the crude assumptions previously made, the errors in micro-decisions should be reduced.

(4) As a result, the stability of the economy should be enhanced. There should be fewer and smaller mistakes in private and public economic decisions. Some of the benefits of indicative planning are realized without the political risks.

Once the basic ideas were clear, how was it to be done? The obvious possibilities were (1) a foundation financed project at Harvard; (2) persuade the government to undertake this work; (3) go to a large company  such as a computer manufacturer or bank; or (4) organize a new, small private enterprise. After some reflection, I decided that the new, small private enterprise form was the only suitable one. A Harvard project was ruled out immediately because of the poor experience with the Harvard Economic Barometers of the late 1920’s, an episode with which I was familiar from reading the archives of The Review of Economics and Statistics. Also, the system would require considerable operating staff for the computers, data banking, service and marketing. A university is not a good employer for such a staff nor a good working environment for these functions. I knew from my government experience that such a project was beyond the capacities of public agencies, at least in the United States, and budget stringency would have made federal funding unlikely, The large company would have posed difficult personal and political questions. Further, I felt that if the scheme were successful — and I had a good deal of faith in it — it could grow and reach its full potential by generating its own revenues. Finally, the idea of ultimately supporting my family from my main activities rather than “moonlighting” was attractive.

In 1968, Mitchell, Hutchins and Company, an investment firm with whom I was consulting, found the venture capital, an amount in seven figures. Donald Marron, its President, and I then co-founded DRI. The largest fraction of the capital was provided by First Security Corporation, an asset management group under the leadership of Mr. Robert Denison, a summa graduate of Harvard College and the Business School. The Board of Directors of the company are Mr. Marron, Mr. Denison, myself, and Mr. Stanton Armour, the Chairman of the Operating Committee of Mitchell, Hutchins.

The project required managers, econometricians, programmers, and computer experts. Mitchell, Hutchins managed the organization of the company, provided the initial business background and management, recruited personnel, etc. Dr. Charles Warden, previously special assistant to several chairmen of the CEA joined the company and took on many of its managerial burdens. Later on the company was organized into three divisions, each headed by a Vice-President.

Given the complexity and ambition of the scheme, I recognized that I needed the collaboration of the very best econometricians in terms of ideas, review and quality control. Mr. Marron and I, therefore, put together a founding consulting group, consisting of Jorgenson, Nerlove, Fromm, Feldstein, Hall and Thurow. This group made major contributions in the design stage. Today, the academic consultants mainly direct policy studies that DRI has been asked to undertake by government agencies and foundations. At all stages, the largest part of the work of developing and operating the DRI system and forecast was done by full-time professional employees of the company.

To help assure the widest application of the new techniques and to be able to offer alternative model forecasts, DRI entered into an agreement with the Wharton model group directed by Lawrence Klein. We continue to collaborate with them, and the Wharton model and its forecasts are maintained on the DRI computers. Subsequently, we have entered into arrangements with the model building group at the University of Toronto and with Nikkei, the sponsors of the Japan Economic Research Center.

As for the distribution of ownership, about half of the equity is in the hands of the institutions who provided the capital. Professional employees have ownership or options on another substantial fraction of shares, and my children and I own about a fifth of the shares. The academic consulting group has about 5% of the shares, received at the time of the founding of the company. All of the stock is restricted; it is not registered with the SEC and hence not saleable. The academic consultants are paid on a per diem basis as they actually spend time. In order to give the company a better start, I did not take any pay in the first three years; last year I began to receive a modest compensation.

(2) The Status of DRI Today

On the whole, my hopes and aspirations for DRI have been realized The economic data bases are the most comprehensive in existence and their accuracy is unquestioned. The econometric models have advanced that art in certain respects. The forecasts have been good and are now followed and reported quite widely. The people — management, research economists, service consultants, data processing and programming experts, and marketing — are capable and the organization is strong. While it inevitably takes time for new concepts and techniques to gain acceptance and be widely adopted, more than half of the fifty largest industrial companies and a large fraction of the financial institutions utilize the DRI system. Every major government agency involved in macro economic policy as well as every major data producing government agency is a user of the DRI system. The research environment created by the DRI data banks, software, models and computers has proved so attractive that even organizations with considerable internal facilities find it useful to have access. DRI as an organization has no political views, though individuals associated with the company can take any position they wish.

Our system has also been used by ten universities and colleges and we have just begun to develop special services for the state governments. As DRI is becoming better known and our communications network to our computers spreads to cover a far greater number of communities, we expect that more colleges and universities will find it possible to take advantage of these research facilities.

The company reached the break-even point in the twentieth month of operation after expending the larger part of the venture capital to create the initial version of the DRI system. It is now moderately profitable and earnings are advancing rapidly. Thus far, the capitalists have earned no return of dividends or interest. They have been extraordinarily forbearing in not pressing for quick returns, preferring to let the company use all of the resources in these early years to bring the DRI concept to full fruition. The probabilities are good that the investors will be handsomely rewarded over the next few years. Having taken the risk and waited, they will have earned their return.

(3) The Relation of DRI to Harvard University

Recognizing the sensitivity of this issue from the beginning, I have made sure that Data Resources produced a flow of benefits to Harvard and that Harvard would not provide resources to DRI. The Board of Directors, heavy with Harvard alumni, formally instructed me early in our development to provide free use of the DRI system to Harvard students. Quite a few have done so, including students on my small NSF project on prices and wages. This Fall, for the first time, I have a graduate working seminar in econometric model building. Each of the seven students enrolled is building his own model, simulating it, and writing a paper. The projects include the first econometric model of Ghana, a small scale two-country model of Canada and the United States, an exercise in policy optimization using the DRI model, a study to use macro models to estimate the changing distribution of income, a study of tax incidence using translog production functions, and a model of Venezuela. If this experimental seminar is successful, a lot more can be done, of course.

In terms of relations with professors, Feldstein and Jorgenson were members of the original academic consulting group, along with professors at MIT, Chicago, Brookings and Wharton. I direct and take responsibility for the DRI forecasts, working with full -time employees. The others have focussed on policy studies, including three major studies for the Joint Economic Committee which received considerable attention. They have also done studies for the U.S. Treasury, the Ford Foundation, etc. These studies have not been a significant source of profit to the company, but they surely help to build Data Resources as an authoritative source of economic analysis and serve the public interest.

DRI has had very limited relations with the non-tenured faculty in the Harvard Economics Department. We cooperated with the Department in January 1969 to make it possible for Barry Bosworth to assume his appointment a semester early when he wished to leave the Council of Economic Advisers. He did some useful research that spring and summer, most of which reached fruition in his subsequent papers at The Brookings Institution. His half-time support was transferred to a project at Harvard after one semester. Mel Fuss collaborated in the early stages of our analysis of automobile demand sponsored by General Motors. Bill Raduchel has done some consulting in the programming area with us, but this was always was a very minor part of his activities. While it would be improper to recount the precise role of myself or Feldstein and Jorgenson in the promotion considerations of these three men, it is perfectly obvious and easily documented that there is no substantive historical issue of DRI considerations entering into Harvard appointments. Bosworth went to Brookings before his appointment came up; Fuss and Raduchel were not promoted.

Perhaps this is the point to digress on my philosophy on Harvard promotions. I believe that assistant professors should be selected on the basis of professional promise, their potential contribution to the undergraduate teaching program and whatever publication record they already possess. Promotion to associate professor should mainly be based on research accomplishments as well as teaching performance, with both prerequisites. I have always strongly felt that collaboration in the research projects of senior professors should be given no weight in non-tenured appointments because of the considerable risk that the Harvard appointment thereby becomes a recruiting device for the personnel of these projects. In my years at Harvard, I have never asked the Department to appoint anyone whose presence would be useful to me, and I never will make such a request. To the best of my knowledge, Feldstein and Jorgenson have pursued the same policy. I recommend adoption of procedures that would assure that all of us avoid such appointments.

There are more intangible relations between DRI and Harvard which are hard to assess and easy to exaggerate. If I did not possess a professional reputation which has been enhanced by my professorship here my career would have been different, and I might not have received my extraordinary opportunities of public service. As far as the development of DRI is concerned, my greatest institutional indebtedness is to the Council of Economic Advisers. It was this experience which made me appreciate the importance of accurate and quick information and of the tremendous potential of using econometrics to bridge the gap between macro- and micro-economics. As far as the relations with our private and public clients are concerned, a sophisticated group containing numerous Harvard graduates, they understand perfectly well the tremendous diversity of people and ideas present at Harvard. They know that Harvard has no institutional position on political questions or on the merits or demerits of the existing social, political or economic system. It is also clear to them that Data Resources is a totally distinct entity. I am not responsible for your views and you will not be tainted by mine.

Your final question, whether “the kind of economics that serves corporate interest will take on an exaggerated importance when some of our ablest faculty members and students are working on such problems” is a deep philosophical one which I can only attempt to answer in this way. The Harvard Economics Department has always contained individuals with widely varying concepts of their role in life and preferences in their professional activities. Compared to its historical position, the Department at this time is exceptionally heavy in abstract theory and methodology, and in social philosophy and criticism of the existing order. I represent a different point of view that has always been common in our department. It is my aim to apply economics to the country’s problems in the belief that the existing system can be made to meet the needs of the good society. The development of Data Resources is my current personal expression of this philosophy.

Sincerely yours
[signed] Otto
Otto Eckstein

OE/gc

_____________________________

Feldstein reports being a satisfied user of DRI services

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

MARTIN S. FELDSTEIN
Professor of Economics

1737 CAMBRIDGE STREET, 617
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02128

January 9, 1973

Professor J. K. Galbraith
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Littauer 207

Dear Ken:

Although I was surprised by your letter, I am happy to describe my relations with Data Resources. I have been an “economic consultant” to DRI since it was organized. I would describe both the amount of work that I have done and my financial interest as very limited. Last year, my only DRI work was a study of the problem of unemployment that I did for the Congressional Joint Economic Committee. The Committee contracted with DRI for the study. DRI provided the use of the DRI model and data bank and the special computing facilities. Professor Robert Hall of MIT, another DRI consultant, worked on the study for a few days. The study, Lowering the Permanent Rate of Unemployment, was used as the background for hearings in October and will be published by the Committee this year. I am enclosing a copy for your interest. I might also note that although the work on this for DRI is now complete, I am planning to continue on my own to do research on some of the problems that I examined in this study. A graduate student who helped me during the summer became so interested in some of the questions of labor force participation that he is considering doing his thesis on that subject.

Before last year I worked on developing the financial sector of the Data Resources model. The basic work here was building a bridge between the usual Keynesian analysis and the Fisherian theory with its emphasis on the expected rate of inflation. My work here started as direct collaboration with Otto Eckstein; we published a joint paper, “The Fundamental Determinants of the Interest Rate,” in the 1970 Review of Economics and Statistics. This research led me to consider the importance of expected inflation in all studies of the impact of interest rates; I described my work on this in “Inflation, Specification Bias, and the Impact of Interest Rates” (Journal of Political Economy, 1970). Although further work on the financial sector is now done primarily by members of the DRI full-time staff, I did some work in 1971 on extending the analysis of expectations and testing alternative econometric models of expectations. This work is described in a recent paper, “Multimarket Expectations and the Rate of Interest” with Gary Chamberlain, that has been submitted for publication.

I have described my DRI studies in such detail to give you a sense of both the substance and nature of the work. It has been scientific research on substantively and technically interesting questions of macroeconomics and macroeconomic policy. I have also found the access to the DRI facilities, particularly the macroeconomic model system and data bank, to be useful in my other research and teaching.

I cannot believe that my association with DRI could create any of the problems that you indicate in your questions 5, 6 and 7. I believe that Otto is writing to you about the specific points that you raised about DRI in your questions 1 through 4. I hope that all of this material reassures you about the relations between DRI and members of our department.

Please call me if you have any further questions,

Sincerely,
[signed] Marty
Martin S. Feldstein

MSF:JT

Enclosure

_____________________________

Galbraith to Feldstein: You did not address my concern about “problems of conflict of interest”

January 19, 1973

Professor Martin S. Feldstein
Room 617
1737 Cambridge Street

Dear Marty:

Many thanks for your detailed — and good-humored — response. I’m grateful also for the JEC Study of which Otto spoke and which I am taking to Europe for my own reading. I have taken the liberty of giving a copy of your letter to Ed Mason who, as you perhaps know, is making a study of this whole problem.

As you can guess, I am untroubled by work done directly or through DRI for the government. I am concerned about the problems of conflict of interest that seem to me to arise when a corporation which owes its esteem to members of our Department markets profit-making services to other corporations. But this is something on which I should like to reserve comment until Ed Mason has come up with his conclusions.

Yours faithfully,

John Kenneth Galbraith

JKG:mjh

_____________________________

Jorgenson: I think you are barking up the wrong tree

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

January 22, 1973

DALE W. JORGENSON
Professor of Economics

1737 CAMBRIDGE STREET, ROOM 510
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138
(617) 495-4661

Temporary Address until 6/30/73:
Department of Economics
Stanford University
Stanford, California 94305

Professor John Kenneth Galbraith
Littauer 207
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Ken:

Many thanks for your letter of December 20 and your note of December 21. Let me take this occasion to thank you for the copy of your AEA Presidential Address you sent to members of the Department. It was a masterpiece of the genre and will be long remembered by its readers. I am very sorry that I was unable to attend your oral presentation at Toronto.

I share your deep concern over recent actions of the Department of Economics on non-tenure personnel, even though our views on these matters do not always coincide. In view of the strong feelings involved I found the discussion to be remarkably free of personal considerations. I hope that I have not been a party to what you describe as a less than gracious response to vour own views. If I have, I hope that you will accept my apologies.

Since your letter is addressed to Otto Eckstein, Martin Feldstein and myself, I will limit this response to my own role in DRI. I am a stockholder and consultant to DRI and have been for almost four years. In my work for DRI, I have acted as a consultant to several U.S. government agencies and to the Ford Foundation. I have had only one corporate client for my services. My main current activity for DRI is a study of energy policy for the Ford Foundation.

DRI provides a unique environment for certain types of research in applied econometrics. My current work on energy policy would be infeasible without the DRI system. The computer software, computerized data bank, and econometric forecasting system have been indispensable in modeling the energy sector and in studying the effects of economic policies related to energy. The facilities available at DRI have reduced the burden of data processing and computation for econometric model-building by several orders of magnitude.

To my mind the two most important features of the DRI system are its high quality from the scientific point of view and its ability to assimilate the results of research and to make them available for routine application. The data bank is unparalleled in scope and reliability and is constantly expanding as new sources of data are made available. The computer software package is highly sophisticated and is under continuous development as new econometric methods are designed. The forecasting system is the core of DRI’s operations and has undergone a process of improvement and extension that has continued up to the present.

The performance of the DRI system is the main source of attraction for DRI’s clients. This is certainly the case for my study of energy policy. You raise a general question about the concerns of DRI’s clients and the views of members of Harvard’s Department of Economics. In my experience there is no connection, either positive or negative. The clients of DRI are buying the services of DRI. As I have already indicated, this is a rather unusual product, unavailable at any university economics department, including Harvard’s.

On the issue of non-tenured members of the Department of Economics who are also employee-consultants of DRI, I have not employed any non-tenured members of the Department in my work for DRI, as I indicated in our telephone conversation. I find it difficult to envision circumstances in which any conflict of interest related to junior appointments could arise from my DRI association. There have been no such circumstances in the past.

I hope that these observations help to clarify the issues you raise

Yours sincerely,
[signed] Dale
Dale W. Jorgenson

DWJ: cg

cc: E. Mason, J. Dunlop, H. Rosovsky, R. Caves, J. Duesenberry, O. Eckstein, M. Feldstein

_____________________________

Galbraith back to Jorgenson: we need to avoid even the appearance of a  “conflict of interest”

Gstaad. Switzerland
February 13, 1973

Professor Dale W. Jorgenson
Department of Economies
Stanford University
Stanford, California 94305

Dear Dale:

Many thanks for your letter and for your nice comments. I hope life goes well for you at Stanford. I am writing this from Switzerland where I am on the final pages of what I intend shall be my last major effort on economics. When I get tired I propel myself across the snow and think how good the mountains in the winter would be in a world where one did not feel obliged to take exercise.

I must say that my attention after writing was shifted to yet another of our corporations of which, to my annoyance, I was unaware. It functions currently, I gather, as a subsidiary of the antitrust problems of IBM.

I do feel that there are serious problems here. Participation in the management of the Department, especially in the selection and recruitment of personnel, and in the management of a profit-making enterprise are bound to involve if not the reality of conflict of interest then the appearance of conflict. Appointments, it will be held, are influenced by what influences corporate customers or needs. This must be avoided. It is especially clear if the corporation sells such services as antitrust defense. But it is also the case if the corporation becomes large and successful —, as I would judge, DRI is certain and deservedly to be.

The proper course, as I have suggested to Ed Mason and informally to Otto, is not to deny any professor the right to participation in a profit-making enterprise. Rather it is to separate the two management roles. A man should be free to have an active ownership role in a corporation or an active position in Department management. He should not do both. This would obviate problems of conflict or seeming conflict and protect the positions of all concerned. Needless to say, I would have the same rule apply to all.

Yours faithfully,

John Kenneth Galbraith

JKG:mjh

cc: E. Mason, J. Duesenberry, O. Eckstein, M. Feldstein, R. Caves, H. Rosovsky, F. Ford

_____________________________

“Economics Dept. Reports On Faculty’s Outside Ties”
by Fran R. Schumer. Harvard Crimson, March 20, 1973

A committee in the Economics Department reported yesterday that business connections between Economics professors and outside corporations do not interfere with hiring decisions and teaching practices.

James S. Duesenberry, chairman of the three-man committee, said yesterday that business ties do not impose a conservative bias on the Department’s hiring practices and do not limit the faculty’s teaching time.

Complaints

The committee’s investigation was prompted by complaints raised last term by John Kenneth Galbraith, Warburg Professor of Economics.

Galbraith attributed the Department’s “conservative hiring practices” to faculty members’ ties with business firms. “The fact that the Department sells its services to American business firms biases its administrative decisions,” Galbraith said.

Despite the committee’s negative findings, Otto Eckstein, professor of Economics and president of Data Resources Inc., a consulting firm, has requested to go on half-time status at Harvard, effective September 1.

Eckstein said yesterday that his decision resulted from Galbraith’s complaints and a new rule prohibiting professors from spending more than one day a week consulting. The rule, previously implicit, was formally written into University law this year.

Galbraith voiced objections to faculty members’ business ties several weeks after the Department’s decision last December not to rehire two radical economists.

At that time, Galbraith told Duesenberry that “business ties necessarily impair the faculty’s ability to impartially judge economists, especially radical economists.”

Galbraith also complained that the Department’s decision last December not to promote William J. Raduchel, assistant professor of Economics, was based on the quality of Raduchel’s work for an outside Resources had little influence on the consulting firm and not on his research and teaching abilities in the Department.

Raduchel is a consultant for Data Resources Inc. and is also a sectionman for Galbraith’s course, Social Science 134, “The Modern Society.”

The committee, composed of Duesenberry, Arthur Smithies, Ropes Professor of Political Economy, and Richard E. Caves, Stone Professor of International Trade, reported last January that Raduchel’s work for Data Resources had no influence on the Department’s decision.

The committee also reported that outside ties do not prejudice the Department’s hiring decisions and do not interfere with normal administrative functioning.

The committee reported its findings only to Duesenberry, the chairman of the Economics Department. Committee members refused to comment on how they investigated the problem.

Duesenberry attributed Galbraith’s objections to the Department’s decision not to promote Raduchel. “Galbraith is annoyed because his boy didn’t get promoted,” he said.

Raduchel told The Crimson last month that he was satisfied with the Department’s decision not to promote him. He said that the decision had “nothing to do with my connection to Data Resources, and was based on my academic work.”

Eckstein agreed with Duesenberry’s conclusion that Raduchel’s work at Data Resources had little influence on the Department’s decision.

Explaining his own position at Data Resources Inc. Eckstein said that his case is no different than that of other faculty members who do consulting work.

Currently, at least three senior faculty members and one junior faculty members do consulting work at Data Resources.

Eckstein described consulting work an inevitable product of Harvard’s hiring policies. “Harvard naturally attracts people who get involved in the outside world,” he explained.

He said that he has a “clear conscience” about the work he is doing at Harvard.

_____________________________

Galbraith to Chairman Duesenberry:

Gstaad, Switzerland
March 27, 1973

Professor James S. Duesenberry
Littauer M-8

Dear Jim:

Herewith some good-humored thoughts on our final talk the other day about our corporate affiliates. As you request, I will now leave the problem to the President, Steiner and whomever.

  1. Although both you and Henry Rosovsky had earlier expressed discomfort about our corporation and some action now seems in prospect, you say I’m severely viewed for raising the issue. Isn’t this a little hard? The important thing, I suggest, is to get things right. However, although given my sensitive soul it has been difficult, I have steeled myself over the years to the idea of not being universally loved.
  2. You say that the bias from combining business entrepreneurship with professorial activities in the eye of some of our colleagues is not greater than that deriving from my (or Marc Roberts’) support of George McGovern. I somehow doubt that the faculty would agree. There is indication of difference, I think, in the way one reacts. I do not find myself shrinking especially from identification even with anything now so widely condemned as the McGovern campaign. I detect a certain desire to avoid public discussion of our corporations.
  3. In keeping with the desire for reticence, I told Ed Mason I wouldn’t talk with the press. The Crimson tells me that you have explained that I raised the issue only out of pique over the non-promotion of Raduchel. Isn’t this a bit one-sided? However, beyond denying any such deeply unworthy motive, I’ll stick to my agreement, always reserving the right of self-defense.
  4. As to my motives, so far as I can judge them, I did feel that Raduchel got judged on his corporate work, while — as Smithies and I both complained — there was no consultation with those who best knew about his teaching. His teaching has been very good. I suggest that we are always in favor of improving undergraduate teaching in principle but not in practice. Also I do not agree that he was unpromotable. He has a lively, resourceful mind and has worked hard for the University and the students. I think him far, far better than the dull technicians we do carry to the top of our nontenured ranks, possibly even beyond.
  5. But, as I probe my soul for the purest available motive, it was not Raduchel. I simply think that, when a professor speaks or acts on a promotion, we should know that he is doing it as a professor and not as a businessman.
  6. I had thought that the separation of our business arrangements from the Department management might be a solution, with the proposed withdrawal of voting rights from the aged as a precedent. This, I gather, will not wash, so I subside. As Ed Mason tactfully hints, I’ve had enough lost causes for one year.

I do have one final thought. In accordance with the well-known tendencies of free enterprise at this level, one day one of these corporations is going to go down with a ghastly smash. It will then be found, in its days of desperation or before, to have engaged in some very greasy legal operations. The Department and the University will be held by the papers to have a contingent liability. It will be hard to preserve reticence then. It would have been better to have taken preventative action now.

Conforming to your wish that I restrict communications on this subject, I’m not circulating this letter. But would it trouble you If I added it discreetly to the file in the President’s office? Do let me know.

Yours faithfully,

John Kenneth Galbraith

JKG:mjh

Source: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. John Kenneth Galbraith Personal Papers. Series 5 Harvard University File, 1949-1990. Box 526. Folder “Harvard Dept. of Economics. Discussion of appointments, outside interests and reorganization, 1972-1973 (1 of 2)”.

Image Sources: John Kenneth Galbraith (1978), Harvard University Archives; Otto Eckstein (April 1969), Harvard University Archives; Martin Feldstein (ca. 1974), Newton Free Library, Digital Commonwealth, Massachusetts Collections Online; Dale Jorgenson. (1968). John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation.

Categories
Economics Programs Fields Harvard

Harvard. Report of Economics Department Visiting Committee. Brimmer, 1974

 

The first African American to have served as a governor of the Federal Reserve System  (1966-1974) was the Harvard economics Ph.D. (1957), Andrew F. Brimmer (1926-2012). Brimmer was a loyal alumnus who served his doctoral alma mater on the Harvard Board of  Overseers and as a member/chair of the visiting committee for the economics department

This post provides the 37 page text of the 1974 Visiting Committee Report on conditions in the Harvard economics department. The topics of radical economics, hiring, tenure and promotion, and the deep dissatisfaction of about half of the economics graduate students with Harvard’s Ph.D. curriculum are all covered in this fairly remarkable document.

_________________________

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO VISIT THE
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

[Andrew F. Brimmer, Chairman (April 15, 1974)]

I. Introduction

General Impression: The Committee found the Department of Economics under a great deal of stress, and it left with considerable concern for its future effectiveness. The Committee observed some disagreements within the senior faculty, but the major division appears to be between the latter as a group and perhaps half the graduate students. The factors giving rise to this division are numerous and complex, but one element stands out above all others: a substantial proportion of the graduate students are convinced that the senior faculty has little interest in teaching them and is not concerned with their welfare. A strong sense of alienation pervades the Department, and the frustration is evident on the part of a significant number of nontenured faculty members as well as among graduate students. On the other hand, the undergraduate concentrators seem to be much more contented than they were a few years ago.

The Committee was deeply troubled about this state of affairs—because on previous visits it had found a far different situation. For example, in its Report for the academic years 1969-71, it concluded:

“…The Department of Economics is in excellent condition. In addition to first-class leadership and fine internal condition, it enjoys the best of reputations. Its graduate school received the top rating in the recent canvas made by the American Council on Education. As we were able to see for ourselves during the visitations, the standard of teaching is very high and the work produced impressive….” 1/

1/ “Report of the Committee to Visit the Department of Economics for the Academic Years, 1969-71,” November 22, 1971, Number Two, p. 7

Against that background, the condition of the Department at the time of the last visit was particularly disturbing. A significant proportion of the members had served on the Committee during previous visits, and they were able to compare the present atmosphere to that which prevailed on previous occasions. For them, the sharpness of the deterioration in attitudes and relationships within the Department was particularly distressing.

Having reported these pessimistic impressions at the very outset, it must also be stressed that the Department of Economics at Harvard remains at the very forefront of the economics profession, For instance, at the time of the Committee’s visit, a senior member of the faculty [Wassily Leontief] was absent—because he was in Europe to accept the 1973 Nobel Prize in Economics, thus joining two other colleagues in the Department [Simon Kuznets (1971), Kenneth Arrow (1972)] who have received this signal honor. In a number of fields (especially in Economic Theory and Econometrics), the Department is at or close to the apex of the profession. Its members are also conducting first-class work in most of the applied fields. Moreover, as discussed more fully below, the Department has appointed a number of committees to re-examine its program. The expected recommendations—if adopted—will undoubtedly correct some of the deficiencies noted in this report. Thus, while economics at Harvard is going through a number of strains, it is by no means on the edge of dissolution.

The Visitation: The Committee met in Cambridge on the evening of December 10 and all day December 11, 1973. Fifteen of the 20 members of the Committee were present for all or a substantial part of the visit. An agenda identifying the main topics to be covered—along with supporting material—had been distributed in advance.

The issue of “Radical Economics” at Harvard was a matter of considerable interest to a number of Committee members, and several had requested that it be given a high priority on the agenda. Reflecting this interest, a number of contemporary items of information were circulated. In addition, an excerpt, “Much Ado About Economics,” from James B. Conant’s My Several Lives, was sent to Committee members. In this chapter, Dr. Conant discussed the controversy evoked by the report of the Committee which visited the Department of Economics in 1950. In its public report, the Committee (through its chairman) criticized the Department for a lack of “balance with respect to the viewpoints of its members.” In essence, The Committee at that time found that the Department had a number of “Socialists,” “Keynesians,” and “advocates of Government control of the economy”; but it found no one on the faculty with opposing views. It concluded that the situation should be corrected. The criticism against the Department which attracted the present Committee’s interest was the charge that political bias on the part of senior members of the faculty influenced the decision not to give tenure to one or more younger members identified as “radical economists.” So, while the specific facts were different, the basic issues were quite similar.

Several other specific issues had been identified in advance, and one or more members of the Visiting Committee had been asked to take responsibility to see that they were not overlooked. Among these were: (1) the quality of undergraduate teaching; (2) the quality of instruction in the first-year graduate courses, and (3) the Department’s affirmative action program.

During its visit, the Committee met separately with representatives of the tenured and non-tenured-faculty. It also met separately with undergraduates. The Committee was invited to a specially-called meeting of the Graduate Economics Club, and a number of faculty members also attended. Several of the Committee members also attended some of the classes which were then in session. On the basis of these contacts, the Committee formed a number of impressions and reached a number of conclusions. These are discussed in the following sections. The Committee also made several suggestions to the Department, and some of these are indicated in the text. Finally, the Committee weighed several recommendations, but agreement could not be reached on some of them. The outcome of that discussion is reported in the final section of this report. At the Chairman’s request, several of the Committee members prepared written accounts of their impressions, and others communicated orally with him following the visit. The Chairman drew extensively on these accounts — as well as on notes taken during the visit — in the preparation of this report.

 

II. Structure of the Department

The Department of Economics at Harvard is a fairly large organization. As shown in Table 1, there were 132 persons holding appointments in the Department during the 1973-74 academic year. Fifty-two of these had primary appointments in the Department, and seven held joint appointments with other units of the University. Three were visitors from other institutions. There were also 70 teaching fellows all of whom were graduate students. There were also 11 persons from other faculties offering instruction in the Department. Four of these had their primary appointments in the Kennedy School and two in the Business School.

Table 1. Faculty of the Department of Economics
Academic Year, 1973-74
Economics Faculty Other Faculty Offering Instruction
Professional Chairs 10 Kennedy School
Professors 10 Professors 2
Associate Professors 6 Associate Professors 1
Assistant Professors 14 Lecturer 1
Lecturers 12 Sub-Total 4
Sub-Total 52
Joint Faculty Business School
Professors 5 Professor 1
Assistant Professors 2 Assistant Professor 1
Sub-Total 7 Sub-Total 2
Visiting Faculty Other Schools
Professor 2 Professors 3
Lecturers 1 Associate Professors 2
Sub-Total 3 Sub-Total 5
Total 62 Total 11
Teaching Fellows 70
Grand Total 132

The size of the Department has been fairly stable in recent years — following a noticeable expansion during the first half of the 1960’s. For example, in the Fall of 1959-60, there were 55 members; by the Fall of 1966-67, there were 118. So the 132 in the Department during 1973-74 represented a gain of 12 per cent over the last seven years. It should be noted, however, that all of the members reported do not devote full time to the Department. The average teaching fellow spends about one-third of this time in the classroom while the remainder is devoted to research (primarily in the preparation of dissertations). Most of the Assistant Professors teach roughly half time and are involved in some variety of research for the remainder. Those members holding joint appointments are also engaged in on-going research for a significant part of their work load. Finally, during any given period, a number of the members will be on leave to pursue independent projects. For the 1973-74 academic year, eight faculty members were scheduled to be on leave for the full year. Three others were to be absent in the Fall term and four others during the Spring. A number of faculty members also had reduced teaching loads because they had bought off a fraction of their time via research grants. The figures in Table 2 show the number of faculty members on a full-time equivalent basis for each rank.

As indicated in Table 3, roughly half of the Economics Department’s faculty (excluding teaching fellows) have tenure. However, quite contrary to the impression frequently gotten by casual observers—the tenured members of the Department carry a sizable share of the teaching load at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. Moreover, as shown in Table 4, the proportion of undergraduate courses taught by the tenured faculty has risen significantly over the last ten years. In contrast, the proportion of graduate courses taught by the senior members has declined somewhat. During the 1972-73 academic year (not shown in Table 4), tenured faculty taught 20 of the 36 undergraduate courses offered. There were 18 tenured members in residence during the year, and 16 of them taught at least a one-semester course offered primarily for undergraduates. Moreover, all of them were available to advise on theses and to supervise independent work. Nevertheless, teaching fellows still carry a significant share of the total teaching load in the Department.

Table 2. Number of Economics Faculty Members on a Full-Time Equivalent Basis,
By Rank
Academic
Year
Full
Professors
Assoc. & Ass’t. Professors Lecturers Teaching
Fellows
1973-74 15.75 11.05 4.25 2.6
Est. for 1974-75 14.25 12.00 2.00 19.1

 

Table 3. Tenure Status of the Economics Faculty
Academic Years 1970-71 and 1971-72
Academic
Year
Total
Faculty
Tenured Professors Non-Tenured Professors
Number Per Cent Number Per Cent
1970-71 71 29 41 42 59
1971-72 53 25 47 28 53

 

Table 4. Number of Economics Courses Taught, By Status of Faculty,
Selected Academic Years
Term and Status
of Faculty
Number of Undergraduate Courses
(Exc. Junior & Senior Tutorials)
Number of Graduate
Courses
1953-54 1962-63 1971-72 1953-54 1962-63 1971-72
Fall Term
Tenured 6 8 14 23 25 25
Non-Tenured 8 6 11 5 5 12
Total 14 14 25 28 30 37
Tenured as per cent of total 43 57 56 82 83 68
Spring Term
Tenured 7 6 15 24 29 27
Non-Tenured 10 11 11 5 5 11
Total 17 17 26 29 34 38
Tenured as per cent of total 41 35 58 83 85 71

 

III. Trends in Enrollment

Undergraduates: The Department has continued to attract a substantial proportion of all undergraduates to its courses. For example, it is estimated that nearly half of all undergraduates were attracted at least to Economics 10—the introduction to economics. Fall term enrollment in this course in recent years is shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Fall Term Enrollment in Economics 10
Year Number Year Number
1965 774 1970 553
1966 828 1971 570
1967 734 1972 706
1968 732 1973 987
1969 535

These figures indicate that enrollment in the introductory course has surpassed the previous peak set in the Fall of 1966. In fact, while enrollment declined by over one-third between 1966 and 1969, the recovery in enrollment since the low point was reached amounted to more than four-fifths through the Fall of 1973.

The Department continues to attract about 7 per cent of all undergraduates as concentrators. Trends over recent years are shown in Table 6.

Table 6. Undergraduate Enrollment
Academic
Year
Number of Economics Concentrators
(3 years)
Per Cent of All Concentrators Harvard/
Radcliffe
Ratio
Course Enroll. Below 300 Level
(Student Sem.)
Economics as Per Cent of Arts & Sciences
1968-69 346 7.4 4.4 3,510 6.4
1969-70 292 6.4 5.5 3,437 6.4
1970-71 288 6.2 4.2 3,588 6.8
1971-72 301 6.4 4.5 3,542 7.0
1972-73 315 6.7 3.8 N.A. N.A.

These results have been achieved in the face of expanding competition from new concentration options offered elsewhere in Harvard and Radcliffe Colleges. The Department’s share of concentrators has been rising somewhat in recent years. However, it still remains well below what it was in the past-for example, 9.8 per cent in 1953 and 8.6 per cent in 1966. Moreover, economics continues to appeal substantially less to Radcliffe students than it does to those in Harvard College. Thus, the figures reported above suggest that men are about four times as likely to concentrate in economics as are women. This situation has existed for many years, and the presence of several women on the economics faculty seems not to have enhanced the Department’s appeal to women undergraduates. In the years ahead, the Department plans to place special emphasis on broadening enrollment of Harvard and Radcliffe undergraduates.

The figures presented above also show that the Department’s courses above the introductory (but below the graduate) level have been competing reasonably well in comparison with other undergraduate offerings.

Graduate Students: The figures in Table 7 show trends in graduate student enrollment and doctorates granted in recent years.

Table 7. Graduate Enrollment and Doctorates Awarded
Academic Year Graduate Students Doctorates Awarded
1968-69 159 28
1969-70 183 28
1970-71 171 33
1971-72 151 37
1972-73 161 28
1973-74 158

These data suggest that roughly one-sixth to one-fifth of the graduate students enrolled complete the requirements and receive the doctorate each year. As a rule, the typical Ph.D. candidate spends about two years taking courses and in other ways preparing for the generals examinations—normally taken toward the end of the second year. The next phase of the work involves the preparation of a dissertation and a special examination. The median time covered by this phase was in the neighborhood of 32 months for the group completing the Ph.D. degree in 1964-65, compared with 57 months for those doing so in 1954-55. Since the mid-1960’s, the median time probably has been shorted further.

As shown in Table 8, the range of specialization of those completing the Ph.D. in economics at Harvard continues to be quite wide. Among the various fields, however, Economic Development continues to be the most popular field. It accounted for about one-fifth of degrees granted during the four years shown. Money and Banking and Econometrics (the next most popular fields) each accounted for about one-tenth of the degrees awarded. Several of the traditional fields (such as Economic Theory, International Trade, Labor Economics, and Public Finance) each accounted for about 5 per cent of the total number of degrees. The emergence of several newer fields of interest—such as Urban Economics, Environmental Economics, and Socio-Economic Structure—should also be noted.

Table 8. Fields of Specialization of Ph.D. Recipients, Selected Years
Special Field 1965-66 1967-68 1971-72 1972-73
TOTAL 29 35 37 28
1. Agriculture 1 1
2. Chinese Studies 1 1
3. Comparative Economic Systems 1
4 Economic Development 4 12 6 6
5. Economic Growth 2
6. Economic History 1 2 3 1
7. Economic Theory 2 1 2 3
8. Econometrics 4 5 3
9. Environmental Economics 1
10. Health Economics 1 1
11. Industrial Organization 1 1 3
12. Input-Output Economics 2
13. International Trade 3 2 2 1
14. Labor Economics 2 2 3
15. Managerial Economics 1
16. Mathematical Economics 2 1
17. Money and Banking 1 3 4 4
18. Public Finance 2 2 2 1
19. Public Utilities 1
20. Regional Economics 1 2
21. Socio-Economic Structure 1
22. Soviet Economics 1 1
23. Statistics 1
24. Transportation 2 1 1
25. Urban Economics 4 2
26. Water Resources 1

 

IV. Departmental Atmosphere

As I have indicated above, the Committee encountered a greatly disturbed environment. One member of the Committee, who had participated in several previous visits, took special note of the strengths as well as the weaknesses within the Department:

“…As for the divisions in the department, the major one by far is between the senior faculty and about 50% of the graduate students. This is the problem that particularly distressed me, and the one which really threatens the future effectiveness of the department. There are, to be sure, disagreements within the senior faculty on issues dramatized by the decision (not to grant tenure to Professor Samuel Bowles). But I do not believe that — absent the unrest of the graduate students — they are beyond normal academic expectations or outside the capacity of the department for accommodation and compromise. Within the senior faculty there is still the civility and mutual respect needed for a functioning, self-governing department. I say this partly because I have recently visited another economics department where this condition does not obtain.

“The undergraduates seemed reasonably content with the program. …A minority of them are concerned about the loss of radical economists, but there was not as strong an undergraduate voice on this issue as might have been expected. As elsewhere, undergraduate radicalism is much weaker than it was five years ago.

“The complaints of junior faculty seemed to me much the same in kind and intensity as on previous visits. They have to do with the impersonality of the place, the lack of community, the inaccessibility of senior faculty, the division of the department into research empires which communicate very little with each other. In addition, junior faculty often express sympathy with the complaints of graduate students about the curriculum and the quality of instruction. At the same time, junior faculty do recognize the very great advantages of the Harvard environment for their own research and intellectual development. And they also participate with devotion and enthusiasm in the teaching programs of the department, and in the work of the various committees for curricular reform.

“The critical problem is the alienation of the graduate students. The most distressing thing is not that there are radicals among them, but that the general shortcomings of graduate instruction have alienated so many students of all persuasions. The radicals have evidently been able to capitalize on this discontent to make recruits among successive waves of students. Otherwise it is hard to understand how a movement which has waned rapidly in economics on other campuses and in other departments at Harvard continues to be so strong. It may also be true that some of the appeal of Bowles et. al. was that they cultivated a solicitude for students in contrast to the indifference perceived in “straight” faculty.

“In my own department radical dissent regarding the methodology of economics, the organization of our program, and the substance of economics has been expressed with emphasis but almost never with hostility and distrust toward the faculty as individuals or as an institution. So I found the tone of hostility and distrust at the Harvard (Graduate Economic Club) meeting very distressing. And of course I was quite impressed that about half of the graduate students were there, and that among them only one person said he was having a really good educational experience. I realize that the 50% present were not representative, but that’s a lot of students in itself and evidently the satisfied students didn’t have strong enough feelings to show up.

“The criticisms of first year courses are not new. We heard a couple of years ago that the theory course was a heavy dose of technical mathematics with no attempt at elucidation of basic economic content. Since then the course has shifted teachers again (frequent shifting is one of its problems), but remains a problem. It is much too large (maybe 80) for effective teaching. For the richest university, that is disgraceful.

“The general reputation of the senior faculty is that they are inaccessible, unapproachable, that they know and see only the few students who have gained access to their empires. No one serves for graduate students the functions performed by junior faculty for undergraduates, as teachers, advisers, tutors, friends. This really must be changed, even at some expense in research output and in outside activities of faculty. As things stand, I would not advise a bright … senior to go to the Harvard department unless he was of such a specialized interest and talent that he clearly could become a student protégé of one of the giants of the Harvard department.

“Perhaps the reduction in size of the graduate student body and the appointment of more non-tenure associate professors who will be active in graduate instruction will improve the situation. But that will not be enough. The senior faculty seems to me overly complacent about the situation, perhaps because they have been so close to it so long that they have forgotten what a decent and civilized community of faculty and graduate students is like.

“Unfortunately it will take time to recreate one at Harvard even if the faculty tries to do so. I don’t think it takes a drastic reformation of the curriculum so much as greater dedication to teaching, the use of smaller classes, assistants in first year courses, etc.”

Still another member of the Visiting Committee addressed himself to the atmosphere in the Department:

“…At the very outset, I think (one must not get) the impression of a deeper split within the senior faculty than actually exists. The division of opinion over Bowles involved only a small minority (not-by the way—a bloc that would hold together on many issues) and represented the sort of difference of opinion that any large faculty must expect to have. Had it not been for the size and intensity of the reaction from graduate students, nothing much would have followed from the Bowles decision. The real split in the department is between most of the senior faculty and a substantial fraction of the graduate student body. That, in turn, is a compound of radical dissidence and much broader student discontent with the teaching and conduct of the graduate program. The most striking aspect of the situation, in some ways, is how little the senior faculty seems to care. To give a clear picture of the department, I think (one must note) the contrast between the turbulence down below and the disaffection of some assistant professors on the one hand, and the fact that at the top things are really quite serene, large amounts of excellent research are getting done, and the faculty is justifiably pleased with its place and performance in the profession. That dichotomy is very important. The Overseers should realize that actions taken to fix some of the bad things may have unexpected effects on the good things…”

In a letter written following the visit, another member of the Committee also captured the essence of the prevailing conditions:

“… The distressing morale situation in the Economics Department shook me profoundly. I know enough to recognize the normal level of gripes in the special pleadings to which one is always open in such a situation, but the reactions of the various academic people on the Committee and that Law School professor at the (Graduate Economics Club) meeting confirm to me that things are really bad.

“…The argument about the radical professors probably pinpoints the entire problem, which is one of alienation between the tenured faculty (most of them, anyway) and all the rest of the department – faculty and students. There is a feeling that nobody cares…. Add to that the clear and unhappy failure to cope with the challenges it must meet (and perhaps was itself the cause of these problems), and the impatience and frustration of the younger people with the conventional … ‘received doctrine’ is only natural.

“…I have never heard the word ‘disappointment’ used so often. One shocking comment at the lunch with the non-tenured faculty was that, ‘It’s almost impossible to get a senior faculty person to read our research papers, but that’s easy in comparison with getting them to look at a reading list of a course we are preparing.’ The conscious and persistent rejection of discussion or Socratic teaching techniques in the classroom is hardly the proper way to help students to master a complex and essentially analytical rather than descriptive subject.

“The contrast with my days as an undergraduate is striking. We knew, took classes with, and spent time with all the great stars of our time—Hansen, Williams, Schumpeter, Mason, Leontief, Chamberlin, Haberler, Machlup, etc. All but the largest classes were full of active discussion and argument. The younger faculty was in ferment about Keynesianism and was just jamming it down the throats of the older faculty—who listened, argued, and clarified. I have never stopped going back to my class notes or the annotations in our books. The whole thing has never lost its relevance, fascination, or utility over the … years. This is what Harvard should do and must do to justify its reputation and importance, but that is precisely what it is not doing now.”

One member (who has visited the Department on several other occasions) focused on another impression shared by a number of others on the Committee. Following the visit, he wrote:

“…For the first time (in several years of) visitations (they were annual prior to the recent innovation)…I feel that the department is in great need of leadership. This conclusion is the result of a number of factors. Among them:

“1. While the department is unquestionably the finest in the country, the aura of leadership stems primarily from research activities. Teaching is another and a considerably spottier story. While the samples we observed were highly selective, they were not good.

“2. The furor over the radical economists does not seems to me to be related nearly as much to the facts as to the way in which the situation has been handled. That Harvard is alone among all universities in being in this position would tend to support this conclusion.

“3. The Harvard Economic Research Institute was a device for channeling research funds to the department. It has been allowed to run down completely. As much as faculty members may like the idea of additional funds being available, there seems no plan for replacing this source. Without such a plan and organized approach, it seems unlikely to me they will be replaced.

“4. I gather Ed Mason’s international activity is about to go out of business. I do not know the full story.

“5. The feeling persists among students (and this is not new) that the Economics Department lacks a ‘personality’ and interest in the student as an individual. As a result, they feel ‘at sea’.

“6. The impression I had from the students, at least, is that the number of socially relevant policy courses is limited (probably wrong) and that it is only the radical economists who are interested in teaching them (probably also wrong) and that these are the kinds of subjects on which students want to spend their time (with which I completely sympathize). If the students are right, this is a bad state of affairs. The fact that this is their perception of reality also seems to me a poor state of affairs.

“I am sure that each of these has its rationale and history. Yet, however much each requires the kind of careful handling one normally associates with management of professional staffs, none of these situations is necessary. Taken together, they worry me. My impression is that if we had time to study the issues truly important to the department’s future, we might well find they lacked the kind of forceful handling they should have….”

The assessment of the Department by a new member of the Committee was as follows:

“…My impression of the concern expressed by both the undergraduate and graduate students was threefold: (1) radical economics; (2) ‘relevant’ courses; and (3) a demonstrated concern for and interest in teaching and students. It seemed that the ‘radical’ economists were lecturing on topics of great interest to the students and were good, concerned teachers. Thus, I would like to emphasize that the Department not only broaden its course offerings but make evident, in a visible, systematic and continuing fashion that a priority function is teaching undergraduates and graduates…”

Again, it must be emphasized that the Committee’s exposure was necessarily short, and it may not have gotten a fully rounded picture of the prevailing situation. On the other hand, the fact that Committee members who have seen the Department over several years got the same impression must be given a great deal of weight.

 

V. Undergraduate Instruction Program

The Committee encountered few criticisms with respect to the undergraduate program offered by the Department of Economics. This was in noticeable contrast to the situation just a few years ago. At that time, students complained about the quality of tutorial programs and the lack of an opportunity to pursue joint majors with other substantive fields. During the 1972-73 academic year, the Department greatly expanded the amount of instruction provided on an individual or small group basis. As part of the initial effort, 20 sophomores received individual tutoring with highly favorable results. As a consequence, individual tutorial will become a permanent option — while group instruction will also be available for those students who prefer it. All concentrators have the option to participate in junior tutorial, and the option is being elected by an increasing number of such students. A senior thesis workshop has been in operation for more than a year. This program (led by a senior faculty member) provides an opportunity for seniors pursuing honors to explain and defend their research proposals well in advance of the March date on which the theses are due.

For the last few years, the Undergraduate Instruction Committee (UIC) has circulated questionnaires in all undergraduate courses in Economics to permit students to evaluate each course. The questions have focused on matters such as (1) the lecturer’s ability to hold interest; (2) overall evaluation of lectures; (3) overall evaluation of reading material; (4) helpfulness of sections; (5) preparation of section leaders; (6) fairness in grading; (7) attainment of initial expectations, and (8) overall impression of course. Each of these elements is rated on a scale of 9 for excellent, 7 for good, 5 for average, etc. The mean evaluation of undergraduate courses (weighted by enrollment) taught in the Fall term of 1971-72 was 6.65. (The standard deviation was 1.63) The highest score was achieved by junior tutorial groups, and several intermediate lecture courses followed fairly closely behind. A rough summary of the students’ evaluation of courses taught in the academic year 1972-73 (unweighted by enrollment) suggests that the overall assessment was about the same as in the previous year.

During the Committee’s visit, however, representatives of the Undergraduate Instruction Committee made two recommendations affecting the undergraduate program. The first related to the procedures of the Faculty Subcommittee on the Undergraduate Curriculum. The UIC expressed apprehension over the possibility that the Faculty Subcommittee might recommend major changes in the objectives and curriculum of the Economics Department without providing an ample opportunity for economics concentrators to discuss the proposals. The UIC strongly urged against such a course. After meeting with UIC, members of the Visiting Committee reported this concern to the chairman of the Faculty Subcommittee and were assured that no definitive action would be taken without proper consultation with undergraduate concentrators.

The second recommendation concerned the place of “radical” economics at Harvard. The UIC stated that:

“…it is clear to the committee that the Department of Economics should provide opportunities for undergraduate study in all major areas of economic theory. ‘Radical’ (Marxist) economic theory, as taught by Professors Bowles, Gintis, MacEwan, and Marglin, is a major alternative to neoclassical economic theory. The possibility exists that none of these faculty members will be teaching at Harvard during the academic year 1974-75. In light of this fact, this committee urges that the Department of Economics make certain that “radical” professors of economics be present on the Harvard Department of Economics faculty for 1974-75.”

In assessing the status of the undergraduate program, a member of the Committee observed:

“…The undergraduate program seems to be in better shape, perhaps because some of the assistant professors and teaching fellows are, against all odds, devoted to teaching. It seems to me that there is a genuine issue to be faced in the (recommendation)…. I have only little sympathy for the notion that “radical” or Marxian economic theory deserves a major place in the curriculum. But I do think that a department that goes in one or two years from a complement of four actively teaching radicals to none is in grave danger of violating a legitimate expectation of continuity held by students. If any number of undergraduates were attracted into the field by the hope of doing some specifically “radical” courses and research, then it is perhaps unfair to them to withdraw that opportunity so suddenly. If that is the content of the UIC recommendation, I think there is merit in it. There may be a similar point to be made on behalf of graduate students.

The Visiting Committee assured the representatives of UIC that their recommendations would be included in its report.

 

VI. Graduate Instruction Program

The Visiting Committee heard the most vocal expressions of discontent from graduate students. The strident tone of these comments was new—even to persons who had been on the Committee for several years. In explaining the apparent sharpness of the changed environment, one must give weight to the observations made by the chairman of the Department of Economics: since the Committee did not meet during the 1972-73 academic year, it perhaps had not kept abreast of emerging graduate student attitudes. Moreover, when the Committee visited the Department during the last few years, the “radical” students had boycotted the Committee’s meeting with graduate students. This time they chose to participate in the discussion through the Graduate Economic Club (G.E.C.).

In fact, the special meeting called by that organization (and to which the Committee and faculty members were invited) was the best session of the entire visit—at least in the opinion of several members of the Committee. The co-chairman of the G.E.C. had obviously worked hard to organize the meeting, and a substantial proportion of the graduate students enrolled participated. Three key issues were listed on the agenda: (1) the first-year program (including the Economic History requirement, theory courses, mathematics instruction, class size, and teaching quality); (2) curriculum content and the “firing” of radical professors, and (3) the structure and control of the Department. The presentations were crisp, and the discussion — while full — was highly focused.

The meeting took place against the background of considerable student unhappiness over the graduate program. One expression of that attitude is embodied in a long letter prepared by the Graduate Economics Club and addressed to entering graduate students. The opening section of that letter sets the general tone:

“The Graduate Economics Club is an organization open to all economics graduate students, whose purpose is to represent, and provide a forum for, the views of students in the department. We are writing to welcome you to the Economics Department. We only wish we could report that it was a more pleasant experience. In general, most of us have found that the first year at Harvard was the worst year of our lives. The teaching is often terrible, the professors distant and uninterested in new students. Many of us found that we were forced to work extremely hard at courses that were poor by any standard. The department makes little attempt to ease new students’ adjustment to Cambridge, so many entering graduates find the initial months are alienating and lonely. Student-faculty relations are often poor, in part as a result of academic and political disputes which have riven the department in the last three or four years.

“Harvard can be a very exciting place to work. Cambridge is a lively, stimulating city: the intellectual and cultural resources available here are extremely broad ranging. Once they come to know the department and the city, most students find Harvard an enjoyable place to study. It is largely the first few terms here that prove so difficult. In an effort to make the first year somewhat better for you than it was for us, a fair number of students have discussed how we might have treated our first year here differently. This letter is an attempt to condense what we now that might help you. Not all of us agree with all of what is included, but most of us agree with most of it….”

The letter then took up three main subjects: (1) the formal academic requirements and the older students’ collective judgment as to the best way to handle them; (2) housing and living arrangements, and (3) an account of the “political” conflicts evident in the Department of Economics in the last few years. The first and third of these subjects were also dominant themes of the G.E.C.’s meeting in which the Visiting Committee participated.

The formal requirements for the Ph.D. established by the Department of Economics specify that candidates must pass examinations in five fields: Economic Theory, Economic History; Quantitative Methods, and two “special” fields chosen by the student. By long-standing practice, many students “write-off” the Economic History and Quantitative Methods requirements by taking specified courses. An additional requirement is enrollment in one working seminar in which a paper must be prepared.

These requirements—and the way in which they have been administered—have engendered numerous complaints by graduate students. In response, the Graduate Instruction Committee was instructed by the faculty of the Department of Economics to review a number of aspects of the doctoral program and to recommend improvements. Six curriculum review committees (which included student members as well as both tenured and non-tenured faculty) were established for this purpose. These were: (1) Committee on the Structure of the Doctoral Program and Examinations; (2) Committee on the First-year Program; (3) Committee on Economic Theory and its History; (4) Committee on Economic History; (5) Committee on Special Fields, and (6) Committee on the Relations Between the Economy and Society. The Graduate Instruction Committee prepared several memoranda to give guidance to the various review committees and to identify the main issues and questions on which it was hoped the latter would focus. At the same time, however, it was made clear that the review committees should not feel constrained by such memoranda but should feel free to define the scope of their own deliberations and recommendations. The key issues on which the committees were urged to focus are summarized in Appendix I to this report.

It was thought unnecessary and unduly complicated to require formal coordination of the work of the various review committees. However, consultation among them was encouraged. This was especially true of the committees dealing with the structure of the doctoral program and relations between economics and society. Most of the committees were asked to report during the Fall term. The tasks were well underway at the time the Visiting Committee was at Harvard, and the Department expects to consider the various recommendations before the end of the 1973-74 academic year. It was generally expected that significant changes will be recommended in several of the areas under review.

 

VII. Controversy over Radical Economics

As indicated above, the debate over Harvard’s receptivity to the presence of “radical” professors on the faculty and the inclusion of “radical economics” in the curriculum held a great deal of interest for members of the Visiting Committee. Background material on the subject had been shared with committee members in advance, and a considerable amount of time during the visit was spent on the issues involved.

To put the matter in perspective, it might be well to summarize the emergence of the debate in the Economics Department in recent years. Apparently in the mid-1960’s, a number of younger faculty members and graduate students concluded that conventional training in economics (in which Harvard was in the forefront) did not address most of the social problems of the day which they thought important. Acting on this conviction, they began to work within the Department for a reform of the curriculum. Some of the senior faculty members were sympathetic with these goals. Partly as a result of these efforts, students were added to the Graduate Instruction Committee (G.I.C.)—first two students and then three on a committee of 13 members. Evidently these changes did little to resolve the student’s discontent. It is reported that recommendations by the G.I.C. favorable to students were not endorsed by the faculty as a whole.

In the generally unsettled atmosphere at Harvard during 1969-70, graduate student protest over the economics curriculum also rose considerably. To meet the criticism, the form of the general examination requirements was relaxed somewhat. Yet, many students still found the content of the curriculum unsatisfactory. Again, it seems that some faculty members (not all of them without tenure) shared this feeling. By the Spring of 1971, this continuing disappointment led to the Graduate Economics Club (GEC) to pass “…a resolution calling for full democratization of the economics department. As the first steps towards implementation the GEC demanded equal representation on the Graduate Instruction Committee and the non-tenured faculty committee….” The faculty (after what was apparently a vigorous debate) turned down these propositions in late March, 1971.

In the wake of this outcome, discussions were held among small groups of students and faculty which focused on the general examination requirements and on the graduate program generally. One of the committees formed at that time addressed itself to the role of “socio-economic structure” and Marxist theory in the curriculum. These two subjects were later approved by the faculty (in the Spring of 1971) as special fields in the Ph.D. program. However, no major changes were made in the content of the generals examinations, and no commitment was made to invite any Marxist economists to join the permanent faculty. Also in the Spring of 1971, the student representatives left the Graduate Instruction Committee—protesting what they considered token representation and lack of influence. Finally, in the Fall of 1971, the Graduate Economics Club adopted a resolution specifying that “… a Marxist theorist shall be hired to teach a curriculum in Marxist theory, to begin no later than the Fall of 1972….”

The faculty made no immediate response to this resolution. However, the issue came into sharp focus during the early months of 1972. At that time, a debate got underway over the question of the tenure of Associate Professor Samuel Bowles—a question which the Department had to answer by the end of the calendar year. The term appointment of Assistant Professor Arthur MacEwan was also moving to the stage at which a decision with respect to his future status would have to be made by the same deadline. These two men were viewed by the students as “…the last two remaining non-tenured radical faculty members….” A campaign to win tenure for them was launched by both undergraduate and graduate students. As part of this effort, a petition urging that they be retained and that more radical economists be brought to Harvard was circulated in the Spring of 1972. More than 700 persons signed the petition. In the Fall of that year, a substantial proportion of Professor Bowles former students (reportedly 75 per cent of them—virtually all of those who could be reached) orally or in writing supported the effort to obtain tenure for him. But, after a long (and apparently sometimes divisive) debate, the majority of the Department voted against a tenure appointment for Professor Bowles. A few weeks later, Professor MacEwan’s term appointment was not renewed, and he was not promoted to Associate Professor. Previously two other “radial” economists (Herbert Gintis and Thomas Weisskopf) had failed to receive promotions.

Immediately, these decisions were attacked as “politically” motivated by many of the students and some of the faculty. These charges of bias were denied vigorously by members of the senior faculty. However, the reverberations of those actions reached well beyond the boundaries of Harvard University. For example, at the annual meeting of the American Economic Association (AEA) in Toronto in late December, 1972, a resolution was proposed condemning the action of the Harvard economics faculty. The chairman and other representatives of Harvard spoke against the resolution which was not adopted. However, a modified version was approved. It held that:

  1. The American Economic Association urges that hiring decisions in economics departments be free of political bias. The Association strongly condemns political discrimination in hiring decisions against radical economists or any others.
  2. The American Economic Association urges all departments to set up university procedures whereby allegations of discrimination on the basis of political differences can be systematically investigated.
  3. The American Economic Association strongly opposes discrimination in government grant allocation on the basis of political views.

As indicated above, strong voices were heard on both sides of the debate over the Bowles appointment. The formal view of the faculty majority was given by Professor James Duesenberry, Department Chairman, in his report covering the 1972-73 academic year:

“…Our pleasure…was marred by criticism, from students and others, of the department’s failure to recommend Associate Professor Samuel Bowles for a tenure appointment. The non-tenure associate professorship is a new rank at Harvard and Professor Bowles was the first person appointed to it and therefore the first to reach the time at which a decision as to a tenure recommendation had to be made. There was perhaps some misapprehension as to the likelihood of tenure appointments for associate professors. There are at present six associate professors and it is a source of regret that only a fraction of this extraordinarily able group of economists can be offered tenure appointments. In Professor Bowles’ case it was alleged that the Executive Committee’s decision was biased because of Professor Bowles’ ‘radical’ views. Since bias like beauty is in the eye of the beholder, that is a difficult charge to answer. I can only say that in my twenty years on the Executive Committee the primary consideration has always been the search for persons who could be expected to maintain and enhance the outstanding professional position of the department. Failure to recommend a particular associate professor for a tenure appointment is not an indication of bias unless it can be alleged that the person in question has scholarly abilities and accomplishments which are obviously superior to those of any other persons—at Harvard or elsewhere—who might be appointed.

“Alternatively it might be argued that ‘radical economics’ should receive more attention. The department already has one ‘radical’ full professor (appointed before his conversion to be sure, but here none the less). The amount of weight to be given to any subfield or approach in our discipline is always a matter of opinion and dispute, but it does not seem obvious that the accomplishments of the relatively new radical approach are so overwhelming as to outweigh the many other claims on our limited number of appointments….”

Several other senior faculty members who thought Bowles should have been given tenure—although their reasons differed—have also spoken on the issue. Professor Stephen A. Marglin (a member who was voted tenure before he began to identify with the “radical” economists) urged his colleagues to give Bowles a tenure appointment—and also to bring more radicals to Harvard. By so doing, he though radical economics would have a chance to develop. Professors Kenneth J. Arrow, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Wassily Leontief were also willing to give radical economics an opening: and they, too supported tenure for Bowles. Professor Arrow has been quoted as saying that Bowles’ appointment would broaden the Department, and he felt that his work was “good enough” judged by standard that “hardly had anything to do with radicalism.”

Partly as a response to this debate, Herbert Gintis (who was lecturing in the School of Education after he failed to win reappointment three years earlier) was invited back to the Department of Economics as an Assistant Professor, with the understanding that he would be recommended for promotion effective with the 1974-75 academic year. Beginning in September, 1974, Gintis and Bowles (along with two other “radical” economists — Stephen A. Resnick and Richard Wolff) will go as a team to the Economics Department of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.1/With their departure, Stephen Marglin will be the only “radical” economist with tenure — in a Harvard community numbering more than 60 economists. Moreover, he is scheduled to be on leave for the 1974-75 academic year.

1/ Subsequent to the Committee’s visit, it was learned that Gintis may remain at Harvard. As this report was being written, the matter was still uncertain.

 

VIII. Continuing Controversy Over the Scope of Economics at Harvard

Aside from the debate over the role of radical economists at Harvard, a number of faculty members (both tenured and non-tenured) are concerned about the scope and content of the curriculum—and think it should be broadened considerably. The curriculum review committees discussed above were appointed for this purpose. Several tenure appointments will become available to the Department in the next few years, but opinions differ as to how they should be filled. The Department chairman, in his report covering the 1972-73 academic year, identified the fields of labor, industrial organization, economic development, and economic history as ones in which additional strength is needed.

More fundamentally, however, at least a few senior faculty members apparently believe that the differences in view with respect to the content of the economics program are so wide that a basic reorganization of the Department may be in order. So far, Professor Galbraith is the only one to express his views in writing. However, Professors Arrow, Albert Hirschman, Leontief, and Marglin are reported to have thought — during the Spring of 1973 — that the possibility of forming a new department or a separate track within the existing Department was worth exploration2/By late fall, Professor Galbraith (who chairs the Committee on the First-Year Graduate Program) had in circulation a proposal to establish an Experimental Program and Committee within the existing Department of Economics. If adopted, this program would provide students an alternative path to the Ph.D. paralleling the more traditional route. Under the umbrella of the new faculty Committee which would oversee the alternative route, appointments would be made and associated research would be conducted. Subject matter of interest to faculty and students working in the Committee’s area might include problems of the arts, discrimination, income maintenance, and poverty. Perhaps one-quarter of the graduate students might elect to pursue this new track. The proposal also visualizes that the committee would have the right to recommend appointments — tenure and non-tenure — about in proportion to its share of the teaching load (both undergraduate and graduate). While the Executive Committee of the Department would vote on such recommendations, there would be a broad presumption that the Committee’s recommendations would be accepted.

2/ A member of the Visiting Committee thought the report should note that this group of senior faculty “…is the group that supported Bowles, and that it is in fact a group that has very little else in common. Galbraith’s and Hirschman’s view of economics has very little overlap with Arrow’s and Leontief’s, and Marglin is his own kind of (man). This appears to more an alliance based on political attitude and temporary happenstance than a genuine current of thought.”

At the time the Visiting Committee was in Cambridge, this proposal had generated considerable reaction. It had apparently won strong support among some of the senior faculty as well as among the non-tenured group and graduate students. But it apparently had also encountered strong opposition — especially on the part of some of the tenured members. Since a version of the proposal will probably be submitted to the Graduate Instruction Committee this spring, the Department may have to vote on it before the end of the 1973-74 academic year.

 

IX. Affirmative Action Program

The Visiting Committee made a special effort to appraise the effort being made by the Department of Economics (in keeping with University policy) to recruit women and members of minority groups. The subject was discussed primarily with the Department Chairman, but other senior members of the faculty also contributed. The non-tenure recruitment procedures used during 1972-73 were described by the Department Chairman as follows:

“The Department of Economics normally plans to hire 4 or 5 assistant professors each year. In the 1972/73 recruiting season, the non-tenure appointment committee obtained names and short vitas of prospective new Ph.D.’s from over twenty leading departments of economics. Additional names were supplied to us on an informal basis by a number of smaller graduate departments. Members of the committees and other members of the department then contacted department chairmen, placement officers, and others to develop a shorter list of the outstanding prospects from this year’s Ph.D. crop. In making these inquiries chairmen and placement officers were pressed as to the availability of women and minority candidates. At the time of the 1972 Christmas meetings of the American Economics Association the “short list” included 40 names of which 6 were women. There were no minority candidates who seemed suitable for our department. At the AEA meetings members of our department interviewed all candidates on the short list who could be contacted, as well as others who requested interviews.

“On the basis of interviews and further correspondence with other universities, a number of candidates were included in these invitations. In the end five offers of assistant professorships were made and accepted through these procedures, of whom one was a woman. It may be worth noting that it was necessary for us to make a considerable effort to find a post for her husband at another university in the city in order to obtain the services of the one woman we have recommended for an assistant professor appointment.

“In addition to the appointments made through these procedures, we have recommended that two persons now holding lectureships in the university be appointed assistant professors. One of these is our head tutor who had been teaching in Social Studies but will now undertake an important teaching assignment in our department. In his case we feel that he should assume professorial status. Because of the importance of continuity in his post as head tutor, we have not considered any other candidates.

“A second appointment has been recommended for a lecturer in the School of Education who has previously taught in our department but who will now switch the bulk of his teaching from the School of Education to the Department of Economics.

“We have also recommended two associate professor appointments. One of these is to be promoted from assistant professor upon completion of his term. We had no women assistant professors reaching the review point this year. The other recommendation is for an appointment to associate professor in the field of labor economics as a stop-gap replacement for Professor Dunlop. An extensive search by a special committee did not reveal any women or minority candidates who could be seriously considered for this position.”

On balance, several members of the Visiting Committee thought that the Department’s procedures (while clearly aimed in the right direction) did not show the kind of vigorous effort required to achieve the Harvard goal. At least one academic member of the Committee thought that the Department’s efforts fell appreciably short of those made by several other institutions — which had also been much more successful in competing for an admittedly scarce supply of women and minority group economists.

Another member of the Committee, who had been asked to give special attention to the matter, observed as follows:

“…The first evening… we discussed … Affirmative Action Plan. But I had a strong feeling that it was a farce. The message seemed to be: Look how hard we’ve tried. We’ve done everything we could, but there simply aren’t any qualified women or blacks. As (another member) said to me informally, they really seem to believe women are inferior. This member of the Visiting Committee would urge a much stronger effort to recruit women at the assistant professor level so as to increase the number in the pipeline for higher level positions later….”

 

X. Concluding Observations

At the conclusion of its visit and after considerable discussion — the Visiting Committee decided not to draw up a list of specific recommendations. Instead, it chose to describe as fully as possible the situation it encountered in the Economics Department. It was assumed that the Harvard faculty itself is best suited to cope with its own problems.

On the other hand, several general observations should be made. In the first place, it was obvious to virtually every member of the Committee that the curriculum being offered by the Department of Economics is greatly in need of reformation.3/ The subject matter ought to be broadened to provide greater scope for students and faculty to work on problems — and search for solutions to them — that are not easily encompassed within the corpus of traditional economics as taught at Harvard. It was realized, of course, that the Department of Economics at Harvard is far less narrow than almost any other department in the forefront of the profession. Yet, a number of the men who have provided this broad thrust over the years have recently retired and others are scheduled to do so in the near future. Consequently, the Visiting Committee thinks it is vital that the upcoming opportunities to make tenure appointments be used to assure that Harvard’s historic concern for economic welfare (broadly defined) be kept alive in the years ahead.

3/ A member of the Committee noted that “…the Harvard curriculum is not atypical for university departments aspiring to high status in the profession’s pecking order. So it is a problem of the criteria by which the profession judges, not specifically of the Harvard Department. Nevertheless, there may be good reason for Harvard to assume some leadership in searching for a broader curriculum. Of course, there may be no good answer….”

The Visiting Committee refrained from expressing a judgment on the appropriateness of the decision not to give tenure appointments to specific members of the faculty identified as radical economists. The reason was simple: in the final analysis, the faculty itself has to decide who will be given status and the right to enjoy its privileges and carry on its responsibilities. On the other hand, the Committee feels strongly that “political” bias or other forms of discrimination should have no weight in judging candidates for tenure. Again, however, these judgments have to be made by the faculty.

But one member of the Visiting Committee also felt strongly that some kind of machinery should be created that would enable some outside body (perhaps even outside the University) to review faculty decisions in which those affected adversely feel they are the victims of discrimination — “political” or otherwise. Two or three other members of the Committee expressed some sympathy with this general view — although not necessarily with the specific elements outlined. On balance, however, the Committee decided not to endorse the proposition or transmit it as a recommendation. 4/ Nevertheless, everyone was sensitive to the difficult issues involved. Several members thought that the general position on political bias embodied in the resolution adopted by the American Economic Association (reported above) is one the Harvard Economics Department might well adopt as its own.

4/ The tone of the opposition to the proposal was captured by one member: “…I have my doubts about any proposal for outside review….Appointments may in fact sometimes be made on a discriminatory basis, and I would be interested in suggestions for protective machinery. I fear, however, that the solution mentioned here may be so open to abuse as to be worse than the problem. I wish I had a better alternative to suggest….”

The Committee was deeply impressed with the criticism of the graduate curriculum which it heard. For that reason, it was pleased to note the work now underway in the various review committees to reassess the program. It appears that a number of important recommendations will be made to the faculty — which if adopted could significantly enhance the appeal and usefulness of the program to graduate students. At the same time, it is also obvious that the senior faculty members in the Department must devote far more time directly to the education of the students who look to them for inspiration and guidance.

Finally, the Committee is convinced that a much greater — and far more systematic — effort should be made to seek out promising women and members of minority groups as potential faculty members. The Committee is under no illusions that this is an easy task. But, unless the Department’s procedures are revamped and more resources devoted to the assignment—it appears doubtful that the Department of Economics will make a significant contribution toward helping Harvard University achieve the goals established in its affirmative action program.

Andrew F. Brimmer
Chairman

April 15, 1974

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

APPENDIX I
SUMMARY OF ASSIGNMENTS OF CURRICULUM REVIEW COMMITTEES

[Incomplete]

As indicated above, the Department of Economics has established six curriculum review committees to work on the improvement of a number of aspects of the doctoral program. The principal guidance given to these task forces by the Graduate Instruction Committee is summarized below.

Committee on Structure of the Doctoral Program and Examinations: This committee “will be responsible for reconsidering the procedure whereby a candidate becomes a doctor of philosophy and is expected to contemplate if not to recommend very fundamental changes in the organization of the program.” Its mandate includes:

  1. Reconsideration of the length and chronology of the doctoral program.
    1. Currently the Economic Department expects candidates to take general examinations at the end of their second year and special examinations one and a half to two years later. What is the actual chronology in recent years? Is this norm sound, or should the Department develop a program of different length and segments?
    2. Should candidates be involved in teaching and research sooner than at present, say during the second year, although this may require some extension of the time devoted to preparing for the general orals?
  2. Consideration of possible course requirements. At present there are none (formally), but it may be advisable to require candidates to take a specified minimum number of courses for letter grades.
  3. Reconsideration of the offering of advanced courses and seminars. There are now a large number of advanced courses and seminars, many with small enrollments. Who takes these courses: second-year students, post-generals students, students from outside the Department? Would it suit the needs of the faculty and students better if some or all of them were replaced by less formal and more flexible tutorials, group or individual?
  4. Is the Department meeting the needs of post-generals students with respect to advanced instruction, stimulation, and guidance? How should that phase of the program be strengthened?
  5. Reconsideration of the role and concept of the thesis. Current legislation is intended to encourage theses that are more like a long paper or short monograph than like a comprehensive treatise, but this seems to be largely a dead letter. Which concept is sound, and how can it be implemented?
  6. Reconsideration of the final examination. For the last few years, the grading and conduct of the special examination have been separated from the acceptance and grading of the thesis. Has this change made the special examination a more useful educational experience than previously? Would other changes improve it further?
  7. Finally, is the graduate program properly attuned to the job market or the requirements for a career in economics? What kinds of jobs do Harvard graduates find, and have they been equipped properly for such jobs? Are any procedures needed for adjusting the program to meet the changing demands on economists?

This list of topics, though long and demanding, was not meant to be exhaustive. The committee was encouraged to feel free to raise questions of its own and to make recommendations about any aspects of the program.

 

Committee on the First-Year Program: Some matters and questions that this committee was asked to consider are:

  1. The efficacy and adequacy of the current procedures for advising first-year students.
  2. Whether the courses and programs now available to entering students provide enough flexibility in view of their widely varying levels of preparation and fields of interest. Is the first year concentrated excessively on the three required fields?

 

  1. [sic, “3.” apparently skipped over or omitted] Whether there is need for more information about the level and contents of graduate courses than is provided by the catalog listing and, if so, how to provide it. Are the current pamphlets about the general nature of the program and the degree requirements adequate? Indeed, should the organization and contents of the catalog listing being revised substantially?
  2. Is there need for additional physical facilities, in particular, for a common room?

 

Committee on Economic Theory and Its History: Some of the issues called to the committee’s attention are:

  1. Level of the requirement. At present the instructors and examiners in economic theory and its history do not have any guidance except vague traditions for determining the level of attainment to expect. It is somewhere between the acquaintance with fundamental concepts expounded in the intermediate undergraduate economic theory course and the highly technical proficiency (also vaguely conceived) expected of a candidate who offers advanced economic theory as a special field.
    A clear, and if possible, operational definition would be highly desirable. This task consists, really, of two parts: first, a policy decision on the appropriate level of advancement, and second, the discovery of a way to express that decision in clear and operational terms, perhaps a syllabus.
  2. The scope of the field. Just what topics are to be included in the field of economic theory and its history is nowhere laid down. It is not at all clear how much acquaintance the faculty expects candidates to have with the present of economic doctrine, either first-hand or second-hand. There is considerable disagreement about how much [… end of copy]

 

NOTE:  PAGES STARTING WITH A-5 ARE MISSING.

Missing are “(4) Committee on Economic History; (5) Committee on Special Fields, and (6) Committee on the Relations Between the Economy and Society.”

Source: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. John Kenneth Galbraith Papers. Series 5. Harvard University File, 1949-1990. Box 527. Folder “Harvard Department of Economics Report of the Visiting Committee, 1975”.

Categories
Economics Programs Economists Harvard Radical

Harvard. Leontief and Galbraith report on conflict within department, 1972

In December 1972 the conflict about opening the Harvard economics faculty to include “broader and necessarily ‘softer’ questions of social structure, social functions and social reform” exploded beyond the confines of the economics department. This post provides two letters/memos sent to Harvard’s President Derek C. Bok written by Wassily Leontief and John Kenneth Galbraith, respectively, that supported curriculum reform involving the continued appointments of young radical economists. It would appear from Leontief’s account that a relatively silent majority of the younger mathematical economists in the department was able to block the recommendation of their more senior colleagues to expand course offerings to meet the demand of students for courses outside the confines of “orthodox technical economics”…a revolution that devoured its own parents.

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Background tip:

Talk presented by Tom Weisskopf “The Origins and Evolution of Radical Political Economics” (September 25, 2012).

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Photocopy Leontief to Harvard President Derek C. Bok

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Wassily Leontief
Professor of Economics

309 Littauer
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
(617) 495-2118

December 21, 1972

Mr. Derek Bok
President
Harvard University
Massachusetts Hall 1

Dear Derek:

I am writing in response to your request for my views on the conflict that for some time has been straining the relationships within the Executive Committee of our Department on the one hand and Executive Committee and the graduate student body on the other. It developed along rather familiar lines and finally broke into the open.

The controversy, as I see it, centers on the question whether the Department of Economics should widen the range of its intellectual concerns and of its teaching responsibilities beyond the narrowly delineated field of orthodox technical economics by inclusion of broader and necessarily “softer” questions of social structure, social functions and social reform: questions raised for example in the old Marxist and the new radical economics.

While a minority in the Executive Committee favors a move in this direction, arguing that it would reflect the natural growth and extension of our discipline, the majority opposes it on the grounds that this would amount to politicalization of the field and lowering of intellectual standards. Somewhat paradoxically, the minority favoring a change comprises mostly senior members of the Department while the core of the majority group consists of the younger mathematical economists. Needless to say, the students are on the side of the minority. While the minority did most of the talking, the majority was content with voting.

Last spring a mixed faculty-student committee appointed by the Chairman proposed a modest curriculum reform that would reflect the interest in the new subjects. After a stiff fight, the report was first accepted, then watered down, and finally scuttled.

The division within the Department was clearly reflected in a series of votes on new appointments. Three years ago, the junior staff contained four radical economists: Herb Gintis, Tom Weisskopf, Art MacEwan and Sam Bowles. All were let go. Gintis is now lecturer in the Department of Education, Tom Weisskopf was avidly acquired by the Department of Economics of the University of Michigan, Sam Bowles failed a week ago to receive a permanent appointment, and Art MacEwan was denied this week a second three-year appointment. The slate is clear except for Steve Marglin, who was elevated to full professorship before his interests had shifted into the field of institutional analysis and criticism.

Adverse votes are invariably based on lack of intellectual distinction and creditable contributions to knowledge by the candidate; this notwithstanding the fact that several permanent slots were filled in the past by scholars of admittedly indifferent stature on the ground that a vacancy had to be filled in some narrowly defined specialized field.

Reluctantly the minority on the Executive Committee came to the conclusion that its advice and counsel will be disregarded in the future as it was in the past; that crucial decisions will be made on the basis of an often silent, but invariably effective majority vote. The rising tension finally led to acrimonious exchanges at the last meeting of the Executive Committee.

The obvious frustration of the graduate students finds its expression in sharp verbiage used by the radical minority and sullen indifference and cynicism among the rest. I hardly need to add that the students are quite aware of the division within the Executive Committee.

This is where we stand now. At best one could observe that as a whole the senior teaching staff of the Economics Department is much less effective than one could have expected it to be considering the distinction of its individual members. At worst, the continuation of the conflict might result in resignations and damage all around.

After you called me up, Jim Duesenberry asked several members of the Department to serve on a committee that would review the intellectual problems involved and try to find some way out. The proposed composition of the committee (Arrow, Bergson, Dorfman, Galbraith and me) assures that its report will give full weight to the minority point of view.

I myself feel that nothing short of a clear-cut reversal in the present trend can prevent further deterioration of the situation. Needless to say, I will do all I can to bring about a constructive and peaceable solution of the difficult problems we are facing. Some counsel and some help from you and John [probably economist John T. Dunlop who was serving as Dean] most likely will be needed. Let me add that some of my colleagues who up to now held an opposing point of view have offered their full cooperation.

I have dictated this letter but had no time to proofread it since Estelle and I are leaving for London two hours from now. In case of need, please do not hesitate to call me. My secretary, Mary Conley, will know all the time where I can be reached.

With best wishes from Estelle and me to Sissele and you.

Sincerely,
[signed]
Wassily Leontief

WL:mc

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

Carbon copy Galbraith to Harvard President Derek C. Bok

December 22, 1972

President Derek C. Bok
Massachusetts Hall

Dear Derek:

This I hope will diminish the concern you may have had following my telephone call of the other evening. My personal anger, as usual, has been difficult to sustain although I surely intend to stay with this problem until things are put right. I’ve met with the young radicals and I think they are persuaded that Toronto is not a good forum and that neither Arrow nor I is the man they most want to embarrass. John has operated with usual skill and panache. He accepts the idea of a commission to consider and act before things get worse, and I am drafting up the terms of reference for discussion with Jim Duesenberry. I’ve gone over the rough outlines with Wassily. With considerable approval, I’ve raised the question of conflict of interest with external corporate enterprises. I enclose a document on that subject.

In any case, a Merry Christmas.

Yours faithfully,

John Kenneth Galbraith

JKG:kv

Enclosure

 

Source: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. John Kenneth Galbraith Personal Papers. Series 5. Harvard University File, 1949-1990. Box 526. Folder “Harvard Dept. of Economics, Discussion of appointments, outside interests and reorganization, 1972-1973 (1 of 2)”.

Image Source: Wassily Leontief from Harvard Class Album 1957.

Categories
Economics Programs Harvard

Harvard. Galbraith’s Proposal to Split the Economics Department, 1973

 

During the early 1970s the Harvard economics department went through an identity crisis in which the orthodox mainstream was challenged by a not-so-silent minority of proto-heterodox economists and a dissatisfied graduate student body. The following three artifacts from the discussion of that time come from John Kenneth Galbraith’s papers. I would not exclude the possibility that some/much of the December 26, 1972 memo from the dean of the faculty of arts and sciences was inspired, if not directly penned, by Galbraith.

Galbraith was incapable of writing even an intrauniversity memo without flashes of wit as both the draft and final versions of his memo clearly demonstrate. And yet, there remains an overwhelming pathetic, quixotic note to his proposal of dividing the economics department in order to save its diverse, social elements.

____________________________

When the Dean Asks
How to Fix the Harvard Economics Department

December 26, 1972

From: THE DEAN OF THE FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

To: THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

Re: TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR A STUDY OF AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

Recent developments and discussions suggest problems of some concern in the Department of Economics. In the belief that such problems, if attacked in timely fashion and a spirit of goodwill, will be more readily resolved than if allowed to persist and be aggravated, I am proposing action which I trust will meet with the approval of all concerned. I shall first identify those matters on which, I believe, there will be general agreement and then suggest terms of reference for the appropriate action.

  1. The Department of Economics has become very large. In the current catalogue I count 25 tenured members, 56 non-tenured members, 5 visiting professors and 13 economists in associated departments principally the Kennedy School, in addition to the large force of teaching assistants. It is not surprising that so large a body should have problems in maintaining a sense of common purpose and identity.
  2. There has of late been a deep difference of view on appointments in the Department. This has led to the suggestions that the Department, its size notwithstanding, is not emphasizing an adequate representation of diverse, socially unpopular or methodologically different positions, and that standards for promotion operate to exclude or minimize the representation of such views.
  3. There will be agreement that a majority may be less urgently seized of the need for representation of a minority view than the minority.
  4. In recent years there has been dissatisfaction among students, principally graduate students, with instruction in the Department. Again I state the fact without passing on the merits of the position. I do note that, historically, students have found satisfaction and pride in their association with the Department.
  5. The question has been raised whether some appointments are being appraised in accordance with contribution or non-contribution to or effect on corporate profit-making which, however useful and legitimate, is external to the scientific work and teaching of the Department.

In light of the foregoing I propose to ask the three past presidents of the American Economic Association together with the two American Nobel Prize winners who are engaged in active teaching (one of whom is also current President of the American Economic Association), together with the Chairman of the Department of Economics to examine the Department as a matter of urgency and to report. The following are the terms of reference for this examination:

  1. The group shall be denoted the Special Study Committee, and hereafter as the Committee.
  2. In its deliberations the Committee will consult to the fullest extent with students of the Department as well as with tenured and non-tenured members of the Department, and will discuss its provisional findings with students and faculty.
  3. The Committee will consider and report on whether the present personnel of the Department reflects an appropriately broad spectrum of method and view and, as necessary, on corrective steps. Corrective steps may specifically include recommendations for change in past action.
  4. The committee will consider whether the present teaching of economics is sufficiently broad, and specifically whether there should be a second and alternative track to a doctorate in economics embracing both course work and examinations and in which the primary emphasis would be on history of economic thought, institutional economics and socialist thought, or subject matter disciplines not required by the present framework.
  5. The Committee shall consider possible division or subdivision or other reorganization of the Department to provide greater knowledge of candidates for appointment or promotion, greater corporate responsibility for instruction and other possible gains from smaller size. In this connection special attention should be given to the relationship with the Kennedy School of Government.
  6. The effect of external corporate or other activities of Departmental members as these may bear on appointments, teaching or research, shall be examined with recommendations.
  7. The report of the Committee shall be made public and, in the absence of specific and fully-supported objection, it is my hope that its conclusions will be found acceptable to the Department. There is no intention to alter the constitutional arrangements by which tenured members, as now or in a suitably reorganized or subdivided Department, if that is the decision, are responsible for appointments and instruction.

____________________________

Galbraith Draft Statement (undated)
[handwritten additions in bold italics]

Draft #2

MEMORANDUM

MEMO:

The President
The Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences
Members of the Department of Economics

From: John Kenneth Galbraith

 

In these last weeks tensions long present in the Department of Economics at Harvard have come to the surface. The consequences are attracting interest and discussion well beyond the confines of the Department and the University. It is doubtful if anyone, and certainly any active participants, can state the issues with complete impartiality but some of the basic circumstances admit of agreement. They are.

(1) The Department has become very large—the current catalogue lists twenty-five regularly tenured professors, thirty-five nontenured professors, thirteen members in an adjunct relationship from other parts of the University and five visiting professors. In addition there are a large number of teaching assistants. The Department has become a parliamentary and not a corporate body. Long before the recent explosion I expressed my concern not only to my colleagues but also to the top management over our increasingly ungainly and ineffective mass and its dangers. I encountered little or no disagreement.

(2) The Department has for some years been deeply divided in its views. There has been an ineffective and mostly unchanging minority, and an effective and largely unchanging majority.

(3) While the basis of the division is diverse, including the polemical folk-tendencies of academic life, our learned delight in self assertion, our sensitivity to the intellectual shortcomings of others, differences in reaction to change, political attitudes, it is also a difference in the view of economics. I doubt that any statement of this difference can avoid prejudice. I shall content myself with being dull. It partly involves the acceptance or rejection of the established economic institutions; partly acceptance or rejection of accustomed preconceptions of economic thought, partly the trade-off between precision in established modalities and lesser precision in more innovative, critical or experimental work; partly it has to do with the degree of commitment to measurement and mathematics.

(4) While the underlying fact is a difference in the view of the subject (including the importance of representing the minority views) the argument over appointments invokes competence. Each side with no slight sense of moral righteousness defines competence in its own image. What is unscientific or soft to one side is irrelevant or unreal or unuseful to the other. Certainty in these positions is enhanced by the effect of professional esteem on ego. The members of the majority rightly reflect on the high regard in which precision and excellence of their work is held in their particular spheres of econometric, mathematical or applied work. The members of the minority rejoice similarly on their standing in the profession generally. Given these attitudes, the likelihood that one side will yield gracefully to the other is (if possible) even further reduced. Thus the absolute certainty of continued conflict.

(5) The difference comes to a head over appointments. This reflects a clear view of the reality. It is recognized by all that it is people who determine what is taught and investigated—and wholly so in such an unstructured environment as Harvard. The majority, not unnaturally, has prevailed. In this context a minority should not be expected to acquiesce. To do so is to accept eventual extinction. No one who is serious about his views or methods should countenance that.

(6) The students, once pridefully associated with the Department, are discontented. Their affiliation is largely, although by no means completely, with the minority. As a consequence some members of the majority hold or harbor the thought that the minority is acting less out of conviction than a desire to seek popularity or appease student opinion. Members of the minority react with a strong (and in my own case previously undisclosed) concern for the quality of our institution.

(7) There is a question as to the bearing of subjective judgments formed in connection with the business activities of members—or in consequence of those activities—on promotion of those whose disposition or work leads to criticism of cherished and remunerative economic institutions.

Aggravated problems sometimes allow of simple choices. This is so in the present case. One course is to continue as now, and enjoy the acrimony and continue to invite, by our public bickering, disesteem for the subject, the Department, the University, our students and ourselves. The other is to move to the obvious and forthright resolution, on which will be to the benefit of all concerned.

The solution is to divide the present vast Department into two parts. One part, a Department or Division of General Economics*, would reflect the specialized interests and scientific purpose of the majority, including those whose identification with the minority has been based not on identity of professional interest but concern for academic diversity. A second part would be the Department of Social Economics. This initially much smaller Department would consist of those tenured and untenured members whose active identification with the social issues of planning, economic structure, criticism, or socialism or institutionalism leads them to make the transfer. The new Department, born out of a need to ensure diversity, would itself be under the normal academic obligation to perpetuate diversity. It would develop an undergraduate and graduate curriculum and degree requirements compromising nothing in depth and rigor, in accordance with the interests of its members and of students. Subject to established ad hoc procedures—and its resources—it would make its own promotions and appointments.

*No difficulty should be made over a name. The parent Department could be called the Department of Economics.

The initial resources of the new Department would consist of the present financial commitment to those making the change. There would, some minor administrative costs apart, be no added burden on the University budget. I would make the transfer and make the revenues from the Paul M. Warburg Professorship, including the supporting research revenues (on neither of which I have drawn in net amount in recent years) available for a new professorial appointment. I believe, not without knowledge, that money for one or two added professorships as well as for research could be raised from sources not presently open either to the University or the Department. Scholarship funds would be divided in accordance with student demand. I am willing to commit a good share of personal time in the next year to money raising, a task in which, unlike my economics, my competence has been sufficiently established.

May I note in summary the advantages of the foregoing proposal.

(1) The basic cause of distress and conflict in the present Department of Economics would be removed. Each of the new Departments or Divisions will be in a position to develop the subject in full accordance with its own lights. Neither will be in the academically repellant position (however agreeable in practice) of imposing its standards or preferences on the other.

(2) The problem of excessive scale and consequent diminution in sense of communal responsibility for teaching, research and appointments is solved in the case of the new small Department or Division. It is alleviated for the larger parent Department.

(3) The Department of Social Economics if it is to attract, retain and place its graduate students, will have to demonstrate itself in competition with its older and more prestigious parent. This competition will be exceedinglyhealthy for both. This is an appealing point. While businessmen favor competition more often in principle than in practice, this is not an error into which any good economist will allow himself to fall.

(4) Undergraduate instruction in the new Department will benefit no alone from the members’ commitment to their subject matter but also from the greater sense of community as between teaching assistants, tenured and non-tenured faculty in a much smaller department and the present Department will be better. In the present Department not even all tenured and untenured members are known to each other. Teaching assistants are known only to a fraction of the faculty members and even less is known about their performance. And again in undergraduate teaching the vigorous competition of the new Department will be good for the older one.

(5) Problems associated with the corporate business activities of professors will be at least partly resolved. No question of concern for attitudes of business clients, however subjective, will be thought to influence those who are passing on appointments in the new Department. Subject no doubt, to appropriate safeguards the activities of present members of the Department with their potential for useful employment, income and information could perhapsremain.

(6) The two Departments through a coordinating committee might [illegible word] combine for the time being on the elementary course.

(7) The creation of the new Department with an admixture of old and new members intent on developing both old and new lines of inquiry will affirm, as nothing else, Harvard’s avidly proclaimed commitment to free inquiry by people of the highest calibre and to whatever result.

(8) Nothing is forever. If, after say ten years, there is demand for reunification, why not.

With so much to be gained—and also so much trouble to be avoided—I hope that we can proceed to consider this solution with a minimum of delay. Needless to say—perhaps on the basis of past departmental performance it is very necessary that I say—I am ready at any notice to lend a hand.

____________________________

Memo On Splitting the Harvard Economics Department
[Apparent Final Draft]

June 18, 1973

From:  JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH

To:

PRESIDENT DEREK C. BOK
DEAN-DESIGNATE HENRY ROSOVSKY
PROFESSOR JAMES S. DUESENBERRY
MEMBERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

Re: THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

The Department of Economics is, I would judge, entering into a period of considerable calm and tranquility. The older dissidents and heretics in the Department will, with one or two exceptions, soon be retiring. And, in any case, they are now a harmless minority. Within a year or so the younger generation of dissidents will be safely gone. Thus the expectation of a period of scholarly calm.

My purpose in this memorandum is to suggest that the prospect is not as happy as these developments imply. And it is to suggest some steps which, without unduly disturbing the equanimity of the situation, the Department and the Administration would be wise to consider. May I note that these are matters on which I have no personal, as distinct from general, professional concern. I am one of those who will be contributing, however modestly, to a more seemly, tranquil and comfortable life by a comparatively early departure.

The problems remaining after the prospective changes are two. There is first the fact that, while faculty affairs have been generally arranged to the satisfaction of all, the students remain deeply dissatisfied. Let no one doubt this or seek, by the usual academic rationalizations, to explain it away. I was much exposed to this in the special seminar last autumn; I determined then to inform myself in a minor way during the spring, which I have done. The students, over a wide political spectrum, deeply dislike their work and the Department. This is especially true of the first-year students who, in a puzzling exercise in public relations reflecting an odd attitude toward education, are now blithely told at the outset to expect the worst year of their lives. Those who have been here two or three years also look back with discontent on their educational experience. My first year of graduate work was one of the most vital and interesting of my life. So, I believe it was with most of my generation.

The complaint of the students is straitforward. They are squeezed, especially in their first year but increasingly as a test in later work, into a narrow model-building, problem-solving, quasi-mathematical routine that they find boring and unrelated to the world in which they live. The emasculated careerist may accept the routine and do well. The student who thought that economics was a window on the problems of the world is abjectly disappointed.

These student reactions are heavily discounted by most although not all of the senior faculty. The rationalization is that such student attitudes are inevitable—that the modern student is inherently lazy, feckless, radical and dissatisfied. It is even suggested, not without scholarly vigor, that those who express concern about students are courting a student popularity in a sadly unscholarly tradition. As I say, this rationalization seems to me unwise and something that very soon will have a more practical consequence. A bad reputation in these matters is not easily kept a secret. It could happen that eventually the Department will have very few graduate students of indigenous origin of any consequence, a few committed careerists, mathematicians and model-builders apart. Numbers and quality of applicants will decline. In consequence, the ratio of faculty to active, teachable graduate students, which is now approaching one to one, will pass that point and will widen as a ratio of students to teachers. This is not hyperbole. A course was recently described to me by a graduate student in which he was the only participant along with three faculty members. We have a fair number of seminars with only a handful of students, sometimes but one. Faculty life will continue in comfort. Workshops will serve, as already now, to disguise the shortage of students. But still there will be nervousness.

There is another and more subjective danger. The harmony which one now foresees is based on a general commitment to neoclassical economics or its applied refinements. Accomplishment in model-building and refinement is, I think nearly all will agree, an increasingly stern requirement. We would not again hire a labor economist who, like Professor Dunlop or Professor Slichter, made his career out of a practical association with the unions and the problems of labor mediation. Professor Leontief, were he now showing the experimental tendencies that marked his early career, would be in trouble. Even his work, when firmly established, was not strongly supported. We would not have an economist who was too much preoccupied with the practical details of tax reform—unless he protected his flank by suitable theoretical or econometric exercise. My own past tendencies would certainly not be acceptable for promotion—although on the merits of this, with characteristic tact, I disqualify myself. What is not in doubt is that we are now very strong in the journals but much less strong in the obscenely practical matters on which many people, including many students, expect economists to be useful. This could be damaging to the reputation of the Department. The latter has always depended in appreciable measure not on the great scientists but on its vulgar practitioners.

Now let me say a word on reform. Mention of reform leads to thoughts of reform of the Department—so it is with faculty and also students. The present course of instruction is wrong. Let us find the right one. The problem is that no one line of graduate economic instruction can now serve all interests, reflect all points of view. Nor does it deal with the highly important fact that instruction is far less important than the inclination of the people who guide it. The Department is now a vast parliamentary body. So long as there is only one educational track, as a matter of course it will reflect the preferences of the majority. All of us, in the oldest of academic traditions, appraise excellence using ourselves as the yardstick. Reform requires that we begin to provide real choices as to teachers and as to work. Three possibilities occur to me:

  1. We should have in the Department of Economics two tracks to two Ph.D.’s. One of these would be in economics, another in (say) social economics. Professors in the Department would be grouped into two broad Executive Committees around these tracks. And each of these two Executive Committees would have responsibility not only for developing graduate work in its track and for examination therein but also for recruitment and promotion. This would broaden the choice for students; would mean that we would have two more nearly corporate bodies rather than one parliamentary body to guide instruction and appointments; would foster the kind of competition which all economists intrinsically and devoutly applaud; and would reduce by half the present parliamentary tendency to exclude the minority view. The first track would continue the present program with all of its neoclassical and model-building rigor. The second track would be experimental, humane and with a much stronger orientation to the emerging issues of our time. It would not, and this must be emphasized, involve any less effort.
  2. The second possibility would be to establish within the Department an institute—an Institute for Economic Innovation. This would enlist the members of the senior faculty so inclined, would develop a program purely of graduate instruction and would lead also to a degree which would reflect its own course of instruction. The purpose of constituting this as an institute would be twofold: to get the energy and attention of one man who would see the institute as the projection of his own efforts, and to use the institute as a device for raising new funds for both chairs and research. It is my near certainty, based on some experience as a medicant, that this enterprise, properly presented, would be very attractive to donors. I am not sure, however, that given the present size of the Department, it would not be wiser simply to allot some Graustein appointments to the Institute for the next few years.
  3. The third and final possibility would be to have two Departments of Economics—one Department of Economics and one Department of Social Economics. There are advantages to this—again the healthy competition in which all economists theoretically rejoice, elimination of the present diseconomies of scale, the much more clearly defined differentiation of purpose. It would not be as difficult a solution as seems at first glance. Those who approve of the Department as it is would remain with the Department of Economics. The rest would make the new Department. It would form its character from those who join it in the feeling that a more strongly innovative, humane and applied—in the modern sense—approach to economics is in order. The problem is, of course, that it involves the largest disruption in established institutional arrangements. That is not something to be undertaken lightly. Sometimes, though, that is good.

I am persuaded that in one or another of the above arrangements lies the only hope for a satisfactory future. For a while the tranquility that is in prospect will be greatly enjoyed. Given the sterile tendencies of the accepted economics and the attitudes of the students, it will be, if not the tranquility of the tomb, certainly that of a kind of somnambulant decay.

J.K.G.

Source: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. John Kenneth Galbraith Personal Papers. Series 5. Harvard University File, 1949-1990. Box 526. Folder “Memorandum on Reorganization of the Department of Economics”.

Image Source: Harvard Class Album 1958.

Categories
Exam Questions Harvard Suggested Reading Syllabus

Harvard. Applied Economic Analysis, Readings and Exams. Duesenberry, 1955-56.

 

The Harvard economics professor, James Stemble Duesenberry (b. 18 July 1918; d. 5 October 2009) was best known for his relative-income hypothesis or at least that hypothesis was something I can recall from my undergraduate course taught by James Tobin almost exactly a half-century ago. Following the official Harvard obituary, you will find the reading lists and exams for his two-term course “Applied Economic Analysis” as taught in 1955-56.

____________________

Duesenberry’s Harvard Obituary

Economist Duesenberry dies at 91
by Amy Lavoie

James Stemble Duesenberry, an eminent economist who was an authority on monetary policy and a faculty member of Harvard University’s Department of Economics for more than half a century, recently passed away at his home in Cambridge at the age of 91.

Duesenberry came to Harvard in 1948 as assistant professor of economics and became associate professor in 1953. He received tenure in 1955, and became professor of economics.

An economic theorist who strove to affect policy and improve economic conditions, Duesenberry was a member of the President’s Council of Economic Advisors from 1966 to 1968, in Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration. From 1969 to 1974 he was chairman of the Board of Directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, and he led the bank during the construction of the First National Bank Building in downtown Boston.

“Jim Duesenberry was a very insightful man who thought deeply about problems in a way that was relatively unconstrained by the fashionable conditions of the day,” said Benjamin Friedman, William Joseph Maier Professor of Political Economy, who was a colleague of Duesenberry’s. “He thought that the purpose of economics was to speak to the way the economy behaves and what policy can do to improve economic performance.”

In 1969, Duesenberry was named William Joseph Maier Professor of Money and Banking. He was chair of the Department of Economics from 1972 to 1977, and led the department at a time when some called for greater intellectual diversity among the faculty. He retired in 1989, and became William Joseph Maier Professor of Money and Banking Emeritus.

Duesenberry’s first book, “Income Consumption and the Theory of Consumer Behavior” (Harvard University Press), was published in 1949. He is also the author of “Business Cycles and Economic Growth” (McGraw-Hill, 1957), “Money and Credit: Impact and Control” (Prentice-Hall, 1964), “Capital Needs in the Seventies” with Barry Bosworth and Andrew Carron (Brookings Institution, 1975), and “Money, Banking and Economy” with Thomas Mayer and Robert Z. Aliber (W.W. Norton, 1981).

Born in Princeton, W.Va., Duesenberry received his B.A. in 1939, his M.A. in 1941, and his Ph.D. in 1948, all in economics from the University of Michigan.

Duesenberry was a research fellow with the Social Science Research Council in 1941. During World War II, Duesenberry was a statistician in the Air Force, and reached the rank of captain. He was an instructor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1946, and in 1954, he was a Fulbright fellow at Cambridge University.

Duesenberry is survived by his son John of Brookline, Mass., and daughters Holly of Gouldsboro, Maine, and Peggy of Stirling, Scotland, as well as four grandchildren.

Source: Harvard Gazette, October 15, 2009.

_______________________

Enrollment

[Economics] 106. Applied Economic Analysis. Associate Professor Duesenberry. Full course.

(F) Total 25: 1 Graduate, 1 Other Graduate, 20 Seniors, 3 Juniors.
(S) Total 19: 16 Seniors, 3 Juniors.

Source: Harvard University. Report of the President of Harvard College, 1955-1956, p. 76.

_______________________

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Department of Economics
Economics 106

Fall Term, 1955

  1. Wages and Labor Allocation and Efficiency
    1. A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, Bk. VI, Chs. 1-5.
    2. Shister, Economics of the Labor Market, Chs. 14, 15, 16.
    3. M. Friedman, “Significance of Labor Unions for Economic Policy,” Ch. X, in Wright, The Impact of the Union.
    4. Meade and Hitch, Introduction to Economic Analysis and Public Policy, Part II, Ch. 3.
    5. Peterson, Economics, Revised Edition, Ch. 20.
    6. Taussig, Principles of Economics, Vol. II, Ch. 52.
    7. M. Friedman and S. Kuznets, Income from Independent Professional Practice, Ch. 4.
    8. T. Parsons, “The Motivation of Economic Activity,” Ch. IX, in Essays in Sociological Theory.
    9. Sanders, Effects of Taxation on Executives, Chs. I and II.

Reading Period Assignment
Fall Term, 1955-56

Economics 106: O. Lange, “Scope and Method of Economics,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 13 (1943-46)

Source: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003. Box 6, Folder “Economics, 1955-1956 (1 of 2).

 

1955-56
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
ECONOMICS 106

Mid-year Examination
(January, 1956)

Answer question 1 and four others

  1. (one hour)
    1. The appearance of unions in an otherwise perfectly competitive labor market with perfect mobility of labor is likely to distort the allocation of resources. Why?
      (Assume that unions do influence wages.)
    2. In the type of labor market which actually exists the adverse effect of unions on resource allocation is much less certain. Why?
  2. Wage differentials attributable to the cost of training both help to determine and are determined by the distribution of income. Discuss.
  3. Outline some of the fundamental factors which make an area a low wage area.
  4. Friedman argues that unions do not influence wages. What evidence does he cite in support of his position? What considerations cast doubt on the proposition?
  5. What are the major reasons for the narrowing of skill differentials in American industry? What evidence would you look for to determine whether any misallocation of resources has resulted?
  6. Wages tend to be higher in rapidly growing industries than in others. Why?
  7. Outline Schumpeter’s views on the influence of monopoly on static efficiency (resource allocation) and progress.
  8. Discuss the effects of income taxes on personal incentives to work.

Source:  Harvard University Archives. Harvard University, Final examinations, 1853-2001. Box 23. Papers Printed for Final Examinations: History, History of Religions,…, Economics,…Naval Science, Air Science. January, 1956.

_______________________

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Department of Economics
Economics 106

Spring Term, 1955-56

Bain, Pricing, Distribution, and Employment, Chs. 5, 6.

P.W.S. Andrews, Manufacturing Business.

T. Scitovsky, Welfare and Competition Ch. 9.

Lutz, Theory of Investment of the Firm, Chs. 2, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16.

Hart, Anticipations, Uncertainty and Dynamic Planning.

Boulding, Economic Analysis, 3rd Edition, Ch. 38.

Durand, “Costs of Debt and Equity Funds” in Conference on Business Finance (National Bureau of Economic Research).

MacLaurin, Invention and Innovation in the Radio Industry.

E.S. Mason, “Current Status of Monopoly Problems,” Harvard Law Review, June 1949.

Butters and Lintner, Effects of Taxation on Corporate Mergers, Chs. IX, X.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Economics 106
Reading List (Cont.)

Federal Inter-Agency River Basin Committee, Subcommittee on Benefits and Costs, Proposed Practices for Economic Analysis of River Basin Projects, Chs. 1-5, pp. 1-56.

Smithies, A., The Budgetary Process in the United States, Ch. XIII.

Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Water Resources and Power, June 1955, Vol. I, pp. 1-85.

Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Task Force Report on Water Resources and Power, pp. 1-164.

Source: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003. Box 6, Folder “Economics, 1955-1956 (1 of 2).

 

 

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Department of Economics
Economics 106

Final Examination (May, 1956)

PART I.
(One Hour)

Required.

  1. Discuss the differences between monopoly and oligopoly in terms of (a) relation of prices to costs (b) investment behavior.

PART II.
(Half Hour)

Answer question 2 or 3.

  1. “The possibility that new firms will enter the industry influences the price and investment policies of firms in oligopolistic industries.” Discuss.
  2. The rivalry among oligopolists is more likely to result in product improvement than in price reduction. Why?

PART III.
(45 minutes for each question)

Answer two questions.

  1. What measures would you recommend for the improvement of the Federal Water Resource Program? Give reasons for your recommendations.
  2. The supply of any collective service by government action is likely to involve a redistribution of income. Discuss the possible effects of this on (1) the level at which these services may be supplied; (2) the degree of efficiency of the allocation of resources within a program.
  3. Even in an economy governed by the strongest preferences against government activity some economic needs will be met collectively. Why?

 

Source:  Harvard University Archives. Harvard University, Final examinations, 1853-2001. Box 24. Papers Printed for Final Examinations: History, History of Religions,…, Economics,…Naval Science, Air Science. June, 1956.

 

Categories
Economics Programs Harvard Undergraduate

Harvard. Undergraduate economics concentrators dropped over 50% in 1950s.

 

This post provides some backstory to the next post that features the reading lists for Harvard’s junior year tutorial in macroeconomics (Arthur Smithies) and microeconomics (Edward Chamberlin) used in 1960-61. The following Harvard Crimson article describes the undergraduate program in crisis (as seen in the massive drop in economics concentrators). The fall in numbers was attributed to the observation that economics “instruction gyrates widely from verbal triviality to mathematical incomprehensibility”.  Now one might say that much economics instruction gyrates from verbal incomprehensibility to mathematical triviality.

Alfred Marshall tried to design his own Cambridge Curriculum to address two classes of students, those needing general economics training for leadership careers in business and government and those needing advanced training for research careers in economics. Integrated training of the two classes within a single program at Harvard appears to have reached its limits by the second half of the twentieth century. 

Marshall, Alfred. The New Cambridge Curriculum in EconomicsLondon: Macmillan, 1903.

________________________

Economics: Undergraduate Program Undergoes Extensive Re-Evaluation
By Michael Churchill

The Harvard Crimson, November 14, 1959

C. P. Snow, British scientist and author, recently called attention to what he termed the problem of two cultures in our society–the gap in understanding between the traditional humanities and social sciences on the one hand and modern science and technology on the other. Both exist side by side, yet remain intellectually divorced in our modern society. This dichotomy serves well in considering the difficulties surrounding the discipline of economics, for its midway position in such a scheme is indicative of its problems.

The subject matter of economics is the productive system, with all its relations to the world of technology. The concern of economics, however, is this system’s role in society and its effect on men, their livelihood, and their institutions. Not an integrator of the two cultures, nevertheless it must span the separation.

The Economics Department is currently undergoing a crisis. It has failed up to now to accommodate both elements in a coherent program. The result is strikingly demonstrated by the flight of undergraduate concentrators from the field. In less than a decade the number has declined by over half; from 709 in 1949 to 340 in 1958. Although the decline may partially reflect a nationwide tendency, it also is the result of the confusion and frustration attending the undergraduate program here, as the instruction gyrates widely from verbal triviality to mathematical incomprehensibility.

Though economics stands mid-way between two cultures, it is its similarity to the natural sciences that causes the greatest problems. Professional economics shares with the sciences an analytic technique “remote from the common experience of the layman and a language that is principally mathematical,” to use the words the Bruner Committee applied to the natural sciences. And to judge from the current trend this will become increasingly so.

Another similarity with science is that the study of economics is often cumulative, thereby necessitating an extensive introduction to provide the requisite basic knowledge. These are the same problems with which the Bruner Report was concerned in the teaching of natural sciences in a liberal arts program. That report dealt primarily with the problem of the non-concentrator in science–the General Education courses in natural sciences. The Economics Department, however, because of the interest of its concentrators, encounters the same problems throughout its program.

Some of the concentrators are presumably economists, and the Department little wishes to discourage their interests. The vast majority, however, will be lawyers, doctors, and even, despite the Department’s hostility, businessmen.

A final similarity with the sciences lies in the difficulty both areas have in getting the proper senior faculty to teach undergraduate courses. Because of the vast gap between the level of professional work and the elementary nature of undergraduate work–a gap so great that the difference is not only of degree of sophistication but of content–many professors are either reluctant to teach undergraduates or incapable of making the transition.

The combination of the inherent difficulties in teaching economics in a liberal arts college plus the almost total neglect of the undergraduate program in past years has resulted in the precipitous decline in concentrators. The hope of halting that decline lies at the bottom of the Department’s plans to re-design the undergraduate program, which are now under way.

Arthur Smithies, Chairman of the Department, met frequently this summer and again this fall with a Department Committee on Undergraduate Education appointed last spring. Headed by Professor Dunlop, members of the group are Professors Chamberlin, Duesenberry, and Meyer, Assistant Professors Gill and Lefeber, and instructors Baer and Berman.

The results of this increased attention are already apparent in changes made this year in Economics 1 and Junior tutorial, Ec. 98. Historical and topical subjects have gained emphasis at the expense of some of the more theoretical and analytical material, which is now consigned to Sophomore tutorial. In former years economic theory was presented in a historical vaccum without any consideration of the evolution of the economic system from a local medieval subsistence economy to the modern international productive system. The first month of Economics 1 is now devoted to filling this gap. Other changes include an increased emphasis upon the problem of underdeveloped countries and the substitution of a three-week study of the economy of the Soviet Union for the former week’s survey of comparative economic systems.

Along with these changes in content have come those of organization. Gone is the “parade of stars” which formerly masqueraded as lectures. Instead there are now blocs of integrated lectures covering single aspects of the course, for example the series of lectures the first month that Professor Gill gave on economic history. Another long-standing distinguishing trait of the course, its extensive use of teaching fellows, is also on the way out.

The changes are clearly tending to make the course less an introduction into the Department and more a General Education course in the social sciences. The stress, in the attempt to interest the non-concentrator through presentation of historical and topical issues, is now upon political economy rather than upon economics. In a liberal arts college such a solution to the problems affecting the discipline seems to be the most logical and rewarding for an introductory course.

Faced, however, with the task of teaching its concentrators some of the methods and techniques of the economist, the department has moved towards increasing utilization of Sophomore and Junior tutorial for this purpose. The analytic material ejected from Ec. 1 has found refuge in Sophomore tutorial, while Ec. 98 (Junior tutorial) although heavily biased towards the empirical is the only course in the Department offering an overall view of the field.

But there is this year, in addition, an increased amount of attention towards policy questions and topical economic issues in both courses, a reflection of the prevalent belief that meaningful economics on the undergraduate level should relate, as Smithies said, “to the great public issues of the day.” In practice these two elements–the analytical tools and the social framework in which they must fit–still remain divorced in these courses, but at least the attempt is being made to integrate them.

The most perplexing problems facing the Department occur in the area of the middle group courses. To some extent they are aggravated by the Department’s quantative approach to the number of concentrators, with its concern to retain the marginally interested student within the Department. And again the nature of the field, with its disparity between advanced professional techniques and an undergraduate approach, intensifies the problem that confronts many other departments in the College–that of withstanding the polar attractions of pre-professional orientation or of superficiality. Concerning the middle course group area, Dunlop’s committee has only just begun its discussions, but the major alternatives are well known.

There is general agreement, according to Dunlop, that the undergraduate program as part of a liberal arts program should not be a pre-professional training. Disagreement, however, becomes manifest quickly after that statement. Many members of the department, for instance, feel that the best concentrators, the potential future economists, should be allowed to take courses on the graduate level, and indeed should be encouraged to do so. In effect these students would be obtaining a pre-professional training, but the supporters of this proposal feel that this is the only way whereby the interest of the economics-oriented student can be prevented from obstruction by the triviality of normal undergraduate economics courses. At present many undergraduates already take graduate level courses, but the new plan would make a sharper distinction between those who do and do not.

Another group in Department, however, voices the opinion that the College student should not clutter his schedule with pre-professional courses, but rather use his time to study such fields as music, literature, and mathematics. If a student does do graduate work later in economics he will have no trouble picking up whatever advanced analytic tools he needs at that time, while if he does not intend to do so there is no sense in wasting his time with a lot of specialized technique, this bloc maintains.

One proposal, approved by nearly all and sorely needed, is to introduce a greater flexibility into the program through increased use of half-year courses. Presently over half of the seventeen courses offered run from September to June. Many of these, it is admitted, could be pared down to a half-year.

This leads to the proposal for a new type course to replace the far-flung surveys. They would probe smaller areas, but penetrate deeper. Based on the combined desire to attract more students, and the premise that the goal is a more intelligent understanding of the public issues of the past and present, the courses would be designed around the topical approach. Examples would be courses on the corporation, on the economic impact of government activity, the present course on the Soviet Union, a half-year course on underdeveloped countries. In discussing this approach, Dunlop stressed that these would not be “watered down versions of the analytic approach but a new crosscut.” It should be noted that, while not analytical, these courses would still include some quantitative analysis or even simple economic models, but these methods would not become ends or major concerns of the courses.

Another proposal is to set up a core program in the Department. There is, in fact, almost one already. Ec. 141–Money and Banking, Ec. 161–Industrial Organization, and Ec. 181–Industrial Relations, cover the major areas of the field and at least two of them are necessary to handle Generals well. A real core program where all concentrators would progress from one level of the next has many advantages; it provides a common background which the lecturer can assume, gives a common training, and insures that a student will not neglect a vital aspect of the field. But it also has disadvantages, the primary one being the difficulty of handling non-concentrators who have not had this core. Separate sections in a course might be a simple answer here. A more difficult problem is that of time. Ec. 1, 98, and 99 already constitute three-fifths of the required courses. A central core program of another three semesters would aggravate the present lack of flexibility.

For the Economics Department this is a time of discussion, but it must soon reach the hour of decision. Certainly the present situation is not tolerable. By its over-concern with theoretical models and tools, the Department has separated itself from the true materials of a liberal arts education in economics. It should not, however, allow itself to reach the other extreme, in its quest for concentrators, of reducing the content of the courses to a point where an economics student is no more qualified to discuss and solve an issue of political economy than an intelligent government concentrator.

There is little question of the importance of economics today, with its strategic position between the technological productive system and the literary tradition of the social sciences, and with its unique combination of the empirical and theoretical. It remains only to be taught well.

 

 

Categories
Harvard Seminar Speakers Sociology Suggested Reading Syllabus

Harvard. Social Influences on Economic Actions, outline and readings. Musgrave and Spechler, 1973

 

The outline below for an ambitious Harvard course organized jointly by Richard Musgrave and Martin C. Spechler in 1973 comes from John Kenneth Galbraith’s papers. Galbraith was invited to give a lecture on institutional economics and a couple of pages of keywords in the folder would appear to confirm that Galbraith indeed lectured on the topic.

Biographical information for Richard Musgrave was provided a few blog postings ago. Martin Spechler too was a Harvard alumnus (indeed all three of his academic degrees come from that institution) and so I’ll first insert the chronology of his academic jobs so one can meet another economic Ph.D. alumnus. Spechler’s main research field was comparative economic systems complemented by a strong interest in the history of economics (see the link to his 2007 c.v. below). 

______________________

Martin C. Spechler (b. January 25, 1943, New York City)

A.B. in Social Studies (1964), A.M. in Economics (1967), Ph.D. in Economics (1971). Harvard

1965-1971. Harvard. Teaching fellow in economics and social studies.
1971-1973. Harvard. Lecturer on economics and on social studies.
1971-1974. Harvard. Head tutor in economics.
1973-1975. Harvard. Assistant professor of economics.
1974-1980. Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Department of Economics, lecturer.
1980-1982. Tel Aviv University. Department of Economics and School of General History. Senior lecturer (acting).
1982-1983. University of Washington, Seattle. School  of International Studies. Visiting associate professor.
1983-1984. University Iowa, Iowa City. Visiting associate professor.
1984-1986. Indiana University, Bloomington. Visiting associate professor of economics and research associate, West European Studies.
1986-1990. Indiana University, Indianapolis. Associate professor of economics
1990-. Indiana University, Purdue University, Indianapolis. Professor of economics.

Source:  Martin C. Spechler c.v. (December 2007).

______________________

ECONOMICS 2080
Tentative Lecture Schedule
[1973]

1. September 27 Spechler on Marxism
2. October 4 Unger on Weber
3. October 9 (Tues.) Galbraith on institutionalism
4. October 18 Duesenberry on consumer behavior
5. October 25 (?) on entrepreneurs
6. November 1 M. Roberts on government bureaucracy
7. November 8 J. Bower on corporate organization
8. November 15 Doeringer on workers and unions
9. November 20 (Tuesday) Bowles (?) on Marxian theory of the state
10. November 29 D. Bell (?) on elite theory
11. December 6 J. Q. Wilson on pluralism
12. December 13 Hirschman on trade policy
13. December 20 Musgrave on objectivity in economics and social science

 

Harvard University
Economics 2080

Social Influences on Economic Action
Fall Term, Thursday 4-6

Martin C. Spechler
Holyoke 833, Office; 10-12 (daily)

Richard Musgrave
Littauer 326

            Designed to be taken in one semester to be followed by a seminar, this course examines the social context of economic activity. It covers theoretic and applied writings in several significant traditions: Marxist, Weberian, institutionalist, and liberal. The list includes a more thorough reading of Marx and Weber than is usually available elsewhere and articles reporting contemporary research of a scale suitable for dissertations. Since certain topics of interest, such as stratification, are treated elsewhere in the Economics or allied departments, the range of topics is intentionally incomplete. But each topic includes competing paradigms and case studies making use of them. Each topic takes off from the limits of conventional economics to show that different assumptions and procedures show promise of answering important questions about economic life.

It is envisioned that the course will be taught during the first year in a conference format, with guest lecturers but with one or two Department members responsible for the entire course and always present in class. The course will culminate in the writing of a long (30-40 pages) case study, employing some or all of the theoretical perspectives which have been presented. There will also be a shorter paper early on to fix the theoretical perspectives in mind.

The course is intended for graduate students with some preparation in economics. To facilitate discussion, one might have to limit enrollment, though a diverse group would be highly desirable.

Works marked (*) are assumed as background; those marked (**) are supplementary.

A. The Content and Limits of Modern Economics: A Point of Departure

*Lord Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science (2nd ed. 1935).

Emile Gruenberg, “The Meaning of Scope and External Boundaries of Economics.”

Kenneth E. Boulding, “The Verifiability of Economic Images.” Both in Sherman Roy Krupp, The Structure of Economic Science. (Prentice Hall, 1966), pp. 129-165.

Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, Analytical Economics (Harvard University Press, 1966), Part I (especially pp. 92-129).

B. Three Social Perspectives on Economic Action

What are the hallmarks of “modern” — now misleadingly termed “Western” — society? What changes in productive relations, in ethos, and in political arrangements favored its development? This section examines in depth three major interdisciplinary systems which undertake to define, explain, and analyze the working of modern society, particularly the limits placed on the market by social forces.

Week 1 (September 27) Marxism

Karl Marx, “Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy”

________, “Estranged Labor”

________, “Private Property and Communism”

________, “The Power of Money in Bourgeois Society”

________, “The German Ideology”, Part I

________, “Wage Labor and Capital”

________, “Capital”, Vol. 1 (selections) all in The Marx-Engels Reader (ed. By Robert C. Tucker), Norton Publ., pp. 306 [30-36 intended?], 56-83, 110-164, 167-317, 577-588.

Friedrich Engels, “Letters on Historical Materialism” in Tucker, ed., pp. 640-651 and 661-664.  OR

Ernest Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, Vol. I, chapters 5, 11; Vol. II, 12-14.

Week 2 (October 4) Weber

Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, entire.

________, The Religion of China, IV, V, and VIII.

________, *General Economic History, Part IV

“Power, Capitalism and Rural Society in Germany,” and “National Character and the Junkers,” all in Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, pp. 159-195, 363-395.

Week 3 (October 11) Institutionalism

Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, in Max Lerner, The Portable Veblen (Viking pb) chapters IV, VI.

________, “On the Merits of Borrowing,” from Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution, pp. 349-363 in M. Lerner, The Portable Veblen, op. cit.

________, The Theory of Business Enterprise, chapters III, IV, VII.

John Kenneth Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose (Houghton-Mifflin, 1973), chapters V, IX-XIV, and XIX.

Possible paper topics (illustrative only) for section B. Due October 18:

Paper: What do Marxist, Weberian, and Historical-institutional theories have to say about kinds of modern economies which have developed in the world?

**England, 1642-1851

David Landes, The Unbound Prometheus, introduction and chapter 1.

Barrington, Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, chapters I and VI.

E.J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, chapters 1-7.

**Japan and China Compared

M. J. Levy, “Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan,” in Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan (Duke, 1955), pp. 496-536.

Henry Rosovsky, “Japan’s Transition to Modern Economic Growth, 1868-1885,” in Henry Rosovsky (ed.) Industrialization in Two Systems: Essays in Honor of Alexander Gerschenkron (Wiley, 1966). Bobbs-Merrill Reprint No. Econom-264.

Thomas C. Smith, “Japan’s Aristocratic Revolution,” Yale Review V (50), 1960-61, pp. 370-83, reprinted in R. Bendix and S.M. Lipset, Class, Status and Power (2nd ed.), pp. 135-40. The samurai class as modernizers.

Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins, op. cit., IV, V, VIII, IX. Particular attention to feudal land patterns as an obstacle to economic and political modernization.

or R.H. Tawney, Land and Labour in China (Octagon, 1964)

or Johannes Hirschmeier, The Origins of Entrepreneurship in Meiji Japan (Harvard, 1964).

**Indonesia, 1945-

Clifford Geertz, Peddlers and Princes (Chicago, 1963). An excellent example of economic anthropology in the Weberian tradition.
[Other suggestions and bibliography available from the instructors.]

C. How do Consumers, Workers, and Entrepreneurs form their Preferences for Market Activities?

This section examines the empirical evidence to date on the relative role of material incentives and job characteristics on productivity, on the effects of advertising on consumer attitudes, and on the relationship between historical experience and decisions about the future.

Week 4 (October 18) Consumer Behavior

*Robert Ferber, “Research on Household Behavior,” American Economic Review, Vol. 52 (1962), pp. 19-63. Reprinted in A.S.C. Ehrenburg and F.G. Pyatt, Consumer Behavior (Penguin, 1971).

*Karl Marx, “Alienated Labor,” and “Needs, Production, and the Division of Labor,” from Early Writings, ed. J. B. Bottomore, pp. 120-134.

*James S. Duesenberry, Income, Saving, and the Theory of Consumer Behavior, chapters I-IV.

J.K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society, (Revised edition), chapter 11.

Lester Telser, “Advertising and Cigarettes,” Journal of Political Economy (October, 1962), pp. 471-99).

Tony McGuiness and Keith Cowling, “Advertising and the Aggregate Demand for Cigarettes: An Empirical Analysis of a U.K. Market,” paper no. 31, Centre for Industrial Economic and Business Research, University of Warwick, England. On reserve in Littauer.

Lester D. Taylor and Daniel Weiserbs, “Advertising and the Aggregate Production Function,” American Economic Review, (September 1972), pp. 642-55.

George Katona, Burkhard Strumpel and Ernest Zahn, Aspirations and Affluence (McGraw-Hill, 1971), chapters 6-12. The effects and causes of consumer attitudes in the United States and Western Europe.

Week 5 (October 25) Entrepreneurs

Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, (Harper Torchbook, 1962), chapter XI-XIV.

Thomas C. Cochran, “Cultural Factors in Economic Growth,” and David Landes, “French Business and the Business Man: a Social and Cultural Analysis,” in Hugh G.J. Aitken, Explorations in Enterprise (Harvard University Press, 1965), pp, 122-38, 184-209.

Alexander Gerschenkron, “Social Attitudes, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Development,” in Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Harvard, 1962), pp. 52-71. [note: workers’ attitudes will be discussed in week 8.]

D. How Do Large Organizations Behave?

The opportunities created by market power and the size of the hierarchy in modern economic bureaucracies probably allowed behavior far from the competitive norm. What are the elements of structure, control, and attitudes which influence corporate behavior? The readings include the Weberian, and the “bureaucratic politics” points of view; and the case comparisons include the U.S. Navy, French enterprise, the Society of Jesus, the Soviet industrial planning system, and the most important American public enterprise.

Week 6 (November 1) Government Bureaucracy

Max Weber, “Bureaucracy,” in Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber, pp. 196-244.

Charles Lindblom, “The Politics of Muddling Through,” Bobbs-Merrill Reprint, Public Administration Review XIX (Spring, 1959), pp.79-88: why strict means-end rationality is impossible in government bureaucracies.

A. Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, (Little, Brown, 1964) chapter 2.

Stanley Surrey, “Congress and the Tax Lobbyist: How Tax Provisions Get Enacted,” Harvard Law Review (1957), pp. 1145-70.

Sandford F. Borins, “The Political Economy of ‘The Fed,’” Public Policy (Spring, 1972), pp. 175-98.

Sanford Weiner, “Resource Allocation in Basic Research and Organizational Design,” Public Policy (Spring, 1972), pp. 227-55.

Benjamin Ward, The Socialist Economy: A Study of Organizational Alternatives, chapters 5 and 6.

The latter considers whether socialization, such as occurs in the Jesuits and the Navy, would overcome some of the control anomalies which have frustrated Soviet planning.

**Joseph Berliner, Factory and Manager in the U.S.S.R. (Harvard, 1957); a classic on informal organizations versus system goals.

Week 7 (November 8) Corporate Organization

A Harvard Business School case will be distributed for discussion.

*R.H. Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica, (1937) reprinted in G. J. Stigler and Kenneth Boulding,Readings in Price Theory (AEA, 1952), pp. 331-351.

Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,” American Economic Review (December, 1972), pp. 777-95.

Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration (Row Peterson, 1957), chapter 4.

David Granick, Managerial Comparisons of Four Developed Countries (MIT, 1972), chapters 1-5, 9-13.

**Alfred Chandler, Jr. Strategy and Structure, chapters 1-3, 5-7, conclusion.

**Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots (Harper pb, 1966).

**Michelle Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Phoenix pb, 1964).

**Alfred Chandler. Pierre Dupont and the Modern Corporation.

Joseph L. Bower, “The Amoral Organization,” in R. Marris and E. G. Mesthene, Technology, the Corporation, and the State (forthcoming) or Harvard Business School 4-372-285.

Week 8 (November 15) Workers and Unions

Victor Vroom,”Industrial Social Psychology,” in Gardner B. Lindzey and Elliott Aronson, eds., The Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. V. (2nd ed.), 1969, pp. 196-248.

Work in America, report of a Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (MIT Press, 1973), chapters 1, 2, 4, 5.
Mancur Olsen, Logic of Collective Goods (paperback, rev. ed., 1971), chapter III, pp. 66-97.

Suggested:

**John Goldthorpe et al., The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure, Cambridge University Press, 1969, pb).

**Andre Gorz, A Strategy for Labor (Beacon pb., 1968), chapter 4.
Leonard Goodwin, Do the Poor Want to Work? (Brookings, 1972).

E. Does Economic Power Give Rise to Political Power?

            Marxist, elite and pluralist theorists all answer differently as to under what circumstances market power and material privilege are translated into political power and what sorts of groups (classes, corporations, trade associations, ideological coalitions, parties) contend for ascendancy. The readings examine such mechanisms as control of mass media, the common training and outlook of American and European elites, pressure group influence on Congressional elections, and the weakening of countervailing interests.

*Otto Eckstein, Public Finance (2nd ed.), chapters 1-2.

Week 9 (November 20, Tuesday) Marxian Theory of the State

Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (Basic Books), entire.

Week 10 (November 29) Elite Theory

C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, chapters 1-13.

G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? (Spectrum pb. 1967), 1-5, 7.

Week 11 (December 6) Pluralism

Arnold M. Rose, The Power Structure, (Oxford pb, 1967), pp. 1-10, 15-24, 26-39, 70-78, 89-127, 131-133.

**J.K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State, chapters I-IX, XXV, and XXXV: A strong statement of the technological impetus towards convergence.

**Walter Adams, “The Military-Industrial Complex and the New Industrial State,” American Economic Review (May, 1968), pp. 652-665.

Stanley Lieberson, “An Empirical Study of Military-Industrial Linkages,” American Journal of Sociology, (1971), pp. 562-82.

George J. Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economic and Manag. Sci., (Spring, 1971), pp. 3-17.

Joseph C. Palamountain, Jr., The Politics of Distribution (Harvard University Press, 1955), II, IV, VII, VIII.

J.Q. Wilson, “Politics of Business Regulation” (revised ed.), mimeographed.

Week 12 (December 13) Trade Policy

Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter, American Business and Public Policy, The Politics of Foreign Trade (Aldine, 2nded., 1972), Parts II, IV-VI.

F. Validation of Theories about Economic Action

Week 13 (December 20) Objectivity in Economics and Social Science

*Milton Friedman, “The Methodology of Positive Economics.”

Max Weber, “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’ in Sociology and Economics,” and “’Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy,” in Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences (Free Press, 1949), pp. 1-112.

Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge Cambridge University Press pb. (Essays by T.S. Kuhn, S.E. Toulmin, K.R. Popper, and I. Lakatos), pp. 1-24, 39-59, 91-196.

Term papers due by January 17.

SourceJohn Kenneth Galbraith Personal Papers. Series 5 Harvard University File, 1949-1990, Box 521, Folder “[courses]: Economics 280: Musgrave Lecture. 9 October 1973”.

Image Source: Martin C. Spechler from the Department of Economics webpage, Indiana University Purdue University, Indianapolis archived at the Wayback Machine (February 18, 2003).

 

 

Categories
Economists Harvard Seminar Speakers

Harvard. Galbraith’s Special Tuesday Evening Seminar, 1973

 

One of the delights of working with the papers of John Kenneth Galbraith is that the man was simply incapable of writing a straight memo. Some flash of wit or felicitous use of the English language always breaks in. The following announcement gives us some insight into the sort of university service that Galbraith most gladly provided. Soft power was his instrument of choice for departmental politics.

___________________

SPECIAL TUESDAY EVENING SEMINAR

As in earlier years, Professor Galbraith will conduct a series of evening discussions for first year graduate students and others who are interested. Meetings will be in the Littauer Lounge at 7 o’clock, and participants are urged to arrive reasonably on time. They may leave when they wish. Following very brief introductory comments by Professor Galbraith and guests, the subject will be open for discussion. No competently presented argument, however inconvenient, will be denied a hearing. Discussion will continue as long as the audience or the supply of useful ideas endures. This year’s subject and dates are listed below. The guest list is still tentative.

 

October 2, 1973—THE ECONOMICS OF THE PRESENT INFLATION

Guests:
Hendrik S. Houthakker
James S. Duesenberry
John Dunlop

October 16, 1973—THE CORPORATION: IS IT RESPONSIBLE: HAS IT BOUGHT THE COUNTRY

Guests:
Theodore Levitt
Marc Roberts
Abram Chayes
Richard Caves

October 30, 1973—WHAT AND HOW SHOULD ECONOMICS BE TAUGHT AND A Ph.D. EARNED OR ACQUIRED

Guests:
Dale Jorgenson
Robert Dorfman
Sam Bowles
Art McEwan

November 13, 1973—WHAT ARE THE ECONOMICS OF SEX DISCRIMINATION, ARE WOMEN ECONOMIC ARTIFACTS

Guests:
Carolyn Bell
Betsy Munzer
Hazel Denton
Arthur Smithies
Lester Thurow

December 4, 1973—ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE

An evening for or against the book. (On this evening, a reasonable quantity of champagne of indifferent quality will be supplied from the accrued royalties, if any)

Guests:
John Kenneth Galbraith
Steve Marglin
Zvi Griliches

 

Source: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. John Kenneth Galbraith Papers. Box 78. Series 5. Harvard University File, 1949-1990. Folder: “Courses, Non-credit seminar1973”.

Image Source: John Kenneth Galbraith in academic regalia from the Harvard Class Album, 1968.

Categories
Funny Business Harvard M.I.T.

Harvard or MIT. Economics graduate student skit, ca. 1963.

 

Because of the reference to Jaroslav Vanek’s leaving Harvard, we are able to date the following script to 1962-63 since Vanek left Harvard to work at the State Department in 1963. Almost everything about this script would lead me to conclude that it was used in a Harvard graduate student skit that somehow wound up in the folder for the Graduate Student Association at the Department of Economics of M.I.T. The folder is otherwise filled with clearly M.I.T. skit material from the 1960s. One of the students is identified as “David” another “Bob” and the third looks like “Les”.  

Lester Thurow did get his Ph.D. from Harvard in 1964 and came to M.I.T. in 1968 so it is not inconceivable that the following transcription is indeed based upon his personal typed script copy with original pencil stage directions that made its way into the folder. 

One thing that I find rather surprising about the text is just how many Harvard professors’ names have been misspelled.

__________________________

D—This is a review with a message—a message no economist can afford to ignore. The year is 2000 A.D. 16 years have now passed since 1984, that Armageddon of the economics profession when Professor Wassily Leontief finally established that the world really was homogeneous of degree one. The then President of the United States, Mr. Norman Mailer, immediately issued the great Marginal Product Proclamation. Everyone was to receive their marginal product.

B— But there was nothing left over for the economists. Economists became the hand-loom weavers of the 20th. century.

L—Arthur Schlesinger Jr. vividly described their position in a 17-volume work entitled “The Coming of the Raw Deal.” Economists everywhere, after the first shock, set out upon new careers. Tonight we shall discover what happened to some of those whom we know and love.

D—Several of them went into the movie industry and we will now let you hear the soundtrack of the preview of one of their movies.

(Epic Music—Bruckner?)

[Insert: Stand]

L—Ladies and Gentlemen, 21st Century Fox are proud to present Arthur Smithies and Joan Robinson in….The Big Push, the story of the unbalanced growth of an economist….

B—Production by Karl [sic] Kaysen

D—Copyright by Edward Hastings Chamberlain [sic]

L—All labor disputes on location and with Elizabeth Taylor arbitrated by John Dunlop.

B—Continuity by Simon Kuznets

L—Editing by Seymour Harris, of course.

D—Costumes by Robert Dorfman.

B—This is the story of Ragnar Maynard von Eckstein (his parents had always wanted him to be an economist). After many struggles at last he got to Harvard Graduate School.

L—It is a tale of |horror. See him now at a seminar on the economics of Medical Care…..

D—This after-noon I am going to discuss the economics of Blood-banking. One of the crucial problems in this field is what proportion to maintain of liquid assets. In this category we have blood [Insert:   L. What about near blood] near-blood. We also have non-liquid assets—bonds in the form of pounds of flesh. Another problem is the current shortage of tellers, for we can only employ vampires with a strong liquidity preference. If we cannot get more it will clot up the flow of funds and reduce the velocity of circulation.

L—It is a tale of |ambition…..

B—Coming from a family whose marginal product was zero, Ragnar Maynard realized that to get on quickly he must publish something. But what? He had not written anything. But our resourceful hero saw a way out: he would publish his first book before it was written. It was called First Draft, a revised tentative, preliminary, provisional text. It was based on Photostat copies of his blackboard notes.

L—It is a tale of |love….

D—Ragnar Manyrd fell passionately in love with a beautiful capital theorist, played in the movie by ravishing Joan Robinson. His demand for her love was infinitely elastic; her supply could not meet him—at least not at his price. The price was to join him in his exhausting search over peaks and through troughs for the elusive U-shaped cost curve.

L—It is a tale of |excitement

B—See Ragnar Maynard trying to free himself from the dreaded liquidity trap.

Insert: D—It’s true, it really is thicker than water

L—All this and more you can see in this movie—The Big Push is a take-off point in the development of the motion-picture.

B—See the exciting attempt on Professor Leontief’s life (with a 202 rifle) to try to prevent him revealing his startling discovery of a constant returns world.

D—See the world’s largest input-output table which proved it—drawn by the Economic Research project in the sand of the New Mexican desert.

L—You cannot afford to miss this motion picture. Filmed in wonderful new—Solocolor. An introducing revolutionary—Rostowscope.

(concluding epic music)

[Insert: Sit]

D—But the movies could not accommodate everybody…

[Insert: Bob in middle]

[Insert: one illegible word]

L—Professor Leontief, having escaped with his life, and using his input-output table from Scientific American as a testimonial, got into the business of designing bathroom tiles.

B—Professor Duesenbery [sic] was well qualified to go into the demonstration business. He drove Cadillacs around low-income districts to stimulate demand. And changed his name to Jones so that it would be him that everyone was keeping up with.

D—In England many economists went to work for the government where they produced a remarkable effect. Before 1984 political speeches had sounded something like this.

B—Good evening; I’m the Prime Minister. My name is….. [insert: ad lib] etc.

D—But now all this has changed…

B—Good evening…[insert: ad lib] etc.

L—Professor Tom Schelling took up a career in Madison avenue. It was he who was responsible for some of the following products…

D—Ladies, now you can wear the most powerful and alluring perfume in the world—First Strike—the only perfume with complete credibility. It also contains the only deodorant with overkill.

B—Now at last there is a product to take away the smell of deodorant—it is called Counterforce. Only Counterforce gives you 24-hour protection against odorlessness. [Insert: 5120 or S120]

[Insert: STAND]

L—For years girls have been searching for a perfume which will attract the men and yet prevent them from taking liberties—now they have it in the form of Deterrence—the perfume which is effective [Insert: only] if you don’t use it.

D—He also introduced a city wide deodorant campaign under the title of Civil defence.

L—And the only really safe method of birth control—Early Warning.

B—Meanwhile Professor Dunlop had become a truck driver and a shop steward for Jimmy Hoffa.

D—And Professor Kuznets took to selling abacuses.

[Insert: Some economists, not from Harvard opened a cafeteria.]

[Insert: Bob-Les—come forward]

L—Professor Galbraith first thought of becoming a rice farmer. But he soon saw that since there was no more need for economists he could now come into his own. After a coup d’etat he took over the Littauer building and changed it into the department of Affluent Studies. The idea was the ultra-popularization of economics; the main qualification for admission was to be a good phrase-monger. The new department published books like…

B—The Economics of Sex, with an appendix on the second derivatives of Jayne Mansfield. A geometric interpretation with diagrams.

D—The department became identified with a new theory of economic decline, published as a non-Rostovian manifesto. All countries, it said, tend to decline, and their speed of decline is determined by their relative degree of economic advancement. Its five stages of decline started with the age of mass consumption, through the age of preconditions for decline, coming then to the crucial landing stage.

B—Other books appeared like ‘The Naked Truth about Public Squalor, and so on.

[Insert: Pause—back to audience]

L—Only one of the redundant economists took the highest calling of all. Let us now eavesdrop on a sermon by [Insert: his eminence] Archbishop Gerschenkron…

[Insert: seated]

B—You know, when I was an economist one of my graduate students wrote a very good paper for my course. Matthew, [Insert: I said] why don’t you publish this paper, no, really why don’t you publish. But you know youll have to change the title. What journal is going to publish a paper called ‘the First Gospel’? But you know it really was a very good paper. There was a lot of interesting material about the farm problem in Egypt and about the almost miraculous elasticity of supply of loaves and small fishes in Gallillee [sic]. Then there was a very good section about Christ throwing the money-changers from the temple. Well, you see, the rate of interest was very high then. Don’t you think that the real reason why Christ did this was to reduce the rate of interest and to stimulate investment. You see, I wanted Matthew to rewrite his paper for the Quarterly Journal and call it ‘Christ as a proto-Keynsian’ [sic] But no, he was a very strong-willed boy and he brought it out in a syposium [sic] edited by Seymour Harris, called the Bible, essays in honor of God. But, you know, it was still required reading for my course.

D—Professor Harberler [sic] took to song writing, and here is a sample…

[Insert: stand behind table]

(tune: God bless America)

[Insert: All:] God bless free enterprise,
[Insert: MOC or HOC or NOC] System divine,
Stand beside her and guide her,
Just as long as the profits are mine.
[Insert: Salute]
Corporations may they prosper
Big business, may it grow!
[Insert: MOC or HOC or NOC] God bless Free Enterprise,
The Status quo!

L—Well, David, I guess that’s it. Do you think they’ll throw us out?

D—I dont know. But I dont suppose we’ll ever be allowed to pass generals. There are still some jobs you can get without a Ph.D.

B—No chance at all is there? I mean about generals….

D—Well they were all in it weren’t they—all the generals board.

L—What about Professor Vanek? He emerged unscathed.

D—That’s true but he’s leaving.

B—That’s fair, of course.

L—Yes, he hasn’t done much since he’s been here really.

D—Half a dozen good articles…

B—4 books, or is it 5?

L—He’s become an acknowledged expert on at least two major fields of economics…

D—A clear and stimulating teacher…
And a nice guy…

L—Not much really. [Insert: Clearly not a Harvard type]

B—Not surprised they’re letting him go

D—Well, that’s it then.

B—One more thing actually…The perpetrators of this entertainment would like it to be known that any resemblance of characters in this review to any person or persons living or half-dead is purely intentional.

L—So be it.

All—In the name of the Holy Trinity:

D—Dorfman,

L—Samuelson,

B—and Solow.

All—Amen

 

Source:   MIT Archives. Department of Economics Records, Box 2, Folder “GEA 1961-67”.

 

Categories
Harvard Suggested Reading Syllabus

Harvard. Undergraduate Honors Economic Theory Readings. Duesenberry and Kaysen, 1951-52

 

 

For some reason the annual Report of the President of Harvard College for 1951-52 does not include the staffing and enrollment figures for courses offered during the academic year. I have been using these annual reports to verify the actual staffing for courses because the course announcements are sometimes inaccurate, being by their nature listings published before the academic year gets going, but at least certainly before the second semester begins. Many times, though not always, there is an instructor’s name at the head of the course reading assignments that have been filed with the library for placing items on reading reserve. Thus for the undergraduate honors course “Economic Theory and Policy” (Economics 101), I am only certain that James Duesenberry taught the first semester (he is named in the Crimson article excerpt below, also in the course announcement, and finally on the first semester reading list itself). Carl Kaysen is mentioned in the course announcement for the second semester of the course, but there is no name on the second semester reading list nor can I verify without an ex post staffing report for the course. Let’s just say there is a strong presumption that Carl Kaysen indeed taught the second semester of Economics 101.

Note the second semester reading list ends with “to be continued” but, alas,  there is no further list to be found in the file.

___________________

Harvard Crimson Report

Three Steps to Economics

The Department’s courses have been organized on three levels, although Economics 1 is the only prerequisite for any course. Economics 1 is the first level course, a dull but thorough introduction to the field. A department committee is now at work considering revising the curriculum, and it is hoped that this basic course will be brighter next year.

There are four courses on the second level, each covering a division of the department. Theory and Policy (101) discusses current theories of production, exchange, and distribution. Professor Duesenberry will take over complete charge of this course next year. It is generally considered dull but important. Almost all of the students are honors candidates, and the course is graded accordingly….

Source: The Harvard Crimson, April 28, 1950.

___________________

Course Announcement

For Undergraduates and Graduates

The courses for Undergraduates and Graduates, unless otherwise stated, are open only to students who have passed in Economics 1.

Economics 101. Economic Theory and Policy

Full course. Mon., Wed., and (at the pleasure of the instructor) Fri., at 12.
Fall term
: Assistant Professor Duesenberry; Spring term: Assistant Professor Kaysen.

Current theories of production, exchange, and the distribution of the national income, with some indications as to their relevance to contemporary economic problems. The course will be carried on mainly by discussion. It is intended primarily for candidates for the degree with honors and may be taken only with the consent of the instructor.

 

Source. Final Announcement of the Courses of Instruction Offered by the Faculty of Arts and Sciences During 1951-52. Official Register of Harvard University, Vol. XLVIII (September 10, 1951) No. 21, p. 76.

___________________

James S. Duesenberry

Economics 101a—Economic Theory
Fall term, 1951-52

I. The Problems of Economics

Samuelson: Economics. Chapter 1
Phelps-Brown: Framework of the Pricing System. Chapter 1
Council of Economic Advisers: Mid-year Report. July 1951

 

II. The Classical System

Ricardo: Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. Chapters 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 21
Mill: Principles of Political Economy. Book I, Chapters 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13
Book II, Chapters 11, 12, 13, 15, 16
Baumol: Economic Dynamics. Chapter 2

 

III. General Equilibrium Theory

Phelps-Brown: Framework of the Pricing System. Chapters 2-5
Marshall: Principles of Economics 8th edition. Books V and VI
Stigler: Theories of Production and Distribution. Chapters 4, 9

___________________

Economics 101, Spring Term 1951-52
Reading List

I. The Keynesian System

  1. Keynes, General Theory, Chs. 1-3, 8-11, 13, 15, 18
  2. J. R. Hicks, “Mr. Keynes and the Classics”, No. 24 in Blakiston, Readings in Business Cycle Theory.
  3. L. R. Klein, The Keynesian Revolution, Ch. 1-3.

 

II. Dynamics

  1. Keynesian Dynamics
    1. Keynes, General Theory, Ch. 22
    2. E. D. Domar, “Expansion and Employment,” American Economic Review, March 1947
    3. W. J. Fellner, Monetary Policy and Full Employment, Ch. 1, 2, 3
  2. Schumpeterian Dynamics
    1. Schumpeter, Business Cycles, Volume I, Ch. 3, 4, 6
  3. Marxian Dynamics
    1. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Ch. 1-4
    2. J. Robinson, Essay on Marxian Economics
  4. General Review
    1. W. J. Baumol, Economic Dynamics, Chs. 3, 4

[to be continued]

Source:   Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003. Fox 5, Folder “Economics, 1951-1952 (1 of 2)”.

Image Source: Duesenberry in Harvard Class Album 1951; Kaysen as 1955 John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellow