Tag: William Hill

The following excerpts from a typed copy of a letter from Wesley C. Mitchell to John Maurice Clark dated August 9, 1928 come from Mitchell’s papers with a hand-written note at the top of the first page, “Revised Feb 11, 1929”. The copy was made by Clark and perhaps given to Mitchell for further comment.

Mitchell begins with a longish response to a question posed by Clark regarding Mitchell’s own professional revealed preference for empirical investigation. This is followed by shorter responses to questions about the origin of his interest in business cycles, the relationship of “analytical description” to “causal theory”, and finally Mitchell’s confessed own perceived shortcomings in the use of statistical techniques for trend and seasonal analysis.

_____________________________________

If you find this posting interesting, here is the complete list of “artifacts” from the history of economics I have assembled. You can subscribe to Economics in the Rear-View Mirror below. There is also an opportunity for comment following each posting….

_____________________________________

Letter from Wesley C. Mitchell to John Maurice Clark
9 August 1928 (excerpt)

[…]

            Concerning the inclination you note to prefer concrete problems and methods to abstract ones, my hypothesis is that it got started, perhaps manifested itself would be more accurate, in childish theological discussions with my grand aunt. She was the best of Baptists, and knew exactly how the Lord had planned the world. God is love; he planned salvation; he ordained immersion; his immutable word left no doubt about the inevitable fate of those who did not walk in the path he had marked. Hell is no stain upon his honor, no inconsistency with love.—I adored the logic and thought my grand aunt flinched unworthily when she expressed hopes that some back-stairs method might be found of saving from everlasting flame the ninety and nine who are not properly baptized. But I also read the Bible and began to cherish private opinions about the character of the potentate in Heaven. Also I observed that his followers on earth did not seem to get what was promised them here and now. I developed an impish delight in dressing up logical difficulties which my grand aunt could not dispose of. She always slipped back into the logical scheme, and blinked the facts in which I came to take a proprietary interest.

I suppose there is nothing better as a teething-ring for a child who likes logic in the garden variety of Christian theology. I cut my eye-teeth on it with gusto and had not entirely lost interest in that exercise when I went to college.

There I began studying philosophy and economics about the same time. I found no difficulty in grasping the differences between the great philosophical systems as they were presented by our text-books and our teachers. Economic theory was easier still. Indeed, I thought the successive systems of economics were rather crude affairs compared with the subtleties of the metaphysicians. Having run the gamut from Plato to T. H. Green (as undergraduates do) I felt the gamut from Quesnay to Marshall was a minor theme. The technical part of the theory was easy. Give me premises and I could spin speculations by the yard. Also I knew that my “deductions” were futile. It seemed to me that people who took seriously the sort of articles which were then appearing in the Q.J.E. might have a better time if they went in for metaphysics proper.

Meanwhile I was finding something really interesting in philosophy and in economics. John Dewey was giving courses under all sorts of titles and every one of them dealt with the same problem – how we think. I was fascinated by his view of the place which logic holds in human behavior. It explained the economic theorists. The thing to do was to find out how they came to attack certain problems; why they took certain premises as a matter of course; why they did not consider all the permutations and variance of those problems which were logically possible; why their contemporaries thought their conclusions were significant. And, if one wanted to try his own hand at constructive theorizing, Dewey’s notion pointed the way. It is a misconception to suppose that consumers guide their course by ratiocination – they don’t think except under stress. There is no way of deducing from certain principles what they will do, just because their behavior is not itself rational. One has to find out what they do. That is a matter of observation, which the economic theorist had taken all too lightly. Economic theory became a fascinating subject – the orthodox types particularly – when one began to take the mental operations of the theorists as the problem, instead of taking their theories seriously.

Of course Veblen fit fitted perfectly into this set of notions. What drew me to him was his artistic side. I had a weakness for paradoxes – Hell set up by the God of love. But Veblen was a master developing beautiful subtleties, while I was a tyro emphasizing the obvious. He did have such a good time with the theory of the leisure class and then with the preconceptions of economic theory! And the economists reacted with such bewildered soberness! There was a man who really could play with ideas! If one wanted to indulge in the game of spinning theories who could match his skill and humor? But if anything were needed to convince me that the standard procedure of orthodox economics could meet no scientific tests, it was that Veblen got nothing more certain by his dazzling performances with another set of premises. His working conceptions of human nature might be a vast improvement; he might have uncanny insights; but he could do no more than make certain conclusions plausible – like the rest. How important were the factors he dealt with and the factors he scamped was never established.

That was a sort of problem which was beginning to concern me. William Hill set me a course paper on “Wool Growing and the Tariff.” I read a lot of the tariff speeches and got a new side-light on the uses to which economic theory is adapted, and the ease with which it is brushed aside on occasion. Also I wanted to find out what really had happened to wool growers as a result of protection. The obvious thing to do was to collect and analyze the statistical data. If at the end I had demonstrated no clear-cut conclusion, I at least knew how superficial were the notions of the gentlemen who merely debated the tariff issue, whether in Congress or in academic quarters. That was my first “investigation” – I did it in the way which seemed obvious, following up the available materials as far as I could, and reporting what I found to be the “facts.” It’s not easy to see how any student assigned this topic could do much with it in any other way.

A brief introduction to English economic history by A. C. Miller, and unsystematic readings in anthropology instigated by Veblen reinforced the impressions I was getting from other sources. Everything Dewey was saying about how we think, and when we think, made these fresh material significant, and got fresh significance itself. Men had always deluded themselves, it appeared, with strictly logical accounts of the world and their own origin; they had always fabricated theories for their spiritual comfort and practical guidance which ran far beyond the realm of fact without straining their powers of belief. My grand aunt’s theology; Plato and Quesnay; Kant, Ricardo and Karl Marx; Cairnes and Jevons, even Marshall were much of a piece. Each system was tolerably self-consistent – as if that were a test of “truth”! There were realms in which speculation on the basis of assumed premises achieved real wonders; but they were realms in which one began frankly by cutting loose from the phenomena can observe. And the results were enormously useful. But that way of thinking seem to get good results only with reference to the simplest of problems, such as numbers and spatial relations yet men practice this type of thinking with reference to all types of problems which could not be treated readily on a matter-of-fact basis – creation, God, “just” prices in the middle ages, the Wealth of Nations in Adam Smith’s time, the distribution of incomes in Ricardo’s generation, the theory of equilibrium in my own day.

There seem to be one way of making real progress, slow, very slow, but tolerably sure. That was the way of natural science. I really knew nothing of science and had enormous respect for its achievements. Not the Darwinian type of speculation which was then so much in the ascendant – that was another piece of theology. But chemistry and physics. They had been built up not in grand systems like soap bubbles; but by patient processes of observation and testing – always critical testing – of the relations between the working hypotheses and the processes observed. There was plenty of need for rigorous thinking, indeed of thinking more precise than Ricardo achieved; but the place for it was inside the investigation so to speak – the place that mathematics occupied in physics as an indispensable tool. The problems one could really do something with in economics were problems in which speculation could be controlled.

That’s the best account I can give offhand of my predilection for the concrete. Of course it seems to me rather a predilection for problems one can treat with some approach to scientific method. The abstract is to be made use of it every turn, as a handmaiden to help hew the wood and draw the water. I loved romances – particularly William Morris’ tales of lands that never were – and utopias, and economic systems, of which your father’s when I came to know it seemed the most beautiful; but these were objects of art, and I was a work man who wanted to become a scientific worker, who might enjoy the visions which we see in mountain mists but who trusted only what we see in the light of common day.

* * * *

            Besides the spice of rationalizing which doubtless vitiates my recollections – uncontrolled recollections at that – this account worries me by the time it is taking, yours as well as mine. I’ll try to answer the other questions concisely.

Business cycles turned up as a problem in the course of the studies which I began with Laughlin. My first book on the greenbacks dealt only with the years of rapid depreciation and spasmodic war-time reaction. I knew that I had not gotten to the bottom of the problems and wanted to go on. So I compiled that frightful second book as an apparatus for a more thorough analysis. By the time it was finished I had learned to see the problem in a larger way. Veblen’s paper on “Industrial and Pecuniary Employments” had a good deal to do with opening my eyes. Presently I found myself working on the system of prices and its place in modern economic life. Then I got hold of Simmel’s Theorie des Geldes – a fascinating book. But Simmel, no more than Veblen, knew the relative importance of the factors he was working with. My manuscript grew – it lies unpublished to this day. As it grew in size it became more speculative. I was working away from any solid foundation – having a good time, but sliding gaily over abysses I had not explored. One of the most formidable was the recurring readjustments of prices, which economists treated apart from their general theories of value, under the capitation “Crises.” I had to look into the problem. It proved to be susceptible of attack by methods which I thought reliable. The result was the big California monograph. I thought of it as an introduction to economic theory.

* * * *

            This conception is responsible for the chapter on “Modern Economic Organization.” I don’t remember precisely at what stage the need of such a discussion dawned upon me. But I have to do everything a dozen times. Doubtless I wrote parts of that chapter fairly early in other parts late as I found omissions in the light of the chapters on “The Rhythm of Business Activity.” Of course, I put nothing in which did not seem to me strictly pertinent to the understanding of the processes with which the volume dealt. That I did not cover the field very intelligently, even from my own viewpoint, appears from a comparison of the books published in 1913 and 1927. Doubtless before I am done with my current volume, I shall be passing a similar verdict upon the chapter as I left it last year.

* * * *

            As to the relation between my analytic description and “causal” theory I have no clear ideas – though I might develop some at need. To me it seems that I tried to follow through the inter-lacing processes involved in business expansion and contraction by the aid of everything I know, checking my speculations just as far as I can buy the data of observation. Among the things I “know” are the way in which economic activity is organized in business enterprises, and the way these enterprises are conducted for money profits. But that is not a simple matter which enables me to deduce certain results – or rather, to deduce results with certainty. There is much in the workings of business technique which I should never think of if I were not always turning back to observation. And I should not trust even my reasoning about what business men will do if I could not check it up. Some unverifiable suggestions do emerge; but I hope it is always clear that they are unverified. Very likely what I try to do is merely carrying out the requirements of John Stuart Mill’s “complete method.” But there is a great deal more passing back and forth between hypotheses and observation, each modifying and enriching the other, than I seem to remember in Mill’s version. Perhaps I do him injustice as a logician through default of memory; but I don’t think I do classical economics injustice when I say that it erred sadly in trying to think out a deductive scheme and then talked of verifying that. Until science has gotten to the stage of elaborating the details of an established body of theory – say finding a planet from the aberrations of orbits, or filling a gap in the table of elements – it is rash to suppose one can get an hypothesis which stands much chance of holding good except from a process of attempted verification, modification, fresh observation, and so on. (Of course, there is a good deal of commerce between most economic theorizing and personal observation of an irregular sort – that is what has given our theories their considerable measure of significance. But I must not go off into that issue.)

* * * *

           […] when writing the first book about business cycles I seem to have had no clear ideas about secular trends. The term does not appear to occur in the index. Seasonal variations appear to be mentioned only in connection with interest rates. Of course certain rough notions along these lines may be inferred; but not such definite ideas as would safeguard me against the errors you point out. What makes matters worse for me, I was behind the times in this respect. J. P. Norton’s Statistical Studies in the New York Money Market had come out in 1902. I ought to have known and make use made use of his work.

That is only one of several serious blemishes upon the statistical work in my 1913 volume. After Hourwich left Chicago, and that was before I got deep into economics, no courses were given on statistics in my time. I was blissfully ignorant of everything except the simplest devices. To this day I have remained an awkward amateur, always ready to invent some crude scheme for looking into anything I want to know about, and quite likely to be betrayed by my own apparatus. I shall die in the same sad state.

[…]

Ever yours,
Wesley C. Mitchell.
(Copy by J.M.C.)

Source: Columbia University Archives. Wesley Clair Mitchell Collection, Box 8 “Ch-Ec”, Folder “Clark, John Maurice: v.p., 8 Apr 1926 & 21 Apr 1927. To Wesley C. Mitchell 2 a.l.s. (with related material)”.

Image Source: Foundation for the Study of Cycles.