Tag: Buchanan

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George Mason Methodology Suggested Reading Syllabus

George Mason. Course readings for Economic Philosophy. Buchanan and Vanberg, 1990

 

This post is an experiment in transcription. The HOPE Center at Duke University has started recently to provide pdf scans of syllabi from Ed Tower’s Eno River Press collection and I wondered how easy it would be to use the text-recognition software in Adobe Acrobat Pro to extract digital versions of the syllabi. It turns out that at least for this initial attempt, tweaking and correction of the OCR text required considerably less blood, sweat and tears than a standard typed transcription would have. 

Like other members of the greater community of historians of economics, I eagerly await further scans from the Tower volumes by the HOPE Center. From time to time, I’ll convert a scanned syllabus to add to the collection of digital material posted at Economics in the Rear-view Mirror. Links to the original scans will be provided whenever available. 

_________________________

George Mason University
SPRING 1990

Economics 827: ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY
James M. Buchanan, Viktor J. Vanberg

Purpose and theme:

The purpose of this course is to discuss some of the issues at the foundations of economics as a social science. It will cover topics like the following (the numbers behind the titles refer to the reading list):

— Economics as moral philosophy (1, 13, 15, 20).

— Welfare economics and political economy (2, 3, 4).

— Methodological and normative individualism (14, 22).

— Subjectivism and opportunity costs (9, 12, 30).

— Utilitarianism and contractarianism (5, 16, 18, 19, 24).

— Agreement in exchange, in politics and in science (10, 29).

— Liberty, voluntariness and efficiency (7, 26).

— Justice as fairness and distributive justice (6, 11, 21, 23, 24).

— Homo economicus, rational choice and rule-following (8, 25, 27).

— Economics and morality (17, 19, 28).

Organization:

The constituting meeting for this course will be held on January 23, 7:20 p.m., in room R 2600. The core part of this course will be taught during the two-weeks period February 19 through March 2 in the library of the center for Study of Public Choice, George’s Hall, from 8:30 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. (daily Mon. through Fri.).

Grading:

Grades will be determined on daily (one page) protocols during the ‘core-period’ and a longer (15-20 pages) paper on a subject to be chosen between student and instructor.

Reading List:

(A set of xerox-copies of the following titles will be available from Kinko’s Copies, University Mall).

  1. Albert, Hans “Knowledge and Decision” chpt. 3 in H. Albert Treatise in Critical Reason Princeton University Press 1985, 71-101.
  2. Buchanan, James M. “Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets” in Fiscal Theory and Political Economy Chapel Hill 1960, 75-89.
  3. — , — “Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy” in Fiscal Theory and Political Economy Chapel Hill 1960, 105-124.
  4. — , — “The Relevance of Pareto Optimality” in The Journal of Conflict Resolution 6, 1962, 341-354.
  5. — , — “Marginal Notes on Reading Political Philosophy” in J. M. Buchanan and G. Tullock The Calculus of Consent Ann Arbor 1965, 307-322.
  6. — , -— “Notes on Justice in Contract” in Freedom in Constitutional Contract Texas A&M University Press 1977, 123-134.
  7. — , — “Criteria for a Free Society: Definition, Diagnosis, and Prescription” in Freedom in Constitutional Contract Texas A&M University Press 1977, 287-299.
  8. — , — “ls Economics the Science of Choice?” in What Should Economists Do? Liberty Press 1979, 39-63.
  9. — , — “General Implications of Subjectivism in Economics” in What Should Economists Do?” Liberty Press 1979, 81-91.
  10. — , — “The Potential for Tyranny in Politics as Science” in Liberty, Market and State New York University Press 1985, 40-54.
  11. — , — “Rules for a Fair Game: Contractarian Notes on Distributive Justice” in Liberty, Market and State New York University Press 1985, 123-139.
  12. — , — “L.S.E. Cost Theory in Retrospect” in Economics — Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy Texas A&M University Press 1987, 141-151.
  13. — , — “Political Economy and Social Philosophy” in P. Koslowski, ed., Economics and Philosophy, Tuebingen 1985.
  14. — , — “The Foundations for Normative Individualism” mimeographed, Center for Study of Public Choice.
  15. Buchanan, James and Gordon Tullock “The Politics of the Good Society,” Chpt. 20 in The Calculus of Consent Ann Arbor 1965, 297-306.
  16. Gauthier, David “On the Refutation of Utilitarianism” in H B. Miller and W. H. Williams (eds.) The Limits of Utilitarianism University of Minnesota Press 1982, 144-163.
  17. — , — “Maximization Constrained: The Rationality of Cooperation” in R. Campbell and L. Sowden (eds.) Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation Vancouver 1985, 75-93.
  18. Hahn, Frank “On Some Difficulties of the Utilitarian Economist” in A. Sen and B. Williams (eds.) Utilitarianism and Beyond Cambridge University Press 1982, 187-198.
  19. Harsanyi John C. ”Morality and Social Welfare” chpt. 4 in J. C. Harsanyi Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations Cambridge University Press 1977, 48-64.
  20. Hayek, Friedrich A. “Kinds of Rationalism” in F. A. Hayek Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics The University of Chicago Press 1967, 82-95.
  21. — , — “The Atavism of Social Justice” in F. A. Hayek New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas The University of Chicago Press 1978, 57-68.
  22. Lachmann, Ludwig M. “Methodological Individualism and the Market Economy” in L. M. Lachmann Capital, Expectations, and the Market Process Kansas City 1977, 149-165.
  23. Nozick, Robert “Distributive Justice” chpt. 7 in R. Nozick Anarchy, State, and Utopia New York 1974, 149-164 + 183-189.
  24. Rawls, John “Justice as Fairness” chpt. 1 in J. Rawls A Theory of Justice Harvard University Press 1971, 3-27.
  25. Sen, Amartya “Behaviour and the Concept of Preference” in J. Elster (ed.) Rational Choice Basil Blackwell 1986, 60-81.
  26. Vanberg, Viktor “Individual Choice and Institutional Constraints – TheNormative Element in Classical and Contractarian Liberalism” in Analyse & Kritik Vol. 8, 1986, 113-149.
  27. — , — “Rational Choice, Rule-Following and Institutions” mimeographed, Center for Study of Public Choice, 1989, 49pp.
  28. Vanberg, Viktor and James M. Buchanan “Rational Choice and Moral Order” in Analyse & Kritik 10, 1988, 138-160.
  29. Vanberg, Viktor and James M. Buchanan “Interests and Theories in Constitutional Choice” in Journal of Theoretical Politics 1, 1989, 49-62.
  30. Wiseman, Jack “General Equilibrium or Market Process: An Evaluation” in J. Wiseman Cost, Choice and Political Economy Edward Elgar 1989, 213-233.

Readings suggested for further study:

Buchanan, James M. Cost and Choice — An Inquiry in Economic Theory Chicago 1969.

— , — Freedom in Constitutional Contract Texas A&M University Press 1977.

— , — Economics — Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy Texas A&M University Press 1987.

Gauthier, David Morals By Agreement Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986.

Gray, John Liberalism Open University Press 1986.

Hayek, Friedrich A. Law, Legislation and Liberty University of Chicago Press 1974, 1976, 1979 (three volumes).

— , — The Fatal Conceit — The Errors of Socialism London: Routledge 1988 (Vol. 1 of The Collected Works of Friedrich August Hayek).

Nozick, Robert Anarchy, State, and Utopia New York: Basic Books 1974.

Rawls, John A Theory of Justice Harvard University Press 1971.

Vanberg, Viktor Morality and Economics — De Moribus Est Disputandum, New Brunswick: Transaction Books 1988 (Social Philosophy and Policy Center, Original Papers No. 7).

Source: Transcribed from the images scanned from the Eno River Press volumes of syllabuses of economics coursescompiled and published by Ed Tower that he donated to the History of Political Economy (HOPE) Center at Duke University.

Image Sources: Buchanan portrait from the Nobel prize website. Vanberg portrait from the Walter Eucken Institut website.

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Economists George Mason Virginia Tech

Virginia Tech. Letter from James Buchanan to Earl Hamilton, 1983

 

Because the papers of the economic historian, Earl Hamilton, are generally an ill-sorted grab bag of documents, I figured the following letter from James Buchanan to Earl Hamilton on the eve of the former’s move to George Mason University had a small probability of being used by future Buchanan scholars if left to lie in a not-elsewhere-classified folder of Hamilton’s papers. 

The meatiest sentence in the letter for historians of economics is probably:

As for economics, I get more and more discouraged at what is being taught for and what passes for our parent discipline. It seems increasingly escapist to me, grown men playing with toys, despite the acknowledged intellectual fascination.

Womp, womp?

______________________

P.O. Drawer G
Blacksburg, VA 24060
20 May 1983

Professor and Mrs. Earl Hamilton
Oak Ridge, TN 37830

Dear Professor Hamilton and Mrs. Hamilton:

We regret very much that we cannot join with you in celebrating the grand occasion of your sixtieth anniversary. It would be very nice to see both of you again after so many years. And Oak Ridge is within reasonable driving distance of Blacksburg. I have on several occasions lectured at the federal executives institute there. If it were not that I had the earlier scheduled commitment at the Pittsburgh conference, we should surely have been in attendance.

Let us wish both of you all that should be wished on such occasions.

I get news from you occasionally when I see George Stigler, who does, apparently, get to his Flossmoor house every now and then. I have been on a Hoover Advisory Committee that George chairs for several years now. And I was at a small meeting with both George and Ronald Coase last fall in Austria.

Our news, which you may have heard, is that our whole Center for Study of Public Choice, is shifting to George Mason University, in Fairfax (the Washington suburbs) after 1 July this year. So we are in the throes of moving. We shall, personally, keep our country place down here in the mountains, but we have already sold off our town property and plan to live in a Fairfax townhouse when up there, at least until retirement when we shall come back to the mountains permanently by current plans.

I find my research and writing interests moving more and more toward political philosophy and ethics (too much Frank Knight I guess), and I have recently been involved in several papers, which will be a book soon, on the basic logic of constitutional constraints. We have a Cambridge Press commitment to publish it under the title, The Reason of Rules.

As for economics, I get more and more discouraged at what is being taught for and what passes for our parent discipline. It seems increasingly escapist to me, grown men playing with toys, despite the acknowledged intellectual fascination.

My gardening suffers terribly in this wettest of all springs, indeed no spring at all. Nothing comes up even when dry enough to plant. Asparagus at least one month late and piddling. Lettuce which should be now ready only commencing to pop out, and too wet to put in any tomatoes as yet. But we hope.

I know that your day will be a grand occasion. Again I sincerely wish that we could join you. It would be very nice to get the opportunity for a visit.

Sincerely yours,
[signed]
Jim Buchanan

/btr

 

Source: Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library. Economists’ Papers Archive. Earl J. Hamilton papers, Box 4, Folder “Correspondence 1920’s-1930’s; 1960’s; 1980’s; and n.d.”

Image Source: PBS webpage “American Nobel Economists”, James Buchanan Image 14

 

Categories
Chicago Economists

Chicago. Talent-Scouting for New Faculty, Joint Appointments and Visiting Faculty, 1945

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On April 10, 1945, the chairman of the University of Chicago’s economics department, Professor Simeon E. Leland, submitted a 77 page (!) memorandum to President Robert M. Hutchins entitled “Postwar Plans of the Department of Economics–A Wide Variety of Observations and Suggestions All Intended To Be Helpful in Improving the State of the University”.

In his cover letter Leland wrote “…in the preparation of the memorandum, I learned much that was new about the past history of the Department. Some of this, incorporated in the memorandum, looks like filler stuck in, but I thought it ought to be included for historical reasons and to furnish some background for a few of the suggestions.” 

In recent posts I have provided a list of visiting professors who taught economics at the University of Chicago up through 1944 (excluding those visitors who were to receive permanent appointments) and supporting tables with enrollment trends and faculty data (ages and educational backgrounds).

In this post we have three lists of names for economists who in 1945 could be taken into consideration for either permanent economics, joint appointments with other department or visiting appointments at the University of Chicago. Many names are immediately recognisable, others less so, and other known names left unnamed. Instead of observing the actual choices of the department, we have, so to speak, an observation of the “choice set” as perceived by the department.

______________________________

          The following list of possible additions to the staff of the Department of Economics represents an enumeration of suggestions made by various members of the Department. It, of course, does not include all of those whom the Department would like to invite as permanent members of the University staff. Many of those whom we would most like to have, it is well-known, are not available; nor can the Department be sure that those listed below would favorably consider an invitation to join our staff. Likewise, this list must not be construed as nominations for membership in the Department. Some members of the staff are known to object to the inclusion of some of the names listed below. But if unanimous consent were required before suggestions could be made, little progress in building a Department would be possible. In its present state, the list is only an enumeration of suggestions warranting further inquiry. The fields of interest of many of the potential candidates overlap and the appointment of some individuals would make it undesirable, or at least uneconomic, to appoint others. Nevertheless, the list does given an idea of some persons who might be considered for future appointments. This list, like any other enumeration, is subject to constant revision, both in the addition or subtraction of names.

Name

 Present Location

Field of Interest or Specialization
Abraham (sic) Bergson University of Texas Wages and Wage Theory
Robert Bryce Ottawa, Canada
Norman Buchanan University of California Public Utilities, Corporation Finance, Business Cycles (also possible interest in United States Economic History)
Earl Hamilton Northwestern University Economic History
Albert G. Hart C.E.D., Chicago Theory, Finance, etc.
J. R. Hicks University of Manchester, England Economic Theory
Harold A. Innis University of Toronto Economic History
Maurice Kelso University of Wisconsin Land Economics
Tjalling Koopmans Cowles Commission Statistics; Mathematical Economics; Business Cycles; Shipping
Simon Kuznets University of Pennsylvania National Income; Historical Statistics
Sanford Mosk University of California Economic History
Charles A. Myers Massachusetts Institute of Technology Labor; Industrial Relations
Walter Rostow Columbia University Economic History (XIX Century)
Leonard Salter University of Wisconsin Land Economics
T. Scitovszky London School of Economics; U.S. Army Theory of Capital and Interest; Theory of Tariffs
Arthur Smithies University of Michigan; Bureau of the Budget, Washington, D. C. Fiscal Policy; Theory; Money and Banking
Eugene Staley School of Advanced International Studies (Washington, D.C.) International Economics; Foreign Trade
George Stigler University of Minnesota Theory and Foreign Trade
R. H. Tawney London School of Economics Economic History
Allen Wallis Stanford University Statistics

______________________________

Joint Appointments

The Department of Economics shares an interest in many fields with other departments, schools and divisions of the University. It recognizes that most problems of the Social Sciences have economic aspects, and other aspects as well. Many of the fields embraced within particular disciplines are explained by accident or tradition, not always by logic. No one department can, therefore, assert a valid claim for the exclusive staffing of fields of interest held in common with other branches of knowledge. It seems wisest to develop these common grounds through joint appointments. Not only does this enable us to attract to the University more outstanding scholars than the fellowship of one department might provide, but it should also place at the disposition of those interested in promoting joint fields, perhaps, larger resources than either acting alone could command.

Joint appointments, too, will tend to integrate the Social Sciences with the other schools and departments affected, as well as contribute to the unity of the University as a whole. The Department of Economics, therefore, ventures to suggest joint appointments in the following fields:

Fields Units Affected
Trusts and Monopolies Business, Law, Economics
Railroads and Transportation Business, Economics
Public Utilities Economics, Political Science, Law
Social Control of Business Business, Law, Political Science, Economics
Advanced Applied Mathematics and Statistics Economics, Mathematics, Business, Institute of Statistics, other departments interested in statistics
Urban Planning (or the Utilization of Land) Geography, Political Science, Economics, Law, Business, Sociology
Social Legislation, particularly affecting Labor Business, Sociology, Social Service Administration, Law, Political Science, Economics

[…]

Among those who might be proposed for joint appointments are the following:

Name Present Location Field of Interest Appropriate Appointment
Charles L. Dearing Brookings Institution and U.S. Government Transportation Economics, Business
Corwin D. Edwards Northwestern University Trusts, Monopolies, Control of Business Political Science, Law, Economics
Milton Friedman Columbia University Economic Theory, Public Finance, Monetary Policy Economics, Institute of Statistics
Homer Hoyt Regional Plan Association, Inc., New York, N.Y. Land Planning Economic Geography, Political Science
David E. Lilienthal T. V. A. Public Utilities Political Science, Law, Economics
Abraham Wald Columbia University Applied Mathematics, Statistics Mathematics, Economics
Allen Wallis Columbia University Applied Mathematics, Statistics Mathematics, Economics
Samuel S. Wilks Princeton University Applied Mathematics, Statistics Mathematics, Economics

Visiting Professorships

Each department needs to diversify its courses. Too frequently the attempt at diversification is made by adding permanent members to the regular staff. The need can best be met by the appointment of visiting professors.

[…]

A list of some who might be invited to the University as Visiting Professors is as follows:

Name Present Location Fields of Interest
John D. Black Harvard Agricultural Economics
(J.) Roy Blough U. S. Treasury Public Finance
Kenneth Boulding Iowa State College Economic Analysis; Theory of Capital
Karl Brandt Food Institute, Stanford U. Agricultural Economics
Harry G. Brown University of Missouri Economic Theory, Public Finance
J. Douglas Brown Princeton University Industrial Relations
Edward H. Chamberlain(sic) Harvard Economic Theory; Monopolistic Competition
J. M. Clark Columbia University Economic theory
J. B. Condliffe California International Trade; International Commercial Policy
Joseph S. Davis Food Institute, Stanford U. Agricultural Economics
Milton Gilbert Office of Price Administration, Washington, D.C. Economic Theory; Price Control
T. Haavelmo Norwegian Shipping Administration, New York, N.Y. Econometrics
Alvin Hansen Harvard Economic Theory; Fiscal Policy
F. A. Hayek London School of Economics and Political Science History of Social Thought; Economic Theory; Monetary Policy
J. R. Hicks University of Manchester Economic Theory
George Jaszy U. S. Dept. of Commerce National Income; Business Analysis
O. B. Jesness University of Minnesota Agricultural Economics
Nicholas Kaldor London School of Economics Theory of the Firm; Imperfect Competition; Money; Business Cycles
M. Kalecki Institute of Statistics of University of Oxford, England Economic Fluctuations; Expenditure Rationing
M. Slade Kendrick Cornell University Public Finance; Farm Taxation
Arthur Kent San Francisco Attorney-at-Law Taxation
J. M. Keynes Cambridge University Fiscal and Monetary Policy
Simon S. Kuznets National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Pennsylvania Statistics; National Income and Its Problem
A. P. Lerner New School for Social Research Economic Theory; Fiscal Policy; Public Finance
Edward S. Mason Harvard University Economic Theory; International Trade and Trade Practices
Wesley C. Mitchell Columbia University Money and Prices
Jacob Mosak Office of Price Administration, Washington, D.C. Economic Theory; Statistics; Control of Prices
R. A. Musgrave Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D. C. Public Finance
Randolph Paul Lord, Day and Lord, Attorneys-at-Law Taxation
Paul A. Samuelson Massachusetts Institute of Technology Economic Theory; Money and Banking; Fiscal Policy
Lawrence H. Seltzer Wayne University Money and Banking; Public Debts; Fiscal Policy
Carl S. Shoup Columbia University Public Finance
Sumner H. Slichter Harvard University Business Economics
Richard Stone England Statistics; National Income
R. H. Tawney London School of Economics Economic History
Abraham Wald Columbia University Mathematics and Statistics
John H. Williams Harvard University Money and Banking

In the past, the Department has supplemented its staff by the appointment of visiting professors, but the invitations have ordinarily been restricted to the Summer Quarter in order (1) to relieve the regular staff from summer teaching and (2) to provide “window-dressing” to make the Summer Quarters more attractive to new students. The potentialities of the visiting professorship can hardly be realized when the practice is applied only to the Summer Quarter. That it has made that Quarter more attractive would seem to be indicated by the outstanding economists who have been guests of the University of Chicago.

[…]

The practice of inviting outstanding men to the University of Chicago seems to have been more prevalent in the early years of the University than it is today. Visiting appointments also declined with the strained finances of the University during the late depression. The Department is anxious to develop a program of instruction and research based upon the policy of the regular employment of visitors. A sum, equal to the stipend of a full professor, if used to finance a program of regular visitors, would add greater content and prestige to the Department than could be secured in any other way.

Source: University of Chicago Library, Department of Special Collections. Office of the President. Hutchins Administration Records. Box 73, Folder “Economics Dept., “Post-War Plans” Simeon E. Leland, 1945″.

Categories
Chicago Economists

Chicago. James Buchanan’s Dissertation Outline, 1947

James McGill Buchanan, Jr.’s Ph.D. in economics at the University of Chicago was awarded in the summer quarter of 1948. The title of his dissertation was “Fiscal Equity in a Federal State”. From the Milton Friedman papers at the Hoover Institution we have the following transcription of the mimeographed dissertation outline submitted by Buchanan that was discussed in the economics department faculty meeting of October 24, 1947. The agenda of that faculty meeting along with Milton Friedman’s handwritten additions (in square brackets) are included at the end of this posting. The procedure for admission to Ph.D, candidacy is described in a 1949 memo written by Milton Friedman to members of the Department’s Ph.D. Thesis Committee.

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If you find this posting interesting, here is the complete list of “artifacts” from the history of economics I have assembled. You can subscribe to Economics in the Rear-View Mirror below. There is also an opportunity for comment following each posting….

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2. Present Procedure
[1949, University of Chicago, Economics]

a. Admission to candidacy. As I understand it, we have no very formalized procedure or requirements. Students typically discuss possible thesis topics with one or more faculty members, construct outlines of the projected thesis, ordinarily get the reaction of one or more faculty members to it, revise it accordingly, and then formally submit the thesis topic and outline to the Department for approval and admission to candidacy. The submitted outline is occasionally extremely detailed, occasionally very general, and is sometimes accompanied by a general statement of objective and purpose, sources of material for the thesis, etc.

[…]

Source: Undated memo (early 1949) written by Milton Friedman to members of the Committee on Ph.D. Thesis Outlines and Requirements from Hoover Institution Archives. Milton Friedman Papers, Box 79, Folder 5 “University of Chicago Minutes, Ph.D. Thesis Committee”.

_____________________________________

Dissertation Outline, James M. Buchanan, October 1947

J. M. Buchanan

EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL ADJUSTMENT

I. The Problem —

A. The federal political structure

1. Federalism in political theory. Varying degrees of dual sovereignty. The question of the finality of a federal structure. Is it a final point in political organization or merely a stage in an evolutionary process?

2. The historical development of federalism in the United States. Trends toward centralization and opposing tendencies. The expanding role of government on the whole. The expanding sphere of activity of the central as opposed to subordinate units. Projection of future trends.

3. The case for federalism as a permanent political structure in the United States. Its value as a means of a division of power, as a protection against a tyranny of the majority, etc.

4. Statement of viewpoint on federalism taken in this study.

B. The national economy —

1. The historical development of the expanding scope of the economy. The extension of the market, the trend toward economic centralization, in the sense that the nation has become the unit which defines the area of the allocation of resources.

2. The extent to which the economy is national — increasing specialization, increased resource mobility, etc.

C. Conflicts which arise in the financing of government due to the superimposition of a federated political structure on a national economy.

1. The heterogeneity of the subordinate units of government. Resource heterogeneity. Cultural, social differences. Income disparities leading to differentials in tax burdens and service standards. The basic fiscal inequity inherent in such a structure.

II.            A Theoretical Solution –

A. What is fiscal equity in such a structure?

1. Definition and limitation. For present purposes concept narrowed to that of “equal treatment for equals and unequal treatment for unequals”. Abstraction from any attempt to determine equity as between unequals since such a concept not needed for problems considered.

B. Application of the concept —

1. Necessity of benefit calculation for any determination of equity among individuals in separate subordinate governmental units. Difficulties in benefit calculation, aside from special cases. Assumption of per capita general expenditure as best measure of benefit.

2. Definition of the “fiscal residuum” or “net tax” – Net value of services available less net value of taxes paid. Considerations of “government” as the total of all layers in structure, federal, state, and local.

C. Arithmetical Examples –

Examples illustrating possible application of the equity criteria in hypothetical cases. Illustration that “equal treatment for equals and unequal treatment for unequals” will impose geographical financial neutrality upon the individual.

III.           A study of Comparative Fiscal Treatment of Similarly Situated Individuals in High Income and Low Income States –

A. Selection of states considered – one with high per capita income, one with low. (Tentatively have selected New York and Mississippi.)

B. Assumptions and abstractions –

1. Assumption of the State-Local fiscal problem as solved or non-existent. Application of criterion to 2-level structure only. State-local considered as one unit. Seek only interstate differentials, not intrastate here.

2. Assumption of money income as measure of economic position. Abstraction from non-pecuniary advantages of geographical location. Individuals considered in similar economic circumstances if money income, pproperty value, same. Physical property same. Family obligations same.

C. Selection of hypothetical individuals to be compared. Determination of income ranges to be covered.

D.            Expenditure pattern of individuals considered.

1. Proportion of income saved, spent at various income levels.

2. Distribution of expenditure at various income levels.

3. Property holdings at different income levels.

E. Determination of tax burdens of individuals considered.

1. Examination of tax structures of states in question.

2. Assumptions as to final incidence of state taxes. More than one set of assumptions can be made and results collocated.

3. Tax burden of hypothetical individuals in each income group in each state can be determined by application of assumptions as to incidence to expenditure patterns.

4. Indication that validity of the study does not depend upon validity of the assumptions as to incidence since no attempt is made to compare dissimilarly situated individuals. (Such a comparison will necessarily show in the computation, however, and for this reason the assumptions should be as realistic as possible.)

F. Determination of value of benefits of government service provided —

1. Necessity to use per capita general expenditure as best benefit measure.

2. Use of value input only not value output. Value output will differ as administrative efficiency of state varies.

G. Calculation of fiscal residua of similarly situated individuals considered —

1. Possibility of abstracting from federal taxes and expenditures since similarly situated individuals supposedly treated similarly by federal government.

H.            Calculation of the interstate differential in fiscal residua of the hypothetical similarly situated individuals considered.

IV.           Existing and proposed attempts at solution.

A. Vertical Integration

1. Examination of the various proposals made to integrate and unify the whole financial structure; plans for realignment of functions, central collection, local administration, complete centralization, etc.

B. Horizontal Integration and Coordination –

1. Readjustment of geographical boundaries, consolidation of non-efficient units. The “regionalism” approach.

C. The grant-in-aid as the adjusting device.

1. The existing structure of grants-in-aid in the United States – a short summary of the more prominent characteristics of the system.

2. Proposals for extension of the system –

a.            Further use of the conditional grant

(1)  Merits of the conditional grant

(2)  Drawbacks

(a)  Effects on budgetary independence of subordinate units.

(b) Central direction and interference.

b.            The concept of a “minimum standard”

(1)  Idea of the “national interest”

(2)  Attempts at defining “minimum standards”

(3)  Violation of equity criteria

(4)  Federal assumption of a function.

D.            Realistic Appraisal of Various Proposals from Standpoint of Political and Administrative Feasibility.

V.            Policy Implications of the Criterion of Equity Proposed in this study.

A. The practicability of direct application.

1. Difficulty of measurement

2. Political and administrative barriers.

B. Effect of the Acceptance of the Theoretical Validity of the Criterion upon Practical Policy.

1. Early elimination of matching requirements in grant-in-aid distribution.

2. Early abandonment of the concept of “minimum standards”.

3. Broadening of purpose for which grants are made.

4. Further extension of so-called “equalization” grants.

5. Elimination of the idea of “charity” in intergovernmental fiscal adjustment.

6. Greater federal reliance on the income tax as a source of revenue.

C. The proposals of the Canadian Royal Commission and Possible Application of Similar Proposals to the United States.

VI.           Possible Objections to the Equity Criterion Proposed and its Policy Implications.

A. Theoretical Objections

1. The central government as the adjusting unit.

2. The inclusion of fiscal treatment by government in the criteria for the optimum allocation of resources.

3. The nation as the economic unit.

B. Administrative Objections.

1. Violation of principle of fiscal responsibility.

VII.          Conclusion.

____________________________

 

Department of Economics
AGENDA
Friday, October 24, 1947, at 3:30 p.m. in SS424

I. Students’ Business

A. Admission to Candidacy for the Ph.D. Degree

James M. Buchanan

Subject: Equity Considerations in Intergovernmental Fiscal Adjustment.
Field: Government Finance
Committee: [Blough, chairman, Perloff, Knight]

Henry Woldon Hewetson

Subject: An Examination of the Distance Principle of Railway Freight rate making with references to Canadian Conditions.
Field: [Transportation]
Committee: [Sorrell, Koopmans, Friedman]

[Inserted:

Harriett D. Hudson.

Progressive Mine Workers of America
Committee: Douglas, ch; Nef; (illegible name) Lewis]

Norman Maurice Kaplan

Subject: Models for Socialist Economic Planning
Field:
Committee: [Marschak, ch.; ch. Harris; A. P. Lerner; Friedman

Raymond H. McEvoy

Subject: Effects of Federal Reserve Policies, 1929-36
Field: Money, Banking, and Monetary Policy
Committee: [Mints, Hamilton, Metzler]

Wallace E. Ogg

Subject: A Study of Maladjustment of Resources in Southern Iowa
Field: Agricultural Economics
Committee: [Johnson, Hardin (pol sci), Lewis]

B. Admission to candidacy for the Alternative Master’s Degree (without thesis.)

Raymond H. McEvoy

C. Admission to candidacy for the Regular Master’s Degree

Peter Senn

Subject: Federal subsidization of the Banks
Field:
Committee:

D. Petitions

Guy Black—for permission to substitute work in Mathematics for the regular requirement of a second foreign language.

Keith O. Campbell—for approval to take Political Science as one of the fields for the Ph.D. Degree.

Gershon Cooper—to substitute the following courses in math. for the German language requirement for the Ph.D. Degree: Mathematics 216, 220, and 228.

Bernard Gordon—to substitute a mathematical sequence of Calculus I and Calculus II in place of one of the language requirements for the Ph.D. Degree.

Dale A. Knight—to use Political science as one field for the Ph.D. Degree.

Chih-wei Lee—to take English as the second language.

[John K. Lewis]

II. Encyclopedia Britannica Economic Articles

III. Language requirements for Foreign students.

IV. Report of Master’s Degree Committee, Spring and Summer, 1947

V. New Business

 

Source: Hoover Institution Archives. Milton Friedman Papers. Box 79, Folder “79.1 University of Chicago Minutes Economics Department 1946-1949”.

Image Source: The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. Biography of James M. Buchanan.