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Harvard. Report on Long-range Plans for the Department of Economics. 1948

The following transcribed report of a special committee regarding the future of the Harvard economics department looking forward from 1948 is fascinating. Eight senior professors would be retiring over the coming decade and there was a serious discussion of the economists needed to replace them. For my money the most interesting comparison is the one made between Arthur Smithies and Paul Samuelson. I’ll let you or your AI of choice fish that out of the report. But there is much more to be found.

_____________________________

The Provost is not amused
[No letterhead, unsigned.
Apparently a copy.]

December 22, 1947

Dear Mr. Burbank:

I am not at all happy with the recommendation sent me by the Department of Economics and the School of Public Administration for the appointment at professorial rank of a man to serve jointly in the Department and in the School. As you realize, the five votes taken by the group reveal a confused picture in which no clear preference is indicated. Nor have I been successful in clarifying the situation by requesting from each member of the group a letter addressed to me in which he explained fully his vote. Hence I believe it necessary to suggest a different procedure from that which has been followed.

One source of the difficulty, it occurs to me, is that the recommendation for the joint appointment has not been studied sufficiently in relation to the other vacancies which are to be filled within the next year or two. As you know, the Department has, in addition to the joint professorship, a vacancy in the rank of full professorship created by the resignation of Professor Crum, and one in the rank of associate professorship. It also has due it in 1950-51 a second vacancy as associate professor. Hence it appears that within a short span, the Department has four major appointments to make. It goes without saying that those appointments will influence in great measure the future of economics at Harvard for many years to come. The importance of making wise selections cannot be lost sight of.

It seems to me that we must consider all these appointments as a related problem. Consequently I shall take no action on the recommendation for the joint appointment until the Department has thought through its entire slate. No evidence has been given me yet which suggests that the Department has worked out a consistent plan or program into which all these appointments can be fitted and which meets, within the resources available, the demands which the Faculty as a whole may properly make upon the Department of Economics.

I have no desire to lecture the Department as to its obligations, but I do have certain responsibilities to discharge as Dean of the Faculty. Hence I venture to suggest that there are certain questions which may reasonably and properly be directed to the Department for an answer. Among those questions are the following:

  1. What is your concept of teaching and research within the Faculty of Arts and Sciences?
  2. What fields will you cover, within the resources at your command, in carrying out the answer to the first question?
  3. Are you properly discharging your obligations to your sister departments of the Faculty and to the programs which the Faculty has legislated as common ventures?
  4. Do your specific recommendations harmonize with a general plan and program?

I understand fully that these are no easy questions to answer and that the difficulty of finding an answer is a prime factor in creating the present state of confusion. But I suspect that more preliminary efforts to answer the questions might have reduced the degree of confusion. Certainly so long as the basic issues are not clarified, the discussion of individuals to be appointed breaks down into fragmentary views.

I am also distressed by the fact that many of the professors in the Department have informed me that they do not consider themselves either willing or competent to serve as Chairman of the Department when your term expires in June. One conclusion which might be drawn from this situation is that the Department as now constituted needs some recruitment from men competent and willing to think of economics in general, and of the relation of economics to the faculty at large and to the world outside the university.

I must also report a sense of uneasiness among members of the Faculty in other Departments, that the Department of Economics is showing a tendency not to give due weight in the filling of its vacancies to common programs. If there is cause for this apprehension, I should be quite dismayed. At a time when the Faculty as a whole gives indication of the need in teaching and research for ever greater cooperation between disciplines of learning, it would be regrettable if the Department of Economics adhered to narrow and vertical procedures. To make the point quite specific, I might inquire what the Department of Economics plans to do in regard to Economic History and to the Area Program in Russian.

I also wonder whether in your immediate desire to fill the vacancies with men now available, you have given proper consideration to the range of younger men coming to maturity in your field. I have, for example, observed two young economists now in the Society of Fellows who seem to me to have ultimate promise of achievement greater than that of at least some of the men now available. There must be many other such men in the University and elsewhere. It would seen wise in any general approach to the problem to give assurance that proper consideration had been made in our appointment schedule for the generation of economists now coming to maturity.

These are some of the matters I have in mind, both general and particular, which incline me to the decision that we should follow an approach in handling these appointments different from the one followed to date. I fear that the approach followed so far is leading into an impasse from which the only escape will be the making of something less than the wisest appointments. Hence I suggest a change of procedure and ask first that the Department present me, in advance of any specific recommendation, with a statement which deals with the questions raised earlier in this letter. Recommendations may accompany this document, but they will not be accepted without it and unless they are shown to have meaning in relation to it.

Finally, the time has come, I believe, when I must personally associate myself with the development of this program. I am therefore arranging a dinner and evening meeting in the rooms of the Society of Fellows on January 21 at 6:30 p.m. to which I shall invite each member of the Executive Committee (all Professors and Associate Professors) of the Department. I shall preside at this meeting, and we shall begin then discussion of the issues outlined in this letter. Needless to say that because of the urgency of the matter, I shall expect a full attendance of the Executive Committee at the dinner.

I am sending a copy of this letter to each Professor and Associate Professor of the Department.

Sincerely yours,
[Unsigned by Paul H. Buck]
Provost

Professor H. H. Burbank
Littauer Center

_____________________________

C O N F I D E N T I A L

REPORT ON LONG-RANGE PLANS
FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
(REVISED EDITION)

February 25, 1948
  1. The Task of the Committee

In his letter of December 22, 1947, to the Chairman of the Department of Economics [Professor Harold H. Burbank], the Provost [Professor Paul H. Buck] raised a series of questions concerning the long-run plans for the growth and development of the Department. Any future appointments clearly ought to be related to a comprehensive study of the needs and objectives of the Department.

The questions posed by the Provost were as follows:

    1. What is your concept of teaching and research within the Faculty of Arts and Sciences?
    2. What fields will you cover, within the resources at your command, in carrying out the answer to the first question?
    3. Are you properly discharging your obligations to sister departments of the Faculty and to the programs which the Faculty has legislated as common ventures?
    4. Do your specific recommendations harmonize with a general plan and program?

Following an evening meeting on January 21, 1948, with the Executive Committee of the Department, the Provost appointed a committee of five to consider the above questions and to prepare a report on long-run plans for the Department. The Committee was also directed to recommend appointments for existing vacancies in the light of such a comprehensive survey of long-range problems. Four appointments are under consideration at this time: (1) a full professor replacement for Professor Crum, (2) a full professor to be appointed jointly in the Department and in the Littauer School of Public Administration, (3) an associate professor available July 1, 1948, and (4) an associate professor normally not available until July 1, 1951, but who might be appointed at an earlier date.

  1. The Prospective Situation in the Department

The growth of the Department in recent years is indicated in the following tabulation of the number of permanent positions and the number of undergraduate and graduate students for selected years since 1925.

Year

Permanent Positions Undergraduate Concentrators

Graduate Students*

1925-26

10

324

75

1930-31

14

397

82

1935-36

13

376

47

1940-41

16 321

102

1947-48

17 726

264

* Prior to 1940, graduate students with Corporation appointments were not required to register in the Graduate School. The graduate figures for 1940-41 and 1947-48 include Joint Degree and Littauer School candidates who take most of their work in Economics.
Radcliffe students are included in the figures only for 1947-48.

The Department of Economics may reasonably anticipate the retirement of one-half of its present permanent members by June 30, 1958. On the normal assumption that retirement takes place at age sixty-six, eight of the sixteen present permanent members may be expected to become emeritus during the next ten years. The members of the Department who are, and are not, expected to retire before 1958 are indicated in the following lists. (The dates of birth are given after each name.)

Expected Retirement by 1958

Active Status Expected, Fall 1958
A.P. Usher January 13, 1883 E. Frickey

August 20, 1893

J.A. Schumpeter

February 8, 1883 S.E. Harris September 8, 1897
J.D. Black June 6, 1883 O.H. Taylor

December 11, 1897

A.E. Monroe

August 2, 1885 E.S. Mason February 22, 1899
J.H. Williams June 21, 1887 E.H. Chamberlin

May 18, 1899

H.H. Burbank

July 3, 1887 G. Haberler July 20, 1900
A.H. Hansen August 23, 1887 W.W. Leontief

August 5, 1905

S.H. Slichter

January 8, 1892 J.T. Dunlop

July 5, 1914

The Department can look forward, under the existing rules of the University, to a total of six new permanent appointments, including the four now under consideration during this ten-year period. The Department can also expect the appointment of an economist to the Lamont University Professorship upon the retirement of Professor Slichter. Accordingly, the Department can expect to retain a total of fifteen permanent appointments in the academic year 1958-59 in comparison with the seventeen permanent members during the current academic year (the above list plus Professor Crum). (The number of permanent members of the staff may at any given time be larger than retirement dates would indicate by reason of extension of normal term of service.)

These expected changes in the personnel of the Department over the next ten-year period indicate clearly the decisive nature of the appointments now under deliberation. Four of the six expected appointments are under study. The distinction and reputation of the Department for many years to come is at stake. It is imperative that every effort be made to appraise the needs and opportunities of the Department during the next decade and to canvass with insight all possible candidates.

  1. The Place of the Department in the Faculty

The first question posed by the Provost in his letter of December 22, 1947, was: “What is your concept of teaching and research within the Faculty of Arts and Sciences?” The Committee makes the following points in a re-examination of the role of the Department.

(a) The Faculty of Arts and Sciences has embarked on programs of General Education and Area Studies [e.g., Russian Studies]. The Department of Economics has a substantial and distinctive contribution to make to each of these experiments: the development of a common core of a liberal education and the integration of different disciplines around the problems of a significant geographical area.

 (b) The past twenty years have witnessed an unprecedented expansion in the need for economists in a variety of positions outside the academic world — government service, business concerns, research organizations, labor and farm groups, consulting practice and economic reporting. The Department of Economics needs to develop a more flexible graduate program to meet this more diversified demand in cooperation with other Departments in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences and with various Graduate Schools in the University. The recognition of these broader objectives will supplement rather than detract from the training of economists for academic posts.

(c) The balance between graduate and undergraduate instruction in Economics is always a delicate adjustment. Indeed, the Provost has recently indicated that the strength and prestige of Harvard College lies in the fact that we are truly a “University College.” The Committee has analyzed the relative proportion of the time of its permanent members devoted to graduate and undergraduate course instruction for selected years since 1925. The permanent staff of the Department gave more courses for undergraduates in 1947-48 than in 1925-26. The proportion of all course time devoted to undergraduate instruction, however, has been reduced in this same period from a half to little more than a third. In other words, the increased permanent manpower of the Department over this period (permanent positions increased from ten to seventeen) has been devoted largely to graduate instruction.

The following table compares the number of courses “taught” or “supervised” by permanent members of the Department for undergraduates with the offering of courses for graduate students for selected dates. Comparative figures are also presented for the History and Government Departments.

Courses of Instruction by Permanent Staff
Economics History

Government

Dates Undergrad. Grad. Undergrad. Grad. Undergrad. Grad.

1925-26

8 ½

8 ½ 14 12 6 ½

8

1930-31

9 11 ¾ 14 22 ¾ 5

9 ½

1935-36

8 ¾ 12 15 ¼ 31 5 ¼

10 ¼

1940-41 9 ¾ 19 ½ 14 13 ½ 7 ¼

19 ¾

1947-48

12 ½ 22 15 10 ½ 9

9

These figures would appear to indicate that graduate course instruction has expanded in Economics relatively to undergraduate course instruction and also relative to the experience of graduate instruction in other departments. It should be noted, however, that the large increase in graduate courses after 1935/36 was associated with the establishment of the Graduate School of Public Administration which affected both the Department of Economics and the Department of Government.

These data on course offering need to be interpreted in terms of graduate enrollment and undergraduate concentration. The following table presents this information. The figures indicate the incidence of the postwar expansion in University enrolment upon the burden of instruction in Economics and allied departments.

Undergraduate Concentrators and Graduate Students

Economics History Government
Dates Undergrad. Grad. Undergrad. Grad. Undergrad.

Grad.

1925-26

324 75 190 113 45
1930-31 397 82 254 138 130

56

1935-36

376 47 283 104 292 38
1940-41 321 102 272 146 314

76

1947-48

726 264 321 207 763

129

The Committee believes that undergraduate instruction in Economics in the past two years has suffered materially by the suspension of the tutorial system. The assistant professor rank in which there is normally considerable contact with undergraduates has not been fully manned in recent years. The Committee believes that undergraduate instruction needs to receive more attention in the Department, not so much by more courses given by permanent members but by rebuilding a strong group of younger teachers in the assistant professor and annual instructor rank.

Assuming the number of the permanent staff at present contemplated to be fixed, the size of the graduate student body in Economics must be reduced from its present size of more than 260 if members of the Department are to fulfill their total obligations to the University and if a more diversified graduate student body is to receive adequate instruction and supervision. The Committee suggests a figure of 200 graduate students — twice the pre-war level — as a normal standard for the period under review. The rate of admission planned for the Fall term, 1948, will eventually yield a student body close to this figure. It is impossible at this time to foresee whether the numbers of qualified graduate students seeking economic instruction at Harvard will substantially exceed 200 after the special circumstances accounting for the present large numbers have been eliminated. If, as may well happen, the demand on the part of first-rate men and women for graduate instruction in economics exceeds the capacity of the staff as at present planned, it may indicate a need for revision of plans of instruction in economics.

(d) There is imperative need for more systematic development of research plans in Economics and for financial arrangements whereby permanent members may be relieved of all duties for periods of a term to pursue research on a full-time basis. Research grants should be used in part to secure substitute instruction. Several research projects which provide a practicable model for the expansion of research have recently been undertaken by members of the Department. Individual members of the Department should be encouraged to organize specific research projects and solicit support, in cooperation with the University administration. These projects should make provision for full-time leave for a term whenever possible. Such projects, moreover, may well become a training center for the most advanced students.

(e) The Department of Economics should expect a continuation of the distinguished tradition of participation by many of its members in wider forms of service to the community — government service, consultation to business and industry, private arbitration, private research organizations, etc. A danger exists, however, that these activities may consume too large a proportion of the time and energy of members of the staff. A devotion to productive scholarship should be an indispensable requirement of every appointee.

In making appointments the Department must be concerned to choose men with the energy and capacity for developing these outside interests and contacts. The Department has not only an obligation to the world of scholarship but also a unique responsibility for leadership at the many points where Economics has a contribution to make to the world of affairs.

  1. The Urgent Needs of the Department

The second question posed by the Provost in his letter of December 22, 1947, asked: “What fields will you cover, within the resources at your command, in carrying out the answer to the first question?” When the objectives for the Department outlined in the preceding section are considered in conjunction with the present personnel and the retirement pattern outlined in Section 2 above, the following needs of the Department appear to be the most urgent. (The listing of these requirements at this point does not imply any particular hierarchy of urgency.)

(a) Economic History. This field has been a required part of the graduate program in Economics for many years. Moreover, for over half a century instruction in this area has been located in the Economics Department. The retirement of Professor Usher requires that provision be made for this field in any comprehensive plan for the Department.

(b) Agriculture and Marketing. Professor Black has developed work in two fields: (1) The Economics of Agriculture and Land Use Planning, and (2) Marketing and Distribution. Ideally two men would be required to carry on this work.

(1) Agriculture. The Committee is of the opinion that work in the Economics of Agriculture and Land Use Planning is indispensable. Research and training in this field have constituted a major contribution of the Department. Moreover, the agricultural field is of particular concern in the School of Public Administration.

(2) Marketing. The Committee reluctantly concludes that, under present prospects and despite the importance of work in marketing and distribution, it is unlikely that one of the few appointments available can be allocated in this field. It may be that the field of Business Organization can be reorganized to permit the inclusion of some portion of the work in the present field of Marketing and Distribution.

(c) General Education and the Area Program. It is imperative that the Department take an active part in the formulation and development of these new programs. The availability of half-time appointments from the General Education and Area budgets would permit the Department of Economics to make two appointments (of half-time each) for one budget vacancy. That is, the appointment of two men, a half time of one in an Area and of the other in General Education, might fill one of the vacancies in the Economics Department.

(d) Business Organization. The resignation of Professor Crum and the administrative responsibilities of Professor Mason make an appointment in this area urgent. Moreover, the field constitutes one of the largest areas of undergraduate and graduate concentration.

(e) Public Policy. The systematic development of the field of the Economic Aspects of Public Policy is essential to the growth of the Graduate School of Public Administration. One of the appointments available at this time has been explicitly earmarked for this purpose.

(f) Public Finance. The retirement of Professor Burbank in the period indicates the necessity for providing for work in this area. The field is indispensable both to the Economics Department and the Graduate School of Public Administration.

(g) Statistics. The burden of instruction in the field of Statistics is heavier than one man should be asked to assume. In addition to undergraduate and graduate courses, this required field involves participation in virtually all general examinations. Ideally instruction should be provided in the field of national income and mathematical statistics. If an additional appointment is not devoted exclusively to this field, consideration should be given to the recruitment of men able to develop such statistical instruction as a part of their program.

(h) Department Chairman. The Department is required to give serious weight in making appointments to qualities which make for a successful Chairman. The Department is so large as to place very heavy administrative responsibilities on its Chairman. The Department should have in its ranks a number of persons qualified to perform the duties of Chairman so that the burden on one individual over the years is not unreasonable.

The Committee believes that the Department should examine its internal operations to determine whether an administrative reorganization might not facilitate the effectiveness of the work of the Department. A systematic survey could be made of such duties as: counselling graduate students, placement, recruitment of superior students, and the supervision of Economics A and the junior teaching staff. Careful study should be given to the possibility of delegating more responsibility to standing committees of the Department.

While the Committee has emphasized, and it believes properly, certain specific needs of the Department, the overriding need, which should take precedence in all appointments, is for able men. If a first-rate man cannot be found in a specific field, it is better either to neglect the field or to divert the attention of existing personnel to this field than to fill the vacancy with second-rate material.

The Committee believes that the answer to the Provost’s third question, “Are you properly discharging your obligations to sister departments of the Faculty and to the programs which the Faculty has legislated as common ventures?”, must, at present, be “no.” It considers, however, that the addition of the personnel suggested below will, together with some reallocation of the time of present officers, enable the Department to meet these obligations.

A consideration of the Provost’s fourth question, “Do your specific recommendations harmonize with a general plan and program?” leads directly to a discussion of the proposed appointments.

  1. Recommendations

(a) The Committee recommends that one appointment at the associate professorship level be utilized in the following manner: that Alexander Gerschenkron be invited on the understanding that the Department assume the responsibility for half his salary, the Russian area assuming responsibility for the other half; that John Sawyer, now a Junior Fellow, be appointed to an assistant professorship at the end of 1948-49, on the understanding that the responsibility for half his salary be assumed either by General Education or the Department of History.

Gerschenkron is one of the two best economists in the country now working on Russian problems, the other being Abram Bergson of Columbia University. Gerschenkron has the advantage of being an economic historian. Consequently, his appointment would enable the Department to take care not only of instruction and research in Russian economics but also to replace Professor Usher’s work in European economic history on his retirement.

Sawyer is an historian of an intellectual ability fully equal to that of our own Junior Fellows, Tobin and Kaysen. He has evinced an interest in cultivating the field of American economic history and also of working in General Education. Since Sawyer’s prospects in the History Department are extremely good, it would be necessary to assure him, on appointment as an assistant professor, that a clear road to advancement exists in the Department, if he shows the competence the Department expects of him.

These two appointments, which would fill one vacancy, would go far towards meeting the Department’s obligations toward the Russian area and toward General Education as well as taking care of economic history.

(b) The Committee feels that the vacancy left by the resignation of Professor Crum must be filled and that the best candidate available is Sidney Alexander, now an assistant professor. Although Alexander’s publication to date does not justify promotion, he has an impressive series of contributions due for publication during the next year which will make him an eminently qualified candidate for promotion by the end of the academic year 1948-49. The Committee therefore believes that one of the vacancies at the associate professorship level should be reserved for the advancement of Professor Alexander.

(c) In many ways the most serious and difficult problem confronting the Committee concerns the replacement of the work now carried on by Professor Black. The research and training program in agricultural economics and land use is an asset of great worth both to the Department of Economics and to the Graduate School of Public Administration.

The Committee understands that before the date set for Professor Black’s retirement the Administration will request him to continue his services to the University for a number of years. It therefore believes that some four to five years are available in which to select a man fully capable of carrying on Professor Black’s work. The Committee believes that there are a number of able young men in the field of agricultural economics who might be secured at the assistant professorship level. The Committee therefore recommends that one or more of these candidates be brought to Harvard and that the next two or three years be utilized to survey the field, including such men as are brought here at lower than permanent rank, to assure the selection of the best possible man.

(d) If one position is filled by Gerschenkron and Sawyer, and another is reserved for Alexander, there remain two positions at the professorial level. These positions might be treated in any one of the following ways:

(1) Both positions could be filled at once;

(2) One position could be filled now and the other held vacant for Professor Black’s successor;

(3)  One position could be filled, the other held vacant pending the appearance of a suitable candidate not necessarily in the field of agricultural economics. In this case it must be assumed that the vacancy caused by Professor Black’s retirement would be filled from the appointment accruing to the Department in 1954, which appointment might be advanced in time. It should also be recognized that this appointment might have to be at the professorial level which would involve a departure from present University policy.

In considering the possibility of filling both vacancies now, the Committee was heavily influenced by the desirability of maintaining balance in the Department not only as among various fields of interest but as among types of mind and of methodological approaches to economic problems. In this connection the Committee considered carefully the qualifications of both Smithies and Samuelson. While of the opinion that each of these men might individually be considered intellectually superior to the rest of the field, the Committee feels strongly that the addition of both would give a particular stamp to the Department that should, if possible, be avoided. Both of these men are, in a sense, system builders, concerned with the logical and mathematical interrelations of the elements of their systems. Neither has done much empirical work. Smithies has shown recently a concern for, and an interest in, institutional developments and public policy. Moreover, he has had extensive experience in government service. The Committee believes that while each of these men is pre-eminent in his type of work the two together do not make a satisfactory combination.

The problem then narrows down to the question of Samuelson or Smithies and someone else. The Committee considers that the interests and type of mind represented either by Richard Bissel or Colin Clark would effectively supplement the Smithies-Samuelson characteristics. No effective way of communicating with Clark suggested itself to the Committee, and there is certain evidence to support the view that he would not be available. It appears that Bissel may not be available at this time. If his views change in the near future, the Committee considers him its first choice.

Of other possibilities the Committee discussed at length the qualifications of Galbraith, Yntema, David Wright, Albert Hart, Donald Wallace, and others. For various reasons, too lengthy here to enumerate, none of these candidates seemed first-rate possibilities.

The Committee therefore recommends that one of the professorial positions be held vacant for the time being pending the appearance of a satisfactory candidate. As to the relative merits of Smithies and Samuelson, the Committee, after deliberating at length, favors Smithies. While recognizing that Samuelson has in his field of activity a better record than anyone near his age in any field, the Committee was heavily influenced by the probability that Smithies’ contribution to the needs of the Department would be substantially greater. He appears to be an ideal man to develop the work in the School of Public Administration on Economic Analysis and Public Policy; he appears to be an eminently satisfactory man to take over the work in Public Finance on Professor Burbank’s retirement; he is clearly a man who would make an able Departmental Chairman. In addition he is competent to develop work in advanced statistics should the Department consider this desirable. For these reasons, and others, the Committee recommends the appointment of Smithies.

Paul H. Buck, Chairman
John T. Dunlop
Wassily Leontief
Edward S. Mason
John H. Williams

Source: Duke University, Economists’ Papers Archive, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library. Edward H. Chamberlin Papers. Box 17, Folder “Economics Department Faculty, 1944-47.”

Image Source:  Harvard Seal detail from the cover of the Harvard Law School Yearbook 1949.

Categories
Economists Germany Harvard

Harvard. Thomas Nixon Carver’s German Summer of 1902.

 

Preparing the previous blog post which provides the syllabus with reading assignments for Thomas Nixon Carver’s 1902-03 Harvard course, Economics 14 “Methods of Social Reform, including Socialism, Communism, the Single Tax, etc.”, I came across the following brief description of his trip with his family to Germany during the summer of 1902. In his autobiography, Carver briefly recounted his contact with colleagues at economic seminars in Halle and Berlin.

For visitors who can read German, I strongly recommend the website “Die Geschichte der Wirtschaftswissenschafte an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin”. During the Winter Semester of 2012, Till Düppe harnessed raw student seminar power to assemble much interesting material about people, organizational structures and the developing curriculum in the Berlin University and its East Berlin successor, the Humboldt University.

________________

Thomas Nixon Carver’s European Summer Vacation (1902)

I had never been abroad and had always wanted to see something of Europe. At the end of the academic year 1901-1902 we decided to make the trip. I got permission from President Eliot to leave Cambridge as soon as examinations were over without waiting for commencement. Just a few days before sailing, I came down with the grippe, as it was then

called. It looked for a day or two as though we might have to cancel the trip, but with Dr. F. W. Taylor’s help I recovered sufficiently to undertake it. I had a Ph.D. examination to conduct during the afternoon of the evening we had to start. The rest of the family called at the University for me with a hack, on the way to the South Station, where we took the train for New York, from which we sailed for Antwerp.

… We went armed with a supply of Baedeckers, American Express Company checks, and several letters of introduction….

Our destination was Germany where we planned to spend a few weeks first at Eisenach and then to Berlin….At Eisenach we stayed at a pension which had been recommended by Professor Albert Bushnell Hart. …

After a week or two I … went on to Berlin, stopping for a few days at Halle, where I visited Professor [Johannes] Conrad and attended one meeting of his seminar. There I met George Thomas, who had been at Harvard but was about to take his Ph.D. at Halle and who has since become president of the University of Utah. One afternoon I went with him to call on Professor Conrad at his home. He offered us beer or cold tea, both in bottles. He had been in America, had a daughter living in Buffalo, New York, and knew that many Americans did not drink liquor. He himself drank no liquor except wine.

I also took time to visit the breeding farm attached to the University of Halle where they were experimenting with all sorts of crossbreeding of animals brought from the ends of the earth.

In Berlin I took rooms in a pension and found it pretty well filled with American students, with a few from Russia, Romania, and Hungary. Edwin F. Gay had been recommended for a position in economic history, to follow Professor Ashley, at Harvard. He was in Berlin finishing his work for the Ph.D. degree at the university. I looked him up almost at once, called on him, and we had several talks. He had made a distinguished record at the university and was soon to take his final examination, which he passed with flying colors. His appointment as instructor at Harvard was confirmed by the Governing Boards and he began his teaching the following autumn.

While in Berlin I attended seminars by Professors [Adolph] Wagner in taxation, Schmoller in economic history, Ausserordentlich Professor [Adolph von] Wenckstern on socialism, and Professor [Max] Zering on Agrarpolitik. Wenckstern, a young man, had been in the army and still held the rank of lieutenant. One night after one of our sessions he invited me with the seminar group to his country place. We left the university about 10 p.m., took a train and traveled nearly half an hour, got off at a country station, walked a mile or so through fields and came to a sizable country house. …

Professor Wagner was getting along in years but seemed fairly vigorous. He was reasonably courteous when he was convinced that I was really an assistant professor at Harvard. My visiting card had merely said “Mr. Thomas N. Carver,” after the American custom, whereas a German would have had all his titles and degrees embossed on his visiting card. Schmoller was genial but dignified. His classes were crowded and he was very busy conferring with his students.

After about four weeks Flora and the children joined me in Berlin. Soon after they arrived Professor and Mrs. Charles J. Bullock turned up in Berlin, also a Miss McDaniels of Oberlin, who had been one of my students. Together we visited Dresden, mainly for the purpose of seeing the famous Art Gallery….

Source:   Thomas Nixon Carver, Recollections of an Unplanned Life (1949), pp. 135-139.

Image Source: The Friedrich Wilhelm University in the old Palace of Prince Heinrich (ca. 1820)

 

Categories
Chicago Economists

Chicago. Talent-Scouting for New Faculty, Joint Appointments and Visiting Faculty, 1945

__________________________

On April 10, 1945, the chairman of the University of Chicago’s economics department, Professor Simeon E. Leland, submitted a 77 page (!) memorandum to President Robert M. Hutchins entitled “Postwar Plans of the Department of Economics–A Wide Variety of Observations and Suggestions All Intended To Be Helpful in Improving the State of the University”.

In his cover letter Leland wrote “…in the preparation of the memorandum, I learned much that was new about the past history of the Department. Some of this, incorporated in the memorandum, looks like filler stuck in, but I thought it ought to be included for historical reasons and to furnish some background for a few of the suggestions.” 

In recent posts I have provided a list of visiting professors who taught economics at the University of Chicago up through 1944 (excluding those visitors who were to receive permanent appointments) and supporting tables with enrollment trends and faculty data (ages and educational backgrounds).

In this post we have three lists of names for economists who in 1945 could be taken into consideration for either permanent economics, joint appointments with other department or visiting appointments at the University of Chicago. Many names are immediately recognisable, others less so, and other known names left unnamed. Instead of observing the actual choices of the department, we have, so to speak, an observation of the “choice set” as perceived by the department.

______________________________

          The following list of possible additions to the staff of the Department of Economics represents an enumeration of suggestions made by various members of the Department. It, of course, does not include all of those whom the Department would like to invite as permanent members of the University staff. Many of those whom we would most like to have, it is well-known, are not available; nor can the Department be sure that those listed below would favorably consider an invitation to join our staff. Likewise, this list must not be construed as nominations for membership in the Department. Some members of the staff are known to object to the inclusion of some of the names listed below. But if unanimous consent were required before suggestions could be made, little progress in building a Department would be possible. In its present state, the list is only an enumeration of suggestions warranting further inquiry. The fields of interest of many of the potential candidates overlap and the appointment of some individuals would make it undesirable, or at least uneconomic, to appoint others. Nevertheless, the list does given an idea of some persons who might be considered for future appointments. This list, like any other enumeration, is subject to constant revision, both in the addition or subtraction of names.

Name

Present Location

Field of Interest or Specialization

Abraham (sic) Bergson University of Texas Wages and Wage Theory
Robert Bryce Ottawa, Canada
Norman Buchanan University of California Public Utilities, Corporation Finance, Business Cycles (also possible interest in United States Economic History)
Earl Hamilton Northwestern University Economic History
Albert G. Hart C.E.D., Chicago Theory, Finance, etc.
J. R. Hicks University of Manchester, England Economic Theory
Harold A. Innis University of Toronto Economic History
Maurice Kelso University of Wisconsin Land Economics
Tjalling Koopmans Cowles Commission Statistics; Mathematical Economics; Business Cycles; Shipping
Simon Kuznets University of Pennsylvania National Income; Historical Statistics
Sanford Mosk University of California Economic History
Charles A. Myers Massachusetts Institute of Technology Labor; Industrial Relations
Walter Rostow Columbia University Economic History (XIX Century)
Leonard Salter University of Wisconsin Land Economics
T. Scitovszky London School of Economics; U.S. Army Theory of Capital and Interest; Theory of Tariffs
Arthur Smithies University of Michigan; Bureau of the Budget, Washington, D. C. Fiscal Policy; Theory; Money and Banking
Eugene Staley School of Advanced International Studies (Washington, D.C.) International Economics; Foreign Trade
George Stigler University of Minnesota Theory and Foreign Trade
R. H. Tawney London School of Economics Economic History
Allen Wallis Stanford University Statistics

______________________________

Joint Appointments

The Department of Economics shares an interest in many fields with other departments, schools and divisions of the University. It recognizes that most problems of the Social Sciences have economic aspects, and other aspects as well. Many of the fields embraced within particular disciplines are explained by accident or tradition, not always by logic. No one department can, therefore, assert a valid claim for the exclusive staffing of fields of interest held in common with other branches of knowledge. It seems wisest to develop these common grounds through joint appointments. Not only does this enable us to attract to the University more outstanding scholars than the fellowship of one department might provide, but it should also place at the disposition of those interested in promoting joint fields, perhaps, larger resources than either acting alone could command.

Joint appointments, too, will tend to integrate the Social Sciences with the other schools and departments affected, as well as contribute to the unity of the University as a whole. The Department of Economics, therefore, ventures to suggest joint appointments in the following fields:

Fields Units Affected
Trusts and Monopolies Business, Law, Economics
Railroads and Transportation Business, Economics
Public Utilities Economics, Political Science, Law
Social Control of Business Business, Law, Political Science, Economics
Advanced Applied Mathematics and Statistics Economics, Mathematics, Business, Institute of Statistics, other departments interested in statistics
Urban Planning (or the Utilization of Land) Geography, Political Science, Economics, Law, Business, Sociology
Social Legislation, particularly affecting Labor Business, Sociology, Social Service Administration, Law, Political Science, Economics

[…]

Among those who might be proposed for joint appointments are the following:

Name Present Location Field of Interest Appropriate Appointment
Charles L. Dearing Brookings Institution and U.S. Government Transportation Economics, Business
Corwin D. Edwards Northwestern University Trusts, Monopolies, Control of Business Political Science, Law, Economics
Milton Friedman Columbia University Economic Theory, Public Finance, Monetary Policy Economics, Institute of Statistics
Homer Hoyt Regional Plan Association, Inc., New York, N.Y. Land Planning Economic Geography, Political Science
David E. Lilienthal T. V. A. Public Utilities Political Science, Law, Economics
Abraham Wald Columbia University Applied Mathematics, Statistics Mathematics, Economics
Allen Wallis Columbia University Applied Mathematics, Statistics Mathematics, Economics
Samuel S. Wilks Princeton University Applied Mathematics, Statistics Mathematics, Economics

Visiting Professorships

Each department needs to diversify its courses. Too frequently the attempt at diversification is made by adding permanent members to the regular staff. The need can best be met by the appointment of visiting professors.

[…]

A list of some who might be invited to the University as Visiting Professors is as follows:

Name Present Location Fields of Interest
John D. Black Harvard Agricultural Economics
(J.) Roy Blough U. S. Treasury Public Finance
Kenneth Boulding Iowa State College Economic Analysis; Theory of Capital
Karl Brandt Food Institute, Stanford U. Agricultural Economics
Harry G. Brown University of Missouri Economic Theory, Public Finance
J. Douglas Brown Princeton University Industrial Relations
Edward H. Chamberlain(sic) Harvard Economic Theory; Monopolistic Competition
J. M. Clark Columbia University Economic theory
J. B. Condliffe California International Trade; International Commercial Policy
Joseph S. Davis Food Institute, Stanford U. Agricultural Economics
Milton Gilbert Office of Price Administration, Washington, D.C. Economic Theory; Price Control
T. Haavelmo Norwegian Shipping Administration, New York, N.Y. Econometrics
Alvin Hansen Harvard Economic Theory; Fiscal Policy
F. A. Hayek London School of Economics and Political Science History of Social Thought; Economic Theory; Monetary Policy
J. R. Hicks University of Manchester Economic Theory
George Jaszy U. S. Dept. of Commerce National Income; Business Analysis
O. B. Jesness University of Minnesota Agricultural Economics
Nicholas Kaldor London School of Economics Theory of the Firm; Imperfect Competition; Money; Business Cycles
M. Kalecki Institute of Statistics of University of Oxford, England Economic Fluctuations; Expenditure Rationing
M. Slade Kendrick Cornell University Public Finance; Farm Taxation
Arthur Kent San Francisco Attorney-at-Law Taxation
J. M. Keynes Cambridge University Fiscal and Monetary Policy
Simon S. Kuznets National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Pennsylvania Statistics; National Income and Its Problem
A. P. Lerner New School for Social Research Economic Theory; Fiscal Policy; Public Finance
Edward S. Mason Harvard University Economic Theory; International Trade and Trade Practices
Wesley C. Mitchell Columbia University Money and Prices
Jacob Mosak Office of Price Administration, Washington, D.C. Economic Theory; Statistics; Control of Prices
R. A. Musgrave Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D. C. Public Finance
Randolph Paul Lord, Day and Lord, Attorneys-at-Law Taxation
Paul A. Samuelson Massachusetts Institute of Technology Economic Theory; Money and Banking; Fiscal Policy
Lawrence H. Seltzer Wayne University Money and Banking; Public Debts; Fiscal Policy
Carl S. Shoup Columbia University Public Finance
Sumner H. Slichter Harvard University Business Economics
Richard Stone England Statistics; National Income
R. H. Tawney London School of Economics Economic History
Abraham Wald Columbia University Mathematics and Statistics
John H. Williams Harvard University Money and Banking

In the past, the Department has supplemented its staff by the appointment of visiting professors, but the invitations have ordinarily been restricted to the Summer Quarter in order (1) to relieve the regular staff from summer teaching and (2) to provide “window-dressing” to make the Summer Quarters more attractive to new students. The potentialities of the visiting professorship can hardly be realized when the practice is applied only to the Summer Quarter. That it has made that Quarter more attractive would seem to be indicated by the outstanding economists who have been guests of the University of Chicago.

[…]

The practice of inviting outstanding men to the University of Chicago seems to have been more prevalent in the early years of the University than it is today. Visiting appointments also declined with the strained finances of the University during the late depression. The Department is anxious to develop a program of instruction and research based upon the policy of the regular employment of visitors. A sum, equal to the stipend of a full professor, if used to finance a program of regular visitors, would add greater content and prestige to the Department than could be secured in any other way.

Source: University of Chicago Library, Department of Special Collections. Office of the President. Hutchins Administration Records. Box 73, Folder “Economics Dept., “Post-War Plans” Simeon E. Leland, 1945″.

Categories
Chicago Economists

Chicago. Memorandum on a Fiscal Stimulus, 1932

Today’s post is a jewel of fiscal policy thought in a memorandum from the University of Chicago written in 1932 at the trough of the Great Depression in the United States. Looking at the signers of the memorandum that argues for aggressive fiscal stimulus (economists covering the ideological spectrum from Aaron Director through Paul Douglas), one is reminded of Ben Bernanke’s bon mot from the last big financial crisis: “There are no atheists in foxholes or ideologues in a financial crisis”.

Note: Bernanke’s crack appears to be a minor variation on Jeffrey Frankel’s twist.

Backstory

After WWI, veterans lobbied for “adjusted compensation” to partially make up the difference between their combat pay and the significantly higher wages that had been paid to workers at home during the War. Veterans preferred the term “adjusted compensation” to the term “bonus” (the latter term being construed as implying something that goes beyond full and fair compensation). In 1924 veterans were finally granted “adjusted universal compensation” in the form of certificates that credited $1.25 for each day served abroad plus $1.00 for those days served in the U.S. These certificates were essentially 20-year insurance policies equal to 125% of the service credit to be redeemed in full on the veteran’s birthday in 1945. (Exceptions for immediate cash payments were granted for amounts less than $50 and in order to settle estates of deceased veterans for payments of less than $500). More details can be found at this link

In 1932 the question arose whether an early payout of these certificates would be a prudent and effective fiscal stimulus and Congressman Samuel Barrett Pettengill (Democrat) of Indiana sent the questionnaire that follows to academic economists across the country to solicit their advice in the matter.

A month later protesting “Bonus Marchers” (ca 20,000 veterans) set up camps in Washington, D.C. that they were evicted from by regular troops of the U.S. Army let by General Douglas MacArthur. It wasn’t until 1936 that the WWI veterans were paid their adjusted compensation.

Responses to Congressman Pettengill’s inquiry were published in the Hearings of the House Committee on Ways and Means for:

Edwin Walter Kemmerer,  Princeton University
Frank Whitson Fetter, Assistant Professor of Economics, Princeton University
Thomas Nixon Carver, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
S. J. Coon, Dean of the College of Business Administration, University of Washington
Harry E. Miller, Professor of Economics, Brown University
C. W. Hasek, Head of the Department of Economics and Sociology, Pennsylvania State College
Walter W. McLaren, Department of Economics, Williams College
Harry L. Severson, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics and Sociology, Indiana University
Hiram L. Jome, Professor of Economics, DePauw University
Warren B. Catlin, Department of Economics and Sociology, Boudoin College
E. E. Agger, Professor of Economics and head of the Department of Economics, Rutgers University
Edwin R. A. Seligman, Columbia University
H. A. Millis et al., Department of Political Economy, University of Chicago
Jacob H. Hollander, Johns Hopkins University
William C. Schleter, University of Pennsylvania
Albert Bushnell Hart, Harvard University (historian)

 Today’s post begins with the cover statement of the memorandum found with the copy in the Papers of the President of the University of Chicago, Robert Maynard Hutchins, Box 72.  It is followed by Congressman Pettengill’s list of questions, as well as the Chicago memorandum submitted by H. A. Millis and eleven of his University of Chicago colleagues.

A cursory sweep of the web discovered that this Chicago memorandum has been reprinted as Appendix B in J. Ronnie Davis’s 1967 Virginia Ph.D. dissertation, “Pre-Keynesian economic policy proposals in the United States during the Great Depression.” A scanned version of the Congressional Hearings in which the Chicago memorandum was published can be found at Hathitrust.org. I have compared the published version from the House Ways and Means Committee Hearings with the typed copy filed with the papers of President Hutchins at the University of Chicago Archives. Other than minor differences in spelling (e.g. the capitalized form “Federal” is used in the published version), the memorandum was published by the House Ways and Means Committee exactly as received.

__________________________________

 

A MEMORANDUM PRESENTED TO A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS, APRIL 26, 1932.

Two members of the staff of the Department of economics, at the University of Chicago, received letters from a member of the House Committee on Military Affairs, requesting answers to certain questions. Inasmuch as the views of a large number of economists were desired, the letter was circulated among and read by twelve men of the Chicago faculty; and steps were taken to prepare a memorandum covering the points raised….The memorandum, with the names of the twelve professors participating in its formulation, is reproduced in its entirety. Because of the character of the issues raised, it seemed better to prepare the memorandum in the form it has taken than to answer the specific questions, the one after the other.

Source: University of Chicago Archives. Hutchins Box 72. Folder 6 “Economics Department, 1932-1933”.

__________________________________

 

STATEMENT OF HON. SAMUEL B. PETTENGILL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

Mr. Pettengill. Mr. Chairman, I am not on the calendar this morning and therefore in justice to those who are here I have asked for only one minute.

Some time ago, before I knew when the Ways and Means Committee was to have hearings on this matter, on my own initiative I sent a questionnaire to 50 of the leading economists of the country on the Patman and the Thomas bills; also with reference to the benefit of “reflation” and the danger of inflation.

I have a very interesting file here, including letters from Mr. Kemmerer and Mr. King who have appeared before the committee.

In order to shorten the record as much as possible, I have briefed the replies somewhat. The entire letters, of course, are available.

[…]

Mr. Pettengill. Mr. Chairman, as I have stated, I endeavored to get the benefit of the best and most disinterested economic thought of the country with reference to the advisability of either borrowing money or printing money with which to liquidate the adjusted service certificates. In the main, I sent my letters to the economics department of our leading colleges and universities. In order to make their replies more intelligible to you, as many of them answered numbered questions in my letter, I attach, first, my original letter.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

Dear Sir: I am writing you and other leading economists in the country with reference to the problem confronting Congress with regard to the proposed payment of the soldiers’ bonus. I trust that I will be able to secure a symposium of opinion by authorities such as yourself which will be of real value to Congress.

As you know, at the end of this fiscal year we will have an accumulated deficit of some $3,000,000,000. It is, I think, the largest peace-time deficit of any country in the world. It is rapidly getting larger. We are going into the red now $7,000,000 a day. United States obligations have recently sold below 85.

On the other hand, commodity, wage, land, and security prices are slowly drifting to levels so disastrous that they threaten the most widespread repudiation of debts and tax defaults, which may wipe out, along with the debtors, classes holding the obligations of individuals, corporations, States, and municipalities now totaling some one hundred fifty to two hundred billion dollars, which is about one-half the Nation’s wealth. For example, the conservative Washington Post, April 11, said:

“The dollar increases in value every day … unless this vicious movement is checked it will result in panic. The extension of credit will not be sufficient. Heroic emergency measures that will arrest the fall of prices seem to be in order. … This economic malady has reached a point where it can not be expected to cure itself without leaving horrible scars. … Some powerful agency must be thrown into the breach to restore the value of goods and services against this exaggerated value of money. … Emergencies of this kind call for drastic action. … It is time for the leaders in Government and financial circles to focus their minds upon realignment of values. The people would not countenance the manufacture of fiat money to make prices rise, But some method of currency expansion on a sound gold basis may be necessary.”

            The question is the advisability of paying the so-called soldiers’ bonus as an antideflationary, inflationary, “reflationary” or stabilizing measure. The name, of course, is not important.

A number of different bills have been proposed. H. R. 1, introduced by Mr. Patman, of Texas, calls for borrowing the $2,400,000,000 necessary to make payment.

  1. Do you think we can, or should, borrow this?

Sentiment here, however, is crystallizing around (for or against) Mr. Patman’s substitute, H. R. 7726; I inclose copy.
This bill simply proposes to print money to pay the debt. Is this sound, advisable, or defensible, in view of the existing emergency? And in the light of present gold reserves?

 It has been suggested that it could be strengthened as follows:
Call in the outstanding adjusted-service certificates now redeemable in 1945. Collateralize them together with 40 per cent gold which is said to be now available over and above the amount necessary for circulation now outstanding. Issue currency against this hypothecation and pay the veterans off. Then set up a sinking fund to retire the currency (together with the certificates) in whole or in part in 1945, or gradually before that time.

With reference to “excess reserves” see Federal Reserve Bulletin, March, 1932, page 143: “On the basis of these excess reserves, the Federal reserve banks could issue $3,500,000,000 of credit if the demand were for currency and $4,000,000,000 if it were for deposits at the reserve banks.”

  1. What credit do you give this statement as a basis for the proposed bonus payment?

There are, of course, all sorts of social and political features around this problem, but I direct your attention to its economic and fiscal aspects. It is a problem of the most tremendous consequences and Members here who are patriotically trying to do their best to cut the present vicious circle for the good of the entire country (not the veterans alone) need, and will appreciate, the advice of men like yourself, whose life study makes your judgment so valuable.

  1. Is the suggested alternative sound?
  1. Does it in reality add any element of safety to H. R. 7726, the outright issue of nonretirable currency?
  1. Can it be improved? If so, how?
  1. It is said the Europe holds $2,000,000,000 of deposits in this country. With their experience with “printing-press” money, would they become frightened for the solvency of the dollar, and cause disastrous liquidation and withdrawals here in America? Could such liquidation of foreign-held obligations be stopped unless we “went off gold,” or had available the precautionary device of authorizing the Treasury to change the amount of gold in our dollar along the lines advocated by Irving Fisher? If foreign exchange began to go against us, would it help Europe pay us her public and private debts, as an offset against our investment and deposit obligations held by Europeans?
  1. Would the introduction of $2,400,000,000 new currency into the pockets of the people necessarily result in the rise of commodity and other levels thus causing merchants to place orders for the products of farm and factory, thus starting production and accelerating employment?
  1. The Glass-Steagall bill, as you know, for the period of one year, authorized placing 60 per cent Government bonds plus 40 per cent gold behind Federal reserve money. This, of course, as I understand it, is 60 per cent “greenbackism,” placing one promise to pay (Government bond) behind another promise to pay (currency) to the extent of 60 per cent. Assuming that the adjusted-service certificates are also promises to pay, can the Glass-Steagall bill and the suggested method of handling the payment of the bonus be distinguished, from the standpoint of soundness?

The Glass-Steagall bill, as it appears to me, does not seem to have stopped the deflationary trend, for the reason that its potential currency expansion is based upon borrowing, and banks and individuals are not borrowing (or lending).
Recently I have heard Willford I. King, professor of economics, New York University, testify before the House Banking and Currency Committee. Although not directing his particular attention to the “bonus” he was quite clear that the currency must be expanded at the present time in order to start commodity prices upward and permit debts and taxes to be paid, as well as to start buying, and employment. However, he was equally clear that for such currency something of equal value should be taken in by the Government, e. g., Government bonds, thus temporarily substituting noncirculating certificates of indebtedness (bonds) for circulating certificates (currency). Then, he said, when commodity prices reach the desired level, e. g., 1926 commodity index, the process would be reversed, the bonds resold, and the currency retired. It was his opinion that such a device is necessary in order to stop the elevator at the right floor—i. e., prevent inflation beyond a certain point.
Neither the Patman nor the suggested alternative plan seems to me to contain this safeguard. That is, the adjusted-compensation certificates when once taken in would not be available for reissue.

            I need not state that every member here is anxious to solve the problem, not from the standpoint of helping the needy veteran and his family at the expense of the rest of the community, but only from the standpoint of benefiting the entire Nation, on the theory that a distribution to the veteran would, of course, be passed on at once in the payment of taxes, interest, land contracts, doctors’ and merchants’ bills, etc., and with the expectation that this would stop and reverse the trend of values. If the plan or any other conceivable plan at this time would bring only disaster to the Nation and thus to the veteran and his family we have no alternative except to wait until the present economic storm blows over.

Your thoughtful consideration of this matter is most earnestly requested. Your prompt reply will be a distinct public service.

I desire, of course, to use the substance of your reply, but will not quote you, by name, without your permission. Please let me know if you do give this permission.

Sincerely yours,

Samuel B. Pettengill, Member of Congress.

 

Source:  U. S. Congress (Seventy-Second Congress, First Session). Payment of Adjusted-Compensation Certificates in Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives (April 11 to 29, and May 2 and 3, 1932),pp. 508, 511-513

______________________________

 

The University of Chicago,
Department of Economics,
April 26, 1932.

Hon. Samuel. B. Pettengill,
            House Office Building, Washington, D. C.

My Dear Mr. Pettengill: The inclosed memorandum has been prepared in an attempt to answer the questions put in your letter of April 13. It has been developed in a committee of two, in conference, and in round table. It is approved by all of the University of Chicago economists who participated in the discussion and formulation; their names appear at the end of the memorandum.

It has seemed better to answer your questions in a memorandum divided into five sections rather than to answer them specifically, the one after the other. I think all of your questions, save that relating to Professor King’s testimony, are answered. No direct reference is made to King’s position because it has seemed better to take a positive stand rather than to criticize.

You ask permission to use the replies to your questions. This is, of course, granted, but our preference would be to have the whole rather than a part of the memorandum given publicity.

Trusting that the memorandum will be of some assistance to you, I am

Very truly yours,

H. A. Millis.

 

(The memorandum referred to follows:)

I.

Severe depression and deflation can be checked, and recovery initiated, either by virtue of automatic adjustments, or by deliberate governmental action. The automatic process involves tremendous losses, in wastage of productive capacity, and in acute suffering. It requires drastic reduction of wage rates, rents, and other “sticky” prices, notably those in industries where readjustments are impeded by monopoly and exceeding politeness of competition. It must also involve widespread insolvency and financial reorganization, with consequent reduction of fixed charges, in order that firms may be placed in position to obtain necessary working capital when and where expansion of output becomes profitable. Given drastic deflation of costs and elimination of fixed charges, business will discover opportunities for profitably increasing employment, firms will become anxious to borrow, and banks will be more willing to lend.

As long as wage cutting is evaded by reducing employment, and as long as monopolies, including public utilities, resist pressure for lower prices, deflation may continue indefinitely. The more intractable the “sticky” prices, the further credit contraction will go, and the more drastic must be the ultimate readjustment. We have developed an economy in which the volume and velocity of credit is exceedingly flexible and sensitive, while wages and pegged prices are highly resistant to downward pressure. This is at once the explanation of our plight and the ground on which governmental action may be justified. Recovery can be brought about, either by reduction of costs to a level consistent with existing commodity prices, or by injecting enough new purchasing power so that much larger production will be profitable at existing costs. The first method is conveniently automatic but dreadfully slow; and it admits hardly at all of being facilitated by political measures. The second method, while readily amenable to abuse, only requires a courageous fiscal policy on the part of the central government.

(We agree entirely with your remarks as to the inadequacy of the Glass-Steagall bill and similar expedients. Little is to be gained merely by easing the circumstances of banks, in a situation where, by virtue of cost-price relations, everyone, including the banks, is anxious to get out of debt. Such measures may retard deflation and prepare the way for recovery; but they cannot much mitigate the fundamental maladjustments between prices and costs.)

II.

If action is needed to raise prices (and we believe it is), it should take the form of generous Federal expenditures, financed without resort to taxes on commodities or transactions. For the effect on prices, the direction of expenditure is not crucially important. Heavy Federal contribution toward relief of distress is the most urgent and, for reflation, perhaps the most effective measure. Large appropriations for public and semipublic improvements are also an attractive expedient, provided projects are chosen which can be started quickly and opportunely stopped. Generous bonus legislation would be the most objectionable of all available devices for releasing purchasing power. Purchase of the certificates at their present value, instead of at maturity value, is perhaps relatively unobjectionable.

Bonus legislation invites comparison with a program of Federal subsidy to agencies engaged in administering emergency relief. Both measures involve a sort of outright gift, the provision of funds to individuals or for their support. One involves allocation according to need, when need is dreadfully acute; the other ignores this criterion completely. Furthermore, funds spent for relief would certainly be spent for commodities, and very promptly, while less needy veterans might only use additional cash further to increase hoarded savings. Of the possible consequences of bonus concessions for the future of pension legislation, mere reminder should suffice. Congress has already capitulated to the veterans and their votes on the grounds that the Treasury was full, and the community prosperous. It is now on the verge of capitulating again, on the grounds that the Treasury is empty, and the community impoverished.

III.

It is impossible to estimate in advance how much Federal expenditure might be required to bring genuine revival of business. We are persuaded, however, that the automatic adjustments have already proceeded to a stage where the necessary inflationary expenditures would be handsomely rewarded, in greater production, larger employment, and higher tax revenues.

One should recognize at the outset a danger that any measures of fiscal inflation may be too meager and too short lived. Inadequate, temporary stimulation might well leave conditions worse than it found them. We might experience temporary revival and then serious relapse, followed by more drastic deflation than would otherwise have been necessary. If we indorse inflation, we should be prepared to administer heavy doses of stimulant if necessary, to continue them until recovery is firmly established, and to discontinue them when the emergency is ended. It is obvious that the bonus measures fail utterly to provide this necessary flexibility.

IV.

The question of how emergency expenditures, for whatever purposes, should be financed, is difficult and highly controversial. The wisest policy for the present, however, would seem to be one guided largely by psychological considerations. It is likely that adequate stimulus could be imparted, and recovery assured, without creating an excessive drain upon our gold reserves. Inflationary measures, in whatever form, will probably accelerate for a time the export of gold; but this strain we may well be able to endure until revival of business is assured. Domestic hoarding of gold, on the other hand, might force us to suspension of our currency laws; and this possibility dictates caution as to the technique of inflation. The problem is simply that of selecting the procedure which will be least alarming.

On other grounds, the issue of greenbacks seems most expedient; but this method must be ruled out unless one is ready to abandon gold immediately, for it would create the greatest danger of domestic drain. Large sales of Federal bonds in the open market would be much less alarming; but the probable effect upon the prices of such bonds must give us pause, especially since a marked decline might jeopardize the position of many banks. It would certainly be better for the Government to sell new issues directly to the reserve banks or, in effect, to exchange bonds for bank deposits and Federal Reserve notes. Much may be said, indeed, for issuing the bonds with the circulation privilege, thus permitting the Reserve Banks to issue Federal Reserve Bank notes in exchange; for this procedure does not much invite suspicion, has supporting precedent, and would greatly reduce the legal requirements with respect to gold.

It is well to face the possibility, though it seems remote, that adequate fiscal inflation might force us to abandon gold for a time. We must be prepared to see a sort of race between depletion of the gold holdings of the reserve banks and improvement of business. If definite business revival is attained before the gold position becomes acute, the hoarders will have missed some great investment bargains; if inflation must be carried beyond the limits tolerated by gold, the hoarders will reap a profit. Moreover, if other gold-standard countries follow our example, as is quite probable, the threat to our adherence to the gold standard will prove negligible.

But we would insist again that, once deliberate reflation is undertaken, it must be carried through, whatever that policy may mean for gold. To withdraw artificial support before genuine recovery is achieved, might create a situation worse than that which would have obtained in the absence of remedial efforts. If the time comes, as it probably will not, when we must choose between recovery and convertibility, we must then abandon gold, pending the not distant time when world recovery will permit our returning to the old standard on the old terms. The remote possibility of our being forced to this step, however, should not influence our decision now. The supposedly awful consequences of departure from gold are, as England has shown us so clearly, nothing but fantastic illusions.

V.

It is easy to be too greatly alarmed about the possibility of extreme and uncontrolled inflation. With improvement of business, Federal revenues will automatically increase. Expenditures may then be financed to a lesser extent by borrowing, and thus with less inflationary influence. Indeed, one might maintain that temporary inflation is the most promising means to restore a balanced Budget. Moreover, with proper precautions, it should not be difficult to effect drastic reduction of expenditures at the appropriate time. The emergency character of inflationary appropriations should be emphasized in the acts themselves; and Congress should record the intention of balancing expenditures and revenues over a period of, say four or five years. Incidentally, no emergency expenditures would permit of more opportune retrenchment than those for relief of distress.

We find it difficult, at the present juncture, to give due attention to the problem of preventing or modifying the next boom. Obviously, we should attend to getting out of the present emergency first. It demands emphasis, however, that successful resort to fiscal methods for terminating deflation will present the very serious problem of keeping recovery within safe bounds. A merely salutary inflation treatment will fail to satisfy many groups. There will certainly be demand for more inflation and more “prosperity” than we can afford or sanely endure. Fiscal inflation must be regarded as a means for meeting an acute emergency for industry as a whole. It should not be viewed as a means of solving the agricultural problem, nor as a method for deflating the rentier. It is properly a most temporary expedient, to be abandoned (and reversed) long before many individual industries and classes have obtained the measure of relief which justice might prescribe.

We have suggested that for the period of the ensuing five years all Federal expenditures, including those of an emergency character, should be covered by tax revenues. To minimize the total necessary outlay, outlays should be very generous now; parsimonious inflation is an illusory economy. It would also be eminently wise to avoid now any new taxes which fall at the producer’s (or dealer’s) margin. The levies on income, however, should be advanced immediately to the maximum levels which an imperfect, but improving, administrative system can support. While such levies will be rather unproductive for a time, they will have no very deterrent effect upon business; and, having gotten them into the statutes during a period of least political resistance, we may be assured of large revenues at the appropriate time. Even after recovery, additional commodity taxes should be resorted to only if more equitable levies prove inadequate to full completion of the “5-year plan.” Indeed, by 1940, our Federal debt should stand at a figure far below that contemplated by existing legislation. We should have high income taxes when incomes are high.

Sound fiscal management during the next few years should give close attention to indexes of production, employment, and wholesale prices. We shall not undertake at this time to indicate any definite rules. There is no immediate problem of excessive inflation—rather, a danger of doing nothing or of a too modest beginning. For the not distant future, however, most careful and intelligent management will be imperative. Once there is clear evidence of revival, of increased and profitable production, the mechanism of credit expansion will begin to operate, and to carry on the task which fiscal inflation has begun. As soon as this happens, retrenchment must be started; emergency expenditures must be reduced as rapidly as is possible without undermining recovery. We should not attempt, by deliberate inflation, to bring prices to any level which we choose to regard as normal; nor should artificial stimulus be continued until production and employment attain really satisfactory levels. Fiscal measures should only be used to give to recovery a sure start. When this is done, the real task will be that of preventing the recovery from becoming a boom; and a beginning must be made in this task long before any alarming signs appear. The seeds of booms are sown by innocent expansion of credit during years of seemingly wholesome revival. The task of control is easily neglected at such times; and there is grave danger that both the Reserve Board and the Treasury will adopt inadequately deflationary tactics in this period when it is so easy to have no policy at all.

In summary, it is our unequivocal position that drastic but temporary fiscal inflation can now be productive of tremendous gains, with no possible losses of compensating magnitude; further, that after genuine revival of business has occurred, and especially if it is attained by artificial stimulation, there will soon be urgent need for prompt and decisive action of a deflationary character.

Garfield V. Cox.         Lloyd W. Mints.
Aaron Director.         Henry Schultz.
Paul H. Douglas.       Henry C. Simons.
Harry D. Gideonse.   Jacob Viner.
Frank H. Knight.       Chester W. Wright.
Harry A. Millis.          Theodore O. Yntem.[sic]

 

Source: U. S. Congress (Seventy-Second Congress, First Session). Payment of Adjusted-Compensation Certificates in Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives (April 11 to 29, and May 2 and 3, 1932), pp. 524-527.

Image Source:  Authentic History Center website: Page “Hoover & the Depression: The Bonus Army.”