Categories
Chicago Economists Funny Business

Chicago. The School of Chicago 1972 by Roger Vaughan (Ph.D. 1977). IDs by Gordon, McCloskey & Grossbard

The 1500th artifact added to Economics in the Rear-view Mirror deserves to be a celebratory post for visitors. For this honor I have chosen a  pastiche drawn by a Chicago economics graduate student in 1972. Roger Vaughan (Ph.D. 1977) was the principal, if not only, illustrator for the student-produced satirical publication P.H.A.R.T., an issue of which has been transcribed for an earlier post.

I first saw a copy of Roger Vaughan’s reworking of Raphael’s “School of Athens” added to a photo from a Tweet of a few years back. At that time it did not occur to me to engage in a serious search for the backstory to the drawing. And yet, serendipity turned out to be kind to me when, on a visit to the Harvard Archives last year, I stumbled upon a folded, mint-condition copy of  Vaughan’s “The School of Chicago 1972” in the papers of Zvi Griliches. Of course I had this masterpiece of economics funny business copied and it now has pride of place in my home study.

A few identifications of the figures seen in “The School of Chicago 1972” are obvious (e.g. Milton Friedman and George Stigler, duh) and others could be identified from other Vaughan caricatures that likewise are found in Griliches’ papers (e.g. Marc Nerlove, Stan Fischer, and Robert J. Gordon). Still, most of the renderings remained unidentified. My first idea was to seek out the artist himself, but alas I could only confirm that he had passed in October 2021. The next idea was to seek a living eye-witness to the Chicago economics department of a half-century ago. Here I was luckier, the Stanley G. Harris Professor in the Social Sciences at Northwestern University, Robert J. Gordon, responded to my inquiry almost immediately and as quickly forwarded my request for further information to Distinguished Professor of Economics, History, English, and Communication at the University of Illinois at Chicago, Deirdre McCloskey, for her confirmation and further commentary. Following the initial posting of this artifact, Professor Shoshana Grossbard of San Diego State University spotted a few misspelled names (mea culpa), but, more importantly, was able to identify Margaret Reid by her beret(!).We can all be grateful to these colleagues for their identifications provided below. There remains one unidentified man in the back-row standing to George Stigler’s left plus a couple of yet-to-be identified graduate students. Peeps, Economic in the Rear-view Mirror needs your help! You can leave comments at the end of this post.

___________________________________

About the artist, Roger Vaughan

From his 1981 AEA Biographical Listing, p. 421

Vaughan, Roger J, 421 Hudson St., Apt. 406, New York, NY 10014. Birth Yr: 1946

Degrees: B.A., U. of Oxford, 1968; M.A., Simon Fraser U., 1970; Ph.D. U. of Chicago, 1977. Prin. Cur. Position: Dep.Dir., Off. Of Develop. Planning, State of New York, 1980-

Concurrent/Past Positions: Econ., Citibank, 1978-80; Econ. The Rand Corp. 1974-78. Research: Urban Policy, finance, taxation training.

Roger J. Vaughan’s Rand Reports,
1974-1980

• The Urban Impacts of Federal Policies: Vol. 1, Overview 1980
• Federal Activities in Urban Economic Development 1979
• Recent Contributions to the Urban Policy Debate 1979
• The Urban Impacts of Federal Policies: Vol. 4, Population and Residential Location 1979
• Assessment of Countercyclical Public Works and Public Service Employment Programs. 1978
• Regional Cycles and Employment Effects of Public Works Investments. 1977
• The Urban Impacts of Federal Policies: Vol. 2, Economic Development 1977
• The value of urban open space 1977
• The Economics of Urban Blight. 1976
• Getting People to Parks. 1976
• Public Works as a Countercyclical Device: A Review of the Issues 1976
• The Use of Subsidies in the Production of Cultural Services. 1976
• The Application of Economic Analysis to the Planning and Development of the Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area. 1975
• The Economics of Expressway Noise Pollution Abatement. 1975
• The Economics of Recreation: A Survey. 1974

Source: Rand Reports. Published Research by Author, Roger J. Vaughan.

Sage. Research Methods.

Communicating Social Science Research to Policymakers
By: Roger J. Vaughan & Terry F. Buss
Published: 1998
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412983686

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Raphael’s Scuola di Atene (1509-1511)

For some explanation of what we see in the original, cf. “The Story Behind Raphael’s Masterpiece ‘The School of Athens'” by Jessica Stewart at the Modern Met Website.

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Roger Vaughan’s Pastiche

Open the image in a new window to see a larger image

Source: Harvard University Archives. Papers of Zvi Griliches, Box 129. Folder “Posters, ca. 1960s-1970s”.

Background

The statues standing in the upper alcove are of the President and Vice-President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon (holding a lyre, a sweet visual pun) and Spiro T. Agnew (with the pennant “Effete Snobs”, abridged from his description of self-characterized intellectuals as an “effete core of impudent snobs” in his  “Generation Gap” speech given in New Orleans on October 19th, 1969.)

1126” refers to the street address of the Social Science Research Building, 1126 E. 59th St.

MV=PT” inscribed in the center of the dome is the Equation of Exchange (cf. Irving Fisher’s The Purchasing Power of Money). Cf. at the left of the back-row of Chicago economists, Arnold Zellner is carrying papers with “MV=PY“. Milton Friedman’s vanity license plates on his red cadillac used “MV=PQ” for the Equation of Exchange. Everyone seems to have agreed on the notational virtues of “M”, “V”, and “P”. Does anyone know whether there was any substantive reason for differences regarding the choice of “T”, “Y”, and “Q” for the final term?

Economics in the Rear-view Mirror comment: Though his arm is blocking part of the equation, Zellner is clearly displaying the equation of exchange, MV = PY.

Deirdre McCloskey’s comment: “Underneath Nixon is Marc Nerlove pointing into the ear, by the way of insult, of Hans Theil the great Dutch econometrician (the four great econometricians at Chicago, which had included Zvi Griliches, who had just moved to Harvard, hated each other).”

Economics in the Rear-view Mirror comment: Robert J. Gordon served as an editor of the Journal of Political Economy (J.P.E.) from 1971-1973.

Economics in the Rear-view Mirror comment: Stigler’s position corresponds to that of Aristotle’s in Raphael’s fresco. There Aristotle holds a copy of his own Nicomachean Ethics. Stigler is seen here holding a book by [Adam] Smith, presumably Wealth of Nations.

Deirdre McCloskey’s comment: “George Tolley [is] in a garbage can because he did urban economics (Vaughan was his student).”

Shoshana Grossbard’s comment: “[Margaret Reid]…not only [wore] the dark beret, but also [has] her hair in a bun, under the beret. that was her typical look. She and I attended Becker’s workshop in applications of economics in the years 1974-76.”

And guess what a casual search just turned up…

Margaret Gilpin Reid, professor emeritus of Home Economics and Economics

Source:  University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf1-07052, Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.

Economics in the Rear-view Mirror’s comment: On the high-resolution hard-copy hanging on my study wall, the beret looks sort of like an ink blot and I regreted that imperfection. But now, thanks to Shoshana Grossbard’s careful observation combined with her memory of Reid’s “typical look” and an archival sighting of said beret, I am convinced and grateful that we now have another positive identification!

Deirdre McCloskey’s comment: “D. Gale Johnson…has a pitchfork because he was an agricultural economist. ”

Deirdre McCloskey’s comment: Ted Schultz […] is pointing down to say “This is where the true Chicago School is, where I am!”.

Foreground

The identification of Robert F. Pollard was made by Roger Vaughan’s work and life partner, Anna Nechai.

 

Deirdre McCloskey’s comment: “…Dick Zecher [is] sticking his finger through an IBM card because he was in charge of the Department’s mainframe computer access.”

Another visual pun: Harry Johnson is portrayed writing on a literal Edgeworth-Bowley-box, a two-dimensional representation of allocations that could be Pareto efficient exchange equilibria. The two tradeable goods are measured in Edgeworth and Bowley units, respectively.

Deirdre McCloskey’s comment: “Mary Jean Bowman, one of two tenured women in a small department; she did educational and demographic economics.  The other woman was Margaret Reid, the inventor of household economics…”

The triangle seen in the previous detail is Arnold Harberger’s measure of deadweight loss (efficiency cost resulting from a natural or policy induced distortion of markets).  See Robert J. Gordon’s historical photo of Al Harberger stripping down to reveal himself as “Triangleman” ca. December 1970. In Raphael’s fresco Harberger’s place was that of Euclid.

Robert  J. Gordon’s comment: “I think the bearded student is Dan Wisecarver

Robert  J. Gordon’s comment: “The woman holding the ball is Carolyn Mosby, the head of the department staff.”

 

 

 

 

 

Categories
Chicago Economics Programs Economists Harvard UCLA War and Defense Economics

Harvard. Economics Ph.D. alumnus, Jack Hirshleifer, 1950

 

This UCLA economics department obituary of Jack Hirshleifer is so good that Economics in the Rear-view Mirror keeps a copy for its “Meet an economics Ph.D. alumnus/a” series. Hirschleifer was Brooklyn born and Harvard bred, but his scientific fruit definitely ripened in the California sun.

__________________________

Harvard Ph.D. 1950

Jack Hirshleifer, S.B. [Harvard] 1946 (1945), A.M. [Harvard] 1948.

Subject, Economics. Special Field, Labor Problems. Thesis, “Price Flexibility and General Interdependence.”

Source: Harvard University. Report of the President of Harvard College 1949-50, p. 197.

__________________________

UCLA
Department of Economics

Obituary of Jack Hirshleifer

Education:

Ph.D. Harvard University

Research Areas:

Economic analysis of conflict; bioeconomics with particular reference to sources of cooperative behavior and the nature of evolutionary equilibrium; voluntary provision of public goods.

Biography:

Jack Hirshleifer, professor emeritus of economics, died July 26, 2005, bringing to a close a career marked by wide- ranging interests and brilliant contributions to the subfields of information economics, investment and capital theory, bioeconomics, and the economic theory of conflict.

After active duty in the U.S. Naval Reserve during World War II, Hirshleifer completed his A.B. degree at Harvard, magna cum laude. Five years later he had earned his doctorate in economics, also at Harvard. From 1949 to 1955 he worked as an economist at the Rand Corporation. Before coming to UCLA in 1958, he took a postdoctoral fellowship in statistics and economics at the University of Chicago where he also taught for five years.

His extensive publications included seven books and close to a 100 scholarly articles. From his first study, Water Supply: Economics, Technology, and Policy [Chicago, 1960] to The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory [Cambridge, 2001], Professor Hirshleifer in his scholarship has demonstrated a clarity of analysis and probing for fundamental assumptions which set him apart as one of the most distinguished economists of his generation.

Elected a fellow of both the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Econometric Society, Professor Hirshleifer also served on the editorial boards of the American Economic Review, the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, and the Journal for Bioeconomics. In 2000 he was elected a Distinguished Fellow of the American Economic Association. He also served as president of the Western Economic Association and as vice- president of the American Economic Association.

Professor Hirshleifer was deeply respected by all his fellow faculty members during his 33 years as a member of the UCLA economics department. His door was always open for any colleague, graduate student or undergraduate who might feel like “popping- in.” While a giant among researchers, Professor Hirshleifer was also deeply committed to the teaching of economics. As a teacher he always strove to give his students a sense of his own deep fascination with the role of competitive markets. This led him to write a revolutionary and best- selling textbook in intermediate microeconomics, Price Theory and Applications. While prior books focused on modeling and theory, the new text added dozens of intriguing real world illustrations of economics forces at work. Through his own text- book and through the many texts that have copied his approach, Professor Hirshleifer continues to influence tens of thousands of undergraduates each year.

Tribute by David Levine

Jack Hirshleifer was an economic theorist with broad-ranging interests. Two areas in economics have especially felt the impact of his work. Early in his career, he was instrumental in the information economics revolution; late in his career, he expanded the domain of economic discourse with his work on evolutionary economics and conflict resolution.

Hirshleifer spanned a broad range of issues in his early work as one of the founding fathers of information economics. He made the abstract ideas of contingent claims concrete through his examples and applications. In the process, he helped develop fundamental tools, such as the covariance of risks, the analysis of gambling and insurance, the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, and the analysis of public investment. He also expanded the range of information economics with two fundamental contributions. His work on the private and social value of information clearly shows that competitive markets need not reflect the social value of information. His example of an inventor who can invest based on the knowledge of the impact of his invention shows that there can be an oversupply of inventive activity. This “race to be first” has its reflection in the current literature on patent races, and represents a fundamental problem in intellectual property law that the profession is only now coming to grips with. His second fundamental contribution showed that differences in taste are not enough to explain speculation. He was the first to analyze speculation in a full general-equilibrium model, with different structures of market completeness carefully considered. Although not generally recognized as such, this is also the first paper to point out the indeterminacy of equilibrium when markets are incomplete.

In addition to his founding contributions in information economics, Hirshleifer had a lifelong interest in conflict, beginning with his earliest work on war damages. Late in his career this area became the focus of his contributions, and he was a leader in extending economic methods to problems more traditionally studied in political science. He wrote broadly on expanding the domain of economic discourse to include the “rational” evolutionary analysis of altruism and spite. His work on conflict showed how “Peace is more likely to the extent that the decisiveness of conflict is low, or … if the stakes are small or the technology favors the defense. More surprisingly, perhaps, increased productive complementarity between the parties does not systematically favor peace…the poorer side is generally motivated to invest more heavily in fighting effort. So conflict can become an income-equalizing process.” Finally, his weakest link/best shot experiment (with Glenn Harrison) demonstrates that economic incentives play a key role in determining how much people will contribute to a public good.

Tribute by Roger Farmer

I was approached last month by Junyao Ying, a UCLA alum who is now working in China. Junyao and his wife Weiyi Qiu have recently translated Jack’s book, Investment Interest and Capital into Chinese. Junyao asked me to write a few words about Jack for the translation. This is what I wrote.

The economics department at UCLA was a very exciting place in the 1980s, not least because of Jack Hirshleifer.  Many of us ate lunch every day in the Faculty Center, and being in Southern California, most days we ate outdoors in the sunshine.  Jack would arrive at 12.00 sharp with an economic question for the day that he would pose to the table. Jack’s questions would be from the news of the day and the analysis he expected would be in the UCLA style.

The department had a unique approach to economics and Jack, along with Harold Demsetz, Armen Alchian, Ben Klein and later, Al Harberger, were a huge part of that. Their economics was intuitive, often verbal, but always incisive.  One story, relayed to me by another UCLA  giant of the era, Axel Leijonhufvud, expresses well the Socratic teaching style that permeated the UCLA curriculum. As Axel relays it, he was sitting in on Armen’s first graduate micro class when the master appeared, paced back and forth for a few minutes, and then boomed loudly: “So why don’t we sell babies anyway?”

Jack had the same approach. Many of our discussions would end up around one of his favorite topics: the economics of disasters. Earthquakes were never far from our minds and Jack was an expert on what today we might call black swan events. LA earthquakes are relatively frequent but they typically register less than 5.0 on the Richter Scale, enough to shake the floor, but usually not to do much damage. Sometimes we see larger quakes and every century or so, an 8.0 magnitude quake brings significant loss of life. Jack pointed out that, if you go far enough back in the fossil record, there have been earthquakes large enough to cause a slippage in the earth’s crust large enough to move two points that were previously next to each other five miles apart!

Jack was an economic imperialist. He believed passionately that the economic method can and should be applied to all of the social sciences. While we may not all share that opinion, in this time of crisis, we can nevertheless benefit from Jack’s insights. He may not be here in person to opine on how to deal with black swan events,  but we can still learn from Jack by reading his written words.

Publications

“War Damage Insurance,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 35, No. 2. (May 1953), pp. 144-153. Argues that vulnerability rated war damage insurance would create private incentives to make property less vulnerable to enemy bombing, and that this would be superior to administrative fiat.

“On the Theory of Optimal Investment Decision,” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 66, No. 4. (Aug 1958), pp. 329-352. Examines different internal rate of return and present value rules when there is a divergence between borrowing and lending rates, and shows that while the problem can be solved by careful consideration of the budget constraint,  neither of these rules gives the correct answer all the time.

“Risk, The Discount Rate, and Investment Decisions,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 51, No. 2(May 1961), pp. 112-120. Discusses how covariance of new risks with the existing portfolio makes it desirable to diversify by adding new risks.

“Investment Decision Under Uncertainty: Choice-Theoretic Approaches,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 79, No. 4. (Nov 1965), pp. 509-536; and “Investment Decision under Uncertainty: Applications of the State-Preference Approach,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 80, No. 2. (May 1966), pp. 252-277. These two paper develop the time-state-preference approach (what we now call the state-contingent model) applied to traditional problems in economics: gambling and insurance; Modigliani-Miller Theorem and evaluation of public projects.

“Urban Water Supply: A Second Look,” (with  J. W. Milliman) The American Economic Review, Vol. 57, No. 2 (May 1967), pp. 169-178. In a famous earlier work with J.C. DeHaven Water Supply: Economics, Technology and Policy(University of Chicago Press, 1960) alternative methods of supplying water to Southern California were subject to cost-benefit analysis. This paper review what actually happened: policy makers ignored the advice, and chose what both prospectively and retrospectively was the worst economic choice. They conclude: “It appears that the agenda for economists, at this point, should place lower priority upon the further refinement of advice for those efficient and selfless administrators who may exist in never-never land. Rather, it should focus on devising institutions whereby fallible and imperfect administrators may be forced to learn from error.”

“The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 61, No. 4. (Sep 1971), pp. 561-574.   Makes the simple yet crucial point that the benefit of receiving information first bears no necessary relationship to the social value of the information. For example, inventive activity may be oversupplied because the inventor can make investments based upon knowledge of the invention. This paper also makes careful use of an infinitesimal deviant individual in a representative individual world.

“Speculation and Equilibrium: Information, Risk, and Markets,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 89, No. 4. (Nov 1975), pp. 519-542. This paper shows that differences in taste are not enough to explain speculation – differences in beliefs are required. Unlike earlier work on speculation that ignores the endogeneity of prices, the setup here is a full general equilibrium model, with different structures of market completeness carefully considered. In particular, market incompleteness alone cannot explain speculation.  Although not generally recognized as such, this is the first paper to point out the indeterminacy of equilibrium in an incomplete market setting.

“Competition, Cooperation, and Conflict in Economics and Biology,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 68, No. 2 (May 1978), pp. 238-243. This paper draws connections between the economics and sociobiology literature, and marks the beginning of Hirshleifer’s interest in sociobiology and conflict.

“The Expanding Domain of Economics,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 75, No. 6. (Dec 1985), pp. 53-68. This paper is a broad overview of the application of economic logic to a variety of “non-economic” problems. Hirshleifer begins by examining endogeneity of preferences. He identifies the different between altruistic preferences, and what would now be called the “warm-glow” effect of participation. He reviews Becker’s “rotten kid” theorem, which says that an altruistic parent can actually gain from altruism. As an alternative theory of preferences, models of status, such as the rat-race are examined. The underlying point of view is that of “as-if” rationality – altruism must provide some benefit to the altruist. From this perspective, Hirshleifer examines models such as the psychological model of “anger, gratitude, response” and argues that seemingly irrational behavior does indeed benefit the individual. The final topic is once again that of conflict. A narrow range of possible settlements it is argued increases the potential for conflict. Increasing returns followed by diminishing returns explains the monopoly on military force within the state, while also explaining the multiplicity of states.

“An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods,” (with Glenn W. Harrison) The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97, No. 1. (Feb 1989), pp. 201-225. This experimental contribution to the public goods literature explores how the increasing incentives to free ride lead to greater free riding. This paper also introduces the “best-shot” game, a public goods contribution game in which only the largest contribution to the public good matters. In this type of game it is socially and individually optimal for only one player to contribute, and unlike many other types of public goods games, this theoretical prediction is exactly what happens in the laboratory.

“The Technology of Conflict as an Economic Activity,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 2  (May 1991), pp. 130-134. “Peace is more likely to the extent that the decisiveness of conflict is low, or … if the stakes are small or the technology favors the defense. More surprisingly, perhaps, increased productive complementarity between the parties does not systematically favor peace…the poorer side is generally motivated to invest more heavily in fighting effort. So conflict can become an income-equalizing process.”

Source: Jack Hirshleifer UCLA page archived by the Wayback Machine.

Image Source: The 1946 Harvard Class Album, p. 153.

Categories
Chicago Funny Business Harvard M.I.T.

Chicago. Lyrics from “With a Little Bit of Luck”, ca. 1962

 

The following number comes as the last sheet of a stapled collection of skit numbers, beginning with an economics version of “Dear Officer Krupke” from West Side Story, already posted. That number was written about 1962 and My Fair Lady ran on Broadway from 1956 through 1962, so this too could have been written sometime around 1962 as well.

_____________________________

FINALE
(To the tune of “With a Little Bit of Luck
from My Fair Lady)

Oh we are all perpetually students
Because the army we would like to shirk
Oh we are all perpetually students
But with a little bit of luck, with a little bit of luck
We will never have to go to work

With a little bit, with a little bit
With a little bit of bloomin’ luck

The men upstairs harass us with their prelims
To write the answers always makes us fret
The men upstairs harass us with their prelims
But with a little bit of luck, with a little bit of luck
We will pass them all without a sweat

(Repeat Chorus)

Ingersoll and Earhart pay us money
And the reason we don’t understand
Oh Ingersoll and Earhart pay us money
But with a little bit of luck, with a little bit of luck
They’ll increase it by another grand

(Repeat Chorus)

Oh we have spent long years in these damn workshops
Hearing all the young professors shout
Oh we have spent long years in these damn workshops
But with a little bit of luck, with a little bit of luck
They’ll have pity and they’ll let us out

(Repeat Chorus)

The MIT men get the best job offers
The Harvard men get all the business dough
The MIT men get the best job offers
But we just never get the luck, we just never get the luck
All that’s left for us is Chicago

We just never get, we just never get
We just never get the bloomin’ luck

Oh everybody thinks that we are madmen
And we have no say in policy
Oh everybody thinks that we are madmen
But with a little bit of luck, with a little bit of luck
We will publish in the J-P-E.

No final Chorus

Source: Harvard University Archive. Papers of Zvi Griliches. Box 129, Folder “Faculty Skits, ca. 1960s.”

Image Source: Stanley Holloway (center) as Alfred P. Doolittle from the Broadway presentation of My Fair Lady. At left is Gordon Dillworth and at right, Rod McLennan. From Wikimedia Commons.

Categories
Chicago Policy Suggested Reading

Chicago. Governmental Price Fixing Reading List. Friedman, 1972

President Richard Nixon’s peacetime wage and price controls were less than a year old when Milton Friedman used the teachable moment to discuss “governmental price fixing” in a course of his at the University of Chicago.

______________________________

Spring, 1972

Economics 496
Selected Topics in Contemporary Economic Problems
Dr. M. Friedman

Reading List

General Note: The special topic that will be considered this semester is governmental price fixing. We shall examine three general categories of price fixing: fixing of prices of specific commodities or services; general price and wage controls; fixing of exchange rates. The basic theoretical tools required to analyze these problems have presumably been studied in courses in price theory, monetary theory, and income and employment theory but will be reviewed in class lectures. This reading list therefore covers mostly applied material.

I. Fixing of Specific Prices

HD1761
H6

Houthakker, Hendrik, Economics Policy for the Farm Sector, American Enterprise Institute, 1967

HD1761
P13

Paarlberg, Don, American Farm Policy, Wiley, 1964

HB171.5
A34
1967

Alchian, A. & Allen, W., University Economics, pp. 92-99, 402-404

HD4918
P47

Peterson, J. M. & Stewart, C T. Employment Effects of Minimum Wage Rate, American Enterprise Institute, 1969

HD4918
F74

Friedman, M. & Brozen, Y. The Minimum Wage Rate, Who Really Pays?

HC106.5
B83

Burns Arthur F., The Management of Prosperity, pp. 45-48

 

II. General Wage and Price Controls

Campbell, Colin (ed.), Wage Price Controls in World War Il, U.S. and Germany, American Enterprise Institute

HB
B24
H1

Ullman, I. & Flanagan, R. J. Wage-Restraints: Study of Incomes Policies in Western Europe, University of California Press, 1971

HC106.5
S435

Shultz, G. P. & Aliber, R. Z. (eds.), Guidelines, Informal Controls, and the Market Place, University of Chicago Press

HB236
A3
G3

Galbraith, J. K., A Theory of Price Control. Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1952

HB236
U5H35

Hardy, C. O., Wartime Control of Prices, Washington, Brookings Institute, 1940
Wallis, W. A., How to Ration Consumers’ Goods and Control Their Prices, American Economic Review, Sept. 1942, pp. 501-512
Gorter, W. & Hildebrand, G. H., “Is Price Control Really Necessary?”  American Economic Review, March 1951, pp. 77-81

III. Control of Exchange Rates

HG3883
U7 F7

Friedman, M. & Roosa, R. L., The Balance of Payments: Free vs. Fixed Exchange Rates

HB33
F7

Friedman, M., “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates,” Essays in Positive Economics, University of Chicago Press

HG538
F856

Friedman, M., Dollars and Deficits

HG3821
A66

Halm, G. (ed.), Approaches to Greater Flexibility of Exchange Rates, Princeton University Press, 1970

Source: Hoover Institution Archives. Milton Friedman Papers. Box 78, Folder 5 “University of Chicago, Econ. 496”.

Image Source:  Milton Friedman (undated) from University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf1-06231, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.

Categories
Bibliography Chicago Fields

Chicago. Reading List for Industrial Organization. Stigler, 1959

 

The following (graduate) reading list comes from Zvi Griliches’ papers at the Harvard University Archives. In structure and content it matches George Stigler’s reading list from the University of Chicago in 1973 previously transcribed and posted, so there is no doubt where and from whom the reading list has come. There are indeed some additions and subtractions between the 1959 and 1973 versions which are indications of how the field evolved over those years, at least in George Stigler’s mind.

______________________________

READING LIST
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
1959

I. The Firm-Structure of Industries

1. The competitive concept in theory and quantitative studies

A. P. Lerner, “The Concept of Monopoly,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. I
R. Triffin, Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory, pp. 125 ff.
J. M. Clark, “Toward a Concept of Workable Competition,” American Economic Review, June 1950 or Readings in Social Control of Business
A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, Bk. V, Ch. 12
F. H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, pp. 76 ff.
E. Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition, Ch. 1
G. Stigler, “Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated,” Journal of Political Economy, 1957
R. Bishop, “Elasticities, Cross-elasticities, and Market Relationships,” American Economic Review, December 1952, June 1955
G. Rosenbluth, “Measure of Concentration,” in Business Concentration and Price Policy
T.N.E.C. Monograph 27, The Structure of Industry, Part 5
T. Scitovsky, “Economic Theory and Measurement of Concentration,” in Business Concentration and Price Policy

2. Some statistical studies

National Resources Comm., The Structure of the American Economy, Ch. 7, Appendix 7
Clair Wilcox, Competition and Monopoly, T.N.E.C. Monograph 21
The Structure of Industry, T.N.E.C. Monograph 27
Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation, Bk. II
G. Stigler, “Competition in the United States,” Five Lectures on Economic Problems
F.T.C., The Concentration of Productive Facilities
A. C. Harberger, “Monopoly and Resource Allocation,”American Economic Review, May 1954
A. D. Kaplan, Big Enterprise in a Competitive System

3. The trend of the structure

T.N.E.C. Monograph 27, Part I
G. W. Nutter, The Extent of Enterprise Monopoly
M. A. Adelman, “Measurement of Industrial Concentration,” in Industrial Organization and Public Policy
F.T.C. Changes in Concentration in Manufacturing, 1935 to 1947 and 1950

II. Factors Influencing Firm-Structures

1. Economies of scale

Cost Behavior and Price Policy, esp. Ch. 10
E. A. G. Robinson, The Structure of Competitive Industry, Ch. 2-7
J. M. Clark, Economics of Overhead Costs, Ch. 5, 6
W. Crum, Corporate Size and Earning Power
J. McConnell, “Corporate Earnings by Size of Firm,” Survey of Current Business, May 1945
J. Johnston. “Labour Productivity and Size of Establishment,” Oxford Institute of Statistics, 1954
R. C. Osborn, Effects of Corporate Size on Efficiency and Profitability
Caleb Smith, “Survey of Empirical Evidence,” in Business Concentration and Price Policy
J. S. Bain, “Economies of Scale, ….” in Industrial Organization and Public Policy
G. J. Stigler, “The Economies of Scale,” Law and Economics, 1958

2. Mergers

F.T.C., The Merger Movement
A. S. Dewing, “A Statistical Test of the Success of Consolidations,” Q.J.E., 1931
S. Livermore, “The Success of Industrial Mergers,” Q.J.E., 1935
A. S. Dewing, Corporate Promotions and Reorganizations, Ch. 20, 21
G. Stigler, “Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger,” in Industrial Organization and Public Policy
Butters and Linter, “Effect of Mergers on Industrial Concentration,” Review of Economics and Statistics 1950
F.T.C. Report on Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions
J. Markham, “Survey of the Evidence and Findings on Mergers,” in Business Concentration
F. Machlup, Political Economy of Monopoly, pp. 105-17
J. F. Weston, The Role of Mergers in the Growth of Large Firms
G. Stigler, “The Statistics of Monopoly and Merger,” Journal of Political Economy, 1956

3. Raw materials

W. Y. Elliott, ed., International Control in the Non-ferrous Metals, essays on Nickel and Aluminum
E. A. G. Robinson, Monopoly, Ch. 3
R. H. Montgomery, The Brimstone Game, Ch, 4-9
D. H. Wallace, Market Control in the Aluminum Industry

4. Patents

A. Plant, “Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Invention,” Economica, 1934 (also companion article on copyrights)
Proceedings, American Econ. Assoc., May 1948 roundtable on patents
T.N.E.C. Monograph 31, pp. 109-15, 93-103
Seager and Gulick, Trust and Corporation Problems, pp. 280-303
Stocking and Watkins, Monopoly and Free Enterprise, Ch. 14
R. MacLaurin, “Patents and Economic Progress,” J.P.E., 1950

5. Taxation and tariffs

D. H. MacGregor, Industrial Combinations, pp. 127 ff.
Linter and Butters, “Effects of Taxes on Concentration,” in Business Concentration
T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 10

6. Unfair Competition

J. S. McGee, “Predatory Price Cutting,” Law and Economics, 1958

III. The Effects of Concentration

1. Collusion

R. B. Tenant, The American Cigarette Industry
W. Fellner, Competition Among the Few
W. Nicholls, Imperfect Competition Within Agricultural Industries, pp. 120-130
F. Machlup, Economics of Sellers’ Competition, Ch. 13

2. Prices

a. Discrimination

Burns, Decline of Competition, pp. 272-372
N.I.C.B., Public Regulation of Competitive Practices, pp. 63-85
J. P. Miller, Unfair Competition, Ch. 7-9
J. Robinson, Economics of Imperfect Competition, Bk. V
F. Machlup, The Basing Point System
J. M. Clark “Basing Point Methods,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 1938
F.T.C., Price Bases Inquiry
T.N.E.C. Monograph 42
G. Stigler, “A Theory of Uniform Delivered Prices,” A.E.R. 1949
C. Kaysen, “Basing Point Pricing and Public Policy,” in Industrial Organization and Public Policy

b. Rigidity

G. Means, Industrial Prices and their Relative Inflexibility
Burns, Decline of Competition, Ch. 5
E. S. Mason, “Price Inflexibility,” Review of Economic Statistics, 1938
T.N.E.C., Monograph No. 1
Sweezy and Stigler, Articles in Readings in Price Theory
A. C. Neal, Industrial Concentration and Price Inflexibility
Machlup, Economics of Sellers’ Competition, Ch. 14

3. Profits

J. S. Bain, “The Profit Rate as a Measure of Monopoly Power,” Q.J.E., 1941
R. C. Epstein, Industrial Profits in the United States
J. S. Bain, “Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration,” Q.J.E., August 1951

IV. Topics in Industry Behavior with Oligopoly

1. Advertising

E. Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition, Ch. 6-7
N. Buchanan, Advertising Expenditures, J.P.E. 1942
N. Kaldor, “Economic Aspects of Advertising,” Review of Economic Studies, 1950

2. Vertical Integration

Smith, Wealth of Nations, Bk. I, Ch. 3
Marshall, Principles of Economics, Bk. IV, Ch. 10-13
A. Young, “Increasing Returns and Economic Progress,” E.J. 1928 (and in Clemence’s Readings in Economic Analysis 2 Vols.)
J. Jewkes, Factors in Industrial Integration, Q.J.E., 1930
S. Dennison, Vertical Integration and the Iron and Steel Industry, E.J. 1939
A. R. Burns, Decline of Competition, Ch. 9
Stigler, “Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of Market,” J.P.E. 1951
M. Adelman, “Concept and Measurement of Vertical Integration,” in Business Concentration and Price Policy

3. Schumpeter’s Theory

Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Ch. 7-8
K. Boulding, “In Defense of Monopoly,” Q.J.E., 1945
D. H. MacGregor, Industrial Combination, Ch. 12
G. Stigler, “Industrial Organization and Economic Progress,” in State of the Social Sciences.

V. Large Number Industries

1. Cartels

Stocking and Watkins, Cartels in Action, Ch. 4-11
Stocking and Watkins, Cartels or Competition, Ch. 3-7
C. Edwards, Economic and Political Aspects of International Cartels
Ben Lewis, Price and Production Controls in British Industry
A. F. Lucas, Industrial Reconstruction and the Control of Competition
R. Michels, Cartels, Combines and Trusts in Post-War Germany
R. Liefman, Cartels, Concerns and Trusts
C. Wilcox, Public Policies Toward Business, Ch. 16

2. Trade Associations

V. Mund, Government and Business, Ch. 11
Burns, Decline of Competition, Ch. 2
T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 18
H. Levy, Retail Trade Associations
Stocking and Watkins, Monopoly or Free Enterprise, Ch. 8, 10, 11

3. Retailing: Resale Price Maintenance

W. Bowman, “Prequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance,” University of Chicago Law Journal, 1955
E. Grether, Price Control under Fair Trade Legislation
F.T.C., Resale Price Maintenance
W. Bowman, “Resale Price Maintenance,” Journal of Business, 1952
Mund, Government and Business, Ch. 21, 22

4. Government Cartels: Agriculture and Coal

W. Wilcox and W. Cochrane, Economics of American Agriculture Part VI
Readings on Agricultural Policy, Part II
C. Wilcox, Public Policy Toward Business, Ch. 15-16

VI. Anti-trust Policy

1. Early History

J. D. Clark, Federal Trust Policy
W. H. Taft, The Anti-trust Act and the Supreme Court
V. Mund, Government and Business, Ch. 10, 15, 16
H. B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy

2. Major Dissolutions

E. Jones, Trust Problem in the United States, Ch. 18
Hale, “Trust Dissolution” in Columbia Law Review, 1940
W. S. Stevens, Industrial Combinations and Trusts, Ch. 14-15
S. Whitney, Antitrust Policies, 2 Vols.

3. Law of Conspiracy

U.S. v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927)
F.T.C. v. Cement Institute, 68 Sup. Ct. 793 (1948)
M. Handler, T.N.E.C. Monograph 38
Report of Attorney-General’s National Committee on the Anti-trust Laws

4. Recent Decisions

U.S. v. Columbia Steel, 334 U.S. 495 (1948)
U.S. v. Aluminum Co., 148 F. (2nd) 416 (1945), 91 Fed Supp. 333 (1950)
Standard Oil v. Fed. Trade Comm., 71 Sup. Ct. 240 (1951)
E. H. Levi, “The Anti-trust Laws and Monopoly,” University of Chicago Law Journal, 1947
Economic Consequences of Some Recent Anti-trust Decisions, A.E.R., May 1949

5. Foreign Policy

F. A. McGregor, “Preventing Monopoly, — Canadian Techniques,” in Monopoly and Competition and their Regulation ed. by E. Chamberlin
C. D. Harbury and Leo Roskind, “The British Approach to Monopoly Control,” Q.J.E., 1953
M. Cohen, “Canadian Anti-trust Laws,” Canadian Bar Review, Vol. 16 (1938)
L. Reynolds, The Control of Competition in Canada
J. Jewkes, “British Monopoly Policy, 1944-56,” Law and Economics, 1958

6. Some Proposals and Issues

H. Simons, Economic Policy for a Free Society, Ch, 2, 3, 4.
C. Edwards, Maintaining Competition, esp. Ch. 4-8
The Sherman Act and the Enforcement of Competition, A.E.R., May 1918
Mund, Government and Business, Ch. 20, 24
S. C. Oppenheim, “Federal Antitrust Legislation,” Michigan Law Review, June 1952

Source: Harvard University Archives. Papers of Zvi Griliches, Box 130, Folder “Syllabi and exams, 1955-1959”.

Image Source:  George Stigler (1960). University of Chicago Photographic Archive (apf1-07960). Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.

Categories
Chicago Exam Questions

Chicago. Final exam for Economics 301, Price Theory. Telser, 1965

 

Chicago Price Theory boils down ultimately to a series of True-False-Uncertain examination questions. One of Lester Telser‘s contributions to the stock of questions comes to us from the Zvi Griliches’ papers at the Harvard Archives. A steady diet of this stuff would make for a dull economist in my opinion, but it was force fed to generations of Chicago economists, and many somehow survived to have productive (in a good sense) professional careers. Hence another important historical artifact that has earned digitization by Economics in the Rear-View Mirror.

______________________________

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
Final Exam

Economics 301
Autumn, 1965

Mr. L. Telser
Time: 2.5 hours

Answer the following questions, true, false or uncertain and briefly defend your answer.

  1. An increase in the demand for the product of a monopoly results in a rise in the price of the product.
  2. If the supply schedule of an industry is perfectly elastic then the production function for the industry is characterized by constant returns to scale.
  3. A monopoly can never have a larger output and lower price than a competitive industry assuming that cost conditions would be the same for both.
  4. No one would resort to the cultivation of inferior lands if he did not run into diminishing marginal returns on fertile land. Since inferior lands are in cultivation, diminishing returns must be present.
  5. If there are empty seats on a train then marginal cost pricing requires that new passengers should ride free.

The following two questions require essay answers.

  1. The margin in stock trading is the fraction of the price of the stock which the trader must supply and the balance is lent to the trader by the broker. Hence the margin represents the trader’s equity and is analogous to a down payment. Assume there is no government regulation of the margin and that brokers are free to set any margin they please and to charge any interest rate they please on the loan they extend to traders. Assume there is perfect competition in the brokerage industry.
    1. Would you expect margins to be higher during periods of “active” speculation?
    2. Would you expect higher margins when stock prices are rising then when they are falling?
    3. Would a rise in the interest compensate for or be equivalent to a rise in the margin?
  2. In the theory of the household demand for perishable goods, for a given money income there is a fall in real income if the price of some good rises. The pure substitution effect is the effect on quantity demanded of a price change for constant real income. In the case of durables households own stocks of durables. Hence a rise in the price of durables causes the value of the stock of consumer owned durables to appreciate. Hence a price rise of perishable reduces the demand for perishables if money income is given and the income elasticity is positive while a price rise of durables increases the demand because it implies a rise in consumer wealth if the wealth elasticity of demand is positive.
    1. What are appropriate budget constraints for the demand for durables?
    2. Is the last statement beginning with “HENCE …” correct?
    3. Would it make a difference if the durable good had a fixed life or if it lasted forever?
    4. What are the counterparts of constant real income in the demand for durables?

Source: Harvard University Archives. Papers of Zvi Griliches. Box 130, Folder “Syllabi and exams, 1961-1969”.

 

Categories
Chicago Exam Questions Suggested Reading Syllabus

Chicago. Course outline, readings, examination for introduction to econometrics. Marschak, 1949

The following course material was transcribed from copies found in Franco Modigliani’s papers at the Economists’ Papers Archive in the David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library of Duke University. These items are also available in a scanned .pdf file at the Cowles Foundation website at Yale. Modigliani’s original mimeographed copy is for the most part much more legible than the on-line scanned copy at the Cowles Foundation. This is particularly true for the “terminal examination” questions. Over forty pages of typescript for the lectures are also found in the original Cowles Commission Discussion paper.

More on Jacob Marschak can be found in Robert W. Dimand’s “Keynesian Economics at the Cowles Commission” (Review of Keynesian Studies, vol. 2, 2020, pp. 22-25).

________________________

J. Marschak. INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMETRICS
Economics 314
Spring 1949.

314. Introduction to Econometrics: Statistical testing of economic theories. Numerical estimation of demand and cost functions and other functions occurring in the theory of the firm and household, the theory of markets and the theory of national income. Estimation of economic models. Statistical prediction under conditions of changing economic structure and policy. Prerequisites: Econ 310, 311, 312 or equiv. Win [sic] TuTh 3-4:30; Marschak.

Source: University of Chicago.The College and the Divisions, Sessions of 1948-1949. In Announcements Vol. XLVIII (May 25, 1948) No. 4, p. 250.

________________________

INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMETRICS
20 Lectures given at the University of Chicago in Spring, 1949*

Cowles Commission Discussion Papers, Economics: 266

[*To be used jointly with 24 Lectures (same title) given at the University of Buffalo in Spring, 1948.]

Part I. Non-stochastic economics [11 lectures]

  1. Best policy. Goal variable; non-controlled, controlled, strategic variables.
  2. Exogenous variables and structural parameters. Types of prediction.
  3. Determining the structure from theory and data.
  4. An example.
  5. Econometric “pitfalls” due to disregarded variables or relations. Non-idenifiable structures.
  6. [continued]
  7. The identification, continued
  8. Why does the identification problem arise in non-experimental sciences?
  9. Discussion of earlier problems.
  10. Discussion of earlier problems. [continued]
  11. When need we know the structure?

Part II. Stochastic economics: Population properties [8 lectures]

  1. Joint distributions, non-parametric.
  2. Mid-term examination.
  3. Parameters of joint distributions.
  4. Least-squares property of coefficients of linear regression. Properties of normal distributions.
  5. Exogenous and endogenous variables in stochastic economics.
  6. Identification and determination of structure by the method of reduced form: examples.
  7. More examples.
  8. Motion of an economic variable. Dynamic models. The assumption of independent successive disturbances and its implication.

Part III. Stochastic economics: Sample properties [1 lecture]

  1. Useful properties of certain least squares and maximum likelihood estimators. Obtaining maximum likelihood estimates of structure from those of reduced form.
Recommended reading.
Attached Materials**

J. Marschak, “Economic Structure, Path, Policy and Prediction”

__________, “Statistical Inference from Non-Experimental Observations—an Economic Example”

G. Hildreth, “Problems in the Estimation of Agricultural Production Functions”

[**As far as available.]

*     *     *

READING MATERIAL TO BE USED IN COURSE ON INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMETRICS,
SPRING QUARTER, 1949

  1. Allen, R. G. D., Mathematical Analysis for Economists.
  2. American Economic Association, “Survey of Contemporary Economics” (Blakiston Co., 1949).
  3. Haavelmo, T., “The Probability Approach to Econometrics” (Supplement to Econometrica, 194) .
  4. Haavelmo, T., “Quantitative Research in Agricultural Economics,” Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 29, No. 4, November, 1947.
  5. Girshick, M. A., and T. Haavelmo, “Statistical Analysis of the Demand for Food,” Econometrica, Vol. 15, No. 2. April, 1947.
  6. Klein, Lawrence R., “The Use of Econometric Models,” Econometrica, April, 1947.
  7. Haavelmo, T., “Methods of Measuring the Marginal Propensity to Consume,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, March, 1947.
  8. Klein, Lawrence R., “A Post-Mortem on Transition Predictions,” Journal of Political Economy, August, 1946.
  9. Marschak, J., L. Hurwicz, Abstracts of papers: Econometrica, April, 1946, pp. 165-170.
  10. Koopmans, T., “Statistical Estimation of Simultaneous Economic Relations,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 40, December, 1945.
  11. Marschak, J. and William H. Andrews, “Random Simultaneous Equations and the Theory of Production,” Econometrica, Vol. 12, No. 3-4, July-October, 1944.
  12. Marschak, J., “Money Illusion and the Demand Analysis,” The Review of Economic Statistics, 25, February, 1943.
  13. Marschak, J., “Economic Structure, Path, Policy, and Prediction,” American Economic Review, Vol. 37, May, 1947, pp. 81-84. Lil.
  14. Marschak, J., “Statistical Inference from Non-Experimental Observations,” Econometrica, January, 1948, p. 53.
  15. Hurwicz, L., “Some Problems Arising in Estimating Economic Relationships,” Econometrica, Vol. 15, July, 1947.
  16. Tinbergen, J., “Business Cycles in the U.S.A. 1919-1932” (Statistical Testing of Business-cycle Theories. II), League of Nations, Geneva, 1939.
  17. Koopmans, T., “Measurement without. Theory,” Review of Economic Statistics, 29, August, 1947.

*     *     *

J. Marschak.
INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMETRICS
Economics 314, Spring 1949.

Terminal Examination

Note: Try to answer all 4 problems first, omitting the questions (III) in problems 1 and 4. Answer the questions (III) if time remains.

Problem 1. The quantity x and the price p of a perishable farm product (each measured from its population mean) are determined as in the following model (subscripts indicate time):

(1.1) Demand: xt = αpt + ut

(1.2) Supply: xt = βpt-1 + ut

(1.3) The disturbance ut is not autocorrelated; nor is vt.

Show

(I) How to estimate α for a long time series.

(II) What other structural parameters are present?

(III) (If time remains): How would you estimate those other parameters?

Problem 2. The model of the previous problem is modified as follows:

(2.1) Demand: xt = αpt + ut  (ut not autocorrelated)

(2.2) Price fixation: p_{t}=p^{\ast }_{t} , a level fixed every year by decree.

Show

(I) How to estimate α and σuu?

(II) Is the estimate of α the same as in the previous problem?

Problem 3. National income y, consumption c, and annual (saving) investment i are all measured in dollars of constant purchasing power, and

(3.1) c = αy + β + u ;

(3.2) E(u);

(3.3) i = y – c (an identity);

(3.4) i is exogenous.

(I) Show how to estimate α, β, σuu from a long time series of data on y, c, i.

(II) Suppose y, c, i denote the income, consumption and saving of an individual family which can control its savings but not its income. How does this modification affect the model and the estimation procedure from a time series of family data, or from a survey of a large number of families?

Problem 4. A survey of very large number T of firms belonging to the same industry but located in places with different wage-rates w1, …, wT has been made. The price p of the product is the same for all firms. Wage-rates and price are fixed independently of the firms’ action. The output Xt of each firm depends on labor used only, Nt, according to the formula

(4.1) {X_{t}=B_{t}N^{A}_{t}}C , t = 1, …, T

(the elasticity A being the same for all firms.) Hence,

(4.2) xt = bt + Ant, t = 1, …, T

where the small letters (except for t) stand for the logarithms. Further assume that each firm pushes its output to the point where, apart from a random deviation, the ratio \left( w_{t}/p\right)  \equiv R_{t} equals the labor’s marginal product,

(4.3) Rt = (dXt/dN)⋅Ct, t = 1, …, T

where Ct is a random percentage deviation. Hence

(4.4) Rt = R_{t}=AN^{A-1}_{t}\cdot B_{t}C_{t} , t = 1, …, T

(4.5) rt = a + bt + ct + (A-1)nt, t = 1, …, T,

where again small letters indicate logarithms.

Questions:

(I) How to estimate A?

(II) What other structural parameters are present?

(III) (If time remains): How to estimate those?

Source: Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library. Economists’ Papers Archive. Franco Modigliani Papers, Box T1, Folder “Jacob Marschak’s Courses, 1940-1949.”

Image Source: Carl F. Christ. History of the Cowles Commission, 1932-1952

Categories
Chicago Funny Business

Chicago. The Journal of Progressive Hedonists Against Radical Thought (P.H.A.R.T.), Rodney Smith & Roger Vaughan, 1971

During the first year and a half of their graduate studies in economics at the University of Chicago in the 1970s, Rodney Smith and Roger Vaughan collaborated in the publication of the (Monty Phython inspired) satirical Journal of Progressive Hedonists Against Radical Thought (a.k.a., P.H.A.R.T.). Smith and Vaughan came to Chicago from UCLA and Oxford, respectively, and clearly shared a common sense of smell. Both later worked as economists at the RAND corporation. Roger Vaughan was responsible for pen-and-ink artwork which will be featured in a later post. He passed away in October 2021, but Rodney T. Smith is alive and well, President of the economics and strategic planning consulting firm Stratton Inc.

The second issue of the Journal of P.H.A.R.T. transcribed for this post was found in Milton Friedman’s papers at the Hoover Institution.

Request: if any visitors to Economics in the Rear-view Mirror have a surviving copy of other issues of the journal or of Roger Vaughan’s Chicago artwork, please let it be copied/transcribed and/or posted here for the benefit of future generations of economists yet untrained.

_____________________________

Vol. 1, No. 2   May, 1971

P.H.A.R.T. EDITORIAL

Mother Apathy, blindfold across both breasts, was aroused, albeit temporarily, when it was announced recently that the dynamic new publication ‘P.H.A.R.T.’ (whose first edition is already a collectors’ item) had engulfed the revered, but aging, ‘P.E.C. Notes’. From the autumn of 1971, a spokesman said, both journals would be published jointly under the P.H.A.R.T. banner. The entire publishing world, normally oblivious to news worth printing, was thrown into confusion. Exclaimed a Time-Life editor, “I’m padlocking my staff to their desks by their private parts!”

Wall Street reacted with typical concern. Both P.H.A.R.T. shares changed hands many times, but speculation was terminated when the purpose of the flimsy pieces of paper was misunderstood and they were flushed into the Hudson.

Smiled a P.H.A.R.T. staffer from his tax-deductible air mattress in sun drenched Lake Michigan, “Anyone who can print the kind of *%¢#$* that we do, is bound to succeed in a place like the Economics Department.

Comparison with Hugh Hefner’s Empire is obvious, a comparison which seems even closer in light of P.H.A.R.T.’s intention of running a pull-out center-fold of economics books without covers.

Certainly the new combined journal should prove to be a bright super-nova in the Gutenberg Galaxy.

P.H.A.R.T. INTERVIEWS

Chicago Charlie: In this issue we are honored to have a pleasantly in depth interview with an obscure, but nevertheless vital, member of the economics community, an economics groupie. We all know that surfers are followed by beach bunnies, musicians are plastered by groupies, but few of us are aware that economists have their own followers who admire them for their abstractions. Enough of such preliminaries. Let’s get it on. How long have you been an economics groupie?

Economics Groupie: I was a know-nothing college dropout until I, sort of, wandered into this economics class and saw this guy draw this groovy diagram. Minutes later I was the virtuous path of abstraction wherein what I adored was emphasized, and what I abhorred was forgotten. Like, nobody else would have me.

C.C.: Very interesting. Which abstraction really turns you on. I mean, what do you really hold near?

E.G.: What to, duckie? I cherish the nominal versus the real distinction; compensated versus uncompensated elasticities, and market versus non-market activities.

C.C.: A strange collection. What exactly do you mean by the latter?

E.G.: Man, like sometimes it’s a drag to hurl my bod on the market just to get what the traffic will bare. Non-market activity can be really heavy, like just getting an economics biggy to fondle my copy of Smith’s ‘Wealth of Nations’, I mean….

C.C.: Thank you. Have you ever had any bad experiences… that is, as an economics groupie?

E.G.: Yes; whenever I attend conventions, like five people on the same abstraction…

C.C.: Who are your favorite personalities?

E.G.: Friedman’s money, Lewis’ labor, Becker’s fertility, Harberger’s compensated triangles, Chez’s jiggles, Nerlove’s heteroscedasticity, Johnson’s distribution, Zecher’s….

C.C.: Really! Familiarity breeds contempt!

E.G.: No, baby, just frustration.

C.C.: Well, I must draw this interview to a close.

E.G.: Regretfully, we never started.

 

P.H.A.R.T.’s NEWS IN BRIEF

Boston: Following on the immense commercial success of rock musicals ‘Hair’ and ‘Tommy’, the songwriting team of Samuelson and Solow is rumored to be working on a rock opera based on the formers’ best selling ‘Foundations of Economic Analysis’. The star part of ‘Negative Semi-Definite Matrix’ is rumored to be played by Samuelson himself, but speculation is rampant concerning the famous nude scene in which cross-elasticities emerge, bare to the world, from the matrix determinant.

Chicago: The long held belief that all economists orbit around Chicago was cast into serious doubt, when, with the aid of powerful econometric telescopes, at least 200 economists were observed going ‘round in circles in the Boston area. “We are submitting the model builder to close questioning”, said a spokesman for the Chicago Inquisition. “I think we can show that these so-called observations were: (a) never made, and (b) not ‘proper’ economists anyway.”

New York: Although much doubt has been cast on the ‘as if’ approach to economic theology, Chicago feels it has, at last, come up with vindication for its views. After experimenting with several hundred dogs on the top of the brand new Trade Center, a Chicago scientist reported, “After we held each dog some five feet from the parapet, every single canine behaved as if they fully understood the Newtonian laws of gravity.” Surveying the pulp-covered street, he added, “That’s exactly the kind of empirical data we like to build on.”

Houston: Initial reports on analysis on moon rock samples brought back by Apollo 11, 12, and 14 confirm the fact that the moon is made of money, spokesman announced here today. “At first glance”, he read from a prepared statement, “they appear to be 19th century British gold sovereigns, with a picture of Milton Friedman and the inscription ‘Veni, Vidi, Vici.’”

London: The real purpose of the American policy of benign neglect towards international payments, masterminded by Harvard’s Gottfried Haberler became evident today when an English postman reported being molested by “A kind of satan-like figure, with an American accent, shouting something about my soul and throwing dollars everywhere”. Under separate questioning, the Federal Reserve admitted to attempting to buy the world and promised that next time, its agents would behave with more discretion and dignity.

Philadelphia: The following rumor, entirely unsubstantiated by P.H.A.R.T. foreign correspondent in Philadelphia, is circulating concerning famed British economist, Sir Roy Harrod. It appears that Sir Roy, unadjusted to the American matriarchal society was accustomed to addressing a sexually integrated class at the University of Pennsylvania, as “Gentlemen”. As attendance dwindled he was faced one day with an entirely female class. He gazed around for a few seconds, and then left muttering, “Since there is no one here, I shall not lecture”. Norman Mailer, eat your heart out.

 

P.H.A.R.T.’s LIVES OF THE GREAT ECONOMISTS

In a bold attempt to instill in economists a sense of pride in the historical development of their discipline, P.H.A.R.T, brings you, in each issue, a brief sketch of one of the giants upon whose shoulders we stand.

Crasso the Greek (? – 410 BC)

It is fitting that the first reference we have to this great economist occurs in the poetry of Obesia, the Fat-Woman of the caves, in those oft-quoted lines.

“The hills are alive with the sound of Crasso,
As he and his acolytes perform the dance of the drachma.”

Already the young Crasso, and his ‘Crassic’ followers were famous for running naked into holy shrines and leaving the walls covered in ‘graphiti’ (or graphs) illustrating some of the new concepts they had discovered. It is to this early period that the world owes the famous Crassic doctrines.

“When prices rise, things tend to become more expensive.”
“What lays ahead of us is in the future.”

Little else is heard of Crasso until he sprung to fame when called to the service of the King of Sicily to fight a serious outbreak of inflation. He successfully stemmed the fearsome tide of price rises by offering 21,000 warm chicken livers to the God, Hypa (a method, incidently, the Federal Reserve is currently considering). His triumph was short lived and as serious food poisoning decimated the population, popular feeling ran against him and he was forced to dust his naked body with flour and escape disguised as a statue.

He moved to Lydia where he perfected a technique of depicting, with amazing clarity, small cameo-like pictures of unequalled pornography on round pieces of metal. His art work became immensely popular, and although known deprecatingly by the Greeks as “Khoynos Pornos” (Foreign Filth) they circulated in Crasso’s native land and became popularly known as Khoyns.

Immensely wealthy, he returned to his native Corrinth idling his time gambling on the innumerable Greco-Persian wars, and was bankrupt when he offered 100 to 1 on Persia at Salamis.

He never again achieved his former glory, and in spite of nearly discovering the formula for the velocity of money, inventing, during hard winter, the concept of a wages freeze, and writing a prodigious number of strange tracts he moved slowly downhill. He gave one or two guest lectures, but was jeered from the podium when he spoke, with missionary zeal, of money floating down from the heavens. He is last recorded as the tragic model for Thucydides’ description of the effects of the plague during the Peloponnesian Wars.

P.H.A.R.T. MISCELLANY

As Others See Us

(From Berman’s ‘The Underground Guide to the College of Your Choice’.)

“The graduate school here (Chicago) is the old apprenticeship type of learning. The difference between the University of Chicago and other universities is like the difference between English Justice and French Justice — at other universities the professors consider you innocent of stupidity until you prove otherwise while here you are presumed guilty of stupidity until you prove yourself innocent.”

* * *

We hope, in each issue, to bring you some of the ‘bon mots’ that are the obvious concomitant of a concentration of high powered minds.

Stigler: “The government take-over of the railways is a vain and abortive attempt to make the post office look efficient.”

Johnson (H.G.): “When a professor leaves M.I.T. for Harvard, the average intelligence in both places rises.”

Samuelson: “If you take a 15 trillion year plan, then the theorem is correct.”

* * *

P.H.A.R.T. would take great privilege in awarding its most treasured prize, a corroded plastic waterbed, to all those sophisticated individuals who manage to reduce student-faculty visits to informal economics seminars. At the risk of belaboring the obvious, P.H.A.R.T, would like to announce, that:

(a) the esoteric economic pun is the lowest form of humor;

(b) there just may be someone in the room who is less than enthralled by the ability to play ‘Obscure-Journal-Article-Snap’ with all comers:

(c) the breath-taking account of how to take-apart a speaker, complete with a 20 minute digression of ‘statistical- discrepancies-I-have-seen-through’, should be saved for the autobiography.

It takes considerable ignorance to assume that everyone present is fascinated by economics 24 hours a day. Those who do have nothing else to talk about should try not to see it as a virtue. A more comprehensive ‘weltanschauung’ would make brighter living.

It was not clear, when the fire and smoke-laden Delphic rumblings had passed, whether or not the Nobel Laureate had actually said anything. After following the pillar of fire around the campus like the children of Israel, the Economics Department received a ‘lecture’, an experience not unlike speed reading a Dictionary of Quotations while being assaulted by a poorly-programmed 360. The quality of evening speakers this year has rarely risen above the esoteric. To quote Leijonhuvfud: “If this is how economics develops — where will it end?”

* * *

P.H.A.R.T. REVIEW OF BOOKS

In response to our previous reviews, readers submitted the following:

The Sensuous Criminal, by G.G. (Alcatraz, 1971) . Discusses in frank, no-nonsense language, the implications of over fifty Neuman-Morgenstern utility functions for criminal behavior. Explains why criminals with Moebius-strip utility functions usually get caught; why most extortionists have homogeneous-of-degree-less-than-one time preference functions; and many, many more. J. Edgar Hoover loved it — you will too. yours for only U= a + bI dollars!

The Godfather (A Story of Money, Interest, and Prices), by Donaldo Patinkini (Extortion Press, 1971). An inside man reveals the true interworkings of a powerful group of variables. Gives a detailed but chilling analysis of how inept government has allowed the Ma Fed to extract millions from society through monetary control.

The Holy Bible (The King Milton Version) Heavenly Press, 1971. In the beginning God created money. That took 6 days, on the 7th day he rested, and so nothing else matters.

 

P.H.A.R.T. CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECONOMIC THOUGHT

A Scatological Theory of Nominal Income*

Few things stand the economics profession in such shame than the narrowness of the treatment accorded to the determination of nominal income. The intensity of the Keynesian/Monetarist debate has obscured the more fundamental limitations of the logical possibilities examined.

It is the contention of this paper that this entire debate is hollow, and it is to the agricultural sector and the determinants of the demand for guano1 that we must look for any truly logical transmission mechanism. In Section 1 of this paper, below, the basic model for the determination of income is outlined, while Section 2 examines some of the implications for the American economy today.

Section 1: The Model

The rapid pace of industrialization in England has long proved a fertile hunting ground for the economist anxious to achieve tenure. Weber blamed it on the Church, Marx on the greedy bourgeois, McLuhan on the printing press, and Rostow argued that take-off was a result of take-off. Few have linked the unbinding of the industrial Prometheus to the discovery of guano deposits in Peru by strong-stomached British sailors in the first half of the 19th century.

Consider the fundamental identity,

Q= k Sh. Y

where Q is the quantity of agricultural output, Sh. is the quantity of soil nutrients, and Y is the quantity of land. It should be obvious that an increase in Sh., holding Y and k constant, will increase Q.2 It is not for nothing that the favorite Anglo-Saxon toast has come to be: “May the Bird of Paradise add nutrients to your soil.”

Neither is it a coincidence that British development should slow adown disastrously in the later 19thcentury when this supply dried up, and the wily Peruvians, under a seagull dictator, clamped a high tariff on this most valuable of bowel-movements.

Section 2: Post Guano Ergo Propter Guano?

It is only recently that the amazing correlation between the depth of guano deposits and the rate of growth of real output has received the attention it richly deserves. Since it avoids the quagmire of nominal and real debates, so long the bane of monetarism, the Federal Reserve has recently taken to publishing guano depth-counts taken at strategic points along the New England coast, and is currently contemplating setting up manure counting stations (M1 and M2) in. Nebraska and New Jersey. However, much pseudo-scientific pressure is levelled against this approach by economists who should know better, and there has been not a little reluctance to admit to using it. Few people, in fact, realize that the oft-repeated ‘1065’ figure was, in fact, the depth to which a now-famous aide to the budget supervisor sunk (in millimeters)3 when supervising one the first ‘counts’.

The theory leads to some important policy regulations:

(1) The removal of the welfare distorting Regulation P, by which a 10¢ surcharge is levelled on guano booths throughout the country.

(2) The conversion of banks into mere guano warehouses, to act as receptacles for such deposits and withdrawals, with a 100% reserve requirement.

(3) The automatic issuing of Feen-A-Mints with food stamps.

(4) The regulation of the guano growth rate to a fixed 5% per annum by an intensive, federally sponsored, seagull training program.

(5) The appointment of seagulls to replace Connally, Schultze, and Nixon to engender a harmonious, non-political environment in which to stabilize the economy.

It is hoped that this analysis proves a fertile hunting ground for the development of economic theory.

*The original idea was suggested by John Graffiti, although the author accepts all credit for the penetrating analysis. The future of 5 assistants is inextricably entwined with any potential faults.

1 Guano (Spanish). Literally, “the food from the heavens” or, more colloquially, “birdshit”, (Ed.).

2 For this proof, the author is indebted to a small, but persistent, Lake Michigan seagull.

3 Believed to proximate the distance from his feet to his neck, (Ed.).

 

P.H.A.R.T. PUZZLE CORNER

Answers to last issue’s questions:

  1. (a) False

(b) Uncertain. Such activity would involve income redistribution from bakers to hens.

(c) False. 1.5976 is, of course, the nominal number of students, which would be about 0.002 in real terms.

(d) True.

  1. (a) What do you receive when purchasing a buffalo?

(b) Which of the following can be categorized as an inferior good: sex or drink?

(c) What is the equilibrium weekly wage of an M.B.A.?

(d) Which?

  1. The quote, of course, was Keynes, page 40, and he was illustrating the importance of choosing units.
  2. H.A.R.T. FORKED TONGUE AWARD remains unawarded.
  3. H.A.R.T. MOST PERFECT COMPETITOR TROPHY is awarded to that perceptive reader who pointed out that the market for splinters from the cross of Christ would seem to fulfill Smith’s conditions an infinite number of buyers, a large number of suppliers, and an amazing invisible hand. More copies of this beautiful sculpture remain to be won for more insights into ‘Our Competitive Environment’.

This issue’s questions:

  1. Quote of the month. What amazing economist wrote the following and where?

“latex$ \left( X^{\prime }_{\ast }X_{\ast }\right)^{-1}  X_{\ast }\bar{y}&s=2$”

(This is to test that you are doing your reading.)

  1. TRUE, FALSE, IGNORANT.

Your grade will be largely independent of anything you write.

(a) Since when care packages were dropped into prisoner of war camps it was cigarettes and not prunes that were adopted as currency: prisoners were not acting rationally.

(b) Three helicopters in formation at sunset is an omen of inflation.

(c) Racehorses sometimes earn tens of thousands of dollars in stud services. Since economists are rarely paid as much for similar services, they are either being exploited, or earn non-pecuniary benefits.

  1. An economist of repute defined homotheticity in the following way: “You stand at the origin and jiggle your head this way and that way and nothing changes.” Utilizing this definition, determine whether the following is true. A compensated jiggle of the head will cause a non-homothetic function to appear homothetic.
  2. If Irving Fisher had defined the money stock as M7, then the business cycle would be the dance of the 7 veils?

* * *

SHELDON DE F’ART SAYS : “PER ARDUA AD INSOMNIA”

* * *

P.H.A.R.T, is an underground journal of negligible literary merit dedicated to the proposition that some followers of economics may possess a sense of humor. It is hoped to stimulate everyone into some form of response. For those who are leaving and wish to subscribe, the cost is $1.00 per annum, plus postage, for 8 copies (or more)

Most of the blame, any personal inquiries, submissions, letters, or donations should be directed to Rodney Smith or Roger Vaughan.

P.H.A.R.T.
Box P
Department of Economics
Social Science Building
West 59th Street
Chicago, Illinois 60637
U.S.A.

Source: Hoover Institution Archives. Papers of Milton Friedman, Box 79, Folder “79.6 University of Chicago Miscellaneous”.

Categories
Chicago Exam Questions

Chicago. Exams for second graduate price theory course. Griliches, 1965

 

A few posts ago Economics in the Rear-view Mirror presented the exams for the first quarter of graduate price theory (Economics 300) at the University of Chicago taught by Giora Hanoch in the autumn quarter of the 1964-65 academic year. In this post we have the exam questions for the winter quarter’s second graduate price theory course taught by Zvi Griliches.

As I transcribe these mind-numbing true-false-uncertain questions, I have wondered if there ever was a University of Chicago graduate student who answered all of the questions “uncertain” and tortured the graders with special cases, counter-examples, and intricate ad-hoc-ceteris-not-so-paribus explanations. But then I think of the canonical image of a WWII bomber that has returned to base with flak damage. Goodnight Mrs. Calabash, wherever you are.

________________________________

ECONOMICS 301
February 10, 1965
Two-hour Midterm Examination

I. (70 points)

Answer whether the statement is true, false, or uncertain. In each case, write a few sentences explaining your answer. Your grade will depend heavily on your explanation.

  1. The elasticity of a linear supply function that passes through the origin is always unity.
  2. If a firm is producing in the region of rising marginal costs, the firm is realizing profits.
  3. An effective price ceiling on cotton, i.e., one that holds its price below the free market level, will decrease the price of textiles.
  4. Steel prices and output usually move together during business cycles. This means that the income effect of a rise in price is greater than the substitution effect.
  5. Firms try to minimize unit costs; at the point where unit costs are at a minimum, they equal marginal costs; therefore, firms tend to operate where their unit and marginal costs are equal.
  6. Marginal productivity theory does not apply if factors are always used in fixed proportion.
  7. Since all firms in competitive industry have the same marginal costs, it is meaningless to speak of more or less efficient firms.
  8. If a Paasche price index is higher than the Laspeyres’ index, tastes must have changed.
  9. The demand for a product at the market price is inelastic. It follows that the product must be produced under conditions of net internal diseconomies.
  10. “Commodities with higher, income elasticities have higher demand (price) elasticities.” (Stigler, 1952 ed., p. 45)
  11. If X and Y are substitutes, a decline in the price of X can increase the amount of Y demanded only if Y is an inferior good.
  12. The elasticity of demand for a group of commodities with respect to the average price of the group can never be larger in absolute value than the largest of the individual price elasticities of the commodities which comprise the group.
  13. A rational consumer is insatiable.

II. (30 points)

A. The demand function for a product is P = 115 — Q. The total cost of producing Q units in one plant is given by TC = 400 — 100Q2 + Q3. Only one-plant firms are allowed.

(a) What is the long run competitive solution (price, quantity, and the number of firms in this industry)?

(b) What would be the approximate price charged and the quantity produced if there was only one one-plant firm and it maximized its profits. (Work only with round figures.) How much profit would it make?

B. Assume now that a firm may have more than one plant. What is the monopoly solution? How much profit will it make?

________________________________

March 15, 1965

ECONOMICS 301
Z. Griliches

FINAL EXAMINATION
Winter, 1965

2 HOURS TO COMPLETE EXAM

I. (80 points)

Answer each question “true”, “false”, or “uncertain”, and explain your answer briefly. Your grade will depend heavily on your explanation.

  1. A competitive firm will increase output as the result of a fall in the price of one of its inputs.
  2. In equilibrium, a competitive firm has all the business (sales) it wants. Hence advertising is incompatible with either competition or equilibrium.
  3. Duopolists with different cost functions cannot achieve a monopoly price without transfer payment between the firms.
  4. A multiplant firm will schedule its output so that the marginal costs are equal in all plants.
  5. The price of haircuts in Chicago is approximately 40 percent higher than in New York; therefore, average earnings of barbers in Chicago are higher than in New York.
  6. The supply curve of a monopolist is inelastic at the point of maximum monopoly profit.
  7. If it takes one day to catch a beaver and two to catch a deer, one deer will exchange for two beavers.
  8. Assume that the world demand elasticity for tin is -2 and that Bolivia produces 1/3 of the world’s tin. Therefore, the elasticity of demand for Bolivian tin is at least -6.0 (in absolute value).
  9. A safety ordinance prohibiting the use of automobiles older than 10 years will increase the long run demand for new automobiles.
  10. The own-price elasticity of demand for a commodity is no smaller in absolute value, than the marginal propensity to consume that commodity.
  11. For a single consumer the sum of income elasticities of demand for all commodities is unity, while the sum of their price elasticities is zero.
  12. It is a convention in economics to draw consumption indifference curves convex to the origin, but we have no way of knowing whether they really are.

II. (10 points)

Each firm in an industry is given a license to operate and no new firms are allowed to enter. The value of a license rises over time. Does this prove that firms operate subject to diseconomies of scale?

III. (30 points)

It is often asserted that Americans love money more than Englishmen (or Europeans, or Latin Americans). Can you think of a way to test this proposition?

Source: Harvard University Archives. Papers of Zvi Griliches. Box 130, Folder “Syllabi and exams, 1961-1969”.

Source: From an image of the Brazilian immigration/visa card for Zvi Griliches dated 18 Aug 1959 that can be found at the ancestry.com website.

Categories
Chicago Exam Questions

Chicago. First price theory course exams. Hanoch, 1964

Giora Hanoch graduated with a doctorate in economics from the University of Chicago in December 1965 with his dissertation “Personal earnings and investment in schooling.” He held the rank of assistant professor of economics for the academic year 1964-65, after which, according to his entry in the AEA 1969 Biographical Listing of Members,  he returned to Hebrew University, Jerusalem, in 1965. With many visiting appointments throughout his career, his academic home was Hebrew University.

Clearly the faculty thought highly enough of him in his fourth year at Chicago to entrust him with the first quarter of the 300-level price theory sequence (Autumn Quarter, 1964).

_________________________

Giora Hanoch, Professor Emeritus of Economics
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

1932. Born in Haifa, Israel
1960. A.B. Hebrew University.
1961. A.M. Hebrew University.
1965. Ph.D. University of Chicago. Thesis “Personal Earnings and Investment in Schooling”
1970. Visiting Lecturer, Harvard University.
1974. Visiting Lecturer, Harvard University.
1975. Visiting Lecturer, University of California, Los Angeles
1975— Fellow of the Econometric Society.

Source: “Giora Hanoch, economist”, Prabook website.

_________________________

Economics 300
G. Hanoch

Mid-Term Examination
November 18, 1964

I. (60 points)

Answer the following True, False, or Uncertain. Explain your answer briefly.

  1. If two individuals engage in barter, or direct exchange of goods, then always either: a) One individual benefits by the transaction while the other one is hurt; or b) Both are neither benefited nor hurt.
  2. In a perfect market economy, each consumer participates equally in determining what is produced.
  3. If an increase in the demand for X results in an increase i n the price of X, the demand for X is upward sloping.
  4. If the demand for X has unitary elasticity (η = -1), changes in the price of X will not affect the total expenditures on all other goods.
  5. If one good is inferior, at least one other good purchased by the consumer has to be income-elastic (ηxI> 1).
  6. If the marginal revenue is decreasing with an increase in the quantity X, the demand for X is inelastic.
  7. The substitution effect of a decrease in price, as defined by Slutsky, is positive for a normal good and negative for an inferior good.
  8. If the market for beef is in a stable equilibrium, changes in the supply of beef will have little or no effect on its price.
  9. It is possible for a consumer to buy a fixed positive) quantity of X every month, whatever the price of X may be. (i.e., his demand for X has zero elasticity for all prices).
  10. The demand for agricultural products is inelastic; hence plentiful harvests result in lower incomes for farmers, in a free market economy.
  11. In view of (10), each individual farmer can improve his own position by destroying a part of his production in good years.
  12. A linear and downward-sloping demand curve is always elastic at high prices and inelastic at low prices.
  13. If the Laspeyres quantity index between two periods is 1.10 and the Paasche index is 0.90, the consumers’ taste must have changed,
  14. The cross-elasticity of demand for left shoes with respect to the price of right shoes is zero.
  15. A consumer with a utility function is in equilibrium if the marginal utility of each good is proportional to its price.
  16. If all prices increase by 10%, but money income remains the same, the quantity of each good purchased will decrease.
  17. The demand of a consumer for X cannot be infinitely elastic at every quantity of X, because of the budget constraint.
  18. In an economy where the king distributes all the goods and services as free gifts to the consumers, all the prices are zero. Hence there is no place for price theory in that country.
  19. The demand for X is of unitary elasticity, and 200 similar firms sell X. A reduction of 1% in the price PX charged by one firm will result in doubling that firm’s sales, if other firms sell the same quantity at any price.
  20. Because of transportation costs, prices will differ in different geographical locations, whether or not there exists free competition in the market.

II. (40 points)

Two consumers, A and B, have equal and stable tastes and incomes. In December, each spent his entire monthly income on x units of X and y units of Y, when the prices in the market were $2.00 for X and $5 for Y. Consumer A accepted an offer of his employer to be paid in kind, by receiving the same quantities y and y every month directly. (He could still exchange any quantity of X and Y at the market, for the current market prices). B’s money income remained the same.

The following prices prevailed in the market during the next few months:

Month

$ per unit of X $ per unit of Y
1 2.00 5.00
2 2.20 5.50
3 2.00 5.50
4 2.00 4.50
5 1.80 4.50
6 2.20 4.50

1) Compare consumer A’s position in each of these months with his position in December (was he better-off, worse-off, or indifferent?)

2) Compare the positions of A and B in each month.

NOTE: Use budget lines (and, if necessary, indifference curves) for your analysis. Do not attempt to answer more questions than you were asked. Be brief and clear.

_________________________

ECONOMICS 300
G. Hanoch

FINAL EXAMINATION
December 14, 1964

(two hours)

I. (40 points)

Mark the following True, False, or Uncertain. Explain your answers very briefly.

  1. A monopolist can afford to pay wages below the market wage rates.
  2. A rise in the price of gasoline will lead to a rise in the price of tires.
  3. In a long run competitive equilibrium, the marginal firms produce where marginal costs equal average total costs.
  4. If a firm is in long run equilibrium, it is also in short-run equilibrium, whether it is a competitive or a monopolistic firm.
  5. If a production function is characterized by constant returns to scale, an increase in the use of one factor by 10% will increase output by less than 10%.
  6. A rise in the price of any factor used by the firm (other things unchanged) will always lead to a decrease in production by the firm.
  7. A firm producing the same product in many plants will determine the quantity produced in each plant so that average costs will be equal in all the plants.
  8. If a firm has zero variable costs, then its best profit output is where the elasticity of demand for the product is unitary.
  9. A firm will carry production to the point where the marginal productivities of all variable factors are equal.
  10. In a competitive industry with external economies, the total short run supply curve of the industry shifts to the left when there is a permanent decrease in demand for the product.

Il. (30 points)

A monopolist is faced with the following stable demand schedule for his patented machines:

Price per machine
(thousand dollars)

Quantity
per month
TR MR TC MC
40 1
35 2
30 3
25 4
20 5
15 6
10 8
5 10

The Costs of production are $5000 per machine, and the fixed costs are $16000 per month.

1.) Compute total and marginal revenue and total and marginal costs in the table above.

2.) Find the equilibrium price, quantity and profits of this firm.

3.) A tax of $60,000 per month is imposed on the firm. Find the new price, quantity and profits.

4.) Instead, a tax of 60% of the market price is imposed on the machines. What will be the monopolist price, output, profits? The tax revenues?

5.) Alternatively, a tax of $24000 per machine is levied. What are the equilibrium price, quantity, profits and tax revenues? What will be the long-run equilibrium quantity?

6.) If no tax is imposed, but a maximum price of $10,000 is enforced, what will be the quantity sold? The Profits?

7.) State your preference among the 5 alternatives ((2) – (6)) above, and justify your choice briefly.

III (30 points)

The current charge for telephone service in city C is $6.40 per month, allowing the consumer 80 free local calls every month, Each additional call costs five cents. Installation is free, and no long-distance calls are available.

NOTE: In the following, assume that each consumer behaves rationally, has constant money income and tastes, with convex indifference curves and no saturation in the relevant range.

Use separate diagrams for each sub-problem. Be precise.

  1. Use a diagram with money-income Y and phone calls X on the axes, to show a consumer’s budget constraint. Be careful to show all the combinations of X and Y available to him, including the case where no service is installed.
    (This portion is crucial for the rest of the problem).
  2. Use indifference curves between Y and X to analyze the consumer’s decision whether to have a telephone installed or not.
  3. Consumer A chooses to have a telephone, and he uses 120 calls every month. Show his equilibrium position geometrically. What is the average price (in cents) of a phone call for him? What is his marginal rate of substitution between money and phone calls?
  4. If the current rates are replaced by a flat rate of 7 cents a call for any number of calls,

(a) Show consumer A’s new budget line, compared with the current position.
(b) Would he now use more or less than 120 calls per month?
(c) Would he be better-off, indifferent, or worse-off relative to the current position?

  1. Consumer A claims that he would prefer to pay a flat rate of 84 per call rather than the current rates. Could he be rational? (demonstrate your answer geometrically).
  2. Consumer B uses only the 80 “free” calls every month, given the current rates. Compare (as in (4)) his consumption and welfare positions with the alternative of being charged a flat rate of 8¢ per call for any number of calls. Could he be indifferent with respect to the two alternative rates?

 

Source: Harvard University Archives. Papers of Zvi Griliches. Box 130, Folder “Syllabi and exams, 1961-1969”.

Image Source: Giora Hanoch in “These Israelis Were Present at the Declaration of Independence.”  Haaretz. Apr. 17, 2018