Month: September 2026

Harvard. Graduate General Exams in Micro- and Macro-Theory. Fall 1993

Post author By Irwin Collier
Post date 2026-09-30
No Comments on Harvard. Graduate General Exams in Micro- and Macro-Theory. Fall 1993

The following general examination for macroeconomic theory (Spring 1993) has been transcribed from a collection of general exams at Harvard from the 1990s provided to Economics in the Rear-view Mirror by Abigail Waggoner Wozniak (Harvard economics Ph.D., 2005). Abigail Wozniak was an associate professor of economics at Notre Dame before being appointed a senior research economist and the first director of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis’ Opportunity & Inclusive Growth Institute. She is currently Vice-President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.

Economics in the Rear-view Mirror is most grateful for her generosity in sharing this valuable material.

Because the “Wozniak collection” is over 90 pages long, it will take time for all the exams to get transcribed. To date the following general examinations have been transcribed and posted:

Spring 1991
Microeconomics; Macroeconomics

Spring 1992
Micro- and Macroeconomics

Fall 1992
Micro- and Macroeconomics

Spring 1993
Microeconomics; Macroeconomics

_________________________

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

GENERAL EXAMINATION
IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY
FALL 1993

Instructions:

You have FOUR hours.

Answer a total of FOUR questions, subject to the following constraints:

You must answer questions 1, 2, and 3. You must answer either question 4 or 5 (but not both).

Please use a separate blue book for each question.

Please put only your exam number on the blue book.

Good luck!

1. Indirect Utility (20 points)

This is a question on the indifference map of indirect utility functions.

There are two commodities. The utility function is $U(x_1, x_2)$ . Wealth is normalized to $w=1$ , so that the indirect utility function has the form $V(p_1, p_2)$ .

Assume that $U(x_1, x_2)$ is continuous and increasing in both arguments.

a) Draw an indifference map of the indirect utility function. Be sure that the axes are properly labelled, that the indifference curves have the proper shape and that the direction of increasing preference is clearly marked. (5 points)

b) Argue that if the utility function $U(x_1, x_2)$ is not quasi-concave then some indirect indifference curve will exhibit a kink. (5 points)

c) Suppose that an indifference curve of the indirect utility function has a piece that is a straight line. What does this correspond to in the direct utility function? Why? (5 points)

d) Consider the slope of an indifference curve of the indirect utility function. Interpret it in terms of the demand function. Justify your answer. (5 points)

2. (20 points)

Consider an industry in which there are two firms: an incumbent and a potential entrant. In each of two periods, total inverse demand in the industry is given by

$p = 5 - Q,$

where $Q$ is total output. The incumbent’s marginal cost of production $c_I$ can either be “high” ( $c_I = 2$ ) or “low” ( $c_I = 1$ ). The incumbent knows the value of $c_I$ , but the potential entrant knows only that the two values each have a 50% probability ex ante. In the first period, the incumbent chooses an output level $q_{I1}$ . The entrant can observe $q_{I1}$ (but not the incumbent’s profit). In the second period the two firms choose quantities $q_{I2}$ and $q_{E2}$ simultaneously. The entrant’s marginal cost $c_E$ is 2. In addition, if the entrant chooses $q_{E2} > 0$ , it incurs an “entry” cost of $\frac{1}{2}$ . The two firms each maximize their (expected) profits (the incumbent maximizes the expected sum of its first- and second-period profits). The model and all its parameters are common knowledge (the value of $c_I$ is not common knowledge, but the fifty-fifty prior distribution on 1 and 2 is common knowledge).

A. Suppose that the entrant concludes, after observing $q_{I1}$ , that the incumbent’s costs are low (i.e., the entrant attaches posterior probability 1 to $c_I = 1$ ). Show that, in this case, the entrant will not enter. That is, show that $q_{E2} = 0$ in the unique continuation equilibrium starting in period 2. What are the incumbent’s second-period output and profit in this continuation equilibrium?

B. Suppose that the entrant concludes, after observing $q_{I1}$ , that the incumbent’s costs are high ( $c_I = 2$ ). Show that, in this case, the entrant will enter, i.e., choose $q_{E2} > 0$ , in equilibrium. Find the second-period continuation equilibrium outputs and profits for both firms.

C. Using the results from parts (A) and (B), show that there exists a “separating” perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the two-period model in which (i) the incumbent chooses a “small” value of $q_{I1}$ if $c_I = 2$ and a “big” value if $c_I = 1$ , and (ii) the entrant enters if and only if $q_{I1}$ was small. In particular, show that $q_{I1}$ is at the high-cost monopoly level if $c_I = 2$ but strictly above the low-cost monopoly level if $c_I = 1$ .

3. Gross Substitute Excess Demand (20 points)

Consider an excess demand system $(f_1(p_1,\ldots,p_{L-1}),\ldots,f_{L-1}(p_1,\ldots,p_{L-1}))$ . There is an Lth commodity for which price is 1 and for which demand is not explicitly recorded.

a) How would you determine the demand for the Lth commodity? (5 points)

b) Suppose that the excess demand system for all L commodities satisfies the gross substitute property (when the price of a single commodity goes up the excess demand of each of the other commodities increases). Argue that the competitive equilibrium is then unique. (5 points)

c) Suppose that the excess demand functions for all L commodities are differentiable and that as in (b) the gross substitute property holds. What is the sign pattern induced in the Jacobian matrix of price effects? (5 points)

d) Suppose that the excess demand functions for all L commodities are differentiable and satisfy the gross substitute property. Suppose now that there is a shock (if this is helpful you can limit yourself to a small shock) the effect of which is to decrease the demand for commodities 1 to L−1 at every vector of prices. What should be the effect of this shock on the equilibrium prices of commodities 1 to L−1? Give a justification of your answer which is as rigorous as possible. (5 points)

Part IV:
Answer ONE of the following two questions:

4. Suppose there is another energy shock and the world-market price of oil goes from its present price of under $20 per barrel to $100. Analyze the short and long term effects on growth and distribution from neoclassical, Marxian, and Keynesian perspectives on the simplifying assumption that all energy is imported at the world-market price.

5. Milton Friedman has argued (“The Methodology of Positive Economics”) that a theory should be judged not on the realism of its assumptions, but on its predictive power. What are the principal criticisms of Friedman’s view? How might Friedman respond to the criticisms?

_________________________

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

GENERAL EXAMINATION
IN MACROECONOMIC THEORY
FALL 1993

Instructions:

You have FOUR hours.

You will answer a total of SIX questions from four sections of the exam:

In section I, you must answer the one question given.
In section II, answer both questions.
In section III, answer one of the two questions.
In section IV, answer two of the three questions.

Please use a separate blue book for each question.

Please put only your exam number on the blue book.

Good luck!

PART I:

1. Suppose that each household-producer has the production function,

$Y_i = AK_i \cdot (G/Y)^{\alpha},$

where $A>0$ , $0<\alpha<1$ . $Y_i$ and $K_i$ are the ith producer’s output and capital stock, respectively, G is the total of government purchases and public services, and Y is aggregate output. The output of all producers is identical and can be used on a one-for-one basis for consumption, investment, or government services. Each household seeks to maximize utility, given by the standard Ramsey expression,

$\displaystyle U = \int_0^{\infty} \left(\frac{c^{1-\theta}-1}{1-\theta}\right) e^{-\rho t}\,dt,$

where $\theta>0$ , $\rho>0$ , and c is consumption per person. The economy is closed, depreciation and population growth are zero, and no technological change occurs. The government finances its purchases by a proportional tax on output at the rate $\tau$ :

$G = \tau Y,$

where $\tau$ is constant over time.

a. What is the growth rate of $Y$ ? Does the model exhibit a convergence property? Why or why not?

b. How does the growth rate depend on $\tau$ ? What condition holds if $\tau$ is chosen to maximize the growth rate?

c. Are the outcomes Pareto optimal if $\tau$ is set to maximize the growth rate? How does this result relate to the usual view that lump-sum taxation is superior to proportional taxation?

PART II:
Answer BOTH questions:

2.—

a.) Under what assumptions does the permanent income hypothesis predict that consumption should follow a random walk?

b.) Derive explicitly the random walk of result (a).

c.) Discuss briefly what you know about the empirical evidence on the random walk.

d.) Consider a pre-announced future temporary tax cut. What are the effects on consumption of this policy before, during, and after the tax cut? Consider the cases of: (1) the life cycle model; (2) the life cycle model with bequests, (3) the Keynesian consumption function; (4) a life cycle model with liquidity constraints.

3. Consider a monopolistic trade union, that can unilaterally set the nominal wage. The union’s utility function is:

$\displaystyle U = \left(\frac{w}{p}\right)^{\frac{1}{2}} + \beta N$

Where: w is the nominal wage
p is the price level
N is employment
and $\beta>0$ is a parameter.

$\displaystyle N = n_0 - \alpha\frac{w}{p},$

where $n_0>0$ and $\alpha>0$ are parameters

1) Suppose first that p is fixed, and compute what is the nominal wage chosen by the union.

2) Suppose that a monetary authority can influence the price level with monetary policy, and suppose that the union can change the nominal wage at any time but with a small cost; that is, any change in the nominal wage has a very small administrative cost for the union. Discuss the effects of monetary policy in this model.

PART III:
Answer ONE of the following two questions:

4. Consider the case of a central bank conducting monetary policy in a standard fractional reserve banking system. The central bank can set either the short-term interest rate or the quantity of bank reserves (but not both simultaneously) to whatever level is chosen. What factors determine the central bank’s optimal choice of which one to set, under each of the following sets of circumstances?

(a) The central bank is trying to come as close as possible to hitting a target for the money stock (defined as public holdings of bank deposits).

(b) The central bank is trying to come as close as possible to hitting a target for real output.

In answering each part, show explicitly what difference (if any) it makes whether the economy is subject to aggregate supply shocks or whether demand-type disturbances are the only ones the economy faces.

5. Under what conditions can a central bank’s prior announcements of its policy actions influence the macroeconomic effect of those actions? If the central bank is free to conduct a politically independent monetary policy, what determines whether it will then actually implement the actions it has announced? Be explicit about the assumptions on which your answer relies.

PART IV:
Answer TWO of the following THREE questions:

6. Consider an unemployed worker searching for work. Each period she draws a wage offer w from a distribution $F(w)$ . Assume that there are no quits or layoffs so once the worker accepts a job, she works at it forever. Assume that wages in future periods are discounted by $\beta$ .

(a) Write a Bellman equation that characterizes the value of an optimal search policy given a current offer of w.

(b) The optimal policy is to set a reservation wage. Explain what this means and write an equation that implicitly defines the reservation wage.

(c) Suppose that the worker only receives a wage offer with probability $\phi$ each period. Explain in words or equations what happens to the reservation wage and why?

(d) Suppose that the worker receives two wage offers each period. Explain in words or equations what happens to the reservation wage and why?

7. Consider the following open economy macroeconomic model

(1) $Y = f(K, L)$
(2) $W/P = f_L$
(3) $Y = C(Y) + G + NX(e, Y)$
(4) $e = EP^*/P$
(5) $M/P = L(Y)$

Where asterisks denote foreign variables, NX is net exports, E is the nominal exchange rate and all other variables have their usual interpretations.

(a) What is the sign of $\partial NX/\partial e$ ? Explain.

(b) Suppose that workers and firms set nominal wage contracts:

$W = \bar{W}$

What is the effect of a change in $M$ or in $G$ on $Y$ ?

$W = \bar{w}P^{\alpha}(EP^*)^{1-\alpha}$

What is the effect of a change in $M$ or in $G$ on $Y$ ?

8. Suppose that price in a market is initially equal to zero, but is expected to rise linearly with time:

$p(t) = \alpha t.$

Suppose that you have a machine that costs k to install and once installed produces a unit flow of output. Time is continuous and the date zero present value of a dollar at date t is $e^{-rt}$ .

(a) At what date t should you have the machine installed in order to maximize profits?

(b) What is the present value of profits at the optimal time of investment?

(c) What is the value of Tobin’s Q at the optimal time of investment? What did Tobin argue should be the relationship between Q and investment? Speculate about what is special about the case considered here.

Source: Department of Economics, Harvard University. Past General Exams, Spring 1991-Spring 1999, pp. 84-88. Private copy of Abigail Waggoner Wozniak.

Image Source: Harvard University Economics PhD graduates from May 2025.

Tags Wozniak

Economics Programs M.I.T.

M.I.T. Report of the Visiting Committee on the Economics and Statistics Department, 1924

Post author By Irwin Collier
Post date 2026-09-29
No Comments on M.I.T. Report of the Visiting Committee on the Economics and Statistics Department, 1924

A century ago economics at M.I.T. was struggling to grow beyond being a mere service department for science and engineering students, having particular emphasis on the intersection of engineering and administration. The following two-page report of the M.I.T. Corporation’s Visiting Committee on the Department of Economics and Statistics (1924) provides us relatively little programmatic grist to grind, so I have chosen to let the report speak for itself and add notes regarding the members of the 1924 Visiting Committee.

The Committee included one of the members of the Jekyll Island group responsible for an initial draft of the proposal for a Federal Reserve System (Frank Arthur Vanderlip), a Harvard-educated man from the Forbes family business (William Cameron Forbes), and my personal favorite, one of the co-founders of Thom McAn’s Shoes (New Hampshire shoe manufacturer, J. Franklin McElwain). Personal favorite because in high-school and the summer before going off to college, I worked as a floor salesman for Thom McAn at the Parmatown Mall.

_________________________

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

REPORT OF THE
CORPORATION VISITING COMMITTEE ON THE
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

Submitted March 12, 1924

* * * * * * * * * * * *

TO THE CORPORATION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY:

The Visiting Committee on the Department of Economics and Statistics begs to report as follows:

Your committee met at the Union Club on January 7, 1924. There were present Messrs. Vanderlip, McElwain, Miller, Humphreys, and Forbes, chairman. We were privileged to have President Stratton as our guest, and Professor [Davis Rich] Dewey brought with him Professors [Martin Joseph] Shugrue, [Erwin Haskell] Schell, [Willard Eldridge] Freeland and Mr. [Oscar William] Hausserman of his department.

At our meeting last year, there was discussion as to the possibility of limiting the course in engineering administration. This limitation has been effectively accomplished by making the conditions of entrance somewhat more drastic, the number reported for this year being three hundred fifty-one as compared with three hundred eighty-four last year, and four hundred sixty-four in 1922. There has also been a falling off of twenty-three in the course in Elementary Economics.

Your committee again agreed on the importance and necessity of an advisory council, to be selected from different industries in different localities and thus to put the Department in touch with representative people whose industrial enterprises are benefited by the training given to young men capable of entering their service. It is believed that the Department is now taking steps to secure such a council, and it is expected that the Visiting Committee will invite the advisory council to sit with it at least once a year.

The need was pointed out in the last report of your committee for an auditorium or lecture hall sufficiently large to hold the entire class in Elementary Economics or in Engineering Administration. This need is recognized by President Stratton and we are assured that in making plans for the future an effort will be made to provide such a room.

In this year’s budget for the Department an appropriation for an additional assistant professor of accounting was recommended and was allowed. Professor Dewey reports that as yet he has been unable to fill this position as he has not found the right person. But efforts are under way to secure a suitable appointee. Meanwhile an instructor has been secured who is assisting in this direction.

Your committee recommended last year that a fifth-year course is desirable and that the staff of the Department be increased by two additional members, to be selected primarily for their research ability and qualification in some specialized field of economics. These men would enable the Department to provide extra courses in subjects usually covered by business schools and not covered by the Institute, such as railroad economics, public utilities, foreign trade, etc. This would give a broader curriculum and an opportunity for advanced students to obtain a master’s degree. We beg to repeat this recommendation and urge that whenever funds of the Institute are available, such increase in staff and courses be established.

We repeat, too, the recommendation of last year that a man be employed to travel from plant to plant where students of the Institute are taking vacation or even term time employment and supervise their work, making sure that they are getting the most out of it and giving the best service to it. As this travelling would not necessarily take his whole time, such an officer could be of great assistance to the Department while not travelling, and could supervise the theses requirements in the fourth year.

Your committee, in closing, calls attention to the low scale of salaries paid in the Department and the difficulty encountered in obtaining and retaining men of the class needed with the meager salaries allowed, and urges that wherever possible more liberal salaries be paid for the staff of this important Department.

Respectfully submitted,

W. CAMERON FORBES, Chairman
J. FRANKLIN McELWAIN
WALTER HUMPHREYS
FRANKLIN T. MILLER
FRANK A. VANDERLIP
LESTER D. GARDNER

Source: M.I.T. Archives. Office of the President. Box 426. Folder “Economics, 1924, 1936-37”.

_________________________

Meet the Visiting Committee of the M.I.T. Corporation

Chairman. William Cameron Forbes (1870-1959).

Life member of the Corporation, 1913-51. Life Member Emeritus 1951-1959.

- - A.B. Harvard 1892.
  - Becomes partner in J. M. Forbes & Co., merchants, 1899.
  - Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, 1909-13.
  - Overseer of Harvard University from 1914-20.
  - Ambassador to Japan, 1930-32.
  - Obituary in The Boston Globe (26 December 1959).

James Franklin McElwain (1874-1958).

Term member of the Corporation, 1919-24.

- - Attended M.I.T., 1893-94. Not listed in the Register of Former Students (1912, p. 266) of being awarded a degree!
  - In 1922 the J.F. McElwain Shoe Company and Melville Shoe opened their first Thom McAn store in New York.

Franklin Thomas Miller (1873-1940).

Term member of the Corporation, 1920-25.

- - S.B. (M.I.T.) in naval architecture, 1895.
  - Assistant Secretary of Commerce under Herbert Hoover as secretary of commerce.
  - Director of the Division of Construction in the Department of Labor during WWI.
  - Retired in 1927 after serving as publisher of architectural and engineering magazines.

Walter Dexter Humphreys (1874-1970).

Alumni term member of the Corporation, 1923-28.
Life member of the Corporation, 1929-1960.
Secretary of the Corporation, 1929-1960.

- - S.B. (M.I.T.) in mechanical engineering, 1897.
  - Registrar (M.I.T.), 1902-1922.
  - Instructor (1907-19); Associate Professor (1919-22).
  - Secretary-Treasurer of the National Association of Wool Manufacturers 1922-1952.
  - Obituary shared with the MIT Faculty written by J. R. Killian, Jr.

Frank Arthur Vanderlip (1864-1937).

Life member of the Corporation, 1916-37.

- - Begins serious career in journalism as the city editor of the Aurora Evening Post (Illinois), 1885.
  - Becomes financial editor at the Chicago Tribune, 1892. Takes extension course in political economy at the University of Chicago.
  - Assistant Secretary of the Treasury 1897-1901.
  - November 1910, at the invitation of Senator Nelson Aldrich, Vanderlip joined a small group of leading bankers on a train to Jekyll Island that would lead to the early plans for the Federal Reserve system.
  - President of National City Bank 1909-19.
  - Finding Aid to the Frank Arthur Vanderlip papers at Columbia University (includes short biography).

Lester Durand Gardner (1876-1956).

Term member of the Corporation, 1922-27.

- - S.B. from M.I.T. in 1898
  - Obituary published by the Daniel Guggenheim Board of Awards. Recipient of the 1947 Daniel Guggenheim Medal for outstanding achievement in advancing aeronautics.

Image Source: M.I.T. Museum website, Great Court with Dome, [April 5,] 1924. Object ID: GCP-00030328.

Tags Dewey, Freeland, Hausserman, Schell, Shugrue

Harvard Math Statistics

Harvard. Career of Math Ph.D. turned Economist/Operations Researcher, J. L. Holley, 1950-1959

Post author By Irwin Collier
Post date 2026-09-27
No Comments on Harvard. Career of Math Ph.D. turned Economist/Operations Researcher, J. L. Holley, 1950-1959

Thumbing through the economics department correspondence at the Harvard archives, I came across a file for the mathematics Ph.D., Julian Laurence Holley, who had tried both insurance and finance, but found himself returning to Harvard for graduate work in economics. Ultimately he ended up doing applied operations research for the Pentagon with a published trail in mathematical economics consisting of two short pieces, one of which was published in Econometrica, “Note on the Inversion of the Leontief Matrix”. I pieced together his time-line for this post. Analogous to not all heroes wearing capes, we have here an example that demonstrates not all serious economic researchers bear Ph.D.’s in economics.

____________________________

Julian Laurence Holley

Born: 25 Aug 1898 in Bristol, Connecticut.

1917-18. Attended Williams College.

WWI Service in the Harvard Naval Unit..

1921. A.B. (specialized in physics and mathematics), Harvard. Phi Beta Kappa, magna cum laude, Highest Honors in Mathematics.

1922. A.M. (Mathematics), Harvard.

1924. Ph.D. (Mathematics), Harvard. Thesis: Linear spaces and their fixed points.

1924-25. Benjamin Peirce Instructor of Mathematics, Harvard.

1925-27. Business Administration course at the Bryant & Stratton Commercial School of Boston (emphasis on accounting). First year work at the Northeastern University Evening Law School. Several special courses at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

1927-28. Six months working in the actuarial department at the Aetna Life Insurance Company (Hartford, Connecticut). Passed the first two actuarial examinations.

1928-29 [ca.]. Temporary job in personnel work.

1929-1936. Investment Counsel on the research staff of Loomis, Sayles & Company at their Boston headquarters. Organized and ran the department of bank and insurance stocks and supervised work on investment trust issues.

1936-37	Economics 101	Economic Theory	A
	Economics 141	Principles of Money and Banking	B+
	Economics 121a¹	Theory of Economic Statistics, I	½ A
	Economics 121b²	Theory of Economic Statistics, II	½ A-
1937-38	Economics 116	Price Theory and Price Analysis	A+
	Economics 103a¹	Trends in Modern Economic Theory	½ A+
	Economics 115²	Selected Problems in Advanced Economic Theory	½ A

1937-39. Instructor and Tutor in Economics, Harvard, in elementary economics (Economics A) and assisted in accounting (Economics 26b).

1940. Joined the staff of the War Production Board. [WWII Draft registration: still employed at War Production Board as of February 1942].

Revenue estimator for the U.S. Treasury.

1946. Married Helen Amelia Lewis (b. 14 June 1900; d. 14 January 2002) in D.C. 1 January 1946. No children. Her A.B. was from Mount Holyoke College, 1922. M.Ed., 1941 Boston University.

1950 Census. Employed as Mathematician for the U.S. Department of the Air Force. [wife employed as economist with the Internal Revenue Service]

1951. [His affiliation: U.S. Air Force]. “Note on the Inversion of the Leontief Matrix” in Econometrica, Vol. 19, Issue 3, pp. 317-320. [Perhaps he was with Project SCOOP (Scientific Computation of Optima Programs) established 1947-48, a Pentagon -based U.S. Air Force research program]

1954. [His affiliation: Melpar, Inc., subsidiary of Westinghouse Air Brake Company, Alexandria Virginia] “Letter to the Editor—Waiting Line Subject to Priorities” in Journal of the Operations Research Society of America. Vol. 2(3), pp. 341-343.

Final position: Senior mathematician and member of the principal staff of the Applied Physics Laboratory at Johns Hopkins University.

Died: 22 Feb 1959

Sources: Harvard University Archives. Department of Economics, Correspondence and Papers (UAV 349.11) Box 16, Folder “Holley, Julian Laurence”.
Obituaries: Evening Star (Washington, D.C.), 23 February 1959, p. 16; Boston Globe, 23 February 1959, p. 38.

Image Source: Evening Star (Washington, D.C.), 23 February 1959, p. 16.

Tags Holley

M.I.T. Theory

M.I.T. Reading list for Economics of Uncertainty. Diamond and Maskin, 1978

Post author By Irwin Collier
Post date 2026-09-26
No Comments on M.I.T. Reading list for Economics of Uncertainty. Diamond and Maskin, 1978

About three decades lie between the following course on the economics of uncertainty jointly taught at M.I.T. in 1978 and the respective awards of economics Nobel prizes to Eric Maskin (2007, mechanism design) and Peter Diamond (2010, economics of search). Still a solid reading list.

_________________________

14.145 Economics of Uncertainty
P. A. Diamond and E. S. Maskin

Fall 1978

Reading List

TEXT

Diamond and Rothschild, UNCERTAINTY IN ECONOMICS, READINGS AND EXERCISES, Academic Press.

REFERENCES

1. Arrow, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK BEARING.
2. De Groot, OPTIMAL STATISTICAL DECISIONS.
3. Drèze, ALLOCATION UNDER UNCERTAINTY.
4. Ferguson, MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS: A DECISION THEORETIC APPROACH.
5. Raiffa, DECISION ANALYSIS.

READINGS (* refers to required readings)

I. Individual Choice (Static)

A. Criterion

1.	Tamerin, J. and H. Resik, “Risk taking by individual option–Case Study–cigarette smoking in perspectives on benefit-risk decision making,” National Academy of Engineering, 1972 in Diamond-Rothschild.
2.	Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman, “Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases,” SCIENCE (September 27, 1974), in Diamond-Rothschild.
3.	Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman, “Value theory: An analysis of choices under risk.”
4.	Milnor, “Games Against Nature,” in DECISION PROCESSES, edited by G. Thrall, 1954.
5.	Maskin, Decision making under ignorance, with implications for social choice, Theory and Decision, forthcoming.
6.	Radner, R. and M. Rothschild, “On the Allocation of Effort,” JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY (1975).
7.	Kunreuther, H., “Economic Analysis of Low Probability Events.”
*8.	Drèze, J., “Axiomatic Theories of Choice…,” in Drèze, ALLOCATION UNDER UNCERTAINTY.
*9.	Arrow, Chapter 2.

B. Comparative Statics

*10.	Pratt, J., “Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large,” ECONOMETRICA (January 1964), 122-36, in Diamond and Rothschild.
*11.	Arrow, K., Chapter 3.
*12.	Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz, “Increasing Risk: I. A Definition,” JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY (September 1970), 225-243, in Diamond and Rothschild.
*13.	Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz, “Increasing Risk: II. Its Economic Consequences,” JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY (March 1971), 66-70, 78-80 only.
*14.	Yaari, M., “Some Remarks on Measures of Risk Aversion and on their Uses,” JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY (October 1969), 315-29, in Diamond and Rothschild.
15.	Dasgupta, P., A. Sen, and D. Starrett, “Notes on the Measurement of Inequality,” JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY (1973).
16.	Diamond, P. and J. Stiglitz, “Increases in Risk and in Risk Aversion,” JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY (1974).
*17.	Leland, H., “Saving and Uncertainty: The Precautionary Demand for Saving,” QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS (August 1968), in Diamond and Rothschild.
18.	Hahn, F., “Savings and Uncertainty,” REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES (1969).

II. Equilibrium (Traditional)

*19.	Debreu, G., THEORY OF VALUE, Chapter 7, pp. 98-102 in Diamond and Rothschild.
*20.	Arrow, Chapter 4.
21.	Hirshleifer, J., “Investment Decisions under Uncertainty–Choice Theoretic Approaches,” QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS (November 1965), 509- .
22.	Radner, R., “Competitive Equilibrium Under Uncertainty,” ECONOMETRICA (1968), 31-58, in Diamond and Rothschild.
*23.	Diamond, P., “The role of a stock market in a general equilibrium model with technological uncertainty,” AER (September 1967), 759-776, in Diamond and Rothschild.
*24.	Grossman, S., “A Characterization of the Optimality of Equilibrium in Incomplete Markets,” JET, June, 1977.
25.	Dreze, J., ALLOCATION UNDER UNCERTAINTY, Chapters 4,5,8.
26.	Hart, O., “On the optimality of equilibrium when markets are incomplete,” JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY (1975).
27.	Leland, H., “Capital asset markets, production, and optimality: A Synthesis,” IMSSS TECHNICAL REPORT.
28.	Gould, “Inventories and Stochastic Demand: Equilibrium Models of the Financial Industry, J. BUSINESS, Jan. 1978, 1-42.
29.	Lucas, Jr., Robert E., “Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy.”
30.	Diamond, “Efficiency with Price Uncertainty,” mimeo.

III. Adverse Selection: Signalling and Screening

*31.	Akerlof, G., “The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS (August 1970), 488-500, in Diamond and Rothschild.
32.	Spence, M., “Job Market Signaling,” QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS (August 1973), in Diamond and Rothschild.
*33.	Spence, M., “Competitive and Optimal Responses to Signals: Analysis of Efficiency and Distribution,” JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY (March 1974).
34.	Riley, J., “Competitive Signalling,” JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY (1975).
35.	Riley, J., “Competitive Signalling: Further Remarks.”
36.	Wilson, C., “A Model of Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information,” JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1977.
*37.	Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz, “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets,” QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS (1976), in Diamond and Rothschild.
38.	Stiglitz, J. E., “The Theory of ‘Screening,’ Education, and the Distribution of Income,” AER (1975).
39.	Wilson, C., “The Nature of Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection,” SSRI #7715, 1977.

IV. Moral Hazard

40.	Pauly, M., “Overinsurance and the Public Provision of Insurance,” QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS (1974), 44-62 in Diamond and Rothschild.
41.	Shavell, S., “On Moral Hazard and Insurance.”
42.	Spence, M. and R. Zeckhauser, “Insurance, Information and Individual Action,” AER (May 1971), 380-87 in Diamond and Rothschild.
43.	Diamond, P. and J. Mirrlees, “A Model of Social Insurance with Variable Retirement,” M.I.T. Economics Working Paper No. 210.
44.	Mirrlees, J., “Notes on Welfare Economics, Information and Uncertainty,” in Balch, McFadden et al., ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR UNDER UNCERTAINTY.
*45.	Spence, M., “Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability,” REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES (1977).

V. Information

*46.	Hirshleifer, J., “The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity,” AER (1971), 561-74, in Diamond and Rothschild.
*47.	Arrow, K., “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care,” AER (1963), 941-73 (also in Arrow, and in Diamond and Rothschild).
48.	Arrow, K. and A. Fisher, “Preservation, Uncertainty, and Irreversibility,” QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS (May 1974), 312-19.
49.	Cheung, S., “Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements,” JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (April 1969), 23-42, in Diamond and Rothschild.
50.	Nelson, P., “Advertising as Information,” JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS (July 1974).
51.	Lucas, R., “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money,” JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY (April 1972).
*52.	Danthine, “Information, Future Prices and Stabilizing Speculation,” JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, (Feb. 1978).
*53.	Blackwell and Girschick, THEORY OF GAMES AND STATISTICAL DECISIONS (last chapter).

VI. Individual Choice (Sequential)

54.	De Groot, OPTIMAL STATISTICAL DECISIONS, Chapters 12-14.
55.	Kohn, M. and S. Shavell, “The Theory of Search,” JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY (October 1974), 93-123.
56.	Rothschild, M., “A Two-Armed Bandit Theory of Market Pricing,” JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY (1974).
*57.	Rothschild, M., “Searching for the Lowest Price When the Distribution is Unknown,” JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (July 1974), in Diamond and Rothschild.
58.	Lippman, S. and J. McCall, “The Economics of Job Search: A Survey,” ECONOMIC INQUIRY.
59.	Axell, B., “Prices under Imperfect Information, A Theory of Search Market Equilibrium.”
60.	Wilde, L., “Labor Market Equilibrium under Nonsequential Search,” JET, 1977.
*61.	Weitzman, M., “A Basic Result in the Theory of Optimal Search,” M.I.T. Working Paper, 373-93.

VII. Equilibrium with Search

62.	Pratt, J., D. Wise, and R. Zeckhauser, “Price Variation in Almost Competitive Market.”
63.	Rothschild, M., “Models of Market Organization with Imperfect Information,” JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (November 1973), 1283-1308, in Diamond and Rothschild.
64.	Salop, S. and J. Stiglitz, “Bargains and Ripoff,” REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES (1977).
65.	Lucas, R. and G. Prescott, “Equilibrium Search and Unemployment,” JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY (February 1974), 188-200, in Diamond and Rothschild.
*66.	Butters, G., “Equilibrium Distributions of Prices and Advertising,” REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES (1977), in Diamond and Rothschild.
67.	Diamond P., “Welfare Analysis of Imperfect Information Equilibria,” BELL JOURNAL, Spring 1978.
68.	Salop, S., “The Noisy Monopolist,” REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES (1977).
69.	Mortensen, D., “Job Matching Under Imperfect Information.”
*70.	Diamond and Maskin, “Search, Liquidated Damages, and Breach of Contract,” M.I.T. Working Paper.
*71.	Diamond and Maskin, “Search Effort and Breach of Contract,” M.I.T. Working Paper.

Source: Duke University. David M. Rubinstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library. Economists’ Papers Archives. Peter Diamond papers. Box 4, Folder “Teaching Material.”

Image Sources: Peter A. Diamond (Credit: Donna Coveny/MIT, 2003) in “An Interview with Peter Diamond” in Macroeconomic Dynamics (2007) p. 544. Eric S. Maskin (1980). From the MIT Museum Museum website’s Biographical/Subject Files Collection .

Tags Diamond, Maskin

Exam Questions Johns Hopkins Undergraduate

Johns Hopkins. Final exams for undergraduate economics courses. 1911-1912

Post author By Irwin Collier
Post date 2026-09-25
No Comments on Johns Hopkins. Final exams for undergraduate economics courses. 1911-1912

Six semester courses in political economy was Johns Hopkins University’s entire offerings for undergraduates interested in the field of economics in 1911-12.

_____________________________

Instructors of Political Economy
(Undergraduate)

JACOB H. HOLLANDER, Ph. D., Professor of Political Economy. A.B., Johns Hopkins University, 1891, Fellow, 1893-94, and Ph.D., 1894. Treasurer of the Island of Porto Rico, 1900-01; Special Commissioner Plenipotentiary to Santo Domingo, 1905-06; Financial Adviser of the Dominican Republic, 1908-10.

GEORGE ERNEST BARNETT, Professor of Statistics. A.B., Randolph-Macon College, 1891; Fellow, Johns Hopkins University, 1899-1900, and Ph.D., 1901.

_____________________________

UNDERGRADUATE COURSES

Political Economy 1.

[Political Economy 1 is required to later attend Polical Economy 2 and 3.]

(a) Economic History. The economic development of England from the tenth century to the present time and the most important experiences of the United States are studied.

Three hours weekly, first half-year.
Professor BARNETT.

(b) Elements of Economics. Particular attention is given to the theory of distribution and its application to leading economic problems.

Three hours weekly, second half-year.
Professor BARNETT.

Political Economy 2.

[Undergraduate Course 2 is open only to such students as have completed Course 1]

(a) Finance. The theory and practice of finance are considered, with particular reference to problems of taxation as presented in the experience of the United States.

Three hours weekly, first half-year.
Professor HOLLANDER.

(b) Money and Banking. The principles of monetary science are taught with reference to practical conditions in modern systems of currency, banking, and credit.

Three hours weekly, second half-year.
Professor BARNETT.

Political Economy 3.

[Save under exceptional circumstances, Course 3 only to students who have completed 1 and 2.]

(a) Statistical Methods. After a preliminary study of the value and place of statistics as an instrument of investigation, attention is directed to the chief methods used in statistical inquiry.

Three hours weekly, first half-year.
Professor BARNETT.

(b) Economic Theory. Critical study is made of recent economic theories.

Three hours weekly, second half-year.
Professor HOLLANDER.

Source: Programmes of Courses. Published in The Johns Hopkins University Circular, New Series, 1911, No. 6 (June 1911) Whole Number, 236.

____________________________

[December, 1911.]

POLITICAL ECONOMY I [a].

Distinguish the one-field, two-field and three-field systems of agriculture.
Describe the government of the craft guild in the fourteenth century.
Discuss the growth of capitalism and its influence on the concept of usury.
Describe the craft guild stage of industry and distinguish it from succeeding and preceding stages.
What economic effects are traceable to the Black Death?
What place did Fairs fill in the organization of economic life in the fifteenth century?
What is meant by an economic unit?
Describe the chief economic institutions which have their origin in the seventeenth century.
Describe the chief mechanical inventions from 1738 to 1790.
What relation is there between the extent or width of the economic unit and the form of industrial organization?

____________________________

[March, 1912.]

POLITICAL ECONOMY I [b].

How far is saving economically justifiable?
What are the advantages of the corporation as a form of business organization?
Define elasticity of demand. Draw and explain two demand curves, one representing an elastic and one an inelastic demand.
Is it correct to say that the demand for a commodity is greater than the supply?
Explain what is meant by consumers’ surplus. Illustrate by a diagram.
Under what circumstances would monopoly price be less than competitive price?
Define cost of production. Under what conditions does the value of a commodity tend to equal its cost of production.
State and illustrate the economic laws relating to (a) the size of the business unit and (b) the proportion of the factors of production.

____________________________

[June, 1912]

POLITICAL ECONOMY I [b].

Trace the attachment of the entrepreneurial function through the different economic stages.
At what period in economic evolution did capital become a claimant in distribution?
What is the “principle of marginal productivity?” Explain the relation of this principle to the law of diminishing returns.
Explain what is meant by the “marginal laborer.” Distinguish the marginal laborer and the marginal unit of labor.
What is meant by “the differential principle?” Show to what parts of the theory of distribution this principle is applicable.
Discuss the arguments for and against the single tax.
What effect does the invention of machinery have on the rate of interest?
Distinguish between the “annual product” and the “annual social dividend.”
Distinguish competitive and monopoly profits.
Would a tax on the value of agricultural land raise the price of farm products?

____________________________

December 16, 1911.

POLITICAL ECONOMY II [a].

The scope of Public Finance, as a study, and its relation to the science of Political Economy.
In what particulars does the economy of the state differ from the economy of the individual?
What policy should influence the distribution of public expenditure upon education between central and local government?
Show the importance of economic or quasi-private receipts as a source of revenue to the federal government in the United States and in Germany respectively.
State the arguments for and against (a) proportional, and (b) progressive taxation.
Discuss the merits and demerits of the taxation of incomes.
Discuss the incidence of an excise tax on manufactured tobacco (cigars and cigarettes).

____________________________

[March, 1912]

POLITICAL ECONOMY II [b].

Discuss the physical characteristics of a good medium of exchange.
Under what circumstances does bad money drive out good money?
What evils flow from instability in the value of the medium of exchange?
State the quantity theory of money.
Discuss Professor Scott’s objections to this theory.
Explain the compensatory action of the bimetallic system. Illustrate by a series of diagrams.

____________________________

[June 1912]

POLITICAL ECONOMY II [b].

What is the “unearned increment tax” and how can it be used in American municipal finance?
What is the incidence of the high license tax on saloons in Baltimore City?
Define money. Is a bank check money?
Would it be possible to have a monetary system under which fluctuations in prices would not occur?
Describe the governmental organization of the Bank of France.
What advantages are there in a system of branch banks?
What is the purpose of a bank reserve? Under what circumstances would a bank need no reserve?
Compare the bank note circulation in the United States and France.
Compare the methods used by the Bank of England and the Bank of France for the protection of their reserves against foreign drain.
Explain the method by which in an emergency the Bank of England brings the market rate up to the bank rate? Why does it do this?

____________________________

[December, 1911.]

POLITICAL ECONOMY III [a].

What is the distinction between cause and chance?
What is a “crude” death rate? Explain in detail how the standard death rate is obtained.
What is meant by a “measure of dispersion?” What is the most usual one?
Define the field of investigation in which the statistical method is useful.
Under what circumstances is the geometric mean a useful form of average?
Define percentile, quartile, mode and arithmetic mean.
Explain the two chief methods of gathering statistical information. Under what circumstances may each be properly used?
Explain the theory of weighting.

____________________________

Note: no March 1912 examination for Political Economy III was found in the collection of examination

____________________________

May 31, 1912.

FINAL EXAMINATION
IN POLITICAL ECONOMY III.

What has been the relation of statistical science to the development of insurance?
What is the relation of statistics to economics?
Discuss the economies incident to large scale production.
What are the economic services, if any, of speculation?
Monopoly value and the law which governs it.
What defects in our national banking system might a central banking institution, of the European type, be expected to remedy?
Discuss the theory of international trade.
What is the function of the entrepreneur and what principle determines his share in distribution?

Source for the examination questions: The Johns Hopkins University, Eisenhower Library. Ferdinand Hamburger, Jr. Archives. Department of Political Economy. Series 5/6. Box 6/1. Folder “Exams, 1907-1924”.

Image Source: Johns Hopkins University seal on the floor of Gilman Hall, on the Johns Hopkins University campus in Baltimore, Maryland. Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C.

Tags Barnett, Hollander

Columbia Economics Programs Faculty Regulations

Columbia. Memo for Planning Graduate Course Work. Vickrey, 1965

Post author By Irwin Collier
Post date 2026-09-22
No Comments on Columbia. Memo for Planning Graduate Course Work. Vickrey, 1965

What is particularly striking about the following memo written by Columbia University’s economics department chairman William S. Vickrey concerning the academic year 1965-66 is that “macroeconomics” is clearly a word not used in fields or course titles. Macroeconomics is a coming attraction for 1966-67.

___________________________

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

September 18, 1965

TO: Incoming (first year) graduate students
FROM: William S. Vickrey, Chairman

SUBJECT: Planning your course work for 1965-66

This memorandum is a supplement to two earlier memoranda addresses to incoming and continuing students — dated respectively April 19, 1965 and Labor Day 1965 — which you are presumed to have read. The present supplementary memorandum carries information and advice which otherwise would have to be conveyed orally to each of you in your registration interview with a member of the departmental Committee on Student Progress.

You may disregard the present memorandum in either of two contingencies. If (a) you are coming to us as a transfer student who has had a substantial equivalent of our first-year program of graduate studies, your problems are apt to fall outside the range the memorandum contemplates, and must be dealt with ad hoc. Or if (b) you have already made up your mind to terminate your graduate work with an MA, your problems are much simpler than here contemplated. But if you are now beginning graduate study in economics and are planning a doctoral program (or are planning an MA program which will hold the door open for doctoral work in case you later wish to continue), please study this memorandum and sketch on the attached sheet a plan of course work which takes it into account, as basis for your registration interview.

————————————————–

As was noted in the mimeographed memorandum of April 19, the academic year 1965-66 is one of transition between the curriculum pictured in the printed Graduate Faculties Bulletin and that sketched for 1966-67 in the mimeograph. Your problem of program-planning has two main sets of objectives: (A) You should aim to arrive as early as possible in your graduate career at a working command of the professional basics which correspond to the four “certificates of proficiency” referred to at the beginning of the statement of new PhD requirements in the memorandum of April 19. Such a command will be presumed in all courses in the number-series 6000, 8000 and 9000; hence both your choice of courses and your ability to master them will be limited until these basics are under control. Furthermore, the earlier you earn your certificates, the more you reduce the danger of an unmanageable peak load arising from simultaneous preparation for these certificates and for the oral examination in subjects. And (B) you should seek in the first year to make an effective beginning with at least one or two of the sequences of more specialized courses which are relevant to fields you are likely to want to present on the oral examination. Since for most first-year students pursuit of objective (A) could readily be made more than a full-time job and pursuit of objective (B) more than a half-time job, you will probably find yourself seeking a compromise– a typical economists’ resource-allocation problem, with your working time as the scarce resource.

Your search for an optimum combination of courses will be conditioned by several peculiarities of the curriculum in this transitional year 1965-66:

Because of the absence on sabbatical leave of Professor A.F. Burns, we do not offer the business-fluctuations sequence G4601-02.
The sequence on monetary theory and policy takes the form this year of a 6-point course (G4711-12) in the first semester. This course is also the closest equivalent available this year to the macro-economics course G4213 [Note: the “4” here is an uncertain reading of an overstruck number] which will be offered from 1966-67 onwards.
Several major subject-matter sequences (those in public finance, international economics, and development-and-planning) are being rearranged to put their logical starting-point in February 1966 (with continuation into autumn 1966). This change does not debar first-year students from all work in these fields: Professor Shoup is prepared to discuss proposals to take G6806 before G6805; and in the international field, students who lack specific undergraduate preparation are presented with a preliminary course (G4901x) in the autumn. Yet on the whole, students to whom these fields are especially interesting will find their time tight in the second semester.
On the other hand, a number of other major subject-matter sequences remain on a schedule under which the logical starting-point is September 1965. Students who are especially interested in these fields will find their time tight in the first semester in case either (a) the Placement Examination puts them in G4210 or (b) they find the monetary-economics course G4711-12 urgent.

You will see from these considerations that it would not be rational for your registration adviser to impose a prefabricated program without regard to your special interests and qualifications. Neither would it be rational for him simply to initial any program you happened to lay before him: it is our experience that a large proportion even of the best-prepared students present preliminary study-plans which would store up trouble for later stages of their doctoral work. So please rough out a preliminary plan (or if you prefer, two alternatives), and come to the registration interview prepared both to explain your proposals and to accept your adviser’s help in bringing them closer to your underlying needs.

————————————————–

To illustrate the foregoing analysis of the logic of course-programming, here are two hypothetical plans, corresponding to two types of interests and qualifications, lying fairly far apart in the continuum of which our advisers have experience.

Program (a):

Subject-matter	Autumn 1965		Spring 1966		Hours committed, as of autumn 1965	Comment
Subject-matter	No.	Pts.	No.	Pts.	Hours committed, as of autumn 1965	Comment
Program (a): for a well-prepared student of quantitative orientation, with strong interests already established in public finance and in international economics
Micro-economic analysis	G6213x	3	G6214y	3	Mon., Wed. 12:00-12:50	Required
Economic statistics	G4411x	3	G4412y	3	Tu., Th. 9:00- 9:50	Also lab. Wed.
Monetary economics	G4711x G4712x	6	——	–	(Mon., Wed. 10:00-10:50 Tu., Th. 2:10- 3:00)
Public finance	——	–	G6805y	3	——————–
International economics	——	–	G6903y	3	——————–
		12		12

Plus one other course, with a presumption for economic history of US.

Program (b):

Program (b): for a student of good general background who was not an economics major as an undergraduate, and leans toward historical-institutional studies.
Micro-economic analysis	G4210	6	G4212y	3	Mon., Wed. 12:00-12:50	Also lab. Fri.
Economic history of US	G4311x	3	G4312y	3	Tu., Th. 10:00-10:50
Industrial organization	G4251x	3	G4252y	3	Mon., Wed. 1:10- 2:00
American ec. thought	——	–	G4232y	3	——————–
		12		12

Plus one other course, with a presumption for economic statistics. Macro-economics (and statistics if not taken in 1965-66) urgent business for 1966-67.

Source: Columbia University Libraries. Manuscript Collections. Department of Economics Collection. Carl Shoup Materials, Box 11, Folder “Economics Memoranda”.

Image Source: August Rodin’s Le Penseur at Columbia University. InSapphoWeTrust from Los Angeles, California, USA, CC BY-SA 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons.

Tags Vickrey

Agricultural Economics Exam Questions Harvard

Harvard. Agricultural economics. Description, enrollment, final exam. Carver, 1912-1913

Post author By Irwin Collier
Post date 2026-09-21
No Comments on Harvard. Agricultural economics. Description, enrollment, final exam. Carver, 1912-1913

The American Farmer by Carl Wuermer (1930)

In 1911 Harvard economics professor Thomas Nixon Carver published a textbook Principles of Rural Economics that undoubtedly encompassed the content of his course on agricutural economics first taught in 1903-04. Somewhat unusually his book is prefaced with an eight page bibliography.

________________________

Carver’s Earlier Courses
on Agricultural Economics

Links to earlier course material for agricultural economics at Harvard, 1903-04 through 1911-12.

_______________________

ECONOMICS 32
Course Description
1912-13

[Economics] 32 ²hf (formerly 23 ²hf). Economics of Agriculture, with special reference to American conditions. Half-course (second half-year). Tu., Th., and (at the pleasure of the instructor) Sat., at 9. Professor Carver.

A study of the relation of agriculture to the whole industrial system, the relative importance of rural and urban economics, the conditions of rural life in different parts of the United States, the forms of land tenure and methods of rent payment, the comparative merits of large and small holdings, the status and wages of farm labor, the influence of farm machinery, farmers’ organizations, the marketing and distribution of farm products, agricultural credit, the policy of the government toward agriculture, and the probable future of American agriculture.

Source: Harvard University. Division of History, Government, and Economics, Courses of Instruction, 1912–13, p. 67.

_______________________

ECONOMICS 32
Course Enrollment
1912-13

[Economics] 32 ²hf (formerly 23 ²hf). Professor Carver. — Economics of Agriculture, with special reference to American conditions.

Total 11: 8 Graduates; 2 Seniors; 1 Junior.

Source: Harvard University. Reports of the President and the Treasurer of Harvard College, 1912-13, p. 58.

_______________________

ECONOMICS 32
Year-end Examination
1912-13

What are some of the larger characteristics which distinguish rural from urban life?
Where would you draw the line between large scale and medium scale, and between medium scale and small scale farming, and what are the principal advantages and disadvantages of each?
Exactly what is the distinction between intensive and extensive farming, and what are the advantages and disadvantages of each?
To what system of culture does the horse as a draft animal belong, and what are some of the characteristics of that system?
Where do we find the larger percentage of tenancy in this country, where land is highly productive or where its productivity is low? How would you explain the situation?
Give your ideas as to the function of the middle-man, and to what extent and how that function may be performed by the farmers themselves.
What are the advantages of diversified farming as compared with specialized farming?
Give your ideas as to how country life may be made more attractive to men and women of education and culture.

Source: Harvard University Examinations. Papers set for final examinations in history, history of science, government, economics, philosophy, social ethics, education, fine arts, music in Harvard College (June 1913), p. 56.

Image Source: The American Farmer by Carl Wuermer (1930) at the Wichita Art Museum website.

________________________

Earlier material

ca. 1904 Problem set
1903-04 Final exam
1905-06 Final exam
1908-09 Description, enrollment, final exam
1910-11 Description, enrollment, final exam
1911-12 Description, enrollment, final exam

Tags Carver

Development Exam Questions Harvard

Harvard. Economy of Latin America. Syllabus, Readings, Final Exam. Clague, 1965-1966

Post author By Irwin Collier
Post date 2026-09-15

Father Ewan Clague and Son Christopher Clague

In preparing this post that features course materials from the second term of the 1965-66 academic year at Harvard for Christopher K. Clague’s “Economy of Latin America”, I ran across obituaries for his distinguished parents, Ewan Clague (Ph.D. Wisconsin, 1929. Thesis: Theory and Measurement of Physical Productivity, major professors Commons & Jerome) and Dorothy V. Whipple (M.D. Johns Hopkins, 1929. Pediatrician, syndicated columnist). Not only was Christopher Clague’s father a trained economist, he also served as the sixth Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics under Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. I have appended short bios for his mother and father as well as for his wife, Harvard trained political scientist, Monique F. Clague (Weston).

But the top of the post is reserved for a brief c.v. of Christopher Karran Clague, Harvard Ph.D. alumnus (1966). Following the stations of his distinguished career, Economics in the Rear-view Mirror provides transcribed copies of his course outline, assigned readings and final examination.

_______________________

Christopher Karran Clague

1938. Born May 28 in Washington, D.C. Parents: Ewan Clague and Dorothy Vermilya Whipple.

Graduate of St. Alban’s School in Bridgeport, Ct.

1960. B.A. in political science (honors), magna cum laude, Swarthmore College. Phi Beta Kappa, Senior Class President.

1960. Married Monique Françoise Weston, June 9 in Cleveland, Ohio.

1966. Ph.D. in Economics. Harvard University. Thesis “Economic Efficiency in Peru and the United States.”

1965-67. Instructor in Economics. Harvard University.

1967-68. Senior staff economist. Council of Economic Advisers, Washington, D.C.

1968-71. Assistant Professor. University of Maryland.

1971-79. Associate Professor. University of Maryland.

1974-75. Visiting professor at Boston University’s Center for Latin American Development Studies.

1979-. Professor of Economics. University of Maryland [now emeritus]

1983. Visiting Professor at the University of California, Berkeley.

1983-89. National Bureau of Economic Research, member of executive committee, Conference on Research in Income and Wealth.

1990. Visiting Professor at the University of Hawaii at Manoa.

1990. Visiting Professor at the University of Nottingham.

_______________________

Economic 116.
The Economy of Latin America

Dr. Christopher Clague
Harvard University

Course Outline.

International Trade and Economic Development
Case Studies: Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Capital Accumulation; Social and Political Factors; Economic Policy: The Price Mechanism versus Direct Controls.
Case Studies: Chile, Brazil.
Agriculture in Economic Development; Land Reform
Case Studies: Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia.
Inflation

Suggested Purchases. The number of pages to be read in each book is given in parentheses.

Gerald M. Maier, Leading Issues in Development Economics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. (63 pages)
John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1961. (135 pages)
Martin C. Needler, editor, Political Systems of Latin America. Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1964. (Chapters on Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay. 145 pages.)
Edwin Lieuwen, Venezuela. 2nd Edition revised. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965 (122 pages)
A. O. Hirschman, Journeys Toward Progress. New York: Doubleday and Company (Anchor Books, paperback), 1965. (Chapters on Colombia and Chile. 168 pages).
Celso Furtado, The Economic Growth of Brazil. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963. (152 pages).
Theodore W. Schultz, Transforming Traditional Agriculture. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964. (110 pages).
Albert O. Hirschman, editor, Latin American Issues. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961. (paperback). (83 pages).
Lester R. Brown, Increasing World Food Output, Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 25, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Foreign Regional Analysis Division, April 1965. (Can be purchased from: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Price $.45) (115 pages).

International Trade and Economic Development
1. The Contribution of Trade to Development
  1. — Meier, Leading Issues:
    — G. Haberler, “Dynamic Benefits of Trade”, pp. 352-358
    — R. Nurkse, “Patterns of Trade and Development”, pp. 358-363
    — A. Cairncross, “Contribution of Trade to Development”, pp. 363-371
    — R. Prebisch, “Center and Periphery”, pp. 339-344
    — G. Meier, “The Carry-Over Problem”, pp. 371-376
  2. — G. Haberler, “Terms of Trade and Economic Development”, in Howard S. Ellis, Economic Development for Latin America, pp. 275-297
2. Case Studies of Trade and Development
  1. Argentina
    — Johnson, Political Change, Chapter 6.
    — J. Barager, “Argentina” in Needler, Political Systems.
    — A. Smithies, “Argentina and Australia”, American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, May 1965, pp. 17-30.
    — S. Mosk, “Latin America and the World Economy, 1850-1914”, Inter-American Economic Affairs. (Hereinafter referred to as IEA), Winter 1948, pp. 53-82.

Suggested:
— UN, ECLA, Analyses and Projections of Economic Development: The Economic Development of Argentina.
— Arthur Whitaker, The U.S. and Argentina
— Aldo Ferrer, La Economia Argentina
— J. Black, “Observations on the Agriculture of Argentina”, Journal of Farm Economics, May 1957, pp. 468-477,

1. 1. Uruguay
    — Johnson, Chapter 4.
    — G. Lindahl, “Uruguay” in Needler.

1. 1. Venezuela
    — E. Lieuwen, Venezuela (1965 Edition), pp. 64-163, 177-200.

1. 1. Peru in the Guano Age
    — Jonathan V. Levin, The Export Economies, pp. 1-48, 77-91, 108-123.

Capital Accumulation and Growth; Social and Political Policy: Price Mechanism versus Direct Controls.
1. The Big-Push Theory
  1. — Meier, Leading Issues:
    — P. Rosenstein-Rodan, “The Theory of the ‘Big-Push,'” pp. 431-436.
    — R. Nurkse, “Balanced Growth”, pp. 250-254.
    — A. Hirschman, “Balanced Growth: A Critique”, pp. 254-259.

Suggested:
— E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change, Chapter 3, pp. 36-52.

1. Political Obstacles to Growth
  1. — Paul Baran, “On the Political Economy of Backwardness”, in Agarwala and Singh, The Economics of Underdevelopment, pp. 75-93 (orginally in The Manchester School, January, 1952).
2. Economic Policy: Price Mechanism versus Direct Controls
  1. — Meier, Leading Issues:
    — P. Rosenstein-Rodan, “The Flaw in the Mechanism of Market Forces”, pp. 416-18.
    — H. Johnson, “The Market Mechanism as an Instrument of Development”, pp. 425-431
    — G. Meier, “Import Substitution and Industrial Protection”, pp. 297-304.

1. 1. — T. Balogh, “Economic Policy and the Price System”, Economic Bulletin for Latin America, March 1961.
  2. — W. Baer, “The Economics of Prebisch and ECLA”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, January 1962, pp. 169-182 (hereinafter referred to as EDCC.)

Suggested:
— J. Marshall, “Exchange Controls and Economic Development”, in H. Ellis, ed., Economic Development, pp. 430-451; also comment by Hirschman, pp. 457-465.

1. Case Studies:
  1. Chile
    — Johnson, Chapter 5.
    — David Felix, “Chile” in Adamantios Pepelasis et al, Economic Development, pp. 288-323.
    — Eric Baklanoff, “Chilean Experience with Multiple Exchange Rates”, IEA, Summer, 1959.
    — A. Hirschman, Journeys Toward Progress, Chapter 3, pp. 215-293.

Suggested:
— P. T. Ellsworth, Chile, An Economy in Transition (1945)
— Ernst Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile (1965).

— See also the section on Inflation.

1. 1. Brazil
    — Johnson, Chapter 8.
    — H. Spiegel, “Brazil: The State and Economic Growth”, in Simon Kuznets et al, editors, Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan.
    — Celso Furtado, The Economic Growth of Brazil, pp. 97-249

Suggested:
— Other articles on Brazil in the volume edited by Kuznets.
— W. Baer, Industrialization and Economic Growth in Brazil (1965).
— W. Baer, “Regional Inequality and Economic Growth in Brazil”, EDCC, April 1964.

The Role of Agriculture; Land Reform
1. Agriculture and Economic Development
  1. — T. W. Schultz, Transforming Traditional Agriculture, pp. 1-110.
  2. — Johnston and Mellor, “The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development”, American Economic Review, September 1961, pp. 566-591.
  3. — J. Mellor, “The Process of Agricultural Development in Low-Income Countries”, Journal of Farm Economics, August 1962, pp. 700-17.
  4. — Thomas Carroll, “The Land Reform Issue in Latin America”, in Hirschman, Latin American Issues, pp. 161-200.
  5. — Lester Brown, Increasing World Food Output, pp. 1-115
2. Case Studies
  1. Mexico
    — Johnson, Chapter 7.
    — Robert Edminster, “Mexico”, in Adamantios Pepelasis, Economic Development, pp. 326-364.
    — Raymond Vernon, The Dilemma of Mexico’s Development, Chapters 1-4; Chap. 7.
    — Richard Parks, “The Role of Agriculture in Mexican Economic Development”, IEA, Summer 1964.

Suggested:
— A. Sturmthal, “Economic Development, Income Distribution, and Capital Formation in Mexico”, Journal of Political Economy, June 1955.
— R. Scott, Mexican Government in Transition, esp. pp. 56-95.

1. 1. Bolivia
    — Robert Alexander, “Bolivia”, in Needler

Suggested:
— Richard Patch, “Bolivia: U.S. Assistance in a Revolutionary Setting”, in Council on Foreign Relations, Social Change in Latin America Today, pp. 108-176

1. 1. Peru
    — Rosendo Gomez, “Peru”, in Needler
    — Allan Holmberg, “Changing Community Attitudes and Values in Peru: A Case Study in Guided Change” in Social Change (see reference under Bolivia), pp. 63-107.

1. 1. Colombia
    — J. Martz, “Colombia”, in Needler
    — A. Hirschman, Journeys Toward Progress, Chapter 2, pp. 131-214.

Suggested:
— V. L. Fluharty, Dance of the Millions, 1930-1956.
— J. D. Martz, Colombia, A Contemporary Political Survey.
— Everett Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change, Chapter 15 (on Colombia), pp. 353-385.
— UN, ECLA, Analyses and Projections of Economic Development, III. The Economic Development of Colombia (1957).

Inflation
1. Causal Theory of Inflation: Structuralists and Monetarists
  1. — Hirschman, Latin American Issues: articles by Felix and Grumwald, pp. 95-125.
  2. — Meier, Leading Issues: R. Prebisch, pp. 207-210.
2. The Effects of Inflation and How to Combat It
  1. — Meier, Leading Issues:
    ECAFE, “Inflation and Capital Formation”, pp. 170-174.
  2. — W. Baer, “Inflation and Growth in Brazil”, EDCC, October 1962, pp. 85-97.
  3. — E. Bernstein and I. Patel, “Inflation in Relation to Economic Development”, IMF Staff Papers, November 1952.
  4. — R. Campos, “Inflation and Balanced Growth” in H. Ellis, ed., Economic Development, pp. 82-103.
  5. — G. Dorrance, “The Effect of Inflation on Economic Development”, IMF Staff Papers, March 1963, pp. 1-44.
  6. — D. Felix, “A Critical Appraisal of the Monetarist-Structuralist Controversy”, in W. Baer and I. Kerstenetsky, editors, Inflation and Economic Growth, pp. 370-385. (Do not bother with the last part of the article.)

Suggested:
Other articles in the volume edited by Baer and Kerstenetsky.

Source: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003. Box 9. Folder “Economics, 1965-1966 (1 of 2)”.

_______________________

Final Examination
Economics 116

June 4, 1966
Dr. Clague

Answer four questions. Select one from each part. (Those who have written papers may select four questions either from Parts I, II, and III, or from Parts I, II, and IV.)

I.

Discuss one of the articles in the Reading Period assignment. Pick an article that you found especially interesting or significant.
Add your own comments on the issue the author discusses.
Which do you think are the most important valid arguments for tariff protection of industry in Latin American countries? Explain each argument in enough detail to make it evident that you understand it.

II.

What are the obstacles to Chile’s exporting manufacturing products? Why might such exports be important for future economic growth?
Discuss the Baran thesis in relation to Chile and Brazil in the twentieth century. To which country is it more applicable? How have political alignments affected economic growth?

III.

W. Schultz (in Transforming Traditional Agriculture) argues that peasants in traditional agriculture are thrifty, hardworking, and economically motivated. Yet they fail to adopt the new practices that would make their farms much more productive. How does he reconcile these two propositions? Do you agree?
You are an economic adviser to President Belaunde Terry of Peru. He asks you to write a memorandum on land reform policy. In particular, he wants to know what lessons, of relevance to Peru, might be drawn from the experience with land reform of Mexico, Bolivia, and Colombia.
President Belaunde is interested in the growth of Peru’s per capita income, the welfare of the peasants, and his continuance in power.

IV.

Explain how inflation could be used by the government to increase the rate of capital formation. What are the arguments against such a policy?
Consider the following two propositions:
1. 1. Inflation is inevitable in an underdeveloped country that is attempting to industrialize.
  2. It follows from (i) that monetary stabilization programs, such as those proposed by the International Monetary Fund, are doomed to failure.

To what extent do you agree with each of these statements?

Source: Harvard University Archives. Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Papers Printed for Final Examinations in History, History of Religions, Government, Economics,… June 1966.

Image Sources: Ewon Clague portrait from The First Hundred Years of the Bureau of Labor Statistics by Joseph P. Goldberg and William T. Moye. September 1985, Bulletin 2235. Senior year portrait of Christopher K. Clague in the Swarthmore yearbook Halcyon 1960.

_______________________

Father: Ewan Clague

Born Dec. 27 1896 in Prescott, Washington. He married Dorothy Vermilya Whipple on June 14, 1924 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. He died in April 12, 1987.

Ewan Clague, born in Prescott, Washington in 1896, was the sixth Bureau of Labor Statistics Commissioner. His education included the University of Washington and, after serving as an ambulance driver in World War I, the University of Wisconsin. Clague’s teacher, John R. Commons, recommended him to Commissioner Ethelbert Stewart, who hired Clague in 1926 to help develop productivity indexes. After finishing his project at the Bureau, Clague moved on to several other jobs, including working at the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, studying the effects of mill closures for the Institute of Human Relations at Yale University, and serving as director of research and professor of social research at the Pennsylvania School of Social Work. In 1936, he was hired as Associate Director of Research and Statistics of the new Social Security Board, and was subsequently promoted to Director. In 1940, he became Director of the Bureau of Employment Security. When Clague was appointed Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1946, he came to the office as a trained economist and experienced civil servant. [Retired from office on September 14, 1965 during his fifth term as Commissioner]

Source: https://www.bls.gov/bls/history/commissioners/clague.htm

Mother: Dorothy Vermilya Whipple

Born November 22, 1900 in Toledo Ohio. Died May 5, 1995 in Washington, D.C.

Speed skater at the University of Wisconsin, where she earned her B.A. and M.A. First married woman admitted to Johns Hopkins Medical School (M.D., 1929). Pediatrician. Published Our American Babies (1944). Most of the revisions in the 1942 Federal pamphlet Infant Care were prepared by her and Dr. Marian M. Crane. Syndicated weekly newspaper column on child care. Two other books: Euthenic Pediatrics and Q: Is the Grass Greener? Answers to Questions About Drugs (1971).

Obituary by David Stout in the New York Times, May 8, 1994.

Wife: Monique Françoise Weston

Born March 5, 1937 and grew up in Shaker Heights, Ohio. Graduated Shaker Heights High School, Ohio, 1955. College Junior year abroad at the London School of Economics in 1957-58. B.A. magna cum laude in Political Science at Swarthmore 1959, Phi Beta Kappa. Woodrow Wilson Fellowship for graduate study at Columbia University. Ph.D. Harvard 1969. Thesis: Heroic Leadership and Legalism: The Case of De Gaulle’s Légalité.” Professor of Education Policy, Planning, Administration at the University of Maryland [now emerita].

Tags ClagueCK, ClagueE

Exam Questions Harvard Public Finance

Harvard. Advanced Public Finance. Description, enrollment and final examination. Bullock, 1912-1913

Post author By Irwin Collier
Post date 2026-09-13

Wealth of Nations, Book V, Part II, Chapter II

Adam Smith appears in eight of the seventeen semester examination questions for Charles Jesse Bullock’s course on comparative public finance in 1912-13.

________________________

Earlier Advanced Public Finance

Links to earlier course material for advanced course in public finance from Harvard, 1905-06 through 1911-12.

_______________________

ECONOMICS 31
Course Description
1912-13

[Economics] 31 (formerly 16). Public Finance. Mon., Wed., and (at the pleasure of the instructor) Fri., at 10. Professor Bullock.

The course is devoted to the examination of the financial institutions of the principal modern countries, in the light of both theory and history. One or more reports calling for independent investigation will ordinarily be required. Special emphasis will be placed upon questions of American finance. Ability to read French or German is presupposed.

Source: Harvard University. Division of History, Government, and Economics, Courses of Instruction, 1912–13, p. 67.

_______________________

ECONOMICS 31
Course Enrollment
1912-13

[Economics] 31 (formerly 16). Professor Bullock. — Public Finance.

Total 7: 6 Graduates; 1 Junior.

Source: Harvard University. Reports of the President and the Treasurer of Harvard College, 1912-13, p. 58.

_______________________

ECONOMICS 31
Mid-year Examination
1912-13

In estimating the pressure of public expenditures what considerations need to be taken into account?
State and discuss the so-called laws of the increase of public expenditures.
Discuss critically Smith’s, Wagner’s, Cohn’s, and Seligman’s classifications of public revenues.
In what branches of expenditures may a decrease be expected either immediately or ultimately? Give reasons.
Compare the opinions of Smith and Bastable concerning revenue from domains.
Compare the opinions of Smith and Mill concerning justice in taxation.
Compare the opinions of Smith and Mill concerning the best system of taxation for Great Britain.
What is the opinion of Leroy-Beaulieu concerning the present and future of revenues from (a) domains, (b) public industries?
What is the opinion of Eheberg concerning the present and future of revenues from (a) domain, (b) public industries?

Source: Harvard University. Mid-year examinations, 1852-1943. Box 9, bound volume Examination Papers, Mid-Years 1912-13.

_______________________

ECONOMICS 31
Year-end Examination
1912-13

How far does the present British system of taxation conform to the maxims of Adam Smith?
How far does the present French system of taxation conform to Smith’s maxims?
How far does the present Prussian system of taxation conform to Smith’s maxims?
How far would the single tax on land values conform to Smith’s maxims?
Compare the general property tax in Switzerland with the same tax in the United States.
What changes in the general property tax have occurred in the United States in recent years?
Discuss fully the opinions of Leroy-Beaulieu or Eheberg concerning the income tax.
Discuss fully the opinions of Leroy-Beaulieu or Eheberg concerning the inheritance tax.

Image Source: Beginning of Chapter II, Part II of Book V of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. This is where to find Smith’s four maxims on taxation.

________________________

Earlier Advanced Public Finance Courses

1905-06. Public Finance (advanced course).
1908-09. Public Finance (advanced course).
1910-11. Public Finance (advanced course).
1911-12. Public Finance (advanced course).

Tags Bullock

Exam Questions Harvard Public Finance Suggested Reading Syllabus

Harvard. Public Investment. Description, enrollment, exam. Marglin et al. 1966-1967

Post author By Irwin Collier
Post date 2026-09-09

The scope of this interdisciplinary course from the mid-1960s is genuinely breathtaking. With his Harvard Ph.D. (1965) still fresh [Thesis: “Decentralized Resources Allocation With a Modicum of Increasing Returns.”], Stephen Marglin was on his famed meteoric rise to tenured professorship when he co-taught the following course on public investmen with political scientists and civil engineers.

For a later observation on his intellectual journey, see the brief profile article in The Harvard Crimson (14 November 2019) on “The Black Sheep of Harvard Economics” from which the image above has been clipped. He’s come a long way.

_______________________

Course Announcement

Economics 112 (formerly Government 257a). Public Investment: Techniques for Relating Economic Objectives, Engineering Analysis, and Government Planning (Offered Jointly with the Graduate School of Public Administration)

Half course (fall term). Th., 2-4, and a two-hour meeting to be arranged.
Assistant Professor S. Marglin and Professors Arthur Maass and H. A. Thomas.

New methods of economic, engineering, and governmental analysis in public investment planning. Techniques include those for converting broad community objectives into specific criteria used to design public projects. Emphasis on systems analysis.

Source: Harvard University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Courses of Instruction for Harvard and Radcliffe, 1966-1967, p. 110.

_______________________

Course Instructors

Stephen Alan Marglin (1938- ) Assistant Professor of Economics.

Arthur Aaron Maass (1917-2004), Frank G. Thomson Professor of Government.

Harold A. Thomas, Jr. (1913-2002), Gordon McKay Professor of Civil and Sanitary Engineering.

Peter P. Rogers (1937-2018) (Ph.D. in Engineering 1966) Lecturer in Systems Analysis in the Graduate School of Design and a research associate in the Center for Population Studies.

George Herman Quester (1936-2023), Instructor of Government.

Henry D. Jacoby (1935-), Harvard economics Ph.D. 1967. Instructor of Economics.

_______________________

Fall Term
1966-67

Economics 112

PUBLIC INVESTMENT: TECHNIQUES FOR RELATING ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES, ENGINEERING ANALYSIS, AND GOVERNMENT PLANNING.

Assistant Professor S. Marglin, Professors A. Maass and H. A. Thomas, Drs. P. Rogers and G. Quester, and Mr. H. Jacoby.

Course Outline

A. Formulating Public Investment Criteria			Date
1.	Introduction	SM	Sep. 29
2.	Production and the Theory of the Firm	HJ	Oct. 4
2.	Objectives: National Income and Its Distribution	SM	Oct. 6
3.	Consumption and the Theory of the Household	HJ	Oct. 11
3.	Selection of the Unit of Analysis and the Definition of Benefits and Costs	HJ	Oct. 13
4.	Intertemporal Criteria	HJ	Oct. 18
4.	Interest Rates and Uncertainty	SM	Oct. 20
5.	Markets, Economic Efficiency and Welfare	HJ	Oct. 25
5.	The Design Process: Methods of Analysis and Problems of Measurement	HJ	Oct. 27

B. Objectives of Public Investment
1.	Alternative Concepts of the Public Interest	GQ	Nov. 1
1.	Multiple Objectives in Public Investment Programs	AM	Nov. 3
2.	Concepts of Decision Making	GQ	Nov. 8
2.	The Weighting of Objectives in the Political Process	AM	Nov. 10

C. Applying Criteria in Project Design
1.	The Mathematics of Optimization	PR	Nov. 15
1.	Mathematical Models: Deterministic Models	HAT	Nov. 17
2.	The Techniques of Systems Analysis	PR	Nov. 22
	(To be announced)		Nov. 29
	Mathematical Models: Stochastic Models	HAT	Dec. 1
3.	Computation Laboratory	PR	Dec. 6
	Simulation	HAT	Dec. 8
	(To be announced)		Dec. 13

D. Summary and Conclusions

All

Dec. 15

Problem Sets

Problem set #1 is due on November 1.
Problem set #2 is due on December 1.
Problem set #3 is due on January 12.

Source: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003, Box 9, Folder “Economics, 1966-1967”.

_______________________

Fall Term
1966-67

Economics 112

PUBLIC INVESTMENT:
TECHNIQUES FOR RELATING ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES, ENGINEERING ANALYSIS, AND GOVERNMENT PLANNING.

Reading List

Recommended for purchase:

Maass, Hufschmidt, Dorfman, Thomas, Marglin, Fair, Design of Water-Resource Systems (1962).

All other readings on Reserve at Littauer or Lamont Libraries
Optional readings are starred

Readings for October 4:

P. Samuelson, Economics (4th or 5th edition), Chapters 24 & 26 (including appendices).

R. Dorfman, The Price System, Chapters 1 & 2 (1964).

Readings for October 6:

K. Boulding, “The Economist and the Engineer: Economic Dynamics of Water Resource Development,” in S. Smith and E. Castle (eds.) Economics and Public Policy in Water Resource Development (1964).

W. Heller, “Reflections on Public Expenditure Theory,” in Edmund Phelps, ed., Private Wants and Public Needs(1962).

J. Krutilla and O. Eckstein, Multiple Purpose River Development, Chapter 2 (1958).

J. Krutilla, “Welfare Aspects of Benefit-Cost Analysis,” 69 Journal of Political Economy 226-235 (1961).

S. Marglin, Public Investment Criteria, pp. 1-36 (1965).

Readings for October 11:

R. Dorfman, The Price System, Chapter 3 (1964).

T. Scitovsky, Welfare and Competition, Chapter IV, pp. 51-65 (1951).

Readings for October 13:

S. Marglin, Public Investment Criteria, pp. 37-46, 91-100 (1965).

R. Haveman, Water Resource Investment and the Public Interest, Chapters 3, 4, 5 (1965).

J. Tinbergen, The Design of Development, pp. 36-41, 76-87 (1958).

*Maass, Hufschmidt, et. al., Design of Water-Resource Systems, pp. 40-87 (1962).

Readings for October 18:

P. Samuelson, Economics (4th or 5th edition), Chapter 29 (including appendix).

I. Fisher, The Theory of Interest, Chapters V & VI (1930).

H. Bierman and S. Smidt, The Capital Budgeting Decision, Chapters 2 & 3 (1960).

Readings for October 20:

S. Marglin, Public Investment Criteria, pp. 46-77 (1965).

J. Krutilla and O. Eckstein, Multiple Purpose River Development, Chapter 2, pp. 32-40, and Chapter 4 (1958).

R. McKean, Efficiency in Government Through Systems Analysis, Chapter 4 (1958).

Maass, Hufschmidt, et. al., Design of Water-Resource Systems, pp. 129-158 (1962).

J. Hirshleifer, “Efficient Allocation of Capital in an Uncertain World,” 54 AER 77-85 (1964), and comment by P. Samuelson, 95-96.

*J. Hirshleifer, “Investment Decision Under Uncertainty — Choice-Theoretic Approaches,” 79 QJE 509-536 (1965).

*J. Hirshleifer, “Investment Decisions Under Uncertainty: Applications of the State-Preference Approach,” 80 QJE 252-277 (1966).

Readings for October 25:

P. Samuelson, Economics (4th or 5th edition), pp. 678-689.

R. Dorfman, The Price System, Chapters 4-6 (1964).

J. Graaff, Theoretical Welfare Economics, Chapters 1-3 (1957).

Readings for October 27:

Maass, Hufschmidt, et. al., Design of Water-Resource Systems, Chapter 3, pp. 88-118, and Chapter 5 (1962).

J. Rothenberg, “Urban Renewal Programs” in R. Dorfman, ed., Measuring Benefits of Government Investments(1965). Also skim the other articles in this collection.

Readings for November 1:

C. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy, Chapter 14.

R. Dahl and C. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, pp. 25-56.

A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, pp. 3-74, 279-300.

Madison, The Federalist, No. 10.

D. Truman, The Governmental Process, Chapters 1, 2, 12 & 16.

Readings for November 3:

Maass, “Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevance to Public Investment Decisions,” 80 QJE 208-226 (1966). Readpp. 208-218.

R. Musgrave, “The Public Interest: Efficiency in the Creation and Maintenance of Material Welfare,” Chapter 9 in Nomos 5: The Public Interest, C. Friedrich, ed. (1962).

G. Colm, “The Public Interest: Essential Key to Public Policy,” Chapter 10 in Nomos 5 (1962).

Maass, Hufschmidt, et. al., Design of Water-Resource Systems, Chapter 15 (1962).

C. Lindblom, “Decision-Making in Taxation and Expenditures” and Comments by A. Bergson and G. Colm, in Public Finances: Needs, Sources and Utilization (NBER Conference) pp. 295-336 (1961).

Readings for November 8:

R. Dahl and C. Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare, pp. 57-88, 294-368.

A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, pp. 114-163, 260-276.

E. Banfield, Political Influence, Chapter 12.

Readings for November 10:

A. Maass, “Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevance to Public Investment Decisions,” 80 QJE 208-226. Read pp. 218-226.

D. Major, Decision Making for Public Investment in Water Resources Development, Chapters 2 & 6 (1965).

S. Dola, Passaic Valley Flood Control, mimeo (1965).

Readings for November 15:

R. Dorfman, “Mathematical or ‘Linear’ Programming: A Non-Mathematical Exposition,” 43 AER 797-825 (1953).

G. Hadley, Linear Programming, Chapter 1, pp. 1-21 (1962).

S. Gass, Linear Programming (2nd edition), Chapter 1, pp. 3-19 (1964).

*J. Henderson and R. Quandt, Microeconomic Theory, Appendices A2 & A3 (1958).

*P. Rogers, “A Note on Maximization,” mimeo (1964).

Readings for November 17:

H. A. Thomas and R. Revelle, “On the Efficient Use of High Aswan Dam for Hydropower and Irrigation,” in Management Science, Vol. 12, No. 8 (1966).

R. Dorfman, “Mathematical Analysis: Design of the Simple Valley Project,” in G. S. Tolley and F. E. Riggs (eds.) Economics of Watershed Planning (1960).

D. Kendrick, “Programming Investment with Interdependent Projects,” Center for International Studies, M.I.T., mimeo, pp. 1-16 (Jan. 1966).

Readings for November 22:

Maass, Hufschmidt, et. al., Design of Water-Resource Systems, Chapter 3, re-read pp. 129-158, and Chapter 12 (1962).

J. Kemeny and J. Snell, Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences, Appendix C, pp. 128-131.

*G. Hadley, Nonlinear and Dynamic Programming, Chapter 10, pp. 350-375 (1964).

*J.D.C. Little, “The Use of Water Storage in a Hydroelectric System,” J. Oper. Res. Soc. Am. 187 (1955).

*P. Massé, Optimal Investment Decisions, Chapter 7, pp. 320-335 (1962).

Readings for December 1:

Maass, Hufschmidt, et. al., Design of Water-Resource Systems, Chapter 13, pp. 524-539, and Chapter 14 (1962).

M. B. Fiering, “The Nature of the Storage-Yield Relationship,” Symposium on Streamflow Regulation for Quality Control, U.S.D.H.E.W., pp. 243-253 (June 1965).

Readings for December 6:

R. Fano and F. Corbató, “Time Sharing on Computers,” in Scientific American, Sept. 1966, pp. 128-148. Also flip through other articles in this issue.

Readings for December 18:

Maass, Hufschmidt, et. al., Design of Water-Resource Systems, Chapter 10 (1962).

G. Orcutt, “Simulation: A Symposium,” 50 AER 893-907 (1960).

G. Orcutt et. al., Microanalysis of Socioeconomic Systems, Chapters 1, 2 & 14 (1961).

M. Hufschmidt and M. B Fiering, Simulation Techniques for Design of Water-Resource Systems, Chapter 2 (1966).

Source: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003, Box 9, Folder “Economics, 1966-1967”.

_______________________

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Department of Economics

Final Examination
Economics 112

February 1, 1967

Answer any four of the following six questions. All questions are of equal weight. Please place each of your answers in a separate bluebook, and put your name on the cover of each book.

“If lump sum transfers were administratively feasible, governments would be well advised to plan all investments to maximize profits, counting profits in the same way that private enterprise does.”
Comment in the light of income redistribution and merit-want objectives, market imperfections (such as monopoly) and other considerations you think relevant.

“If the government’s social rate of interest based on time preference differs from the marginal productivity of investment in the private sector, it is wrong to use the social rate of interest to plan public investment. The error arises from the fact that using the social rate of interest precludes the government from taking into account the value of private alternatives to public investment.”
Comment.

The problem is to compare and evaluate two ways of designing and authorizing public works projects:

(1) There are no useful legislated standards, so that engineers must use their engineering judgment for design. Projects so designed are then considered by policy makers (President and Congress) for inclusion in omnibus authorizing bills.

(2) Policy makers initiate, debate, and adopt standards for design of projects. Engineers design them, and any projects that conform to the standards are considered to be authorized.

Assume that partisan mutual adjustment is the criterion for comparing and evaluating the two design methods — i.e., that “bargaining is at the heart of the governmental process.” Compare and evaluate the design methods using the criterion given.

Evaluate the utility of partisan mutual adjustment as the evaluative criterion for this specific problem.

Economists assume that the individual behaves selfishly on issues relevant to his monetary income; yet they ask political scientists to define an explicit public interest function as if such a function were of more than academic significance for participants in the legislative process.Is this inconsistent, or is there some political value to specifying an explicit public interest to be contrasted with the personal preferences of individuals?

“Simulation methods are more useful for the planning of large scale public investment projects than the analytic methods of mathematical programming.”
Discuss this statement and give your reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with it.

The following simple model of a water resource system involves two reservoirs and two uses.One use is for domestic water supply for which no monetary benefit function is available but a water requirement is specified; the other use is one for which there is a direct market value.

The two reservoirs are shown in the sketch together with outflow vectors. The outflow from Reservoir A can only be used for meeting the water supply requirement. The outflow from Reservoir B can be routed to either or both uses. All flows are assumed to be non-stochastic. The following cost and benefit functions are assumed:

cost function for reservoir A C₁ = a+x² dollars,

cost function for reservoir B C₂ = b+½(y+z)² dollars,

benefit function for other use B = pz dollars,

where

x = safe yield of reservoir A,

y = portion of safe yield of reservoir B diverted to municipal supply,

z = portion of safe yield of reservoir B diverted to other use,

p = price per unit of flow to other use, and

a,b = the given constants.

The municipal water requirement is

R = x+y .

The problem is to find the sizes of x, y and z which maximize the net economic benefits of the system subject to the water supply constraint. Write the Lagrangean function for the constrained optimization and indicate how you could find the optimal design of the system and the marginal imputed value of municipal water supply.

Would the design be different if we merely asked for a least cost design?

Source: Harvard University Archives. Papers Printed for Mid-Year Examinations. History, History of Religions, Government, Economics, …. January 1967.

Tags JacobyHD, Marglin

GENERAL EXAMINATION IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY FALL 1993

GENERAL EXAMINATION IN MACROECONOMIC THEORY FALL 1993

Meet the Visiting Committee of the M.I.T. Corporation

Chairman. William Cameron Forbes (1870-1959).

James Franklin McElwain (1874-1958).

Franklin Thomas Miller (1873-1940).

Walter Dexter Humphreys (1874-1970).

Frank Arthur Vanderlip (1864-1937).

Lester Durand Gardner (1876-1956).

Julian Laurence Holley

14.145 Economics of Uncertainty P. A. Diamond and E. S. Maskin

Fall 1978

Reading List

I. Individual Choice (Static)

II. Equilibrium (Traditional)

III. Adverse Selection: Signalling and Screening

IV. Moral Hazard

V. Information

VI. Individual Choice (Sequential)

Instructors of Political Economy (Undergraduate)

UNDERGRADUATE COURSES

Political Economy 1.

Political Economy 2.

Political Economy 3.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

Program (a):

Program (b):

Carver’s Earlier Courses on Agricultural Economics

ECONOMICS 32 Course Description 1912-13

ECONOMICS 32 Course Enrollment 1912-13

ECONOMICS 32 Year-end Examination 1912-13

Earlier material

Christopher Karran Clague

Economic 116. The Economy of Latin America

Dr. Christopher Clague Harvard University

Final Examination Economics 116

June 4, 1966 Dr. Clague

I.

II.

III.

IV.

Father: Ewan Clague

Mother: Dorothy Vermilya Whipple

Wife: Monique Françoise Weston

Earlier Advanced Public Finance

ECONOMICS 31 Course Description 1912-13

ECONOMICS 31 Course Enrollment 1912-13

ECONOMICS 31 Mid-year Examination 1912-13

ECONOMICS 31 Year-end Examination 1912-13

Earlier Advanced Public Finance Courses

Course Announcement

Course Instructors

Fall Term 1966-67

Economics 112

PUBLIC INVESTMENT: TECHNIQUES FOR RELATING ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES, ENGINEERING ANALYSIS, AND GOVERNMENT PLANNING.

Course Outline

Problem Sets

Fall Term 1966-67

Economics 112

PUBLIC INVESTMENT: TECHNIQUES FOR RELATING ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES, ENGINEERING ANALYSIS, AND GOVERNMENT PLANNING.

Reading List

HARVARD UNIVERSITY Department of Economics

Final Examination Economics 112

February 1, 1967

GENERAL EXAMINATION
IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY
FALL 1993

GENERAL EXAMINATION
IN MACROECONOMIC THEORY
FALL 1993

14.145 Economics of Uncertainty
P. A. Diamond and E. S. Maskin

Instructors of Political Economy
(Undergraduate)

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

Carver’s Earlier Courses
on Agricultural Economics

ECONOMICS 32
Course Description
1912-13

ECONOMICS 32
Course Enrollment
1912-13

ECONOMICS 32
Year-end Examination
1912-13

Economic 116.
The Economy of Latin America

Dr. Christopher Clague
Harvard University

Final Examination
Economics 116

June 4, 1966
Dr. Clague

ECONOMICS 31
Course Description
1912-13

ECONOMICS 31
Course Enrollment
1912-13

ECONOMICS 31
Mid-year Examination
1912-13

ECONOMICS 31
Year-end Examination
1912-13

Fall Term
1966-67

Fall Term
1966-67

PUBLIC INVESTMENT:
TECHNIQUES FOR RELATING ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES, ENGINEERING ANALYSIS, AND GOVERNMENT PLANNING.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Department of Economics

Final Examination
Economics 112